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Temurah 19 for kids: A Baby from an Offering

תמורה י״ט

🐑 This daf asks what happens when an animal chosen for an offering gives birth. Can its offspring be offered, or must it be sold so another offering can be bought?

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Stories from Temurah 19

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Temurah 19 in simple English

Rashi on Temurah 19a, in English Tab translation (12)
  1. But the offspring of a substitute for a guilt offering has no burnt-offering status through its mother — The original animal, from which all the others derive, was designated and sacrificed as a guilt offering; neither it nor its proceeds were for a burnt offering. This is the wording of the Jerusalem Talmud. The comment returns to the opening question: “Is everyone agreed that it is wholly burned on the altar?” In other words, why do the Rabbis not also dispute the law of a substitute’s offspring, as they do with the offspring of a burnt offering?
  2. And this is Rabbi Elazar’s view — According to the Rabbis, it must be sold. The same applies to the offspring of a substitute for a burnt offering; the first clause follows Rabbi Elazar.
  3. A substitute for a burnt offering — It is secondary to the original animal he designated. That original was a male and was sacrificed, so the substitute’s offspring is also sacrificed.
  4. It has burnt-offering status through its mother — A female bird can be offered as a burnt offering, and this animal’s proceeds are designated for a burnt offering. Thus its offspring can be sacrificed. But the original guilt offering, from which the substitute and its offspring derive, was sacrificed as a guilt offering; a substitute for a guilt offering is never sacrificed as a burnt offering. The substitute therefore has only monetary sanctity, and its offspring is not sacrificed.
  5. If it remained after Passover — A Paschal offering during the rest of the year has the status of a peace offering. The female itself, however, cannot be sacrificed as one. Although female animals may be peace offerings, this animal was unfit for the Paschal offering for which it was consecrated, and so is excluded from sacrifice as a peace offering too.
  6. If it gave birth — After Passover.
  7. The offspring itself is sacrificed as a peace offering — Even though its mother was consecrated for a Paschal offering, not a peace offering.
  8. After Passover is different, because a leftover Paschal offering — For example, if someone designated an animal for his Paschal offering but fulfilled his obligation with another, the leftover is sacrificed as a peace offering. Thus, after Passover, this female has the status of a peace offering rather than a Paschal offering. It still cannot itself be sacrificed, because it came from a Paschal consecration and is female.
  9. If so — If Rabbi Elazar’s reason is that the mother has peace-offering status, he should also disagree in the first clause, when she gave birth before Passover, and permit the offspring itself as a peace offering. A Paschal offering slaughtered as a peace offering before Passover is valid, so its mother also has peace-offering status.
  10. Abaye said: They do not disagree at all — Rabbi Elazar’s reason is not the mother’s peace-offering status. Rather, a tradition teaches that offspring follows the same course as a leftover offering. A second animal designated as a backup for a burnt offering can itself be sacrificed as a burnt offering, so the offspring of a female designated for a burnt offering can be sacrificed too. A leftover guilt offering grazes until it becomes unfit, so the offspring of its substitute does likewise. After Passover, a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering, and so is its offspring. Before Passover, a backup Paschal offering cannot be offered as a peace offering, while only one of the two can be offered as the Paschal offering. Its offspring therefore follows its mother: both are consecrated only for the value of a Paschal offering.
  11. If he excluded it, it is excluded — Someone who consecrates a pregnant animal can reserve its fetus for a different consecration. This shows that they are separate animals. Even when he does not reserve the fetus, its sanctity does not have to come through its mother: the fetus itself can be consecrated as a Paschal offering.
  12. It and its offspring — This implies that both existed when he consecrated them. Otherwise, the baraita would have said, as the earlier one does: “One who designates a female for his Paschal offering lets it graze; if it gives birth to a male, he lets the offspring graze.”
Tosafot on Temurah 19a, in English Tab translation (4)
  1. But here its mother has no peace-offering status — Both interpretations can be maintained here: birds cannot be brought as peace offerings, and the mother was not originally consecrated as a peace offering.
  2. If so, let him also disagree in the first clause — Rashi explains, in his first interpretation, that if the mother gave birth before Passover, Rabbi Eliezer should say that the offspring itself is brought as a Paschal offering, since its mother has Paschal-offering status even though she cannot be sacrificed. But Rashi’s earlier first interpretation, which relied on a mother’s status as a bird burnt offering, cannot be applied here: a female cannot be brought as a Paschal offering, and birds cannot be brought as Paschal offerings. His second interpretation works: the mother was originally consecrated as a Paschal offering, so the offspring should itself be brought as one. One might answer that its mother must be eligible to be brought as a Paschal offering in some circumstances, whereas a female never is, and that this is why the offspring cannot itself be brought as a Paschal offering. Rabbi Meir therefore says that a mother’s status as a bird burnt offering was never said to suffice to make the offspring itself eligible. With God’s help, we will explain accordingly wherever that interpretation appears. Rashi explained the first clause well.
