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Arakhin 5 for kids: What Does a Vow Mean?

ערכין ה׳

📜 This daf asks what becomes sacred when someone names just one part of an animal. It also explores vows about a baby’s value and who can make a fixed-value vow.

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Stories from Arakhin 5

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Arakhin 5 in simple English

Rashi on Arakhin 5a, in English Tab translation (23)
  1. It should be sold to someone who needs a burnt offering, and its proceeds are non-sacred — because he did not consecrate the animal itself.
  2. Except for the value of the limb — He receives no payment for that limb. Since it has inherent sanctity, he may not sell it; if he does, the sale does not take effect, for the limb remains his burnt offering. Because the unblemished limb cannot become non-sacred, its sanctity does not transfer to the money. One might ask: How can the buyer offer an animal missing a limb that belongs to him? The first chapter of Temurah raises this question and answers that the buyer says, ‘I undertake to bring this living animal as a burnt offering.’
  3. And even according to the one who says otherwise — As explained at the end of the first chapter of Temurah, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree only about a part on which the animal’s life does not depend, such as the leg below the knee.
  4. The correct reading is ‘It is not difficult’ — The text should not include ‘Rather.’
  5. This concerns inherent sanctity — The teaching that sanctity extends to the whole animal concerns one who consecrated its head for sacrifice, saying, ‘I will offer the head of this animal as a burnt offering.’ The earlier teaching, that only the cow’s head is consecrated, concerns one who consecrated its value, saying, ‘I undertake to give the value of this animal’s head for a burnt offering.’ That is like the cases of a slave and a donkey, which cannot themselves be consecrated for sacrifice.
  6. But was it not you, Master, who said — In the first chapter of Temurah, you said that if someone consecrates a male ram fit for a burnt offering for its value, it acquires inherent sanctity and is itself offered. Since sanctity attaches to its value, inherent sanctity attaches too, because it is fit for sacrifice. So too, if he designates the value of a cow’s head for a burnt offering, the cow should acquire inherent sanctity, and sanctity should extend to all of it.
  7. This is where he consecrated the whole animal — If he consecrated the whole animal for its value, it acquires inherent sanctity, because only one further step is needed.
  8. That is where he consecrated one limb — Here he designated the value of the cow’s head for a burnt offering. We do not say both that consecrating one limb consecrates the whole animal and that consecrating its value gives it inherent sanctity. We do not combine two such steps.
  9. You, Master, also raised a question about a limb — At the end of the first chapter of Temurah.
  10. If one consecrated a limb for its value, what is the law? — Does the whole animal acquire inherent sanctity? Perhaps the limb acquires inherent sanctity because its value was consecrated, and then sanctity extends from the limb to the whole animal. Or perhaps we do not combine those two steps. If your explanation is correct, you could resolve the question from this teaching, which says that only the head is consecrated, even though the head was designated for its value toward an altar offering.
  11. In the case of an unblemished animal — There is reason to think it might acquire inherent sanctity, since it is fit for sacrifice. The teaching that plainly says the whole animal is not consecrated concerns a blemished animal, like the slave and donkey mentioned alongside it, which are not fit for sacrifice.
  12. ‘The value of my head for the altar’: Is he assessed according to the significance of the part, or not? — If so, he would pay half his value. A human being is certainly unfit for the altar, yet this remains a question. Why not resolve it from the teaching that he is not assessed that way?
  13. Do we say, ‘We have not found’ — We have not found a vow anywhere that is not assessed according to the significance of the specified part? Or do we say that we have not found such an assessment for the altar?
  14. Assessed according to his means — In a vow or voluntary pledge of this kind.
  15. If one consecrated an ancestral field — For the value of a burnt offering.
  16. What is the law? — How does he redeem it if he wishes to? Had he consecrated it for Temple upkeep, he would redeem a field sown with a homer of barley for fifty silver shekels, as Scripture prescribes, even if it were worth a thousand zuz.
  17. An ancestral field that is redeemed — Scripture discusses such a field only when it is consecrated for Temple upkeep, since unspecified consecrations are for Temple upkeep. So perhaps even when he expressly consecrates it for the altar, he redeems it at that fixed rate. Or perhaps altar consecrations are redeemed at market value: Scripture discusses altar consecrations only in connection with animals and sets no fixed redemption price for them if they become blemished. The question remains unresolved.
  18. Mishnah: One younger than a month can be the subject of a pledge of value — If someone else says, ‘I undertake to pay his value,’ the pledge applies, since even an infant has some market value.
  19. But he cannot be the subject of a fixed valuation — The passage in Scripture specifies only those aged one month or older.
  20. Gemara: He pays its value — The price it would fetch in the market.
  21. This follows Rabbi Meir — He says a person does not speak to no purpose. Knowing that the fixed valuations apply to people, not vessels, the speaker must have meant the vessel’s market value.
