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Arakhin 2 for kids: Who Does Everyone Include?

ערכין ב׳

🔎 The mishna discusses promises to give the Temple treasury either a value set by the Torah or a person’s assessed value. The Gemara keeps asking: when a teaching says “everyone,” who else does it include?

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Stories from Arakhin 2

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Arakhin 2 in simple English

Rashi on Arakhin 2a, in English Tab translation (20)
  1. Mishnah: Everyone takes vows of valuation — The fixed valuations are written in the Torah passage. By contrast, someone who vows, “My monetary value is upon me,” is assessed as though he were a slave sold in the market.
  2. Take vows of valuation — If someone says, “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me,” he pays that person’s fixed valuation according to the person’s age, as prescribed in the passage on valuations.
  3. Are valuated — This applies if someone says, “My valuation is upon me,” or another person says of him, “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me.”
  4. Vow monetary assessments — Someone says, “The monetary value of so-and-so is upon me.”
  5. Are the object of monetary vows — Someone says, “My monetary value is upon me,” or another person says of him, “The monetary value of so-and-so is upon me.”
  6. Women and slaves — They pay later, when the woman is divorced or the slave is freed.
  7. A tumtum and a hermaphrodite can vow monetary assessments and be the object of such vows — They have a monetary value.
  8. Can take vows of valuation — They can value others: if they say, “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me,” they pay that person’s fixed valuation.
  9. But they cannot be valuated — If either says, “My valuation is upon me,” or someone else says of either, “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me,” the statement has no effect. The Torah passage gives valuations for males and females, but not for them.
  10. Gemara: A discerning minor nearing adulthood — This is someone twelve years and one day old, nearing adulthood but not yet an adult until he develops two pubic hairs. He is called “discerning” because he is examined to see whether he understands to whom he made his vow or dedicated an item, as taught in tractate Niddah.
  11. What does ‘are valuated’ add? — That is, since “everyone” applies to the entire mishnah, including “are valuated,” what does it add here?
  12. ‘A vow … according to your valuation’ is written — The verse links fixed valuations to monetary assessments. A repulsive person or someone afflicted with boils has no monetary value: they can make monetary vows concerning others, but cannot be the object of such vows.
  13. ‘Persons’ — This includes anyone who is a living person. All the cases raised as objections are stated explicitly in the mishnah.
  14. It teaches the rule and then explains it — The Gemara could likewise have chosen one of the other cases, but chose one of several. Alternatively, it chose this case because Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree later in this chapter about one who vows the fixed valuation of a child less than a month old. Rabbi Meir says he pays the child’s monetary value: he knows there is no fixed valuation at that age and therefore meant a monetary assessment. The Sages say his statement has no effect. The mishnah states the rule generally at the outset to teach, through its apparently extra wording, that even the Sages agree he pays if he explicitly says, “The child’s monetary value is upon me.” This explanation is from our teacher.
  15. An heir — His father set aside an offering but died before bringing it.
  16. ‘His offering’ — In Leviticus, “his offering” is written three times concerning placing hands on a peace offering. Rabbi Yehuda interprets one occurrence to mean: his own offering, not his father’s offering.
  17. The beginning of consecration — Substitution, by which this animal first becomes consecrated.
  18. The end of consecration — Placing hands on the offering, which takes place shortly before slaughter.
  19. All joint owners — If five people bring one offering in partnership, all must place their hands on it; one cannot do so on behalf of the others.
  20. He does not accept this — He holds that one partner may place hands on behalf of them all. This is not considered placing hands on someone else’s offering, since he also has a share in it.
Tosafot on Arakhin 2a, in English Tab translation (16)
  1. Mishna: Everyone takes vows of valuation — In Nazir and Nedarim, the mishnayot mention substitute expressions so that people will not say God’s name needlessly, as explained there. Here there was no such concern, because people did not say God’s name when making valuation vows. A valuation is the fixed amount written in the Torah. For a vow to give a person’s worth, one says, “I undertake to give my value,” and the person is appraised like a slave sold in the market.
