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Temurah 29 for kids: Not Fit for the Altar

תמורה כ״ט

⛔ This daf asks when an animal set aside for idol worship may not be offered to God. It also asks when a lamb given as payment to a prostitute may not be offered.

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Stories from Temurah 29

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Temurah 29 in simple English

Rashi on Temurah 29a, in English Tab translation (22)
  1. And service vessels — That is, he did not need service vessels.
  2. And vessels of an asheira — He offered the sacrifice using vessels that had served the asheira; he used those same vessels for God.
  3. And wood of an asheira — He burned it as fuel, as it says there: “And cut down the asheira that is beside it.”
  4. From where in the Torah is a set-aside animal derived? — The Gemara initially understands the question to mean: How do we know that a person must set aside an offering for God rather than sacrifice it immediately upon consecrating it?
  5. Safeguard — Keep it designated for a sacred offering.
  6. A hungry lamb — A lamb that had never been cared for, yet no one considered that a problem.
  7. For Me, and not for another master — I mean that an animal set aside for idol worship is forbidden by Torah law, based on this verse.
  8. Until it is used for work — One reading is that it does not become forbidden until it performs some task for idol worship, such as pulling a wagon. Another reading is that it remains forbidden only until it is put to work for the idol’s priests; afterward it is no longer forbidden, because they will not offer it as a sacrifice. The second reading seems correct to me: the wording “only until it is used for work” fits it, whereas the first reading would require “it is not forbidden until it is used for work.”
  9. Until they hand it over to the priests — For food; from then on they will not offer it as a sacrifice.
  10. Until they feed it vetches of idolatry — They fatten it for the priests, and from then on they will not offer it as a sacrifice.
  11. He was from both places — From Babylonia and from Eretz Yisrael.
  12. From where are these matters derived? — From where do we know that these animals may be eaten by ordinary people?
  13. From the well-watered pastures of Israel — This is written about offerings in Ezekiel’s description of the Temple. It implies that an offering must come from what Israelites are permitted to eat.
  14. And if you think — If an animal set aside for idolatry or worshipped as an idol is forbidden to ordinary people, why are the earlier verses needed to exclude them from offerings—“from the cattle” to exclude a worshipped animal and “from the flock” to exclude a set-aside one? The rule “from the well-watered pastures of Israel” already excludes anything forbidden to ordinary people.
  15. From the cattle, from the animals, from the cattle and from the flock, from the cattle below — The later verse says, “If his offering is a burnt offering from the cattle.” That phrase cannot be unnecessary merely because “from the cattle” appeared earlier: the later phrase excludes an animal with a fatal condition, while the earlier one excludes a worshipped animal. Thus a separate verse does exclude an animal with a fatal condition.
  16. They were needed — Both verses were needed: without the second, I might have thought that “from the well-watered pastures of Israel” excludes only an animal that developed a fatal condition before it was consecrated.
  17. Say it should be permitted — That is why “from the cattle” is needed. But why would two verses be needed for animals set aside for idolatry or worshipped as idols? If someone consecrated an animal and only afterward set it aside for idolatry or worshipped it, that act could not forbid it: it was no longer his, and a person cannot forbid something that is not his. Since verses are nevertheless needed to exclude these animals from offerings, they must be permitted for ordinary people to eat.
  18. That does not pass through — For example, an animal whose legs were severed above the knee. This excludes an animal that developed a fatal condition before it was consecrated.
  19. They were needed — All three verses were needed. From “the well-watered pastures of Israel” alone, I might have excluded only an animal born with a fatal condition, like fruit from a tree in its first three years and produce grown with grapevines, which had never been permitted. Those laws are derived from “out of two hundred” in the same verse: Pesachim explains it as the permitted portion remaining in a pit after one part in two hundred has been removed. “All that passes under the rod” is therefore needed for an animal that developed a fatal condition after birth but before consecration, and “from the cattle” for one consecrated before it developed that condition.
  20. Mishnah — The Gemara explains that this is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis.
