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Berakhot 20 for kids: Miracles, Shoes, and Shema

ברכות כ׳

🌧️ This daf asks why miracles happened for the earlier generations but not for later rabbis, and tells stories about sages who were extra careful to honor Hashem. Then the Mishna discusses which mitzvot women, servants, and children must do.

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Stories from Berakhot 20

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Berakhot 20 in simple English

Rashi on Berakhot 20a, in English Tab translation (16)
  1. But he does become impure for a met mitzva — this is a matter of human dignity, and it overrides a Torah law.
  2. A case of 'sit and refrain from action' is different — Many things were permitted to uproot a Torah law because of a rabbinic safeguard or because of human dignity, in a case where one does not actively uproot something with his hands, but rather sits in his place and the Torah law is uprooted on its own — such as the blowing of the shofar and taking the lulav on Shabbat, using a sheet for ritual fringes, and many similar cases in tractate Yevamot (90b). But where one actively uproots the prohibition with his hands, this leniency does not apply. One who wears a garment of forbidden mixed fibers actively uproots the prohibition by actually wearing it. As for the impurity of his own body, which was permitted for a priest or nazirite in order to become impure for a met mitzva — that is actively uprooting the prohibition with his hands because of human dignity, which is not a case of 'sit and refrain from action.' This is why we cannot derive a general principle from there: because there, it is not human dignity that overrides the prohibition. Rather, originally, when the prohibition against impurity was written, it was not written with regard to a met mitzva, just as it was not written with regard to relatives. But the mitzvot of returning a lost object and the Paschal offering were stated for all of Israel, and it was specifically with regard to human dignity that they were given leave to be overridden. This must mean that their being overridden is not done through action, but rather through his sitting passively the mitzva is overridden. But in the case of forbidden mixtures, where it would be overridden through the action of his hands, the Torah was strict in its prohibition.
  3. In the order of Nezikin — meaning: they were not expert in the Talmud of all four orders, but only in three, compared to us who have six. This matter is mentioned here because the passage deals with those who give up their lives for the sanctification of God's name, and until now it also discussed one who degrades himself for the sanctification of God's name by stripping off a garment of forbidden mixed fibers in the marketplace.
  4. The woman who pickles a vegetable, or olives pickled with their leaves — this is a mishna in tractate Okatzin.
  5. Pure — for they harvest olives together with their leaves in order to hold them by the leaves, so the leaves serve as a 'handle' for the olives, which can bring impurity upon them, as we say in the chapter 'Ha'or VeHarotev' (118a), that a handle can bring impurity upon food. But if he pickled them with their leaves in vinegar, the status of 'handle' is nullified from the leaves, because the pickling rots and softens them, and they are no longer fit to be held by.
  6. We see here the dialectical disputes of Rav and Shmuel — meaning: the reasoning behind these mishnayot is as difficult for me as all the difficulties my two teachers struggled with throughout the entire Talmud.
  7. Thirteen versions — among us there are thirteen versions of the mishna and baraita of the six orders, and tractate Okatzin too has thirteen versions, such as the mishna of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Chiya, and the mishna of Bar Kappara and Levi, and the teaching of the school of Shmuel. And so we say in tractate Nedarim (41a): Rabbi would teach halakha in thirteen versions.
  8. Karbalta — the name of an important garment, as in 'their cloaks and their karbalta' (Daniel 3).
  9. Maton maton — a term related to the word for 'two hundred.'
  10. Four hundred — twice two hundred, meaning: the name [itself] caused this for me. Alternatively: 'maton maton' is a term meaning 'waiting' — had I waited, I would have gained four hundred zuz.
  11. Like white geese — white geese.
  12. Rabbi Yochanan — he was a man of beautiful appearance, as we say in the chapter 'HaSokher Et HaPoalim' (84b): the beauty of Rabbi Abbahu was like a reflection of his beauty, etc.
  13. Olei ayin — removed from the power of the eye, so that it has no dominion over them.
  14. That it did not wish to feed — to derive benefit from his master's wife.
  15. MISHNA: Women, slaves, and minors are exempt from reciting Shema — because it is a positive, time-bound commandment, and we hold in tractate Kiddushin (29a) that women are exempt by Torah law. Phylacteries are also a positive, time-bound commandment, for he holds that night and Shabbat are not a time for phylacteries.