  3. If so — Why does the Gemara say ‘if so’? It could have challenged Rabbi Eliezer directly from the Mishnah: when someone designates a female as a burnt offering and she gives birth, he says the offspring itself is brought as a burnt offering; why, then, does he say that the offspring of a female designated for a Paschal offering must graze? Without Rava’s answer, the cases differ. Bringing the first offspring as a burnt offering does not displace the mother’s burnt-offering status, since a person can bring a burnt offering every day. But bringing the second offspring as a Paschal offering would displace the Paschal-offering status of both the mother and her proceeds, since a person can bring only one Paschal offering. Rava, however, treats a leftover Paschal offering’s eligibility to be brought as a peace offering as giving the mother peace-offering status. The Gemara therefore asks why, on that reasoning, the offspring should not itself be brought as a Paschal offering before Passover. This differs from Rashi’s explanation that the offspring should be brought as a peace offering before Passover: a Paschal offering slaughtered as a peace offering at a time other than the fourteenth of Nisan is valid, so its mother has peace-offering status.
  4. Abaye says there is no disagreement: the offspring follows the leftover offering — Abaye’s statement does not explain all of Rabbi Eliezer’s rulings. Rabbi Eliezer says that the offspring itself is sacrificed both when a female was designated as a burnt offering and gave birth, and when a female designated for a Paschal offering remained until after Passover and gave birth. In neither case does sacrificing the offspring displace the mother’s sanctity: her proceeds can still be used for a burnt offering in the first case, and after Passover she is fit only for a peace offering in the second. But Rabbi Eliezer says that the offspring must graze in the cases of a substitute guilt offering and of a female designated for a Paschal offering that gave birth before Passover. Sacrificing the former offspring would displace its mother’s original designation as a guilt offering, since one cannot bring two guilt offerings. Sacrificing the latter would displace the mother and her proceeds from their Paschal-offering designation, since one can bring only one Paschal offering a year. This is how I heard it, though the Gemara’s wording does not quite fit this explanation, and Rashi did not explain it this way.
Rashi on Temurah 19b, in English Tab translation (15)
  1. The mother can have burnt-offering status — because a female bird can be brought as a burnt offering.
  2. The mother cannot have guilt-offering status — no female guilt offering exists, so that status does not take effect on her.
  3. This offspring, too, is fit to be sacrificed — as a guilt offering.
  4. This teaches us — Rabbi Eliezer’s reason depends on the mother’s ability to have burnt-offering status; this mother cannot have guilt-offering status.
  5. If so — if the mother’s status is the reason, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Hanina, should have taught that her offspring is not sacrificed as a burnt offering, since the mother was designated a guilt offering. We would then know all the more that it is not sacrificed as a guilt offering: even though the mother’s value can fund a burnt offering, the offspring cannot be brought as one; neither the mother nor her value can serve as a guilt offering.
  6. MISHNA: It may be sold without a blemish — Rabbi Shimon holds that, since the female cannot serve as a guilt offering, this disqualification is like a full blemish. It does not become inherently sacred, so it may be sold immediately and a guilt offering bought with the proceeds. He does not say this of a female designated as a burnt offering, because a female bird can be a burnt offering; that animal must develop a blemish before sale.
  7. GEMARA: It also acquires inherent sanctity — enough to require a blemish before it may be sold.
  8. This teaches us, and so forth — although the female was consecrated for its value, the requirement of a blemish shows that it also acquired inherent sanctity. It cannot be sacrificed because a guilt offering cannot be female. Thus, if a male is consecrated for its value toward a burnt offering or guilt offering, it also acquires inherent sanctity; since it is fit, it may itself be sacrificed.
  9. From Rav Yehuda’s statement in Rav’s name — he explained the mishna by saying that sanctity of value also brings inherent sanctity.
  10. A two-year-old guilt offering — the guilt offerings for robbery, misuse of sacred property, and relations with a designated maidservant; Scripture calls each a ram.
  11. A one-year-old guilt offering — the guilt offerings of a nazirite and a person with tzara’at; Scripture calls each a lamb.
  12. They are not sacred at all — they have no sanctity whatsoever.
  13. An animal not yet old enough, which Rabbi Shimon says is sacred — as taught in tractate Hullin: Rabbi Shimon says that one who slaughters outside the Temple an animal that will later be fit for sacrifice violates a prohibition.
  14. A firstborn is sacred — while still in the womb, before it is old enough to be sacrificed.
  15. For his burnt offering — it can generate a substitute offering, because a female can have burnt-offering status as a bird offering.
Tosafot on Temurah 19b, in English Tab translation (8)
