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Keritot 14 for kids: When Rules Add Up

כריתות י״ד

🧩 This daf asks when a second prohibition can join one that already applies. It looks at offerings and Yom Kippur, then at rules about forbidden family relationships.

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Stories from Keritot 14

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Keritot 14 in simple English

Rashi on Keritot 14a, in English Tab translation (22)
  1. A plain prohibition — A prohibition does not take effect when another already applies. For example, one who eats the carcass of a non-kosher animal is not also liable for eating a carcass, because that second prohibition is neither inclusive nor expanded.
  2. Since he became prohibited from eating other portions — Becoming impure also prohibited him from eating sacrificial meat that was otherwise permitted, so the prohibition extends to the forbidden fat. This is an inclusive prohibition: it adds restrictions on the person, not on the food.
  3. The prohibition against deriving benefit — This is an expanded prohibition, because it adds a restriction to the food itself.
  4. Leftover sacrificial meat — Its prohibition is also an expanded prohibition.
  5. Yom Kippur — Its prohibition is inclusive, because it prohibits the person from eating foods previously permitted to him.
  6. The mishna does not discuss two animals, and leftover meat and piggul cannot occur in one animal — Piggul arises only during the four blood services. Once the offering becomes piggul, it is fit neither for human consumption nor for the altar, so the prohibition of leftover meat does not take effect.
  7. Its piggul status has been abrogated — The altar sanctified it through the act of offering it. Ulla’s reasoning is explained in Zevaḥim 43a.
  8. If most of it is on the altar, throw it on the altar — Treat the entire limb as being on the altar, so all of it becomes leftover meat.
  9. Does one follow the majority with regard to limbs? — This question appears in the chapter “An Animal in Difficult Labor” in Ḥullin 70a.
  10. One olive-bulk — The mishna discusses one olive-bulk of forbidden fat, not two.
  11. A date-bulk contains two olive-bulks — The throat can hold that amount.
  12. For example, he ate a kidney with its forbidden fat — Eating the fat makes him liable for three sin offerings and a guilt offering; the kidney supplies another olive-bulk to complete the date-bulk. The mishna therefore does not teach piggul, since it does not discuss two olive-bulks of fat. One might suggest placing an olive-bulk of the kidney on the altar, leaving the fat as piggul and making the kidney leftover meat. But then the prohibition of leftover meat would not apply to the olive-bulk of fat, whereas the mishna requires one olive-bulk to bear all the prohibitions associated with the eating.
  13. Rather, it discusses one olive-bulk — If he placed half that olive-bulk on the altar, offering less than an olive-bulk does not count as burning it.
  14. For example, he ate a kidney with its forbidden fat — One cannot instead make him liable for piggul on the kidney and leftover meat on the fat: the mishna speaks of an impure person eating forbidden fat, so all the prohibitions must apply to the fat itself. This is my teacher’s explanation.
  15. Rav Pappa said — The mishna omits piggul because it does not discuss two olive-bulks of fat. As for the date-bulk, he completed the required amount by eating dates with the fat.
  16. And he answers it with a case where he ate an olive-bulk of piggul — It came from another animal, and he ate it together with the other food.
  17. And let it teach, ‘If he carried it out, he is liable’ — After all, it is Yom Kippur.
  18. One designated for the task — They designated him the previous day to lead the goat.
  19. This teaches — Since the mishna says ‘even on Shabbat,’ the restrictions on carrying and eruv do not apply on Yom Kippur. If carrying were prohibited on Yom Kippur, why would Shabbat need to be mentioned? If the task overrides Yom Kippur, it would likewise override Shabbat.
  20. Perhaps — We cannot infer the rule for Shabbat from Yom Kippur: on Yom Kippur, carrying may be necessary to perform this mitzva, just as the daily offerings are brought on Shabbat.
