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Bechorot 32 for kids: Bones, Sales, and Firstborns

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🐑 Can the price of animal-tithe meat be included in the price of its bones? This daf also asks when an animal tithe may be sold and who may eat a blemished firstborn.

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Rashi and Tosafot on Bechorot 32 in simple English

Rashi on Bechorot 32a, in English Tab translation (26)
  1. Not appraised while alive — The hide and sinews do not significantly affect the animal’s appraised value. Therefore, even an adult may include the meat’s price in their price. For young orphans, the Sages allowed the meat to be sold normally after slaughter to protect their property, as Torah law permits.
  2. He agrees with Rava — By Torah law, an animal-tithe offering may be sold after slaughter.
  3. Only according to all your soul’s desire — The Sifrei explains that this verse concerns consecrated animals that became blemished. It says, “You may slaughter and eat.”
  4. What has no blessing while alive — It cannot be used for benefit while alive. Other offerings that develop a blemish may be redeemed and then sold alive to anyone.
  5. Rather, it is the animal tithe — “It shall not be redeemed” means it cannot be sold alive. The verse indicates that after slaughter it has a “blessing”: it may be sold. Thus, Torah law permits its sale after slaughter; the baraita’s prohibition is rabbinic. For young orphans, the Sages left Torah law in force.
  6. May its price be included — May an adult include the price of animal-tithe meat in the price of the bones?
  7. A small animal — Its bones are of no use, so the meat’s price may not be included in their price.
  8. A large animal — Its bones can be used for handles for axes and hatchets, so the meat’s price may be included in their price.
  9. In each sage’s locale — In one locale people make utensils from bones; in the other they do not, so the meat’s price may not be included in the bones’ price there.
  10. From where is this derived — How does “It shall not be redeemed” imply that the animal tithe may not be sold?
  11. Dedications — The verse says, “No dedicated item may be sold or redeemed” (Leviticus 27:28).
  12. Free — The words “it shall not be redeemed” must be superfluous so they can serve as the basis for this interpretation.
  13. For they apply to everything — If someone dedicates consecrated property, the dedication takes effect, and he gives a priest the value of his right to choose which priest receives it. Animal tithe, by contrast, applies only to unconsecrated animals. Also, dedication can apply to an entire herd, while animal tithe applies only to every tenth animal.
  14. One could refute this — Perhaps dedications need their own prohibition against redemption, because it cannot be learned from animal tithe. Animal tithe has a special feature: if the owner calls the tenth animal “ninth,” the ninth “tenth,” and the eleventh “tenth,” all three become sacred.
  15. One could refute this — As one can object when deriving animal tithe from the firstborn offering: the firstborn is sacred from birth, whereas animal tithe is not. Thus, animal tithe needs its own verse, “It shall not be redeemed.”
  16. “You shall transfer” is superfluous — It is available for a verbal analogy between firstborn and animal tithe, teaching that animal tithe may not be redeemed; this analogy cannot be refuted. The verse could simply have said, “Every first issue of the womb belongs to the Lord,” as another verse does. Why add “you shall transfer”?
  17. Let us also derive firstborn through the word redemption from dedications — This would teach that a firstborn may not be sold. Although the firstborn verse speaks of “ransoming” rather than “redeeming,” the terms mean the same thing.
  18. The redemption wording for animal tithe is free — As explained, it can therefore support a verbal analogy with dedications. The firstborn verse’s wording about ransoming is needed for its own law and to teach the law of animal tithe through the analogy based on “transfer.”
  19. Why choose this arrangement — Why use the firstborn’s ransom wording for its own law and to teach animal tithe, while using animal tithe’s redemption wording for an analogy with dedications? Perhaps animal tithe’s wording serves its own law and teaches firstborn, leaving the firstborn’s wording available for an analogy with dedications that would prohibit its sale.
  20. Then derive firstborn from animal tithe through “transfer” — This would prohibit selling a firstborn, since we have already derived that prohibition for animal tithe from dedications.
  21. Animal tithe is the more fitting case — It should be included in the law of dedications because, like dedications, its verse uses the word “redeemed.” The firstborn verse instead uses “ransomed.”
  22. Dedications do not need “it shall not be redeemed” — Not because the law is derived from firstborn, but because it follows from their nature that they cannot be redeemed.
  23. They are sacred property — They cannot be redeemed; they are unlike offerings brought on the altar.
  24. They are ordinary property — A priest may sell them to anyone he wishes.
  25. Every dedicated item is sacred — It may not be sold.
  26. It shall be yours — They belong to the priest like the rest of his property.
Tosafot on Bechorot 32a, in English Tab translation (4)
  1. And Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak also agrees with Rava — He derives the ruling from a different verse, not from Rava’s reasoning.
