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Temurah 10 for kids: Two People, One Offering

תמורה י׳

🤝 This daf asks who may redeem an offering or make a substitute for it when one person dedicates it for another. It also asks whether an unborn animal can be made sacred as an offering.

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Stories from Temurah 10

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Temurah 10 in simple English

Rashi on Temurah 10a, in English Tab translation (18)
  1. Does the one who consecrates it add one-fifth, or the one for whom it atones? — An owner adds one-fifth when redeeming his consecrated animal; someone else does not. If a person designated an offering for another and it became blemished, who counts as its owner when redeeming it?
  2. If so — If the one who consecrates an animal can make a substitute for it, then a community or partners could do so by appointing one person to consecrate their offering. But the mishna says they cannot. We must therefore follow the person for whom the offering atones: because many people atone through it, it is not an individual offering, and no substitute can be made for it.
  3. According to his means — This refers to an offering whose cost varies with a person’s means. But a nazirite’s offering is fixed, whether he is rich or poor.
  4. How so? — The verse says that a nazirite brings the offering he designated from his own property. If he is too poor to do so, he may also bring one that others later provide for him and thereby fulfill his obligation.
  5. With regard to atonement — To teach that he can gain atonement through an animal someone else designated for him.
  6. Just as when he designated it from his own property — He, and no one else, can make a substitute for it. So too, when others designated it for him, he alone can make a substitute.
  7. Only from his own property can he gain atonement — For the verse calls it ‘his offering to the Lord.’
  8. The benefit of discretion is his — The person separating the teruma may choose which priest receives it, not the person whose produce it exempts.
  9. As it is written, ‘all the tithe,’ and so forth — ‘When you have finished tithing’ implies that the person taking the tithe from the produce in his possession chooses its recipient, not the person whose produce is being tithed. This benefit of discretion can include receiving a small payment from another Israelite in return for giving all his priestly gifts to that Israelite’s grandson, who is a priest.
  10. Mishna: Not limbs — One cannot substitute a limb of an unconsecrated animal for a consecrated fetus. If he says, ‘Let this animal’s leg be a substitute for the consecrated fetus in that animal’s womb,’ the limb does not become consecrated.
  11. Nor fetuses for limbs — If he says, ‘Let the fetus in this unconsecrated animal be a substitute for the leg of that consecrated animal,’ the fetus does not become consecrated.
  12. Nor limbs and fetuses — Of unconsecrated animals for whole consecrated animals.
  13. Nor whole animals — That are unconsecrated for consecrated limbs or fetuses.
  14. One may substitute limbs for whole animals — If he says, ‘Let this unconsecrated animal’s leg be a substitute for that whole consecrated animal,’ the leg becomes consecrated. The sanctity spreads through the entire animal, which becomes a substitute and may be offered.
  15. But not whole animals for them — A single limb of a consecrated animal cannot cause another animal to become a substitute.
  16. But surely, with consecrated animals — This concerns the initial act of consecration: what if he says, ‘Let this animal’s leg be a burnt offering’? The Gemara explains the reasoning below.
  17. Gemara: Sanctity does not take effect on fetuses — If one consecrates a fetus in the womb, it is not consecrated for sacrifice. Offering it after birth without consecrating it anew would mean bringing an unconsecrated animal into the Temple courtyard. Likewise, if one designates a pregnant sin-offering, the mother and fetus are not two sin-offerings set aside as alternatives. The fetus is consecrated only through its mother, so it is treated as the offspring of a sin-offering and must be left to die. In every respect, it is treated as the offspring of a consecrated animal, not as an animal consecrated in its own right.
  18. If he wishes, he may gain atonement through its offspring — The rule that a sin-offering’s offspring must die applies when the animal was designated first and then conceived and gave birth; that rule is a law given to Moses at Sinai. But if a pregnant animal was designated, the fetus is considered a separate animal and becomes consecrated in its own right. It is like setting aside two sin-offerings as alternatives: he may gain atonement through either one, while the other grazes until it develops a blemish. This shows that sanctity can take effect on a fetus.
