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Bechorot 28 for kids: When Experts Decide

בכורות כ״ח

🐄 This daf asks how long someone may keep a firstborn animal after it develops a blemish. It also asks what happens when someone rules about an animal, or a judge makes a mistake.

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Rashi and Tosafot on Bechorot 28 in simple English

Rashi on Bechorot 28a, in English Tab translation (21)
  1. And the other ones — Those who derive the law from “their flesh shall be yours” agree that the verse compares a firstborn to the breast and thigh of a thanks offering. They derive the additional day from the repeated words “shall be yours,” which imply another period of possession.
  2. For we have not found it anywhere in the entire Torah — That a blemished firstborn must be given to a priest is derived only from the additional words “shall be yours.”
  3. And the other one — The one who derives the two days and one night from “shall be yours” derives the requirement to give a blemished firstborn to a priest from “their flesh shall be yours”: the plural includes both unblemished and blemished firstborn animals.
  4. And the other ones: “their flesh” — They understand this to refer only to unblemished animals. It is plural because it refers to the firstborn animals of all the Israelites.
  5. And another thirty days after its first year — Even if the blemish developed long before that year ended.
  6. The entire twelve months — Until twelve months have passed since its birth.
  7. If a blemish developed after its first year — He may keep it for thirty days from when the blemish developed. On this reading, that is what the mishna means by “if it developed after its first year.”
  8. In the present time — An unblemished firstborn cannot be offered and has no permitted use.
  9. Until it is fit to be shown to an expert — Until a blemish has developed that can be shown to an expert, even if its first year has passed.
  10. He may not keep it even one day — The Gemara initially assumes this concerns a blemish that developed during the first year. The thirty days allow an Israelite who has the firstborn time to find a priest: if he slaughters it first, the meat may spoil. If he still cannot find a priest, he slaughters and salts it until he finds one. Thus, on this reading, the thirty days apply to a blemish that developed during the first year.
  11. The question still remains — The baraita itself is ambiguous. “After its first year, he may not keep it” could mean that the blemish developed after its first year; the allowance of thirty days would then apply to that case.
  12. Or perhaps before its first year — Perhaps the baraita also grants thirty days after the year ends when the blemish developed before then.
  13. One completes fifteen days for it after its first year — This shows that an animal blemished during its first year receives only enough time after the year ends to complete thirty days from the blemish, not a fresh thirty days. If the blemish developed a month or more before year’s end, it may be kept until the year ends; if it developed after the year or near its end, it may be kept for thirty days from when the blemish developed.
  14. He is given thirty days — If the blemish developed after its first year.
  15. Year by year — This implies two years. Thirty days within a year count as a year, as explained in the first chapter of Rosh Hashanah.
  16. Completion, yes; granting, no — He may complete a thirty-day period after the year ends, but is not given a full thirty days beginning then.
  17. The mishna: And he showed its blemish — He showed it after slaughter, and the blemish was found to be permanent.
  18. The Gemara: Films — Thin films over the eye, like the thin covering in the verse “who stretches out the heavens like a curtain” (Isaiah 40:22).
  19. They change — The distress of dying changes the eye. Although the blemish now appears permanent, had it been examined while the animal was alive, it would have appeared temporary.
  20. On the body — For example, a split ear.
  21. Because they change — That is, because films over the eye change, the Sages extended the rule to bodily blemishes, even though those do not change.
Tosafot on Bechorot 28a, in English Tab translation (6)
  1. I might have thought: the breast and thigh of a thanks offering — Rabbi Akiva does not accept this possibility in Zevachim 57a. There, the dispute is explained as turning on whether an inference drawn partly from the subject itself and partly from another source counts as a scriptural comparison.
  2. We have not found this anywhere in the entire Torah — Rashi explains that nowhere else does the Torah say to give a blemished firstborn to a priest except through an expansive reading. But that could be said of any law derived by interpretation. Ri explains that nowhere else does an animal in this situation go entirely to the priest: when a sin offering or guilt offering becomes blemished, the altar loses its share and so does the priest, but a blemished firstborn still belongs to the priest. Similarly, Menachot 91b says that nowhere else is a secondary obligation stricter than the primary one, though it could have cited the eleventh animal counted for tithing as an exception. And Shabbat 83b says that nowhere else does an impure person convey impurity by shifting something, as a zav does.
