Kids Daf Quest

Daf Yomi for kids · Talmud Bavli · Masechet Meilah

Meilah 16 for kids: Cow, Camel & Creepers

מעילה ט״ז

🐪 This daf asks when two half-pieces of forbidden food join together to make a full forbidden amount. It compares carcasses of kosher and non-kosher animals, and also looks at how much of a creeping animal one must eat to be punished.

Daf Yomi day:

📖 Open Meilah 16a in Daf QuestOpen Meilah 16b in Daf Quest

In the app: the Gemara with Rashi and Tosafot, the printed page, games made from this daf, play coins and treasure chests.

Stories from Meilah 16

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 16 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 16a, in English Tab translation (13)
  1. Amar Rav lo shanu — Rav said: They only taught that carcasses join with one another — meaning even the carcass of a non-kosher animal with the carcass of a kosher animal — with regard to ritual impurity, since the verse "one who touches its carcass becomes impure" (Leviticus 11:39) is written regarding both. But with regard to eating, to be liable for it under the prohibition "You shall not eat any carcass" (Deuteronomy 14:21), they do not join together; rather, kosher carcasses join only with each other, and non-kosher carcasses join only with each other, because a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists — the prohibition of carcass cannot attach to and take effect upon the prohibition of a non-kosher animal. Therefore they do not join together.
  2. VeLevi amar afilu la'achila nami metzarfei — And Levi says: Even with regard to eating they do join together, for he holds that a prohibition does take effect where another prohibition already exists, and one is liable for two violations: one for eating a non-kosher animal, and one for eating a carcass.
  3. Ika de'amri — There are those who say: This statement of Rav Asi disagrees with Rav, and we can establish that what Rav Asi means by "kosher is distinct and non-kosher is distinct" applies both to impurity and to eating, and he interprets the mishna's statement that "all carcasses join together" as meaning kosher carcasses join among themselves and non-kosher carcasses join among themselves — even with regard to impurity. This is a disagreement with Rav. And there are those who say he does not disagree, for we can also interpret Rav Asi's statement in accordance with Rav: when Rav Asi says "kosher is distinct," he means only with regard to eating, but with regard to impurity they do indeed join together, which is consistent with Rav's view.
  4. Mitat para vechayei gamal — The death of a cow and the life of a camel: meaning, if one took half an olive-bulk from a dead cow and cut off half an olive-bulk from a live camel and ate them, they do not join together to create liability, neither for the prohibition of carcass (from the dead cow) nor for the prohibition of a limb from a living animal (from the live camel).
  5. Ha mitat shneihem — This implies that if one took half an olive-bulk from a dead cow and half an olive-bulk from a dead camel, they do join together with regard to impurity. This poses a difficulty for Rav Asi according to the view that he disagrees with Rav, who said that even with regard to impurity, non-kosher and kosher remain distinct from each other. But this is not a difficulty for Rav, since Rav can establish that this inferred ruling — that the death of both join together — refers specifically to impurity.
  6. Eima ha chayei shneihen metzarfin — Rather, say: It is when both are alive that they join together, to constitute an olive-bulk for the prohibition of a limb from a living animal.
  7. Umani Rabbi Yehuda hi — And who taught this? It is Rabbi Yehuda, who said in the chapter 'Gid HaNasheh' (Chullin 101b) that the prohibition of a limb from a living animal applies also to a non-kosher animal.
  8. Aval mitat shneihen [mai] lo metzarfei — But if both are dead, what is the halakha? Do they not join together? — because kosher carcasses are distinct in themselves and non-kosher carcasses are distinct in themselves.
  9. Im ken amai rahit vetani — If so, why does the tanna run to teach specifically: 'the death of a cow and the life of a camel do not join together,' since one is dead and the other alive? We might have said that even if both are dead they do not join together, so why not simply state: 'the death of a cow and the death of a camel do not join together'? Rather, it must be that since it taught 'the death of a cow and the life of a camel do not join together,' it implies that he holds that if both are dead, they do join together — and this poses a difficulty for Rav Asi.
  10. Ve'od tanya chatzi zayit para vechu — And furthermore, it is taught: 'Half an olive-bulk from a cow and half an olive-bulk from a camel, whether both are alive or both are dead, join together.' This is the latter clause of the same baraita cited above, which had stated 'the death of a cow and the life of a camel.'
  11. Kashya reisha — The first clause, which taught 'the death of a cow and the life of a camel... do not join together,' implying that if both are dead they do not join together, is difficult when compared to the latter clause, which taught 'but half an olive-bulk from a cow, whether alive or dead...join together.' Rather, must we not conclude from the latter clause that the death of both does indeed join together? If so, the first clause should also mean that the death of both join together, which is a difficulty for Rav Asi according to the view that he disagrees with Rav.