Tosafot on Temurah 10a, in English Tab translation (5)
  1. Rava said, “If so” — That is, if the person who consecrates the animal can make a substitute for it, then a community or partners could make a substitute by appointing an agent to consecrate an animal for them. But one cannot make the same argument if the person for whom it atones makes the substitute: an animal consecrated to atone for one individual belongs to that individual, not to the community or partners.
  2. It was stated in the name of Bar Padda — This is Bar Padda, Bar Kappara’s nephew. As related in the first chapter of Me’ila, Bar Kappara told him, “See what you ask me tomorrow in the study hall.” He is not Ben Pedat, who is Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat.
  3. And consecration does not take effect on fetuses — If someone consecrates a fetus inside an unconsecrated animal, it is not consecrated for sacrifice. Offering it after birth without consecrating it then would be bringing an unconsecrated animal into the Temple courtyard. Likewise, if someone designates a pregnant animal as a sin offering, this does not count as setting aside two sin offerings in case one is needed: the fetus derives its sanctity from its mother, not from its own designation. It is therefore treated as the offspring of a sin offering and is left to die. In every respect, it is treated as the offspring of a consecrated animal, not as an animal originally consecrated in its own right.
  4. But Rabbi Yochanan said, “Consecration does take effect on fetuses” — A fetus consecrated inside an unconsecrated animal becomes consecrated. If someone designates a pregnant animal as a sin offering, it is like setting aside two sin offerings in case one is needed. The fetus is not treated as the offspring of a sin offering: it is consecrated by the person’s declaration, not through its mother. An offspring of a sin offering is left to die only when an animal was consecrated while not pregnant and subsequently conceived.
  5. And Rabbi Yochanan follows his own reasoning: “If he wishes, he may achieve atonement with its offspring” — The offspring needs no further consecration; this is like setting aside two sin offerings in case one is needed. It follows that Rabbi Yochanan holds that consecration takes effect on fetuses. Otherwise, the offspring would need to be consecrated after birth. The proof is not merely that the offspring is not left to die. Even if consecration cannot take effect on a fetus, Rabbi Yochanan might still hold that an explicit exclusion of the fetus from its mother’s consecration is effective. He holds that one may say of an unconsecrated animal, “It is consecrated, but its offspring is unconsecrated,” because a fetus is not considered a limb of its mother, as the Gemara explains later in the chapter “How May One Circumvent.” The proof is that Rabbi Yochanan says one may achieve atonement with the offspring without consecrating it again after birth: the person’s declaration consecrated it directly, not through its mother. Rashi’s explanation of Bar Padda is somewhat difficult. Rashi says that, because Bar Padda holds that consecration does not take effect on fetuses, the offspring of a pregnant animal designated as a sin offering must be left to die. Why must that follow? Perhaps Bar Padda agrees that an explicit exclusion is effective, so the offspring would not be left to die. But Bar Padda must hold that such an exclusion is ineffective. Otherwise, he could not explain the mishna in “How May One Circumvent”: when a person says, “The offspring of this animal is a burnt offering,” and then, “This animal is a peace offering,” its offspring is a peace offering. If Bar Padda held that an exclusion was effective, why would the offspring not be a burnt offering? The person could have left it unconsecrated when consecrating its mother. Rabbi Yochanan can explain the mishna: as soon as the person calls the mother a peace offering, that declaration also consecrates the fetus directly as a peace offering, rather than through its mother. But for Bar Padda, who holds that consecration cannot take effect on a fetus, the fetus can become consecrated only through its mother. Its failure to become a burnt offering therefore shows that, in his view, it becomes consecrated through its mother as soon as she is consecrated; the fetus cannot be excluded. One might ask: If consecration cannot take effect on a fetus, how can the mishna say that the declaration “Her offspring is a burnt offering and she is a peace offering” is valid? The declaration about the offspring refers to its monetary value. One might also ask: How can consecration take effect on a fetus when it is forbidden to consecrate an animal too young to be offered? A later mishna allows someone to say of a pregnant animal bearing its first offspring, “If what is in its womb is male, it is a burnt offering.” Why is a fetus different? A fetus may be consecrated before birth; Bekhorot derives this from a verse.