  2. Take vows of valuation — If someone says of a person in the marketplace, “I undertake to give so-and-so’s valuation,” he pays the amount set out in the Torah’s valuation passage, according to that person’s age.
  3. Are valuated — This applies if someone says, “I undertake to give my valuation,” or another person says, “I undertake to give so-and-so’s valuation.”
  4. Women and slaves — Rashi explains that they pay later, when the woman is divorced or the slave is freed. Alternatively, someone may have given them property on condition that the husband or master has no rights to it. Even if they have no property, the obligation takes effect immediately, as the Tosefta teaches: Women and slaves can make vows and be the subject of vows. If they have property now, payment is collected now; otherwise, the obligation is recorded and collected later. Although a slave has the status of a woman regarding commandments, his Torah valuation is the male amount. No tanna ever says that his valuation is the female amount.
  5. A tumtum and a hermaphrodite vow and are the object of vows — They have a market value. They can also take vows of valuation for others: if one says, “I undertake to give so-and-so’s valuation,” he pays that person’s valuation. But they themselves are not valuated. If someone says of either of them, “I undertake to give this person’s valuation,” the vow has no effect, because the Torah’s valuation passage specifies male and female. This is Rashi’s explanation.
  6. A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor — This implies that a deaf-mute has market value. But Bava Kamma says that someone who causes another person to become deaf must pay his entire value. That refers to deafness that cannot be cured. Alternatively, Rabbeinu Tam explains that a person born deaf has market value.
  7. A discerning minor close to adulthood — This is a child aged twelve years and one day, close to adulthood but not yet an adult until thirteen years and one day. He is called ‘discerning’ because he is questioned to see whether he can distinguish and explain to whom he made his vow or consecration, as taught in Niddah.
  8. ‘Are valuated’—what does it include? — In other words, what does ‘everyone’ add to the rule that people are valuated? The word ‘everyone’ applies to the whole mishna.
  9. To include a repulsive man and one afflicted with boils — This inclusion apparently applies to the slaves mentioned in the mishna too. But Gittin raises a question about a slave whose master sells the right to collect a penalty for injury to him; that suggests the slave has market value. We can answer that this case concerns a person with an injury that makes him a tereifa, one expected to die from it. One might ask: Since ‘persons’ includes him, should someone who kills him be liable? After all, that is the reason Niddah includes one who kills a one-day-old baby, even though the baby might not be viable. The answer is that the teaching in Sifra applies to a baby carried to full term; Niddah also gives this explanation according to Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel.
  10. A vow of persons according to your valuation — This suggests a link between valuations and market-value vows. A repulsive man or one afflicted with boils can make a vow concerning someone else, but cannot be the subject of a market-value vow, because he is worth nothing.
  11. Anyone subject to market-value vows is valuated — This is not meant literally, since a palm tree or land can have a market value. It means any person subject to market-value vows.
  12. His offering — Rashi explains that three instances of ‘his offering’ appear in Leviticus in connection with laying hands on an offering, and Rabbi Yehuda interprets one to mean ‘his offering,’ not his father’s. But Rashi overlooked that there are only two there. Perhaps he counts ‘on its head,’ which is written there, as equivalent to ‘his offering’; alternatively, Rabbi Yehuda derives the rule from another occurrence of ‘his offering.’
  13. The initial stage of consecration — Substitution begins the consecration of the substitute animal; laying hands on an offering is the final stage, close to slaughter. This is Rashi’s explanation. Bava Metzia calls substitution a final stage of consecration because it follows the consecration of the original offering. One might ask whether slaughter too should be derived from laying hands, so that an heir could not slaughter the offering. That does not follow: even an agent is permitted to slaughter it.