  16. Minors — even a minor who has reached the age for educational training, the Sages did not place upon his father the obligation to train him in reciting Shema, because the father is not always present when the time for reciting Shema arrives.
Tosafot on Berakhot 20a, in English Tab translation (4)
  1. A case of 'sit and refrain from action' is different — And if you ask: regarding a nazirite and the High Priest, becoming impure for a met mitzva is actually an act of 'arise and do' [an active transgression, not mere inaction]? Rashi answered that the verse teaches us that the prohibition against becoming impure was simply never stated with regard to a met mitzva in their case. This is not compelling, for if so, then wherever we say a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, it would likewise be called 'sit and refrain from action' etc. — yet how could that be called 'overriding'? We would have to say it is not really an override, since the prohibition was never stated there to begin with. Moreover, circumcision, the daily offering, and the Paschal offering, which override Shabbat, as stated in the chapter 'Elu Devarim' (Pesachim 69b), show that such cases are indeed properly called 'overriding.' Rather, it seems that we cannot derive a general principle from the nazirite, because the nazirite is different in that he has recourse to have his vow dissolved by a sage; and likewise we cannot derive it from the priest, because the priest is different in that his prohibition does not apply equally to everyone.
  2. Olives pickled with their leaves are pure — Rashi explains that since they were pickled in a pot, the leaves lose their status as a 'handle' that could convey impurity. This is not compelling, for if so, what would be the point of the Gemara's explanation that they were only pickled for the sake of appearance? What additional reasoning would that provide, if the mere pickling already nullifies their status as a handle? Therefore it seems correct to explain instead that they are pure because those leaves are not considered food, since they are fit for eating only by virtue of that pickling in the pot — and here they 'were only pickled for appearance,' meaning that the leaves were pickled together with the olives merely to show that the olives are fresh and new, and that is why they are pure. But if one pickled them in order to make them fit for eating, then from the time they become fit to be regarded as edible, they are impure.
  3. Thirteen yeshivot/versions — Some explain that this means there are thirteen academies among us expert [in this tractate], and that 'thirteen' is not meant literally but is simply an expression commonly used in the Gemara, like 'thirteen' (Chullin 44b) regarding plain zuzim. Rashi explained it differently.
  4. And minors are exempt from reciting Shema — Rashi explains this as referring to a minor who has reached the age of training in mitzvot. This is not compelling, for in the chapter 'Lulav HaGazul' (Sukkah 42a) it states: a minor who knows how to take care of tefillin — his father is obligated to buy him tefillin. This shows that once he has reached the age of training, such that tefillin become relevant to him, he is obligated in tefillin, and he should certainly be obligated in Shema all the more, since we find there that a minor who knows how to speak, his father teaches him Torah and the first verse of Shema. Rabbeinu Tam therefore holds that the mishna here is discussing a minor who has not yet reached the age of training. However, regarding the latter clause of the mishna, which states 'and they are obligated in prayer,' Rabbi Yitzchak said that this refers to a minor who has reached the age of training, for if he had not reached it, there would be no reason to obligate him in prayer. This too is not compelling, for if so, minors would not be comparable to women and slaves, who are exempt under all circumstances, whereas minors would only be exempt when they have not reached the age of training and do not know how to care for tefillin. Rather, Rabbeinu Tam explains that the entire passage refers to a minor who has not reached the age of training, and that the obligation in prayer stated in the latter clause applies only to women and slaves, while minors are completely exempt, since they have not reached the age of training. And if you ask: if so, why does the mishna list minors together with women and slaves, since they are not equivalent, as explained? The answer is that it is the style of the mishna to teach together women, slaves, and minors who have not reached the age of training, just as it does with women, slaves, and minors who are exempt from sukkah (Sukkah 28a).
Rashi on Berakhot 20b, in English Tab translation (26)
  1. ומן התפלין — Because typically a minor does not know how to guard his body so as not to pass gas while wearing them.
  2. וחייבין בתפלה — Because prayer is [an expression of seeking] mercy; and it is rabbinic in origin, and the Sages instituted it even for women and for the education of minors.
  3. ובמזוזה ובברכת המזון — Mezuza is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, and in the Gemara it asks: is this not obvious?