  22. Obviously this follows Rabbi Meir — Why was it necessary to identify whose view it follows?
  23. There — In the case of one younger than a month, the Rabbis exempt him because he may have thought an infant had a fixed valuation like a month-old child. Even if people do not speak to no purpose, that principle applies only when they know their words would otherwise have no effect. Here his pledge was mistaken, and he did not pledge the child’s market value. One might therefore think the Rabbis would require payment for a vessel. The teaching clarifies that this is Rabbi Meir’s view, not theirs: the Rabbis hold that a person may speak to no purpose even when he knows his words have no effect.
Tosafot on Arakhin 5a, in English Tab translation (6)
  1. It should be sold to someone who needs a burnt offering — How can the buyer offer an animal missing a limb that does not belong to him? The first chapter of Temurah answers that he undertook to bring a burnt offering “as it can live”—even if its leg has been cut off below the knee. Why not instead say that the owner consecrated the leg to fulfill someone else’s obligation to bring a burnt offering, like the undertaking in the first chapter of Hullin to provide bread for someone else’s thanksgiving offering? That explanation fits the wording of an amora’s statement, but not the wording of this baraita.
  2. But wasn’t it you, Master, who said that consecrating a male animal for its value makes it inherently sacred? — This suggests that the text should read “Rabba,” since Abaye would not call his colleague Rava “Master.” Rabbi Yosef did call his student Abaye “Master” in Zevahim, but that case is different: Abaye understood what others had not.
  3. Rabba asked about the value of his head for the altar … and the question remained unresolved — This was before they heard the baraita cited above, as the Gemara concludes.
  4. The value of my head for the altar — It requires examination why the Gemara does not say “the fixed valuation of my head for the altar,” as it does in the next question.
  5. Rava asked: My fixed valuation is incumbent upon me for the altar — If all the questions are attributed to Rabba, they can be read as successive questions, each assuming a possible answer to the preceding one, as above.
  6. A person knows that there is no fixed valuation for a child less than a month old — Even if he does not know, his intention follows the meaning the Sages assigned to his words. But why is this different from Pesahim, which says that someone who meant to say “terumah” but said “tithe,” or meant “tithe” but said “terumah,” has said nothing? One answer is that his spoken words have no effect, but what he intended in his heart remains valid. Alternatively, that case is different: he did not want what he said aloud, and he was mistaken about what he had in mind.
Rashi on Arakhin 5b, in English Tab translation (23)
  1. And for Rabbi Meir, why was it necessary? — Since Rav spoke according to Rabbi Meir rather than the Rabbis, why did he need to say that the person pays its value? Rabbi Meir obligates payment even for a child under a month old, where the person might mistakenly think the child has a fixed valuation. Surely he would obligate payment for a utensil, which everyone knows has no fixed valuation.
  2. He pays its value — A person knows that consecration cannot take effect on property he does not own, so he meant to pledge its monetary value.
  3. Let it be consecrated now, and I will offer it — He means to offer the animal after buying it. On this reading, he mistakenly intended to consecrate the animal itself, not to pledge its value. He would therefore owe nothing: the consecration cannot take effect on the animal, and he did not intend to pledge money.
  4. This teaches us — We do not assume that he made that mistake. He knows that his consecration cannot take effect on the animal itself, so he intended to pledge its value.
  5. And this is when he says, ‘It is incumbent upon me’ — If he says, ‘It is incumbent upon me to offer the value of this animal belonging to another,’ he pays its value. He did not pledge the animal itself, but did undertake to pay its value.
  6. But if he says, ‘This’ — If he does not say ‘It is incumbent upon me,’ but says, ‘This animal is a burnt offering,’ his statement has no effect.
  7. Mishnah: A gentile can be valuated — If a Jew says, ‘This gentile’s fixed valuation is incumbent upon me,’ he pays the amount set for a gentile of that age.
  8. But cannot make a vow of valuation — If a gentile says, ‘My fixed valuation is incumbent upon me,’ or ‘Someone else’s fixed valuation is incumbent upon me,’ his statement has no effect.
  9. Rabbi Yehuda says he can make a vow of valuation — For example, a gentile says of a Jew, ‘His fixed valuation is incumbent upon me.’
  10. But cannot be valuated — If a gentile says, ‘My fixed valuation is incumbent upon me,’ there is no fixed valuation for him. Likewise, if a Jew says, ‘This gentile’s fixed valuation is incumbent upon me,’ his statement has no effect.
  11. Gemara: ‘A man’ — The term includes anyone.
  12. Rabbi Meir’s ruling is plausible — Gentiles cannot make vows of valuation.
  13. But his reasoning is not plausible — He bases it on a deaf-mute, a person lacking mental competence, and a minor. One could object that they cannot make such vows because they lack legal capacity: they also cannot make other vows or consecrate property. A gentile, however, can do both; Rabbi Meir himself agrees that a gentile can make a vow to give someone’s monetary value and can be the object of such a vow. Without the verse ‘It is not for you and us to build,’ one might therefore say that a gentile can also make a vow of valuation. Gentiles had offered to help build the Second Temple, but Nehemiah son of Hacaliah told them that only the Jews would build it.
