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Bechorot 36 for kids: Who Can Be Trusted?

בכורות ל״ו

🐑 This daf asks whose words we can trust about a firstborn animal’s blemish. It also asks who may examine a clear blemish when no expert is nearby.

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Stories from Bechorot 36

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Bechorot 36 in simple English

Rashi on Bechorot 36a, in English Tab translation (30)
  1. To establish them as suspects — Did Rabbi Meir say priests are definitely suspect? The rule that someone suspected of one offense is suspected of violating the whole Torah applies when we know he has committed an offense.
  2. Testimony about a firstborn animal — To testify that this blemish was not deliberately inflicted.
  3. Testimony about a woman — Testimony that her husband died abroad.
  4. Teach instead: testimony for which a woman is qualified — A woman is also qualified to testify about a firstborn animal, since the halakha follows Rabban Shimon, who accepts even the priest’s daughter as a witness.
  5. Yeimar who permits firstborn animals — He called Yeimar one who permits firstborn animals, as an insult.
  6. It had not been established — The animal was not known to be a firstborn. Its priestly owner came and said it was a firstborn whose blemish had not been deliberately inflicted, so he could show it to an expert to determine whether the blemish was permanent or temporary.
  7. He is believed — The same person who made the animal forbidden by saying it was a firstborn made it permissible by saying its blemish was unintentional.
  8. I was a married woman — She had never previously been known to be married.
  9. She is believed — And may marry.
  10. For she could have said nothing — If she intended to marry unlawfully while her husband was still alive, she could have stayed silent about ever being married, since she was presumed unmarried.
  11. But here — The priest must say the animal is a firstborn so an expert can determine whether its blemish is permanent or temporary. A priest is not suspected of eating an unblemished sacred animal outside the Temple, an offense punishable by karet, but he is suspected of causing a blemish, which violates an ordinary prohibition. One might therefore think he is not believed. Rabbi Ile’a teaches that he is believed.
  12. For if so — If the priest had caused the blemish, he could have made one obvious even to an unlearned person. Then, since no one else knew the animal was a firstborn, he would not need to come before an expert or say it was a firstborn. Nor would eating it raise a concern about eating an unblemished sacred animal outside the Temple. But if everyone knows it is a firstborn, this argument does not apply: he must come before an expert, or people will suspect him if he slaughters it without one.
  13. Where there are witnesses — We can attest that there is always water on that route. Likewise, since priests are known to be suspected of causing blemishes, we should not accept a ‘why would he lie?’ argument.
  14. Here, did he definitely cause the blemish? — This is a rhetorical question.
  15. This teaching — Rabbi Ile’a’s teaching.
  16. Without a named authority — He stated it anonymously: The animal had not been established as a firstborn, and so on.
  17. Have we distinguished between a learned priest and an unlearned priest? — Would you suspect me of deliberately causing a blemish, as you would an unlearned priest?
  18. Yes — We do distinguish between them, and you are not suspected.
  19. Shield-bearers — Torah scholars who fight in the battle of Torah learning.
  20. What could I do? — Could I deny what he said?
  21. If I were alive and he were dead — I could deny it and say I had never said that.
  22. How can one living person deny another? — I certainly said it, but I now retract it.
  23. Stand, and he stood — He told him to stand, and he did; to be silent, and he was silent.
  24. Mishnah: I showed this firstborn animal — He says he showed it to an expert, who ruled that its blemish was permanent and that it may be slaughtered, provided he has witnesses that he did not cause the blemish.
  25. Gemara: The priest is believed when he says — He tells an expert: An Israelite gave me this firstborn animal with its present blemish.
  26. Likely to be exposed — An expert may come and say, “I did not permit it for you.”
  27. No, people may lie even when the truth can be exposed — Here the priest is believed because priests are not suspected of eating unblemished sacrificial animals outside the Temple courtyard. If an expert had not permitted the animal, he would not claim that one had and then slaughter it without an expert’s permission.
  28. But here — He shows the blemish to an expert and says, “An Israelite gave it to me with this blemish,” so he will not need witnesses that the blemish occurred on its own. Since priests are suspected of causing a blemish and claiming it occurred on its own, they are also suspected of causing one and claiming an Israelite gave them the animal already blemished.
  29. Buy for me from someone trustworthy — Someone who does not buy produce from an unlearned person, or who does buy it but separates the required tithes before selling it.
  30. Yes — This agent is believed when he says, “I bought it from someone trustworthy.”
