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Daf Yomi for kids · Talmud Bavli · Masechet Keritot

Keritot 22 for kids: Blood in the Heart

כריתות כ״ב

🫀 This daf asks which kinds of blood have different rules. It also asks what offering someone brings if they are unsure whether they misused consecrated property.

Daf Yomi day:

In the app: the Gemara with Rashi and Tosafot, the printed page, games made from this daf, play coins and treasure chests.

Stories from Keritot 22

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Keritot 22 in simple English

Rashi on Keritot 22a, in English Tab translation (27)
  1. That was separated — blood that left a person and entered a vessel or fell onto a loaf of bread.
  2. Milk of bipeds — a woman’s milk.
  3. You were lenient regarding its contact — a non-kosher animal does not have zav emissions or menstruation.
  4. Not the same for all — milk is permitted from a kosher animal but forbidden from a non-kosher animal.
  5. They taught — one does not violate the prohibition only in the case of a bird’s heart, whose blood is less than an olive-bulk.
  6. Its own blood — blood absorbed in the heart’s flesh, like blood absorbed in other limbs.
  7. That comes to it from elsewhere — blood found in the heart’s cavity.
  8. It draws in — as the animal breathes, the heart draws blood from the place of slaughter and gathers it inside.
  9. It draws in — in French, *humer*, “to suck in.”
  10. Marginal note: It draws in — this is lifeblood, for which, as stated at the beginning of the chapter, one incurs karet. End of note.
  11. Blood from bloodletting — at first it is black, then red; both flow slowly without spurting outward. It then spurts, and finally, as the blood diminishes, it trickles down close by.
  12. As long as it spurts — this is the middle stage.
  13. From the last black drop onward — once the initial black blood ends and the blood begins to turn red, it is lifeblood.
  14. The first and last — the red blood before and after the spurting. The baraita gives its reason as slow flowing, and these stages also flow slowly.
  15. Not to exclude the black blood — for it too is like residual blood.
  16. And drinks the blood of the slain — blood that comes from the slain, meaning after death, is called a liquid. This excludes spurting blood, which comes before death: it is lifeblood and is not called a liquid, so it does not make produce susceptible to impurity.
  17. For the first, everyone agrees he is liable — because spurting blood is mixed into it.
  18. One sin offering — for the first blood, because spurting blood is mixed into it.
  19. Blood — the verse could have said simply “blood.” What does “any blood” teach in the verse that continues, “and shall be cut off”?
  20. For it is stated, “For the blood makes atonement by reason of the life” — this suggests liability only for blood fit for atonement by sprinkling on the altar: lifeblood from an offering. “By reason of the life” suggests that only lifeblood makes atonement.
  21. And residual blood — from offerings.
  22. It is Rabbi Yehuda’s view — evidently he holds that residual blood does not make atonement, since a separate inclusion from “any” was needed to prohibit it.
  23. Mishnah: He does not bring payment for his misuse — he need not pay the money.
  24. He brings payment for misuse — the money and an additional fifth.
  25. Marginal note — This is what the verse means by “that which he has sinned against the sacred property”: he pays the value of his benefit plus an additional fifth in money and gives it to the priest in charge of the treasury. The money goes toward voluntary offerings for the altar. Tosafot.
  26. For two selaim — It is purchased for two selaim, as it says in Leviticus 5: “At your valuation, in silver…”
  27. Of the kind he brings, and so on — Therefore, he can bring it and stipulate what it is for.
Tosafot on Keritot 22a, in English Tab translation (4)
  1. If he did not tear it, he does not transgress — The Gemara applies this to a bird’s heart, which contains less than an olive-bulk of blood. Even so, it is forbidden according to the view that the Torah forbids consuming less than the minimum amount. He is not flogged, however, because the blood does not amount to an olive-bulk.
  2. The teaching refers to the heart’s own blood — The text should not read, “The teaching says one is not liable for it,” since the baraita does not say that specifically about the heart. Why, then, does the Gemara challenge Rav from the baraita rather than from the mishna, which explicitly says that one is not liable for blood of the spleen or heart? The mishna could be referring to a bird’s heart. The baraita cannot, because it says these cases are subject to a prohibition punishable by lashes.
  3. The blood of the slain, excluding spurting blood — Rashi explains here that blood from an animal that has already died renders food susceptible to impurity, but blood spurting as it dies does not. In Ḥullin, however, Rashi explains that the blood by which it becomes a corpse renders food susceptible, but blood spurting after it has become a corpse does not. This is difficult, since our discussion indicates that spurting blood is the blood released as life departs. The discussion also suggests that human and animal blood differ: human blood released after death renders food susceptible, but blood released as life departs does not; animal blood released after death does not render food susceptible. As stated in Pesaḥim, even for non-sacred food, blood that merely drains out does not render food susceptible. Neither blood released at death nor blood from a wound does so; only blood from slaughter does, as derived from “You shall pour it out like water.”
  4. He collected its blood in two cups — The first cup contains spurting blood, and the second contains blood released afterward. If he ate the blood during two separate lapses of awareness, he is liable for two sin offerings.
Rashi on Keritot 22b, in English Tab translation (28)
  1. “And if anyone sin” — This is written about the provisional guilt offering. Just before it, Leviticus discusses the guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property.
  2. To require a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse — At this point, the Gemara assumes this follows from the passages being written next to each other.
  3. The earlier passage — The passage about misuse of consecrated property.
  4. From the later passage — From the passage about the provisional guilt offering.