  14. Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is plausible — It makes more sense to apply the verse’s exclusion to those who can be valuated and its inclusion to those who can make vows of valuation. A person whose sex is indeterminate and a person with both male and female sexual characteristics have legal capacity, like gentiles, yet they can make vows of valuation but cannot be valuated. The verse excludes them from valuation by specifying ‘the male,’ understood to mean someone who is definitely male.
  15. But his ruling is not plausible — A gentile should not be able to make a vow of valuation, since valuation payments go to the Temple’s upkeep, and the verse says, ‘It is not for you and us to build.’
  16. Avimi said — When Rabbi Yehuda says that gentiles can make vows of valuation, he does not mean that their payments go to the Temple’s upkeep; the verse forbids that. Rather, the payment becomes sacred and is stored away, since deriving benefit from it is forbidden.
  17. If so — If the payment is destined to be put away, why should someone who benefits from it be liable for misuse of sacred property? The Mishnah teaches that one who benefits from sin offerings destined to die is not liable for such misuse. These are the sin offerings discussed in Tractate Temura, including the offspring of a sin offering and its substitute.
  18. And money destined for the Dead Sea — Such money must be disposed of, like a sin offering whose owner has died. Someone who benefits from it is not liable for misuse of sacred property, since what is destined for disposal is not called ‘the Lord’s sacred things.’
  19. Yet concerning offerings consecrated by gentiles, it is taught — This teaching appears in the chapter on the slaughter of offerings in Tractate Zevachim.
  20. When does this apply? — The rule that one is not liable for misusing offerings consecrated by gentiles applies to altar offerings. The law of misuse is linked by the shared word ‘sin’ to the law of priestly gifts. Just as the relevant penalty concerning priestly gifts applies only to gifts from Jews, as the verse explicitly says, ‘They shall not profane the sacred things of the children of Israel,’ so too the law of misuse applies only to offerings consecrated by Jews.
  21. But sacred property — One is liable for misusing property a gentile consecrated for the Temple’s upkeep. Tractate Zevachim explains that the comparison to priestly gifts concerns offerings whose very substance is sacred, not property consecrated for its monetary value. This explanation is stated explicitly there and is the primary one. I also heard another explanation from my teacher: gentiles’ altar offerings differ from Jews’ altar offerings in that the laws of an offering invalidated by improper intent, an offering left over past its allotted time, and an offering consumed in impurity do not apply to them. No such difference is found for property consecrated for the Temple’s upkeep, so the law of misuse applies. But the first explanation is primary. In any case, the teaching says that one is liable for misusing this property. It cannot be destined to be stored away, since the law of misuse applies to it.
  22. Rather, Rava said — The payment does go to the Temple’s upkeep. In Ezra’s time, there was a different reason they told the gentiles, ‘It is not for you and us to build.’
  23. Because they would weaken their hands — The gentiles did not intend to help. They wanted a role in the building so their advice would be heard; they would then delay construction until they persuaded Cyrus to oppose it.
Tosafot on Arakhin 5b, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. One might think they cannot be the object of a valuation; therefore the verse says “a man” — Although “a man” is written about someone who takes a vow of valuation, the phrase appears twice. If the second instance is not needed for the person making the vow, apply it to the person being valued. But doesn’t the first chapter of Temurah use “a man” here to exclude gentiles from the law of substitution? The answer is that the chapter Beit Shammai in Zevachim gives another derivation for that exclusion, on which Temurah relies: it learns from the animal tithe, an obligatory offering with no fixed time that Israelites bring but gentiles do not.
  2. A deaf-mute, a person lacking mental competence, and a minor are different, since they lack understanding — Rabbi Meir, who draws a comparison from them, holds that they are alike in one respect: they can be the object of a valuation even though they cannot take a vow of valuation. He says the same of gentiles.
  3. If so, the law of misuse of consecrated property should not apply to it — According to Rabbi Yehuda, why does a baraita teach that the law does apply to gentiles’ gifts for Temple upkeep? To whom can that baraita be attributed? It certainly cannot follow Rabbi Meir: he derives his ruling from “It is not for you and us,” indicating that gentiles cannot consecrate anything for Temple upkeep at all. Nor does it fit Rabbi Yehuda. One cannot resolve this by saying that, in the Gemara’s conclusion, the baraita fits Rabbi Meir because his concern is that accepting their gifts would weaken the builders’ hands. Rabbi Meir does not accept that reason; otherwise, how could he derive from “It is not for you and us” that gentiles cannot take vows of valuation? Further study is needed: If, according to Rabbi Meir, gentiles cannot donate to Temple upkeep, how can the mishna say that both sages agree gentiles can make vows? It is strained to say that this means vows to bring offerings to the altar, since the mishna apparently speaks, like its discussion of valuations, about gifts for Temple upkeep. Perhaps it is better to explain that Rava ultimately retracted his earlier statement that the law follows Rabbi Meir on the basis of “It is not for you and us.”

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Arachin, Erchin 5.