  12. Amar lecha Rav Asi hai tanna kasavar issur chal al issur — Rav Asi could say to you: This tanna holds that a prohibition takes effect even where another prohibition already exists. Even though there is already a prohibition of a non-kosher animal, there is also a separate prohibition of carcass, so they join together. But I (Rav Asi) do not hold this way; rather, I hold that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and therefore the death of both does not join together. The baraita's first clause, teaching that the death of a cow and the life of a camel do not join together, refers to combining the prohibition of a carcass with the prohibition of a limb from a living animal of a non-kosher animal, where the prohibition of a carcass cannot attach to and take effect upon the prohibition of a limb from a living animal. And the latter clause, teaching that a cow, whether alive or dead, joins with a camel, refers to a case where there is no prohibition of carcass at all, since a non-kosher animal has no prohibition of carcass, only the prohibition of being a non-kosher animal and of a limb from a living animal. Alternatively, the difficulty might be understood as between the first and last clauses: the first clause teaches that half an olive-bulk from a live cow and half an olive-bulk from a dead camel do not join together, which is difficult against the latter clause teaching that a cow and a camel, whether alive or dead, do join together — implying that this includes a case where one is dead and the other alive. Rather, must we not conclude that the death of both joins together? So one must explain that the latter clause actually means: whether both are alive, or both are dead — and this does pose a difficulty for Rav Asi according to the view that he disagrees with Rav, implying that he holds that even for impurity they do not join together.
  13. Amar lecha Rav Asi hai tanna savar vechu — Rav Asi could say to you: This tanna holds [that a prohibition takes effect even where another prohibition already exists] — but I do not hold this way.
Tosafot on Meilah 16a, in English Tab translation (5)
  1. And there are those who say that [Rav Asi] does not disagree with Rav — When Rav Asi says that kosher carcasses are distinct and non-kosher carcasses are distinct, he means this with regard to eating, but with regard to impurity he concedes to Rav.
  2. The Gemara raises an objection: the carcass of a dead cow and the flesh of a living camel do not join together, implying that if both are dead they do join together — This poses a difficulty for Rav Asi according to the version that says he disagrees with Rav, but it is not raised against Rav, because Rav interprets this baraita as referring to impurity. This indeed seems implied from the fact that shortly afterward it says 'Rav Asi could say to you,' showing the difficulty is specifically against Rav Asi. Furthermore, how could Rav interpret this as referring to impurity? The statement that the carcass of a dead cow and the flesh of a living camel do not join together must actually be referring to the prohibition of eating — meaning that if one ate half an olive-bulk from a dead cow and half an olive-bulk from a living camel, they do not combine to create liability, neither for the prohibition of eating a carcass nor for impurity. It cannot be referring to impurity, since no impurity at all applies to flesh from a living camel, as stated in the chapter 'HaOr VehaRotev' (Chullin 128b), that flesh separated from a living animal does not transmit impurity. One can answer that 'the living camel' here refers to a limb from a living animal, to which impurity does apply, as stated there in Torat Kohanim, because it has no replacement and is similar to a carcass. But then one may ask: why would joining be necessary, since we say there that such a limb has no minimum measure? One can answer that nevertheless it is required that there be flesh along with sinews and bones; here the case involves sinews and bones but no flesh, so joining is needed before it can become impure. Still it is difficult: how can the Gemara reject the inference that if both are alive they join together? We say at the end of the chapter 'Gid HaNasheh' (Chullin 103b) that even with a whole limb, if one divided it from outside before eating, one does not transgress — showing that if one divided a limb in two and ate it all, one is exempt. All the more so an olive-bulk composed of two halves from two different limbs should be exempt. This shows that the baraita must be referring to the prohibition of eating. If so, why isn't the difficulty raised against Rav just as it is against Rav Asi? One can answer that indeed it is raised even against Rav, and the Gemara says 'Rav Asi could say to you' only because it holds that Rav Asi does not disagree with Rav; whatever resolves the difficulty for Rav Asi likewise resolves it for Rav. My teacher, may he live, further says that according to the version that Rav Asi does not disagree with Rav, then Rav and Rav Asi are essentially the same, and Rav Asi is speaking in the name of Rav, since he was his disciple.