  21. Where she takes two — He promised her only one lamb but gave her two. This teaches that he increased her payment: both lambs are payment, not one payment and one gift, since she holds him to what he stipulated with her.
  22. Let the payment status take effect retroactively — At the time they had intercourse, the lamb still existed, and he was having intercourse with her in exchange for it; wherever it is now, it should acquire the status of payment. By contrast, if he had intercourse with her and only afterward gave her a lamb, one could say that, because no lamb was designated at the time, it is merely a gift and does not become forbidden.
Tosafot on Temurah 29a, in English Tab translation (5)
  1. How do we know from the Torah that a designated animal is forbidden? — At first, the Gemara understands the question to ask how we know an offering must be designated for sacrifice before it is brought. It concludes that the question concerns an animal designated for idol worship. This is somewhat difficult: the prohibition is derived from many other verses, so why not say that this sage derives it from this verse instead?
  2. Only until they use it for work — Rashi gives two explanations. First, the animal becomes forbidden when it is put to work for an idol, whether pulling a wagon or doing another task; before then, it is not forbidden. Second, the animal remains forbidden only until it is put to work for the idol’s priests; afterward, it will no longer be offered to the idol. Rashi favors the second explanation, because the wording “only until they use it for work” does not fit the first.
  3. Baha was from here and there — Baha became a Torah scholar through study in both Eretz Yisrael and Babylonia, not through the merit of Eretz Yisrael alone.
  4. How do we know that a designated or worshipped animal is permitted for ordinary use? — Why suppose it is forbidden for ordinary use when, without the earlier verses, it would not even be forbidden as an offering? Rabbi Yehuda explains that once a verse forbids it as an offering, we might infer that it is also forbidden for ordinary use. But then why does the Gemara ask why a verse is needed to exclude it as an offering? Because, if it were forbidden for ordinary use, the Torah could have stated that prohibition there; we would then know it was unfit as an offering from “the well-watered pastures of Israel,” which requires offerings to come from what is permitted to Israel.
  5. It was necessary — Even though “the well-watered pastures of Israel” excludes a tereifa from being offered, another verse is needed for an animal consecrated before it became a tereifa. Rashi says that no parallel case requires a second verse for a designated or worshipped animal: once consecrated, it no longer belongs to its owner, who cannot forbid what is not his. But this is difficult, since the Talmud elsewhere requires separate verses for an animal that mounted or was mounted in a sexual act, distinguishing consecrated animals from unconsecrated ones; according to Rabbi Yosi HaGelili, an owner retains ownership of an offering of lesser sanctity. Rather, even if a parallel case exists, the verse excluding a worshipped animal addresses only one case: it was worshipped before being consecrated. If such an animal were also forbidden for ordinary use, the Torah could have stated that prohibition there, and “the well-watered pastures of Israel” would exclude it as an offering. Its exclusion in the laws of offerings thus shows that ordinary use is permitted. A separate verse is needed for an animal consecrated before it was worshipped: if it was brought onto the altar, it must be taken down.
Rashi on Temurah 29b, in English Tab translation (15)
  1. She sacrificed it first — Before intercourse.
  2. If you need it, take it from now — The lamb is therefore in her possession, and she can sacrifice it. Since he also said, “You will not acquire it until intercourse,” we need to be taught that it is permitted if she sacrificed it first; otherwise, we might have thought it counted as payment to a prostitute.
  3. Rabbi Elazar’s statement itself is in question — Was it clear to Rabbi Elazar that sacrificing the lamb first permits it, but merely consecrating it does not? Or was only the case of sacrificing it clear to him, while consecration remained in doubt? The question remains unresolved.
  4. A declaration to the Most High — One cannot retract it, just as one cannot retract a transfer made to an ordinary person.
  5. For this lamb — Since he gives her that lamb at the time of intercourse, it immediately becomes payment to a prostitute.
  6. For a lamb, without specifying one — The lamb he sends her afterward is merely a gift. Only one designated at the time of intercourse counts as payment to a prostitute.
  7. He gave it to her from the outset — Since the lamb is in her courtyard, she acquires it at the time of intercourse. Why, then, call this a case where he gave it to her afterward? Besides, it is obvious that the lamb is prohibited.