  4. ברכת המזון — In the Gemara it asks whether this obligation is by Torah law or by rabbinic law.
  5. גמ' מהו דתימא נקיש תפלין למזוזה — Lest you say: juxtapose phylacteries to mezuza, as it is written 'and you shall bind' followed by 'and you shall write' — just as women are obligated in mezuza, so too women would be obligated in phylacteries; this teaches us [that nevertheless they are exempt].
  6. הכי גרסינן תפלה דרחמי נינהו — This is the correct version: prayer is [an expression of seeking] mercy — and one should not read 'isn't that obvious,' for prayer is not a Torah obligation [and so it would not be obvious that women are obligated].
  7. נקיש מזוזה לתלמוד תורה — Juxtapose mezuza to Torah study, as it is written, 'and you shall teach them to your sons,' immediately followed by 'and you shall write them' — just as regarding Torah study women are exempt, and even though it is not time-bound the Torah exempted them, as it says 'your sons' and not 'your daughters' — so too mezuza, women would be exempt. This teaches us that women are obligated, as it is written 'so that your days and your children's days may be increased' — do men need life and women not need life? [stated rhetorically].
  8. קדוש היום מ"ע שהזמן גרמא הוא — 'Remember the Shabbat day to sanctify it' (Exodus 20) — remember it over wine.
  9. בשמירה — Through observance — that is, 'you shall not perform work' (ibid.).
  10. והני נשי איתנהו בשמירה — And these women are included in the obligation of observance — as we learned (Kiddushin 29a): regarding all negative commandments, whether time-bound or not time-bound, women are obligated, for the verse equated woman to man regarding all punishments stated in the Torah.
  11. נשים בברכת המזון דאורייתא — Women's obligation in Grace after Meals is by Torah law — as it is written, 'and you shall eat and be satisfied' (Deuteronomy 8:10), which is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound.
  12. או דרבנן — Or by rabbinic law — as it is written 'upon the good land that He has given you' (ibid.), and the land was not given to females for inheritance; and as for the daughters of Zelophehad, they took their father's portion, since he had been among those who left Egypt.
  13. בן — A minor.
  14. מברך — He recites Grace after Meals on behalf of his father, if his father does not know how to recite the blessing.
  15. שיעורא דרבנן — A rabbinic measure — such as an olive's bulk according to Rabbi Meir, or an egg's bulk according to Rabbi Yehuda — for by Torah law it is written 'and you shall eat and be satisfied' and then bless, but for such a small measure one is obligated only by rabbinic law. Therefore a minor, who is obligated by rabbinic law, can fulfill the obligation of an adult.
  16. עד כזית עד כביצה — Up to an olive's bulk, up to an egg's bulk — up to an olive's bulk according to Rabbi Meir, up to an egg's bulk according to Rabbi Yehuda, as we learned below (Berakhot 45a): until how much food must one eat to join a zimmun quorum? Rabbi Meir says: until an olive's bulk; Rabbi Yehuda says: until an egg's bulk.
  17. מתני' בעל קרי — One who had a seminal emission — this exemption dates from the enactment of Ezra onward, who instituted immersion for those who had seminal emissions before engaging in Torah study, as stated in Bava Kamma, in the chapter 'Merubeh' (Bava Kamma 82b).
  18. מהרהר — He contemplates — that is, he recites the Shema in his heart when its proper time arrives.
  19. ואינו מברך — And he does not recite a blessing — even through contemplation.
  20. לא לפניה ולא לאחריה — Neither before it nor after it — since these blessings are not a Torah obligation, the Sages did not require it of him [in this state].
  21. ועל המזון מברך לאחריו — But regarding food he does recite the blessing after it — because that obligation is by Torah law.
  22. ואינו מברך לפניו — But he does not recite a blessing before it — because that blessing is not by Torah law.
  23. רבי יהודה אומר וכו' — Rabbi Yehuda says, etc. — the Gemara will explain this.
  24. גמ' כדבור דמי — It is considered like actual speech — and indeed anyone can fulfill their obligation through such contemplation.
  25. למה מהרהר — What benefit is there in merely contemplating [if it does not count as speech]?