  2. Let the verse not say ‘shall not be redeemed’ about dedications — We could learn from animal tithe: just as it is sacred and cannot be redeemed, so too dedications. But perhaps we would instead learn from other consecrated property that they can be redeemed? We answer that we follow the stricter comparison. Alternatively, since the verse says dedications ‘may not be sold,’ we understand ‘shall not be redeemed’ to apply to them as well.
  3. ‘It,’ but not a firstborn animal — Rava, who later explains that ‘may not be sold’ is unnecessary for dedications, also needs this exclusion. As shown in the first chapter of Temurah, without ‘it’ we would link the verses’ shared word ‘transfer’ and apply the animal-tithe rule to a firstborn. Abaye reads ‘it’ as meaning that the tithe remains in its original state, yet he too can exclude a firstborn: ‘it’ appears beside ‘most holy,’ implying that it remains in its sanctity.
  4. Rava said: ‘Shall not be redeemed’ is unnecessary for dedications — This is the reading in the texts, but Rashi reads ‘may not be sold.’ Rashi’s reason is the argument ‘What situation is there? If they are still with their owners, they are consecrated property’: that argument cannot make ‘shall not be redeemed’ unnecessary, since property consecrated for Temple maintenance can be redeemed. Rabbeinu Tam explains that dedications remain consecrated even after redemption: ‘most holy’ implies that their inherent sanctity lasts until they reach a priest. But this is difficult. The first chapter of Temurah indicates that Abaye, who holds that a prohibited act can take effect, derives ineffective redemption from ‘it shall remain as it is,’ while Rava, who holds that such an act cannot take effect, derives it from ‘shall not be redeemed’ itself. How, then, can Rava call that phrase unnecessary because the dedication remains consecrated even after redemption? That very rule depends on the phrase. There is another difficulty, raised by Rashi: Why apply the dedications’ ‘shall not be redeemed’ to animal tithe, when animal tithe has that phrase in its own verse? If the aim is to prohibit selling it, the argument should say, ‘If the phrase is not needed for redemption, which is stated explicitly, apply it to sale.’ Alternatively, it should ask, ‘Why does Scripture say “shall not be redeemed” for dedications?’—showing that the phrase is available for the verbal analogy.
Rashi on Bechorot 32b, in English Tab translation (10)
  1. Apply it to animal tithe — to prohibit its sale.
  2. It is reasonable to apply it to animal tithe, since redemption is mentioned for it too — That is the explanation I heard, but I have several objections. First, the Gemara says, “If they are in their owners’ hands, they are consecrated.” Yet consecrated property can be redeemed, as the verse says of a consecrated house, “If the one who consecrated it redeems his house.” Thus the verse needed to say of devoted property, “It may not be redeemed.” Second, why apply that phrase to animal tithe when it is already written there? If the point is sale, the Gemara should have said, “If it is not needed for redemption, apply it to sale.” Alternatively, it could have asked why the phrase is needed for devoted property and used it to establish an analogy: just as sale is prohibited there, so too with animal tithe. I therefore think the correct reading is: “Rava said: ‘It may not be sold’ concerning devoted property is unnecessary.” Rava’s point is that animal tithe cannot be sold even without an analogy. If devoted property is consecrated, its owner has no right to sell it to others; it belongs with the Temple treasurer, and it cannot be sold while still in the owner’s hands. If it is non-sacred, it may be sold. So apply the unnecessary prohibition on sale to animal tithe. This is the correct reading.
  3. How do I know this? — The verse prohibits it only while the animal is alive. If it means that the owner cannot redeem it, that implies that after slaughter the owner can redeem it and the redemption money acquires its sanctity.
  4. It requires standing and valuation — Therefore, it cannot be redeemed at all, and its sanctity cannot pass to redemption money. “It may not be redeemed” means “it may not be sold”: the Torah prohibits treating it like an ordinary animal. While it is alive, its stronger sanctity bars its sale. After slaughter, its sanctity is weaker—it may be slaughtered outside the Temple and eaten by non-priests—so it may be sold.
  5. Redemption implies an act by the owner — It also implies that the redemption money acquires the animal’s sanctity; otherwise, why would its owner redeem it? Rather, the verse prohibits sale because selling it treats it like an ordinary animal.
  6. That is why it says, “It may not be redeemed” — By expressing the ban on sale in the language of redemption, the verse teaches that the animal may neither be sold nor redeemed. It cannot refer only to redemption, for then we could not infer that it may be redeemed after slaughter.
  7. One may not include him — Even if a priest invites an Israelite guest to share a blemished firstborn animal, the guest may not eat it with him.
  8. Our mishna — It permits a gentile to eat a firstborn animal.
  9. Whose opinion is it? Rabbi Akiva’s — Rabbi Akiva says that, according to Beit Hillel, even a gentile may eat it.
  10. Just as with the breast and thigh, which priests may eat but Israelites may not — As the verse says, “You and your sons and daughters with you.”