Rashi on Temurah 10b, in English Tab translation (25)
  1. The fetus itself — He consecrated it separately, so sanctity takes effect on it.
  2. Another version: What does Rabbi Yochanan teach us by saying, “If he excluded it, it is excluded, and a fetus is not its mother’s thigh”? — By treating the fetus as a separate entity, rather than as the offspring of a sin offering that must be left to die, Rabbi Yochanan shows that one can reserve it for a different status. If he says, “This animal is a sin offering and its fetus is a burnt offering,” his words take effect; likewise, he can say, “She is a sin offering and her offspring is non-sacred.” For bar Padda, the fetus is not a separate entity: if he consecrates the mother but reserves the offspring for another offering, it is not consecrated separately and must be left to die as the offspring of a sin offering. Saying that the offspring is non-sacred has no effect. According to the view that offspring of consecrated animals become sacred in the womb, it becomes sacred immediately; according to the view that they become sacred upon coming into being, it becomes sacred at birth.
  3. Why do I need both statements? — We already learn from the first that sanctity can take effect on a fetus, which shows that it is considered a separate animal.
  4. Fit in its own right — The mother can receive inherent sanctity and be offered as a sacrifice.
  5. How may one employ artifice concerning a firstborn? — To remove it from the priest’s claim and make use of it himself.
  6. If she gave birth to a male, it is a burnt offering — He offers it to fulfill his obligation, if he owes a burnt offering. The designation as a burnt offering took effect first: firstborn sanctity does not take effect until the womb delivers it, and cannot then displace the earlier sanctity. Evidently, a fetus can be consecrated, which challenges bar Padda.
  7. Sanctity of value — He sells the fetus and brings a burnt offering with the proceeds. The fetus itself does not acquire inherent sanctity and can be sold without a blemish.
  8. And did we not learn in a mishna? — This introduces support for the answer, not an objection.
  9. Subject to firstborn obligations — If they are female and give birth to their first offspring after being redeemed.
  10. Evidently, sanctity of value is strong enough — Since they had a permanent blemish before consecration, only their value was consecrated from the outset.
  11. Permitted — The mother may be shorn, since she herself was not consecrated.
  12. It weakens the fetus — Work performed by the mother weakens the fetus. Evidently, the fetus is consecrated.
  13. And did we not learn in a mishna? — This introduces support for the answer, not an objection.
  14. They become non-sacred — This is the latter part of the mishna cited above about sacrificial animals blemished before consecration. It says that, once redeemed, they become non-sacred and may be shorn and used for work. Because their permanent blemish preceded consecration, they never acquired inherent sanctity.
  15. He raised an objection to him — Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira.
  16. One does not substitute, and so on — The mishna says that one does not substitute whole non-sacred animals for them.
  17. It is only substitution that cannot be made — The verse concerning substitution says, “an animal for an animal,” and a fetus is not considered an animal for this purpose.
  18. But fetuses can be consecrated — If they could not be consecrated, it would be obvious that whole non-sacred animals could not be substituted for them.
  19. But did we not learn that offspring cannot effect substitution? — The mishna must therefore concern a fetus consecrated directly, which counts as the original consecration.
  20. It follows Rabbi Yehuda — In the mishna, Rabbi Yehuda says that offspring can effect substitution.
  21. If it follows Rabbi Yehuda — How can the beginning of the mishna say that non-sacred limbs cannot be substituted for whole consecrated animals? This implies that, although limbs cannot effect substitution, consecrating a limb initially can sanctify the whole animal. Rabbi Yosei’s reply—“Among consecrated animals, if one says, ‘This animal’s leg is a burnt offering,’ the whole animal is a burnt offering”—shows that the first tanna agrees about initial consecration. Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosei’s counterpart in the baraita below, also says this of initial consecration, while excluding substitution. That exclusion may follow from “an animal for an animal,” or from the comparison of substitution to the animal tithe later in the chapter: just as the tithe does not apply to limbs, neither does substitution.