  14. His offering, not another person’s offering — One might ask: Menahot derives from ‘he shall lay his hand’ that an agent may not lay hands on the offering. All the more so, surely, another person may not; why is ‘his offering’ needed? Without ‘his offering,’ we might have understood ‘his hand’ to exclude another person but permit his agent. One might also ask why this does not teach that an agent can never act on someone’s behalf, contrary to the rule derived in Kiddushin. The answer is that laying hands, levirate marriage, and the heifer whose neck is broken each have a verse excluding an agent: for levirate marriage, ‘they shall call him’ means they themselves, not their agents; likewise, for the heifer, ‘they shall measure’ means they themselves, not their agents. One might then ask whether the need for these exclusions proves that agents can act everywhere else. But without the verses in Kiddushin teaching that an agent can act on another’s behalf, we would have read these three verses as teaching something else.
  15. All joint owners — When five people bring an offering together, each must lay hands on it. One cannot lay hands on behalf of them all.
  16. He does not accept this rule — He holds that one joint owner may lay hands on behalf of all, since he too has a share in the offering; this is Rashi’s explanation. Menahot supports this: If waving an offering, which applies to those who slaughter it, is nevertheless limited for joint owners, should laying hands, which does not apply to those who slaughter it, not certainly be limited for joint owners? The verse says ‘his offering’ to include them all. Thus, one who does not interpret ‘his offering’ that way derives the rule from waving, for the mishna there teaches that one person waves on behalf of all.
Rashi on Arakhin 2b, in English Tab translation (13)
  1. A gentile and another person — An Israelite does not place hands on a gentile’s offering or on the offering of another Israelite.
  2. They are derived from one verse — Neither offering is his own. But his father’s offering requires a separate verse, since one might think it counts as his own because he inherited it.
  3. The entire matter — The laws of substitution.
  4. How do we ultimately come to include — What is the basis for including a woman, so that if she substitutes an animal for her offering, the substitution takes effect?
  5. A minor who does not need his mother — Tractate Sukka explains that he wakes from sleep and does not call for his mother.
  6. One who is half-slave — A full slave is exempt, for the verse says, “before the Lord, the Master”: this applies to one who has no master other than Him.
  7. And according to Ravina, who said — Ravina says this in the first chapter of tractate Ḥagiga, deriving it from the end of the mishna there, which says, “slaves who have not been freed.”
  8. Lame — He is exempt from appearing at the Temple, for the verse speaks of going there “on foot,” excluding those who need wooden leg supports.
  9. This works well according to the one who says — In the first chapter of tractate Ḥagiga, one opinion explains the permission to bring a Festival offering throughout the Festival by saying that all seven days make up for one another: the second can make up for the first, and the third for the second. Thus each day has its own standing, and someone who was unable to appear on the first day but is able on the second may be obligated.
  10. The later days make up for the first — Someone who was eligible and obligated to bring an offering on the first day but failed to do so may bring it during the seven days. But someone who was not eligible on the first day does not become obligated later, since the remaining days only make up for the first. What, then, can be said?
  11. Shall see; shall appear — The word is written to mean “shall see” but read to mean “shall appear.” Just as the Holy One, blessed be He, comes to see you with both eyes, so you come to appear before Him able to see Him with both of your eyes.
  12. According to the initial version of the mishna — Before Beit Hillel conceded, the half-slave was regarded as a slave. But after they conceded, he is considered free, since we can free him: his master no longer has authority over him, and he is not considered to have another master.
  13. Who has reached the age for training — The opinions differ in the last chapter of tractate Yoma: one says eight or nine years old, and another says nine or ten. At that age, a child is trained to fast for part of the day.
Tosafot on Arakhin 2b, in English Tab translation (16)
  1. A gentile and another person are excluded by one verse — Neither a gentile’s offering nor another person’s offering is the Israelite’s own, so one mention of “his offering” excludes both from placing hands. An inherited offering needs a separate exclusion, since one might think it counts as the heir’s own. One might also have thought that a priest could place hands on someone else’s offering, as a priest offers sacrifices that are not his own, or on a gentile’s offering, for which libations are supplied from communal funds. The verse rules out placing hands when the offering is not one’s own.
  2. To include a woman — If a woman substitutes another animal for her offering, the substitution takes effect. Although the Torah generally uses masculine language and women are included in its penalties, substitution requires an explicit verse to include them, as explained in tractate Temura.
  3. And Rabbi Yehuda does not interpret “and if” — He does not derive a teaching from the extra “and,” as explained in tractate Temura.