  1. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Chanina, said: Rabbi Elazar concedes — Although Rabbi Elazar says that the offspring of a female designated for a burnt offering may itself be offered as a burnt offering, he agrees that the offspring of a female designated for a guilt offering may not be offered as a guilt offering, even before its owner has obtained atonement.
  2. Isn’t it obvious? Rabbi Elazar said this only about a female designated for a burnt offering, since its mother has burnt-offering status — Here we cannot use Rashi’s second explanation above, that the mother was originally designated for the same offering: a female designated for a guilt offering meets that condition too, yet her offspring is not offered as a guilt offering. We would have to use Rashi’s first explanation, that a female bird can be a burnt offering. But then why call the ruling obvious? Besides, I explained above that the possibility of offering the mother as a bird does not make her offspring eligible. My teacher explains instead that the mother’s value will ultimately be used for a burnt offering, so her offspring can likewise be offered as one. With a female designated for a guilt offering, the mother would instead be set aside from that offering and her value used for a burnt offering; offering her offspring as a guilt offering would give it a different fate from hers. Although Rava concludes above that Rabbi Elazar allows the offspring of a female designated for a Passover offering to be offered as a Passover offering if born before Passover, even though the mother will ultimately become a peace offering, that is because an unused Passover offering is offered as a peace offering. Rava treats the two as one category.
  3. Rather than teach us that her offspring is not offered as a guilt offering, teach us that it is not offered as a burnt offering—and certainly not as a guilt offering — On Rashi’s explanation, the argument is: If it cannot be a burnt offering, despite the fact that its mother could be offered as a bird burnt offering, it certainly cannot be a guilt offering, which its mother could never be. On my teacher’s explanation, it is: If it cannot be a burnt offering even after its owner has obtained atonement, although the mother’s value will ultimately be used for a burnt offering, it certainly cannot be a guilt offering before atonement, when the mother will not ultimately serve as a guilt offering if her offspring is offered as one.
  4. Rabbi Shimon says: It may be sold without a blemish — Why does Rabbi Shimon not say the same about a female designated for a burnt offering? According to the view in the Gemara that, for Rabbi Shimon, a female designated for a burnt offering can produce a substitute offering but a female designated for a guilt offering cannot, the distinction is clear: the former has greater inherent sanctity. But according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, who holds that even a female designated for a burnt offering cannot produce a substitute offering, we must say that Rabbi Shimon disagrees in that case too. The mishna states his view about a guilt offering to teach that, even so, its proceeds go to gift offerings.
  5. That is to say: If one consecrates a male animal for its value, it acquires inherent sanctity — My teacher Rabbi Shmuel asks: Why is this different from consecrating an animal for the value of libations, which, as the first chapter of Shevuot says, does not give it inherent sanctity? Perhaps that passage follows Rabbi Shimon, who says below that an animal unfit for the offering itself does not acquire inherent sanctity.
  6. A guilt offering requiring a year-old animal, for which he brought a two-year-old, or one requiring a two-year-old, for which he brought a year-old, is valid but does not fulfill its owner’s obligation — Yet the chapter HaTekhelet in Menachot calls it invalid and says it must be left until its appearance changes before being burned. Some explain that passage as following Rabbi Shimon, who says here that such animals never acquire inherent sanctity. It concerns an animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, like an animal consecrated for Temple upkeep and slaughtered there. It is left until its appearance changes so that it will not be confused with other invalid offerings that require this. Rabbi Ephraim instead explains that here the animal was slaughtered for a different offering, making it valid, whereas there it was slaughtered for its designated offering. Similarly, the last chapter of Zevachim indicates that a guilt offering slaughtered for a different offering can be fit for sacrifice in the Temple. But if that is the case here, why attribute its failure to fulfill the owner’s obligation to the wrong age? It would fail anyway because it was slaughtered for a different offering. Alternatively, here the animal had already been assigned to graze until blemished, whereas there it had not and remained an invalid guilt offering.
  7. But an animal too young to be offered is unfit, yet Rabbi Shimon says it acquires inherent sanctity — In the chapter Oto Ve’et Beno in Chullin, Rabbi Shimon says that one who slaughters outside the Temple an animal that will become fit to be offered later transgresses a prohibition.
  8. Even an animal too young to be offered becomes sacred before its time and may be offered afterward — This seems to conflict with Bekhorot, which implies that offerings do not become sacred before they are old enough, and with the statement in Zevachim, ‘Night is for consecration; day is for acceptance,’ which implies that an animal becomes sacred only on the night before its eighth day. The answer is that one may not initially consecrate an animal before it is old enough, but if one does so, the consecration takes effect, as learned from the firstborn animal.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Temura 19.