  5. If so — If, as the Rabbis hold, the earlier passage cannot be learned from the later one, we would have no source requiring cattle brought as sin offerings or burnt offerings to be slaughtered in the north. Leviticus states that requirement for sheep and goats, and Zevachim 41a derives it for cattle by learning the earlier passage from the later one.
  6. “Commandments” — This word appears both in the passage about the provisional guilt offering and in the passage about the sin offering.
  7. By death — At the hand of Heaven.
  8. The sin offering for forbidden fat — This means the ordinary sin offering. Forbidden fat is mentioned because the passage about the sin offering follows the prohibition on eating fat and blood in Leviticus.
  9. To exclude sliding-scale offerings — For example, those brought for hearing a call to testify and failing to testify, violating an oath, or defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods. Uncertainty about these offenses does not require a provisional guilt offering.
  10. Marginal note: The correct text reads — Rather, Rabbi Akiva’s reason here is that the verse says, “And if anyone sin.”
  11. Let us say they disagree about this — One sage holds that the analogy created by the adjoining passages takes precedence, while the other holds that the verbal analogy takes precedence.
  12. No; everyone agrees that the analogy created by the adjoining passages takes precedence — For such an analogy cannot be refuted. The Rabbis can say that it teaches the cost of the later offering from the earlier one: silver shekels.
  13. Rabbi Akiva holds that the guilt offering’s cost in silver shekels is derived from “This is the law of” — The analogy between the adjoining passages therefore teaches the law of the earlier passage from the later one. This explains the Torah’s wording and agrees with the main commentary, but states it more fully. End of marginal note.
  14. The letter vav adds to the preceding subject — Thus the analogy between the adjoining passages overrides the verbal analogy on this point, so the verbal analogy necessarily applies only in part.
  15. The earlier passage specifies silver shekels — The analogy between the adjoining passages teaches the law of the later offering from the earlier one, not the earlier offering from the later one, which would make the verbal analogy apply only in part.
  16. “And Rabbi Akiva holds there is no partial analogy between adjoining passages” should be omitted — That is not the issue here. Zevachim 48a gives this entire discussion without that phrase. Instead, the text reads: “And from where does Rabbi Akiva derive that the guilt offering costs silver shekels?” Thus the analogy between the adjoining passages must override the verbal analogy and make it apply only in part; otherwise, what would that analogy teach?
  17. This works for one who derives a law from “the law of” — As in the opening discussion of Menachot 3b, which derives from “And this is the law of the meal offering” that one law applies to all meal offerings.
  18. This works for one who derives a law — Rabbi Akiva can then say that the analogy between the adjoining passages is not needed to establish the guilt offering’s cost in silver shekels, because that is derived elsewhere. The analogy is needed instead to require a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse.
  19. “Your valuation,” “your valuation” — The repeated expression links the provisional guilt offering to the guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property.
  20. The guilt offering for relations with a designated maidservant is derived through the shared word “ram” — The reference to a nazirite’s guilt offering in some texts is an error: Numbers 6 prescribes a year-old lamb for it. As Keritot 10b states, if a two-year-old ram is valued at two sela, a year-old lamb is valued at one sela.
  21. What does “and if he is uncertain” mean? — It is obvious that he is uncertain.
  22. In the end — Even if, for a small misuse, he makes restitution and brings his offering conditionally, he has not avoided the possibility of bringing two guilt offerings. If he later learns that he certainly misused the property, he must bring a definite guilt offering. The Gemara initially assumes this parallels a sin offering: One who brings a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty must still bring a sin offering if the offense becomes certain.
  23. From the words of both of them — From the words of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon, who agree about a small misuse.
  24. Initial knowledge is not required — Therefore, an offering brought conditionally because of uncertainty counts as his definite guilt offering if he later learns that he did misuse the property.
  25. A bird sin offering — If a woman is unsure whether she gave birth in a way that requires an offering, she brings a pair of birds. She brings the burnt offering on condition: If she is obligated, it fulfills that obligation; otherwise, it is a voluntary offering. She also brings the sin offering because of the uncertainty, but it is not eaten.
  26. It becomes definite — It is treated as a definite guilt offering and eaten by the priests.
  27. Rabbi Akiva requires it — Rabbi Akiva follows his own view that one must bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property.
  28. Both bring one guilt offering — They bring it jointly, and each says to the other: “If you ate the piece of consecrated food, I relinquish my share, and the entire guilt offering is yours.”
Tosafot on Keritot 22b, in English Tab translation (1)
  1. If she learns before its neck is pinched, etc., she makes it a definite offering — meaning that it is eaten like any other sin offering. Why specify that she learns before the neck is pinched? Even if she learns afterward, the priests should be allowed to eat it. The lack of definite knowledge at the time of pinching is no obstacle: Rabbi Yosei agrees that someone who still needs an offering to permit her to eat consecrated food does not need prior knowledge. If the concern is a decree lest people say that a bird sin offering brought in a case of uncertainty may be eaten, that fits Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that even if she learns after the pinching that she definitely gave birth, it may not be eaten because of such a decree. But according to Rav, it may be eaten if she learns before the blood is sprinkled. Why, then, does the teaching not say “after the pinching”? The answer is that the same rule applies after the pinching; the teaching excludes only a case in which she learns after the blood is sprinkled. In that case, people would certainly come to say that a bird sin offering brought in a case of uncertainty may be eaten.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Kerisus, Kritot, Kerithoth 22.