  3. And the others say that ‘their flesh’ refers to the firstborn animals of all Israel — In Zevachim 57a, Rabbi Yishmael instead takes ‘their flesh’ to refer to the firstborn ox, sheep, and goat mentioned just before it. That is a different answer. One might ask why he derives nothing from the plural ‘their flesh,’ when Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives from the plurals ‘their blood’ and ‘their fat’ that firstborn animals and animal tithes require blood to be applied and their sacrificial portions to be burned on the altar. The answer is that this derivation is disputed in Zevachim 37a; Rabbi Yishmael derives it instead from ‘the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured out.’
  4. Before it was fit to be shown to an expert — Rashi explains that no blemish had yet appeared. But then why say the owner ‘may’ keep it for two or three years? He has no choice. It is strained to read ‘may’ as ‘must.’ One could suggest that the owner need not shut it in an enclosure to die, as one does with other animals consecrated in the present era. But that would imply he could choose to do so, whereas people regularly keep firstborn animals until a blemish appears. It is better to explain that a blemish has appeared but no expert has been available to examine it: the owner need not take the animal a long distance to find one.
  5. For the sake of returning a lost item to its owners — Rashi explains that the priest is the intended recipient: sometimes an Israelite cannot find a priest to take the animal, and slaughtering it immediately would let the meat spoil. He may therefore keep it for thirty days after its first year. Our teacher says instead that the animal is already in a priest’s possession, but he does not currently need the meat, so the Sages gave him thirty days. An Israelite, however, always waits until he finds a priest.
  6. Rabbi Meir holds that we decree concerning blemishes on the body, etc. — Our teacher says that although Ketubot 57a states that the law follows Rabbi Meir in his decrees, this ruling is later called a penalty imposed by Rabbi Meir. The She’iltot of Rav Achai distinguishes his decrees from his penalties and rules against his penalty requiring a man who married another man’s pregnant or nursing former wife to divorce her and never remarry her. The discussion in Yevamot 37a also does not follow Rabbi Meir, and the discussion here follows Rabbi Yehuda: Rabbi Meir would penalize all the cases because of blemishes that change. The later suggestion that an unattributed mishna follows Rabbi Meir is answered by saying it may concern films on the eye, a case on which all agree. Our teacher therefore also rules against Rabbi Meir’s penalty for a loan document containing interest: that the lender may collect neither principal nor interest.
Rashi on Bechorot 28b, in English Tab translation (28)
  1. The mishna is also precise — Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about bodily blemishes, but not about blemishes on the cornea.
  2. Since it was slaughtered without an expert’s ruling — Rabbi Meir identifies no defect in the bodily blemish itself; he penalizes the person for slaughtering without an expert’s ruling. If the case concerned corneal blemishes, the mishna would have said Rabbi Meir prohibits it because they change after death. Rather, they disagree about bodily blemishes, and Rabbi Meir prohibits the animal by decree because of corneal blemishes.
  3. Do all of them change? — Do all corneal blemishes change after death, or only some? In either case, we prohibit animals with bodily blemishes as a decree because of corneal blemishes that do change.
  4. What practical difference does it make? — Even if some do not change, we do not know which ones they are, so any animal slaughtered without an expert’s ruling would be prohibited.
  5. To discredit witnesses — The animal was slaughtered without an expert’s ruling, and its blemish now appears permanent. Witnesses testify that it looked the same while the animal was alive.
  6. They are lying — If all corneal blemishes change after death, the animal is prohibited according to everyone.
  7. We rely on them — If some corneal blemishes do not change, the animal is permitted according to Rabbi Yehuda, who does not impose the penalty.
  8. An unattributed mishna following Rabbi Meir — Rabbi Meir said above that the animal is prohibited in either case. Accordingly, the mishna says it must be buried, even though its blemish now appears permanent.
  9. Perhaps it concerns corneal blemishes — The mishna says it must be buried because everyone agrees that these blemishes may change after death.
  10. When he pays — He pays the priest a quarter of a small firstborn animal’s value, or half of a large one’s. Half is due because the loss is uncertain: a qualified expert might have permitted the animal, which must now be buried; or the expert might not have permitted it, and the animal might never have developed a permanent blemish before dying.
  11. What is the reason? — Why does he pay a quarter for a small animal but half for a large one?
  12. The loss of a large animal is greater — Therefore, the payment is greater.
  13. Let him pay according to the loss — Let him pay half the value in each case: more for the large animal and less for the small one.
  14. Because of the decree concerning those who raise small livestock — Raising them involves considerable work. By permitting the firstborn, this person spared the priest that work: another expert might not have permitted it, leaving the priest to care for it until it developed a blemish. Therefore, he pays only a quarter. Another explanation: Because the Sages forbade raising small livestock in the Land of Israel, they imposed a penalty limiting payment to a quarter. This second explanation was not received from my teacher.
  15. If he was an expert appointed by the court, he is exempt — The litigant cannot fault him for judging the case on the grounds that he was unqualified.