  21. His daughter and his sister — He had relations with his mother, and she bore a daughter.
  22. His brother’s wife — She had previously married his brother. After the brother died, their father’s brother married her, and this man, her father, had relations with her while she was menstruating.
Tosafot on Keritot 14a, in English Tab translation (9)
  1. Notar and piggul cannot apply to one animal — This implies that if the prohibition of notar could take effect on piggul, the mishna would list five sin offerings. But how could there be five? Someone who eats piggul while ritually impure is not liable for eating sacrificial food in a state of impurity, because the piggul was never permitted to the ritually pure. The Gemara should have said that notar, piggul, and impurity cannot all apply to one animal.
  2. Ulla said: A handful of a meal offering that is piggul — Why not ask about a limb? The Gemara says that if a limb from an offering slaughtered with improper timing was placed on the altar, it should not be taken down; Ulla adds that once the fire has taken hold, it may be put back even if taken down. This suggests that it has become fit for the altar and lost its piggul status. The answer is that the loss of piggul status is stated explicitly for the handful, but not for the limb.
  3. Its piggul status has lapsed — Rashi asks why a verse is needed to exclude the handful from liability for eating piggul: its permitting rite was not performed properly. He answers that the verse concerns a handful whose greater part caught fire, permitting the rest of the meal offering. But then its piggul status should lapse, as stated here. The case must be that only half the handful was placed on the altar; the half left off it retains its piggul status. Why not place that half on the altar even from the outset? Permission to put back half a handful applies when the whole handful was first placed on the altar and half was then removed, unlike this case. A verse is also needed to exclude the wholly burned libation meal offering and the anointed priest’s meal offering from piggul: although they permit nothing else, sanctification in a vessel establishes their potential piggul status.
  4. Resolve Rami bar Hama’s question whether limbs follow the majority — Rashi identifies this with a question in Hullin about whether an animal whose limb has mostly emerged is considered born when half the animal has emerged. Rabbeinu Tam disagrees: that question is unrelated. He identifies it instead with the question in Zevachim about the altar’s airspace and whether what is mostly on the ramp or altar has that location’s status. The Gemara’s challenge is whether this resolves Rami bar Hama’s question about whether parts of an offering placed on the altar count as connected.
  5. For example, he ate a kidney with its fat — Why is this different from eating two olive-bulks of fat? In this case, one cannot suggest separating the fat, leaving the kidney on the altar, and having notar take effect on it: the discussion does not concern two separate pieces.
  6. The throat cannot hold more than two olive-bulks — This means in the ordinary manner of eating.
  7. Carrying was grouped with the Sabbath prohibitions — Carrying was included among the other prohibited labors of Shabbat, but not among those of Yom Kippur. This is my teacher’s explanation.
  8. If it was Shabbat and he carried it out — How does carrying relate to eating? He carried the food in his mouth: he put it there in a private domain and took it into a public domain. Swallowing counts as setting it down, just as someone who carries two letters and writes them while walking is liable because writing them counts as setting them down.
  9. Rather, Rafram’s statement is mistaken — The same discussion appears in Yoma, but there the Gemara does not respond, as it does here, that the scapegoat may be different. It is common for a teaching to be sparse in one place and fuller in another.
Rashi on Keritot 14b, in English Tab translation (21)
  1. But Rabbi Meir does not hold this — Above, we could explain the case only as an inclusive or expanded prohibition.
  2. Since a prohibition was added regarding the other brothers — She became forbidden to them as their brother’s wife, so that prohibition also takes effect for him.
  3. She married his father’s brother — Since she became forbidden to his brothers as the wife of their father’s brother, the prohibition also takes effect for him.
  4. Another version reads: Since a prohibition was added regarding the sons of his father’s brother — They became forbidden to her because she is their father’s wife.
  5. His daughter’s daughter and his daughter-in-law — She became his daughter-in-law when his son married her.
  6. And his wife’s sister — He had married his son-in-law’s daughter by another woman. She was the paternal half sister of his own daughter’s daughter, the woman in the mishna.