  26. Kedashkachan beSinai — just as we find regarding Sinai, that Moses separated the people from their wives, as it is written, "Do not approach a woman" (Exodus 19:15). Based on this precedent of separation, Ezra instituted that one who experienced a seminal emission must immerse before engaging in Torah study, as it is written, "and you shall make them known to your children" (Deuteronomy 4:10), and juxtaposed to this verse is "the day that you stood before the Lord your God at Horeb" — as we will explain later in this chapter (Berakhot 21b).
Tosafot on Berakhot 20b, in English Tab translation (7)
  1. Regarding prayer — obvious: Obvious that women are obligated, since it is written, 'Evening and morning and noon I pray and moan' (Psalms 55:18), making it seem like a time-bound positive mitzva (from which women would be exempt) — the Gemara teaches us that prayer is [fundamentally] a plea for mercy [and not truly time-bound]. Rashi does not have this reading of the text, since prayer is rabbinic, so what relevance would a positive mitzva have to it? Nevertheless, one can resolve this: Hallel too is rabbinic, yet women are exempt from it for the same reason — because it is treated as a time-bound positive mitzva — as we find in Sukkah (38a): one who was a slave, woman, or minor, others recite for him and he answers after them what they say; the listener does not thereby fulfill his obligation through their reading, since they themselves are exempt.
  2. Some have the reading: Grace after Meals — obvious: And the Gemara answers: since it is written, 'When the Lord gives you meat to eat in the evening and bread in the morning to the full' (Exodus 16:8), [one might think] it is like a time-bound positive mitzva — therefore the Gemara teaches us [that nevertheless women are obligated].
  3. Are women obligated in Grace after Meals by Torah law or by rabbinic law — Rashi explains that one might think they are not obligated by Torah law because it is written 'for the good land,' and women did not receive a portion in the land; and what the daughters of Zelophehad received was their father's portion. But this is difficult: priests and Levites also did not receive a portion in the land, so by this reasoning they too should not be able to discharge others of their obligation in Grace after Meals. Rather, one must say the reason is that it is written 'for Your covenant which You sealed in our flesh, and for Your Torah which You taught us,' and women are included in neither the covenant nor Torah study. And we say later (Berakhot 49a) that one who did not mention covenant and Torah in Grace after Meals has not fulfilled his obligation. Now the question is: since women cannot say 'covenant' and 'Torah,' is their obligation then only rabbinic? Or perhaps, since this simply does not apply to them, their obligation is nonetheless fully by Torah law? And the passage below is speaking of men, to whom covenant and Torah do apply.
  4. One who had a seminal emission contemplates in his heart but does not recite a blessing before or after it — meaning even mere contemplation [suffices], as is implied in the Gemara. This is why they were more lenient regarding Shema than regarding the blessings: Shema is Torah law while the blessings are rabbinic. And even according to the opinion that Shema itself is rabbinic, that leniency applies where he already mentioned the exodus from Egypt; but in our mishna, where he had not yet mentioned the exodus from Egypt, they did not permit him to recite 'Emet VeYatziv,' since Shema is Torah law and 'Emet VeYatziv' is rabbinic — for he mentions the exodus from Egypt within Shema itself. One should not ask: why not institute that he say 'Emet VeYatziv' instead of Shema — because it is preferable that he say Shema, which also contains acceptance of the kingship of Heaven.
  5. He shall bring it forth with his lips — since you permitted him mere contemplation, even though contemplation is treated like speech for the purpose of fulfilling the obligation of Shema, so too it is called speech for the purpose of being considered 'engaged in Torah study.' And since you permitted him to merely contemplate despite his being one who had a seminal emission, you should likewise permit him actual speech.
  6. As we find at Sinai — meaning: even though contemplation is treated like speech for fulfilling an obligation, it is nevertheless not treated like actual speech regarding forbidding one who had a seminal emission from contemplating [words of Torah] — as we find at Sinai, where there was [Divine] speech and the people needed to immerse themselves [in preparation], and even though they themselves were silent, the principle that 'the listener is like the one who speaks' applied (Sukkah 38b).
  7. And Rav Chisda said: it is not considered like speech — Rabbeinu Chananel explained that the halakha follows Rav Chisda, since Rav Adda and Rabbi Elazar formulated their statements accordingly, indicating that they hold like him — that one does not fulfill the obligation of Shema through mere contemplation.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Berachot, Brachos, Berachos, Brachot 20.