Tosafot on Bechorot 36a, in English Tab translation (7)
  1. One might say that Rabbi Meir said this only as a matter of concern — The wording suggests that this is Rabbi Meir’s view, which we do not follow: even someone known to violate one commandment is not thereby suspected of violating the entire Torah. Although Abaye rules in Sanhedrin 27a that someone who defiantly eats forbidden meat is unfit to testify, and the law follows Abaye there, that applies specifically to testimony, because the Torah forbids accepting a wicked person as a witness. In other matters, he is not presumed suspect. Rabbi Meir’s example there of a witness proven to have testified falsely could have been another offense; he chose it to disagree with Rabbi Yosei, who accepts such a witness in capital cases if his false testimony was in a monetary case.
  2. And Rava said: Why would he lie? — The reading should be “Rabba,” Abaye’s teacher, not “Rava.” Rava explicitly holds in Bava Batra 33b that the argument “Why would he lie?” does not apply where there are witnesses; he says that he and Abaye disagree with Rav Hisda on this point.
  3. He came before Rabban Gamliel, who said to him: No — This is the law: there is no distinction between a learned, observant person and an unlearned person. In Yoma 78a, the Gemara asks whether the law concerning Rabbi Yosei ben Zimra, who was a priest, follows Rabbi Meir, who says that someone suspected in a matter may neither judge nor testify about it, or Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who trusts him regarding another person’s property. This shows that Rabbi Meir would not have permitted it even though Rabbi Yosei was learned and observant.
  4. The questioner stood and asked — The Jerusalem Talmud, in the chapter on the betrothed girl in Nedarim, derives from the wording “And the two men shall stand” that someone asking a question of law or aggadah must stand.
  5. Stand on your feet, and let them testify against you — The words “and let them testify against you” should not be included here or at the start of the chapter on the Morning Prayer in Berakhot 27b: what testimony is involved here? They belong to the account of King Yannai in Sanhedrin 19a and were copied here from there.
  6. How can the living contradict the living? — That is, “I had intended to conceal it, but I cannot.” Rashi explains, “I did say that, but I changed my mind.” That cannot be right, because Berakhot 27b rules according to his view.
  7. Rabbi Hutzpit the interpreter — He was one of the Ten Martyrs.
Rashi on Bechorot 36b, in English Tab translation (28)
  1. Because he has a way to excuse himself — He can say, “Even if you do not trust him, I thought he was trustworthy.” Therefore, the agent is not afraid to lie from the outset.
  2. From a particular person — The sender named the trustworthy person, so the agent is believed: he fears the sender will question that person and discover a lie. This latter clause supports Rav Yehuda’s statement that people do not lie about matters that can be checked.
  3. There, because someone can challenge him, he is afraid — This is no proof. The agent sees that the sender took care to name the person and assumes he will check. But the priest with the firstborn animal thinks no one will trouble to find the Israelite and ask whether he gave it to him already blemished.
  4. How does Yehuda know this? — That a priest is believed when he says, “An Israelite gave me this firstborn animal already blemished.”
  5. I taught it to Giddul — I taught it to Giddul, who taught it to Rabbi Yehuda. But this is what I told Giddul: An Israelite is believed when he says, “I gave it to the priest already blemished.” Another explanation reads this as: “I taught it to a certain great scholar.”
  6. When it was young — The lamb was young when the Israelite gave it to the priest.
  7. You might think he cannot identify it — Because the lamb has grown, perhaps he does not recognize it. It may be a different animal that the priest blemished.
  8. According to the latter version — An Israelite is believed.
  9. According to the first version — Even the priest is believed. The law follows even the first version.
  10. One day he became ill — Rafram had an ailment in his eyes.
  11. He brought it — The priest brought the firstborn animal to Rafram to see whether its blemish was permanent. He thought Rafram’s eye ailment would keep him from recognizing the animal he had given him unblemished.
  12. He forced his eyes open — He opened them with effort.
  13. He saw that the priest was lying — He recognized the animal he had given the priest unblemished.
  14. He was not concerned — Rafram did not conclude from this incident that priests should no longer be believed when they say an Israelite gave them a firstborn animal already blemished.
  15. This one is unusually brazen — He both blemished the animal and, instead of showing it to another sage, brought it to the very person who had given it to him.
  16. Uneven-eyed — One eye is larger than the other.
  17. Whether he is a priest or an Israelite — Rav Ashi did not know which he was. Even if he was a priest suspected of blemishing a firstborn animal, there is no suspicion here, since the animal was born this way.