  7. And his brother’s wife — After his son died, his brother married her.
  8. And his father’s brother’s wife — After his brother died, his father’s brother married her.
  9. If the elder transgressed — If this man’s father married her, and the man then had intercourse with her, he is also liable for intercourse with his father’s wife.
  10. Likewise, his wife’s daughter — He is liable for her as his wife’s daughter, daughter-in-law, brother’s wife, and so on; she is subject to all the prohibitions listed there.
  11. Is she permitted to him? — How can this man’s father marry her? She was married to his brother, as shown by the son’s liability for intercourse with his father’s brother’s wife. She is therefore forbidden to the father as his brother’s wife; marriage to her cannot take effect. Why, then, does Rabbi Yosei say the son is liable for intercourse with his father’s wife?
  12. She fell to him for levirate marriage — His brother died childless, and he married her through levirate marriage.
  13. If so, why say the elder transgressed? — He did nothing wrong under the laws of forbidden relatives. One might object that she is his daughter-in-law, since his son is liable for intercourse with his brother’s wife. But that brother could be the son’s maternal brother, who is only his father’s stepson. The stepson’s wife is permitted to the father.
  14. He transgressed because she was his son’s daughter-in-law — This is a secondary relative forbidden by rabbinic law: his son is liable for intercourse with her as his daughter-in-law. One could also answer that she is his son’s granddaughter, another secondary relative; the Gemara gives just one reason.
  15. Two death penalties — The penalties for intercourse with his mother-in-law and with a married woman are burning and strangulation, respectively; burning is the harsher penalty.
  16. According to the first prohibition that applied — Not the later one, because a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already applies.
  17. Rabbi Yosei agrees — In the mishna, he accepts an expanded prohibition; the same applies to an inclusive prohibition or to prohibitions that take effect simultaneously, as explained below. If she was first his mother-in-law and then became a married woman, marriage added a prohibition for everyone else. Even so, he is sentenced for intercourse with his mother-in-law because its penalty is harsher. But if she was first a married woman and then became his mother-in-law, the later prohibition is neither inclusive nor expanded.
  18. Here, if his father married his daughter’s daughter, what prohibition was expanded? — How could the prohibition against intercourse with his father’s wife also take effect for this man?
  19. The grandfather has another son — That son is this man’s brother. Since the woman becomes forbidden to the other son as his father’s wife, that prohibition also takes effect for this man.
  20. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: for his mother-in-law and her mother — He had married the woman’s daughter and granddaughter. As for his father-in-law’s mother, he had married her son’s daughter.
  21. All three are one category — They are written in one biblical verse under one prohibition, so they do not require separate sin offerings.
Tosafot on Keritot 14b, in English Tab translation (8)
  1. She married his brother, so that a prohibition was added — This means the prohibition against a brother’s wife. But she is a mamzer, so how can that prohibition take effect when she is already forbidden to his brother as a mamzer? The case can be one in which the brother is also a mamzer, so that prohibition does not apply to him. Alternatively, as explained above, a more severe prohibition can take effect over a less severe one.
  2. Since a prohibition was added regarding the brothers’ sons — Two prohibitions are added here: the wife of one’s father and the wife of one’s father’s brother. Both are cases of an expanded prohibition.