  3. This is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda — As he states in the chapter 'Gid HaNasheh' (Chullin 101b), that the prohibition of a limb from a living animal applies to both non-kosher and kosher animals; the same applies to flesh from a living animal. Therefore, the two halves from the living animals join together to create liability for eating, on account of the prohibition of a limb from a living animal.
  4. Why does it specifically run to teach of the carcass of a dead cow and the flesh of a living camel — That is, why does it specifically mention these two cases? The wording of Rabbeinu Moshe of Coucy regarding Meilah differs from other places.
  5. And furthermore, it is taught: half an olive-bulk, etc. — But half an olive-bulk from a cow, etc., do join together; so the first clause is difficult against the latter clause, showing that if both are dead they join together. This means that even the latter clause of this baraita, which says 'whether when dead or when alive,' referring for example to the flesh of a living camel and the carcass of a dead cow or vice versa, states that they join together — but if so, the first clause would contradict the latter. Rather, this shows that the correct inference is that if both are dead, they join together. One can answer that the latter clause means both when both are dead and when both are alive; and the reason it is phrased this way is only to resolve the baraita so that it not be considered a corrupted text, for even if it meant one alive and one dead, it would still prove that the case of both being dead works. [The Gemara answers:] Rav Asi could say to you that this tanna holds that a prohibition takes effect even where another prohibition already exists, whereas I speak according to the opinion that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, as we explained above, that all the amora'im disagree in accordance with the view that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.
Rashi on Meilah 16b, in English Tab translation (14)
  1. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said — Regarding eating creeping animals: one is flogged for them only for an olive-bulk, not for a lentil-bulk.
  2. What is the reason? Because 'eating' is written concerning them — "You shall not eat them, for they are detestable" (Leviticus 11:42), and 'eating' is never less than an olive-bulk.
  3. The verse opens with eating — For what is written (Leviticus 20), "You shall not make your souls detestable," refers to eating, since when one eats them he makes himself detestable.
  4. And it ends with impurity — "Which I have set apart for you as impure." This teaches you: just as the impurity of a creeping animal applies at a lentil-bulk, so too one is flogged for eating them at a lentil-bulk.
  5. And Rabbi Yoḥanan praised — this teaching of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina, and this poses a difficulty for Rav Yehuda's statement in the name of Rav, who said the measure is an olive-bulk.
  6. This is not difficult; here it refers to when they are alive, there to when they are dead — The ruling of an olive-bulk applies when one eats them while alive, but when one eats them after death, he is flogged even for a lentil-bulk, similar to the law of ritual impurity.
  7. But doesn't Rav also rely on the mishna? — And how do we know this? Because Rav stated above, 'They taught this only with regard to eating,' and that statement certainly relies on the mishna 'all carcasses combine.' Here too, Rav's statement that one is flogged for eating creeping animals at an olive-bulk relies on the mishna 'all creeping animals combine with one another,' and that mishna discusses the case when they are dead, since it teaches 'all carcasses combine with one another' — referring to when they are dead. Since it relies on the mishna, this implies that Rav's measure of an olive-bulk also refers to when they are dead — so how can this be reconciled with the answer that Rav was speaking of when they are alive?
  8. 'That there is a bit of this, etc.' — We have not heard an explanation of this phrase.
  9. Rav Yosef said to Abaye: That inference is yours — Meaning: this inference you are drawing, that Rav relies on the mishna, is your own conclusion, not mine. In fact, Rav's statement 'one is flogged for eating creeping animals, etc.' does not rely on the mishna, but is simply an independent halakhic statement.
  10. 'And Rabbi Yoḥanan praised him' — the Gemara now raises an objection against the earlier statement that Rabbi Yoḥanan praised Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina's teaching, which implied that one is liable at a lentil-bulk.
  11. 'Limbs have no minimum measure' — A whole limb, of any size, imparts impurity even if it is less than an olive-bulk (in the case of a carcass) or less than a lentil-bulk (in the case of a creeping animal), since being a whole limb makes it significant, even though it lacks the usual minimum measure.