  4. Who does not need his mother — Tractate Sukka defines this as a child who wakes up and does not call for his mother.
  5. Everyone is obligated in ritual fringes — This applies when they have a four-cornered garment; they need not buy one. That remains true whether the obligation rests on the garment or on the person. The difference between those views concerns a garment kept in storage. An angel challenged Rav Ketina for wearing garments that avoided fringes and said that neglect of a positive commandment can be punished in a time of divine anger. That concerned a time when garments generally had four corners, so changing one’s clothing to avoid fringes was blameworthy. Today, when most garments do not require fringes, one is not punished for failing to buy a four-cornered garment.
  6. Who knows how to wrap himself — Tractate Moed Katan describes proper wrapping as covering oneself in the manner of the Ishmaelites, up to the upper lip. Rabbi Yosef Tov Elem wrote that one fringe should hang in front and one behind on the right, and likewise on the left.
  7. Who knows how to wrap himself — If fringes are an obligation of the garment, why would a child’s ability matter when he owns such a garment? Garments kept in storage are obligated only when their owner is obligated and knows how to wrap himself. Halakhot Gedolot rules that fringes are an obligation of the person, as indicated by the blessing, “to wrap oneself in fringes.”
  8. His father buys him phylacteries — The teaching about fringes does not say “buys,” since a child presumably already has a garment. A child can use his father’s lulav, whereas phylacteries are expensive and must be bought for him.
  9. Everyone is obligated to appear — Rashi explains this as appearing in the Temple courtyard. The Jerusalem Talmud says the exemption applies to the offering, but even young children must appear in the courtyard, citing the command to assemble women and children. That citation is only a scriptural allusion: appearance is not the same as assembly, since the verse “your males” excludes women from appearance. The mishna appears to mean appearance with an offering, as its nearby ruling sets the offering’s minimum value at two silver coins.
  10. One who is half-slave — A full slave is exempt because the verse says to appear before “the Lord God”: the obligation applies to one who has no other master. Although the mishna later exempts slaves who are not fully freed, its opening follows the later ruling that a half-slave must be freed. Its clauses can reflect rulings from different stages, as we find elsewhere.
  11. And according to Ravina, who said — In tractate Hagiga, Ravina derives this from the mishna’s exemption of slaves who are not fully freed. It also exempts a lame person from appearance: the verse speaks of coming on foot, excluding one who needs supports to walk.
  12. This works according to the one who says — Tractate Hagiga says one may bring the Festival offering throughout the Festival because its seven days make up for one another: the second day can make up for the first, and the third for the second. Each day therefore has its own standing, so someone who became fit to appear on the second day can be obligated then.
  13. The remaining days make up for the first — Someone who was fit and obligated to bring the offering on the first day may do so throughout the seven days. But someone who was not fit on the first day never became obligated; the later days merely make up for that first day. What, then, does the general statement include?
  14. According to the initial version of the mishna — Before Beit Hillel accepted the later ruling, a half-slave was treated as a slave. After they agreed that he must be freed, he is considered free for this purpose: his master cannot keep him from going up to the Festival to work for him. Although tractate Gittin asks whether someone awaiting a document of emancipation still has a master for purposes of a fine, the cases differ. His owner is still called his master, but cannot prevent his pilgrimage.
  15. Who has reached the age for education — Tractate Yoma gives differing ages for beginning a child’s training: six, eight, nine, or ten. But that discussion concerns fasting. For other commandments, readiness depends on the particular commandment, as with lulav, sukka, and phylacteries above.
  16. We do not stop children from blowing the shofar — Tractate Rosh Hashana asks why this teaching merely says not to stop them, while another says to practice with them so they learn, even on Shabbat. It answers that we actively practice with a child old enough for education in shofar blowing, but merely do not stop a younger child. Why say even that, when a court generally need not stop a child from violating a prohibition? It can mean a child old enough to be trained in keeping Shabbat but not yet ready for shofar blowing. That makes the ruling somewhat novel.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Arachin, Erchin 2.