  3. One who has intercourse with his daughter’s daughter — Rabbeinu Baruch asks why the mishna does not also count the daughter of his wife’s son. His daughter could marry his wife’s son and have a daughter, making the child both his daughter’s daughter and his wife’s son’s daughter at once. Similarly, why does the later case not count both the daughter of his wife’s son and the daughter of his own daughter? Jacob could marry Rachel and Leah, who are not sisters. Rachel has a son by another man; that son marries Leah’s daughter by Jacob, and they have a daughter. She has both relationships to Jacob. This is resolved by the explanation below that the mishna deals only with expanded prohibitions. Rabbi Yom Tov also asks why it does not count a mother-in-law: if a man married his daughter’s daughter’s daughter, his daughter’s daughter would be his mother-in-law. The first tanna does not discuss a case requiring a forbidden marriage; for the same reason, he does not count his wife’s mother’s mother or father’s mother, who are relatives forbidden by rabbinic law. Even though Rabbi Yosei does discuss the elder’s forbidden marriage, these cases involve inclusive prohibitions. Even if Rabbi Ḥiyya holds that Rabbi Yosei accepts an inclusive prohibition, that applies when both prohibitions have the same name, not different names. This also explains why, in Rabbi Ḥiyya’s view, a man whose wife later becomes his mother-in-law is not sentenced for intercourse with a mother-in-law: the two prohibitions have different names.
  4. And his wife’s sister — Rabbi Yitzḥak says this phrase should not be in the text: it would make seven prohibitions, whereas the mishna says six. Why not list seven? Suppose Jacob’s daughter Dinah had a daughter, and Jacob married that daughter’s paternal half-sister. Dinah’s daughter would then be both his granddaughter and his wife’s sister. The latter prohibition would be inclusive: his marriage forbids him to his wife’s other sisters, and so it also forbids him to Dinah’s daughter. The mishna, however, lists only prohibitions Rabbi Yosei accepts here—expanded prohibitions. Even if Rabbi Ḥiyya holds that Rabbi Yosei also accepts inclusive prohibitions, the mishna need not list them. Could the two prohibitions instead take effect simultaneously? Jacob could marry a daughter of the man to whom Dinah was married, before Dinah had a daughter by that man. When Dinah later had a daughter, the child would at once be Jacob’s granddaughter and his wife’s sister. But the mishna counts a prohibition arising through marriage only when it takes effect at the time of marriage, not one that takes effect upon a later birth. Similarly, the Gemara cannot explain every prohibition in the mishna as taking effect simultaneously when a girl betrothed before age three reaches three years and one day: the marriage-based prohibitions did not take effect at betrothal. Alternatively, as explained above, the mishna addresses only expanded prohibitions.
  5. Because he transgressed the rabbinic prohibition against his son’s daughter-in-law — The first tanna does not count this case because the marriage is forbidden by rabbinic law.
  6. Rabbi Yosei accepts an expanded prohibition — A more severe prohibition can take effect over a less severe one, as can an equally severe prohibition—for example, those concerning a brother’s wife and a wife’s sister. A less severe prohibition cannot take effect over a more severe one, even if it is expanded. Thus, although the mishna lists many prohibitions, Rabbi Yosei, who adds the prohibition concerning a father’s wife, does not accept them all. The prohibition against a daughter-in-law, punishable by stoning, can take effect over that against a granddaughter, punishable by burning; and the prohibition against a father’s wife can take effect over that against a daughter-in-law, since both carry stoning. But the prohibition against a married woman, punishable by strangulation, cannot take effect over prohibitions punishable by burning or stoning. Certainly the prohibitions concerning a wife’s sister, a brother’s wife, a father’s brother’s wife, and a menstruating woman, which carry karet but no court-imposed death penalty, cannot take effect over them. For Rabbi Yosei, then, only three apply: granddaughter, daughter-in-law, and father’s wife.
  7. Rabbi Yosei accepts an expanded prohibition — Rashi explains that he also accepts an inclusive prohibition, but that does not appear to follow from the discussion in the chapter Four Brothers.
  8. His brother’s wife — This means his maternal brother’s wife. If the brother shared his father, how could the elder marry her? She would be the elder’s daughter-in-law, and marriage to her would not take effect. This implies that intercourse with a maternal brother’s wife carries karet and, if done unwittingly, requires a sin offering. The exclusion in the Sifra concerns the punishment of childlessness, not karet.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Kerisus, Kritot, Kerithoth 14.