  12. 'And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: one who eats them is flogged only for an olive-bulk' — This now implies that Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to this baraita about limbs, which certainly discusses the case when they are dead, since it teaches a measure even less than an olive-bulk for carcasses, and Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled that one is flogged only at an olive-bulk. But how then could Rabbi Yoḥanan have praised the teaching that one is flogged for a lentil-bulk, which we established likewise refers to when they are dead? This poses a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and another.
  13. Rava said: the verse speaks of those that are set apart — The praise Rabbi Yoḥanan gave to the teaching, 'just as impurity applies at a lentil-bulk, so too eating applies at a lentil-bulk,' refers specifically to those eight creeping animals about which the Torah states 'you shall separate' — these are set apart from other creeping animals and are more stringent regarding impurity, since other creeping animals do not impart impurity at all, only these eight. It is about these that the verse speaks, implying that eating too applies at a lentil-bulk. Rabbi Yoḥanan's other statement, that one is flogged only at an olive-bulk, does not refer to the baraita about limbs; rather, that baraita certainly discusses creeping animals that are not set apart, and regarding those, Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled that one is flogged only at an olive-bulk.
  14. If that is so — that the verse speaks of those set apart, so that the measure differs between those set apart and those not set apart, then the same should apply to an animal too, since the Torah juxtaposed it with creeping animals in one verse — the carcass of a non-kosher animal and of a kosher animal alongside creeping animals, as it is written, 'and you shall separate... among all that swarms on the earth.' Shall we then say that here too the verse distinguishes between the set-apart and the not-set-apart, so that the ruling that a carcass imparts impurity at an olive-bulk refers to the 'set apart' one — namely, the kosher animal, called 'set apart' because it is separated from non-kosher animals, being permitted for consumption — while a non-kosher animal, which is not 'set apart,' would not impart impurity unless there is more than an olive-bulk, requiring an egg-bulk?
Tosafot on Meilah 16b, in English Tab translation (6)
  1. What is the reason? Because eating is written regarding them — An unqualified reference to 'eating' in the Torah means an olive-bulk.
  2. It opens with eating and concludes with impurity — As it is written: 'And you shall separate between the animal (that is impure and that which is pure)... and you shall not make your souls detestable by animal, or by bird, or by anything that swarms on the ground.' Here the verse opens with eating, since 'making the soul detestable' relates to eating, and it then writes 'which I have set apart for you as impure,' meaning to render others impure through contact — this is 'concluding with impurity.' That is to say, the verse opens with eating and concludes with impurity in order to teach that the measure for eating equals the measure for impurity: just as impurity applies at the volume of a lentil-bulk (as is expounded elsewhere, that the Sages fixed the minimum size of the weasel-like creeping creature, in its earliest formation, as a lentil-bulk).
  3. And Rabbi Yoḥanan praised him — Rabbi Yoḥanan praised Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina for arranging this baraita before him. If so, this is difficult for Rav, who says the measure is an olive-bulk, and this is not merely one individual's view against another's, for it seems that Rav's reasoning is that no one disputes it, and moreover he derives his ruling from verses.
  4. Here it is speaking of their death, there of their lives — That is, when they are dead, there is impurity at a lentil-bulk, so one says the prohibition of eating has the same measure as impurity; but when alive, there is no impurity, so one says that one is flogged for eating them only at an olive-bulk. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: But did not Rav base his statement on our mishnah, which discusses creeping animals whether dead or alive? Rav Yosef replied: That inference is yours — meaning, this deduction is your own; I have no part in it. Rav was stating an independent halakha, not relying on the mishnah. Abaye, however, assumed that Rav's statement was based on the mishnah, similar to the earlier case, which was limited only to the halakhot of impurity.
  5. And Rabbi Yoḥanan praised him — [said] with surprise: An objection is raised from the mishna about limbs, etc. That is to say: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan really praise him, when there is in fact a refutation of this, since it creates a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and another? [The mishna states that] limbs have no minimum measure, even though for a carcass we require an olive-bulk and for a creeping animal a lentil-bulk; nevertheless for limbs no measure at all is required. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one is flogged only for an olive-bulk, whereas earlier he said that a lentil-bulk suffices. If you would say to resolve this by distinguishing between death and life [as before], the answer is that here too all agree that the case is speaking of their being dead, since the baraita about the limbs is discussing a case of death, as indicated by the word 'they impart impurity.'