  16. Rabbi Meir, who holds one liable for indirectly caused damage — In Bava Kamma, Rabbi Meir holds a person liable when he fails to repair a breached vineyard fence after being told to do so, thereby causing his neighbor’s produce to become prohibited.
  17. Granted, when he finds an innocent party liable, he can have taken and handed over the money himself — He took the money from that party and paid it to the other litigant.
  18. But when he exempts a liable party, how could that happen? — The judge apparently did nothing but tell him, ‘You are exempt.’
  19. The lender had collateral — The judge exempted the borrower, took the collateral from the lender, and returned it to the borrower.
  20. He brought a creeping animal into contact with them — Someone brought ritually pure items for the judge to rule on. He declared them impure, then touched them with a creeping animal to remove any doubt and establish his ruling.
  21. He mixed them with the person’s produce — Someone brought items for the judge to rule on. He declared them pure and personally mixed them with the person’s other produce. Later, an expert ruled the items impure, making the produce mixed with them impure as well.
  22. Its mother — Its womb.
  23. Rabbi Tarfon fed it to the dogs — He was asked whether the cow was unfit to eat because of a fatal defect, and he fed it to the dogs.
  24. So that it would not give birth — Their cows and sows were highly prized and sold for high prices. To keep another kingdom dependent on them, they wanted the animals not to give birth there, so they removed their wombs. The animals did not die; thus, removal of the womb is not a fatal defect.
  25. Your donkey is gone, Tarfon — You have lost a donkey’s worth: you will have to compensate the cow’s owner.
  26. And why not conclude this from another reason? — Even if the judge is not an expert, he is exempt: he erred about an explicit mishnah, which says that a cow whose uterus was removed is permitted. As explained in Sanhedrin, a judge can retract such a ruling. Had the cow still been alive, he could have retracted and permitted it. His ruling therefore had no effect, and the person who fed the cow to the dogs caused his own loss.
  27. Alternatively, you erred in a matter of judgment — Even if the cow were still alive, you could not retract and permit it. Your prohibition would stand, and you caused the loss. Even so, you are exempt from paying because you are an expert. Sanhedrin explains a matter of judgment as a dispute between two Tannaim or two Amoraim in which no ruling was established, but common practice follows one side and the judge rules like the other. His ruling stands, and he pays from his own funds.
  28. One may not slaughter — Perhaps he permitted it because he would receive a fee.
Tosafot on Bechorot 28b, in English Tab translation (4)
  1. A quarter for a small animal and half for a large animal — Rashi explains that payment is reduced because it is uncertain whether an expert would permit the firstborn on account of its blemish. This does not mean the ruling follows Sumchus’s principle of dividing disputed money; it is simply a rabbinic enactment. Even when the blemish is known to be one an expert would permit, some uncertainty remains: the expert might decline to examine the animal. The ruling does not distinguish between blemishes. It would fit better if this baraita dealt only with blemishes on the eye’s cornea, since, as explained above, we rule like Rabbi Yehuda, according to whom the animal is buried only in that case. Alternatively, the Sages assessed an animal not yet permitted as worth only half its full value. Similarly, terumah is worth only half as much as ordinary produce: Ketubot 58a says that where terumah is specified, twice as much ordinary produce is given. The cases are not quite alike, however: terumah is forbidden to non-priests and when impure, whereas a blemished firstborn, once permitted, may be eaten freely, like a gazelle or deer.
  2. Because of the decree against raising small livestock — The Sages restricted their raising to wooded areas away from settlements. This entails considerable effort, reducing their value to a quarter; the payment rate is thus half that for a large animal. Rashi also attributes the reduction to this effort, but does not fully explain the word ‘decree.’
  3. If he judged a case, etc. — Sanhedrin 6a challenges Rabbi Abbahu, who says that a judgment by two judges is invalid, from this mishna. But how does it know the mishna concerns a lone judge? The singular wording proves nothing: Chullin 44b also says ‘if he judged a case,’ yet speaks of several people, as shown by ‘all of them may purchase.’ There, however, the judges are mentioned alongside witnesses. Here the whole mishna concerns individuals: its later clauses speak of an expert authorized by the court and of Rabbi Tarfon, while its opening speaks of a non-expert who examined a firstborn.
  4. Shall we say the unattributed mishna follows Rabbi Meir, etc. — Why not infer this from the earlier ruling that a firstborn slaughtered on a non-expert’s advice must be buried and that he must pay? That necessarily follows Rabbi Meir, who holds one liable for damage caused indirectly: it cannot be explained as a case where the non-expert physically handed something over, since the animal was slaughtered on his advice. Moreover, Bava Kamma 100 finds support for Rabbi Meir’s rule only in a baraita about a vineyard partition, rather than citing this mishna. And when Bava Kamma 117 considers holding someone liable for pointing out another’s property, it cites and then rejects a proof from the mishna about a judge’s error. Why not cite this earlier ruling instead?

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Bekhorot, Bechoros, Bekhoroth 28.