Tosafot on Bechorot 32b, in English Tab translation (2)
  1. But after slaughter it may be redeemed? It requires standing and valuation — This is difficult: Why not say the animal is still convulsing after slaughter? Such an animal is treated as alive in every respect, as the discussion of the Passover offering’s blood in the second chapter of Hullin indicates. Perhaps, though, it would also count as alive for making a substitute, so it would not solve the problem. Rabbi Shimon of Neuville explained that here, once slaughter has been properly completed, a convulsing animal does not count as alive. I have explained this fully in the discussion of a red heifer’s susceptibility to food impurity in the chapter Meruba of Bava Kamma.
  2. Ruling: The mishna follows Rabbi Akiva — Rabbi Yitzḥak says the law follows Beit Hillel as presented in our mishna: they permit even a gentile to eat a blemished firstborn. It does not follow Beit Hillel as presented in the baraita, who disagree with Rabbi Akiva and forbid this. Our mishna states its ruling without naming an authority, whereas the baraita records a dispute; the law follows an unattributed mishna. All the more so here, since the mishna presents the baraita’s wording as an unattributed ruling, a form stronger than other unattributed rulings. The Gemara below explains Rabbi Akiva’s view from the comparison with a gazelle and a deer, while the others use that comparison as Rabbi Elazar HaKappar does: just as blemished sacrificial animals require slaughter, so do gazelles and deer. On his view, the requirement to slaughter a bird is only rabbinic. This might suggest that Rabbi Akiva instead follows Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who derives the rules for slaughtering birds and animals from ‘slaughter as I commanded you.’ Perhaps that is indeed the law, despite Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina’s view that bird slaughter is not required by Torah law; his view does not establish the law. Alternatively, Rabbi Akiva can agree with Rabbi Elazar HaKappar and derive one point from the gazelle and another from the deer, as explained earlier. Halakhot Gedolot appears instead to rule like Beit Hillel in the baraita and to understand their disagreement with Rabbi Akiva as rabbinic: a gentile may have the fat because blemished sacrificial animals are compared with gazelles and deer, but giving him the meat is rabbinically forbidden. One cannot prove that a gentile may not have the meat from the accepted interpretation, ‘You may eat it—but not feed it to your dogs,’ even though that exclusion also applies to gentiles. Several unattributed rulings require burial: those concerning a blood clot, a firstborn slaughtered on the word of someone who was not an expert, a firstborn slaughtered before it was shown to an expert, and an animal whose greater part emerged from the womb. Yet these rulings can accord with Rabbi Akiva himself. He says that when a firstborn is slaughtered and found to be mortally injured, the priests may use its hide, implying that its meat may not be used. As explained earlier, the comparison with gazelles and deer permits even a gentile to have a blemished sacrificial animal only when an Israelite may eat it. It does not permit an animal that an Israelite may not eat. Thus a firstborn that dies, is slaughtered without authorization, or is authorized but then found mortally injured requires burial; even Rabbi Akiva agrees. He permits the hide only when an expert authorized the slaughter. In any event, the law does not follow his permission concerning the hide, but follows the Sages, who say that it must be burned. For us, however, burning is not required: that ruling concerns offerings in the Temple. Rashi therefore omits the text that states, ‘The law follows the Sages: the meat is buried and the hide burned.’ The Sages’ ruling about burning the hide responds not to Rabbi Akiva’s case of a firstborn outside the Temple, but to Rabbi Ḥanina’s case of Temple offerings. A difficulty remains: a baraita about two sin offerings, one unblemished and one blemished, says that even if the blemished one’s meat is already cooking when the unblemished one’s blood is sprinkled, that meat is forbidden; another source says it must be burned. Why burned? Its disqualification is only that it is like a sin offering whose owner has already gained atonement, which must be left to die. Nor can slaughter alone explain burning as the rule for an offering disqualified after slaughter, since a firstborn slaughtered without an expert’s authorization, or found mortally injured, is buried. Perhaps Temple times differed from the present. Alternatively, if slaughter without an expert’s authorization differs from other disqualifications arising after slaughter, the printed reading in Zevaḥim could be resolved by reversing it: ‘The law follows the Sages: the meat is burned and the hide buried.’ That would concern the present time, when they did not require burning the hide as they did the meat. But why does the mishna in Orla say that a garment woven with a small measure of firstborn wool must be burned, when the sources cited above say a firstborn is buried? We cannot simply distinguish wool from hair: a similar distinction is challenged in the discussion of a nazirite’s hair and a firstborn donkey’s hair. A Tosefta also says that wool pulled from an unblemished firstborn and set aside must be buried, even if the animal later develops a blemish and is slaughtered. The answer may be the distinction given there for a firstborn donkey: loose hair is quickly destroyed, so burial suffices; a woven garment might be dug up, so it must be burned. Another answer there assigns the burning rule to Rabbi Yehuda, who permits a person to be stricter and burn what ordinarily requires burial.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Bekhorot, Bechoros, Bekhoroth 32.