  18. Unless a priest is with him — If told the blemish is permanent, the Israelite might slaughter and eat the animal himself. Although anyone may eat an animal with a permanent blemish, it belongs to a priest; he might disregard that and take it.
  19. How are the cases alike? There — With other, less obvious blemishes, the concern is that the Israelite might take what belongs to the priest. Even if he is careful to slaughter only with an expert’s approval, he may avoid the penalty of karet for slaughtering a sacrificial animal outside the Temple while still being willing to commit theft, which is a lesser prohibition.
  20. Would he commit a prohibition? — Surely he would not steal.
  21. Mishna: Everyone is believed concerning blemishes in an animal tithe — They may testify that the blemish occurred on its own. This concerns an animal of doubtful tithe status, such as one called “tenth” when it was the ninth; it cannot be eaten unless it develops a blemish.
  22. Gemara: How would he know which one will emerge? — How could he know in advance which animal will come through the opening as the tenth, so that he could blemish it?
  23. At the tenth — That is, the tenth animal.
  24. Mishna: Whose eye became blind — This is an unmistakable blemish.
  25. Members of the synagogue — People who are not scholars.
  26. Outside the Land of Israel — a firstborn animal from there is not fit to be offered as a sacrifice, even when the Temple stood, as explained in Tractate Temurah (21b).
  27. Uncertain — I am unsure whether Rabbi Yirmeya told me this in Rav’s name or in Shmuel’s name.
  28. Three may permit the firstborn animal, etc. — this applies to unmistakable blemishes.
Tosafot on Bechorot 36b, in English Tab translation (8)
  1. And the law follows even the first version — Although we rule here that a person does not lie about something that can be checked, a single witness who reports a husband’s death is believed only because the woman checks carefully before remarrying. Alternatively, one might worry that her love for him will keep her from checking carefully. As for the view here that the priest is not believed even about something that can be checked, one may distinguish the priest from a witness; alternatively, the law is lenient for a woman who would otherwise be unable to remarry, and she checks carefully.
  2. He recognized the falsehood — This means that Rafram saw the animal and recognized it. The Aramaic word means “recognition,” as in the passages about someone whose foreskin is stretched so that he is not recognized (Eruvin 19a), and about someone who passed before them and was not recognized (Yevamot 120a). Rashi explains it differently.
  3. Out of respect for the sage — As stated below, three people may permit the slaughter of a firstborn where no expert is available, but not where an expert is available. Ruling: Even an obvious blemish does not permit slaughter without authorization from three people or an expert.
  4. He did not infringe the sage’s honor, but he did commit a prohibition — Why, then, not permit every firstborn a priest brings us with an obvious blemish, without testimony? A priest is different: he fears eating it without a sage’s authorization, lest it become known that he caused the blemish. But one cannot say that this Israelite brings it to a sage for fear that his plan to eat it and deprive the priest will become known. Bringing it now does not establish that he will not eat it himself.
  5. Permitting a firstborn outside the Land of Israel on the authority of three members of the congregation — This cannot be learned from the mishna, which could concern the present era. When the Temple stood, one might instead have prohibited this leniency outside the Land of Israel as a safeguard against applying it within the Land. Moreover, one opinion in Temura 21a holds that unblemished firstborn animals brought from outside the Land are offered as sacrifices.
  6. We learned this already: It may be slaughtered, and so forth — The Gemara does not answer that the ruling excludes Rabbi Yosei’s view, even though his reasoning generally prevails, because Rav Yehuda would then have said, “The law follows the Sages,” or “The law does not follow Rabbi Yosei.” Rabbi Hiyya, mentioned below, instead states two related rulings, about permitting a firstborn and releasing a vow.
  7. Where an expert is available, they may not — “Expert” does not mean only someone formally appointed by a court. The firstborn brought to Rav Ashi above was brought out of respect for him as a sage. Anyone outstanding in wisdom and qualified may permit a firstborn or release a vow alone, as the accounts of Rav Ashi here and in Nedarim 8b indicate. Similarly, the expert who may judge a civil case alone in Sanhedrin 5a need not be formally ordained; Rav Naḥman says there, “Someone like me may judge civil cases.” Ruling: Today, however, no one appears to qualify as such an expert to permit a firstborn, release a vow, or judge a civil case alone.
  8. Three may release a vow where there is no sage — This is subject to the rule in Nedarim 8b that a person may not release a vow in his teacher’s locale. Even if another expert is there, that expert may not do so in his teacher’s locale, as in the case of Ravina and Rav Ashi.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Bekhorot, Bechoros, Bekhoroth 36.