  22. But Rabbi Yehuda says — In the baraita below, he says that sanctity does not spread from one limb to the whole animal.
  23. What case are we dealing with here? — In what case may we infer that, apart from substitution, consecrating one limb sanctifies the whole animal?
  24. Where he consecrated a limb on which the animal’s life depends — Rabbi Yehuda agrees below that consecrating a limb whose loss would render the animal mortally impaired, such as a leg from the knee upward, makes the whole animal a burnt offering. Substitution is different because the verse requires “an animal for an animal.”
  25. One may consecrate limbs and fetuses — This appears later, in the second chapter, among the ways consecration is more far-reaching than substitution: one may consecrate limbs and fetuses, but one may not use them to effect substitution.
Tosafot on Temurah 10b, in English Tab translation (4)
  1. But here, where he consecrated its mother, the fetus is included in its mother — My teacher, Rabbi Meir, asks: Why is this explanation of why both rulings are needed necessary? We could simply say that, without the second ruling, we would think that excluding the fetus from the consecration has no effect. The statement that he may atone with the fetus teaches that the exclusion does take effect. There is another difficulty: How can the Gemara suggest that a fetus included in its mother’s consecration is not sacred? A mishna explicitly says that if he declares, “The mother is a peace offering and her fetus a burnt offering,” the fetus is a peace offering. Clearly, it becomes sacred as part of its mother. The meaning must be that it would not be consecrated by the person’s declaration in its own right; its sanctity would come through its mother, because a fetus is considered part of her. If so, he could not exclude it. The second ruling is therefore needed to teach that the fetus can be consecrated by the person’s declaration, independently of its mother. — Rabbi Meir
  2. That teaching concerns sanctity of value — But the end of that mishna says that if she gives birth to two males, one is offered as a burnt offering. If it has only sanctity of value, why is it offered? Nor can this mean that it is sold to someone who needs a burnt offering, since the mishna says separately that the second male is sold for that purpose. What, then, distinguishes the first from the second? We must say that once sanctity of value takes effect on the first, inherent sanctity takes effect on it as well.
  3. One does not substitute for them, but fetuses do become consecrated — If fetuses could not become consecrated, it would be obvious that one cannot substitute an ordinary animal for them. Here the Gemara cannot answer, as it did above, that the fetus has only sanctity of value, because an animal with only sanctity of value cannot be the subject of substitution.
  4. This follows Rabbi Yehuda — Some texts continue: “If so, how can the first clause follow Rabbi Yehuda?” It says that one cannot substitute a non-sacred limb for a whole consecrated animal. This seems to imply that, although such a substitution cannot extend sanctity to the entire animal through its limb, consecrating a limb initially does extend sanctity to the entire animal. The first tanna appears to agree on this point: Rabbi Yosi replies to him, “But with consecrated animals, if one says, ‘This animal’s leg is a burnt offering,’ the whole animal is a burnt offering.” Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosi’s counterpart in the later baraita, holds that sanctity does extend to the whole animal upon its initial consecration, but not through substitution. That distinction may follow either from his interpretation of “animal for animal” or from the comparison of substitution to animal tithe later in the chapter: just as animal tithe does not apply to limbs, neither does substitution. The Gemara makes this point in Chullin. Rabbi Yehuda, however, says in the later baraita that consecrating a limb does not extend sanctity to the whole animal. The case could instead involve consecrating a limb on which the animal’s life depends. As stated later, Rabbi Yehuda agrees that consecrating a limb whose loss would render the animal fatally injured—such as a leg above the knee—makes the entire animal a burnt offering. Substitution still does not apply, because of “animal for animal.” This is Rashi’s explanation. But the additional text need not be included. The question rests on the assumption that Rabbi Yosi’s reply shows that the first tanna agrees with him. Elsewhere in Chullin, another explanation says that Rabbi Yosi is stating his own view, while the first tanna disagrees even about initial consecration. On that reading, the first tanna can be Rabbi Yehuda.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Temura 10.