  6. Rava said: Scripture speaks of those that are set apart — That is, when Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the prohibition follows the measure of impurity, he meant specifically the eight creeping animals set apart in the verse [whose impurity applies at a lentil-bulk]; and when Rabbi Yoḥanan said that one is flogged only for an olive-bulk, he was speaking of other creeping animals, which do not impart impurity, so that one cannot apply to them the rule that the prohibition follows the measure of impurity. One might ask: Since earlier the resolution distinguished between dead and alive, why not here distinguish, as is done now, between those set apart and those not set apart? The answer is that if Rav's earlier statement referred to creeping animals not set apart, what novelty would there be in teaching that an olive-bulk is required, since that is obvious, just as with all other prohibitions in the Torah? Still, this raises a difficulty: if so, what novelty is there in Rabbi Yoḥanan's statement either, since it too would be speaking of other creeping animals to which impurity does not apply? Furthermore, if Rabbi Yoḥanan's statement here were speaking of other creeping animals, it would not correspond to what the baraita discusses — namely, the eight set-apart creeping animals — since it speaks of them imparting impurity. Therefore it seems that the meaning is: 'Scripture speaks [of equating eating with impurity] only regarding those that are set apart,' meaning that Scripture juxtaposed eating with impurity only in the case of creeping animals, where the concept of separation applies — such as the eight creeping animals set apart from the others — but not with regard to an animal (behemah), whose eating was not juxtaposed to its impurity. Rather, it is with regard to an animal that Rabbi Yoḥanan says an olive-bulk is required, and this does not apply to all the cases in the baraita — not to less than a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal — but only to the limbs of a carcass. This teaches that even though for the purposes of impurity even less than an olive-bulk is effective, nevertheless for the purposes of eating an olive-bulk is required. On this the Gemara asks: Let the same distinction apply to an animal as well — that is, distinguish between what is set apart and what is not, just as with creeping animals, where eating is juxtaposed to impurity specifically for those set apart; similarly for an animal, since an animal is juxtaposed to creeping animals in this verse, one should likewise juxtapose eating to impurity, which would have practical significance regarding the limb of an animal's carcass, that its prohibition would follow impurity — meaning, at any amount at all, as the mishnah teaches that limbs have no minimum measure. And when the baraita speaks of 'set apart' versus 'not set apart,' this is not meant precisely, but rather means that for an animal, a limb should not require an olive-bulk. The Gemara answers: When the Merciful One juxtaposed them [the animal] to the law of 'you shall not make your souls detestable,' this juxtaposition of eating to impurity applies specifically to creeping animals, concerning which the verse continues 'which I have set apart for you as impure.' But the verse does not speak this way regarding an animal, since there is no possibility of distinguishing between those set apart and those not set apart among animals, for both pure and impure animals alike impart impurity. Therefore, since the concept of separation does not apply to them, the end of the verse does not refer to animals, and so one cannot juxtapose eating to impurity regarding an animal; and when an animal is juxtaposed to creeping animals, it is specifically regarding the prohibition of 'you shall not make your souls detestable.' This explanation, however, is quite forced, since what was the original assumption — did the Gemara not already know clearly that eating can be juxtaposed to impurity only regarding creeping animals, to which separation applies? Therefore it seems that the original intent of the question was: let the same distinction between set apart and not set apart apply to an animal as well — meaning, true, one cannot juxtapose eating to impurity through this very derivation, since it seems that the concept of separation does not apply to an animal; nevertheless, since with regard to creeping animals the eating was juxtaposed to impurity because the concept of separation applies to them, so too for an animal, since animal and creeping animal are juxtaposed to each other in this verse, we should likewise say that the prohibition of eating it follows the law of impurity, and for its limbs an olive-bulk should not be required. The Gemara's answer is: When the Merciful One juxtaposed animal and creeping animal, it was specifically regarding the prohibition of 'you shall not make your souls detestable,' which applies to both — but not regarding equating eating with impurity, for in that respect an animal is not like a creeping animal.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 16.