  8. By a certain day I will pay you a certain amount; if I do not, take the lamb — When that day arrives and he has not paid her, it becomes clear that the lamb was hers at the time of intercourse. Still, it is called a case of giving it afterward, since it did not become hers until that day arrived. We therefore need to be taught that it is prohibited.
  9. Payment to a male — If a man has intercourse with a male and gives him payment, that payment is prohibited as an offering.
  10. It says “abomination” — The verse calls such payment “an abomination to the Lord your God.” Intercourse with a menstruating woman is also an abomination: she is listed among the forbidden relationships, of which Scripture says, “all these abominations.”
  11. But not a male prostitute — If a woman gives a man payment for intercourse, it is permitted.
  12. Those who come to him through transgression — This refers to relationships that can never be permitted, unlike his menstruating wife, who becomes permitted to him later. Alternatively, he paid the prostitute for the work she missed, not for intercourse.
  13. Although there is no proof for the matter — There is no proof that what a woman gives a man is permitted as an offering, but the words “and you were the reverse” support the idea that it is not payment to a prostitute.
  14. The child of a gentile woman is not regarded as his offspring — The child is called hers, not his. As the Sages say in Yevamot 23a: A child you have with a Jewish woman is called your child; a child you have with a gentile woman is called her child.
  15. Why do they derive one from the other? — By analogy based on a shared feature.
Tosafot on Temurah 29b, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. For example, the lamb is in her courtyard — This seems to imply that a lamb can count as payment to a prostitute only when it is already in her courtyard. But elsewhere the Gemara says that the Torah forbids such payment even if a man has intercourse with his mother: because he incurs the death penalty, a court would not order him to pay her. How could the court order payment if she already has the lamb? Rabbi Yitzhak explains that, although her courtyard gives her possession, it counts as payment only because he gives it to fulfill his obligation before Heaven. Had she not possessed it, the court would not have ordered him to give it. My teacher explains instead that the Gemara mentions her courtyard only to find a case in which he has intercourse and gives her the lamb afterward. He could also transfer ownership by a symbolic exchange, stipulating: ‘When you have intercourse with me, this lamb will become yours wherever it is.’ In that case, too, the court would not order him to give it to her.
  2. Rava said: In either case her payment is forbidden, and a priest who has intercourse with her is flogged for intercourse with a prostitute — If a gentile woman is a ‘prostitute’ under Torah law, what did the Hasmonean court add by its decree concerning intercourse with a gentile woman? Rava can follow the version of that decree that does not include the prohibition concerning a prostitute; a priest is flogged for that prohibition under Torah law. But according to Abaye, who says that a priest is not flogged for intercourse with a gentile woman as a prostitute, why does the Mishnah call a convert a prostitute? Once she converts, she certainly has that status; while she remains a gentile, she does not.
  3. An objection: Whether a prostitute or a gentile woman — On the first reading of the text, the Gemara initially understands ‘a prostitute’ to mean a Jewish woman who already became a prostitute through intercourse with someone forbidden to her on pain of excision, or a woman who is sexually available to anyone. Her payment would then be forbidden even when this particular man is permitted to her. That supports Rava and challenges Abaye, who derives that payment is forbidden only for intercourse with someone to whom marriage cannot take effect. The Gemara objects that the baraita later includes a widow with a High Priest, although marriage between them does take effect. It answers that the baraita follows Rabbi Elazar, who says that intercourse between an unmarried man and woman makes her a prostitute. On his view, payment for any intercourse outside a fully valid marriage is forbidden; the other sages can still limit the prohibition to intercourse where marriage cannot take effect. Why assume Rabbi Elazar does not accept their limitation? Since he defines ‘prostitute’ more broadly than they do, the Gemara understands him to define forbidden payment more broadly as well. The Gemara then asks why the baraita specifies a widow with a High Priest rather than an unmarried woman. Rashi explains its answer as addressing a possible inference that the rule applies only to unmarried people who are otherwise permitted to one another, not to a widow and High Priest, whose intercourse is already forbidden. Rabbeinu Natan’el explains it differently: one might infer from the comparison with a priest’s prohibition concerning a prostitute that payment is forbidden only when her prohibition to the priest bears the name ‘prostitute,’ not when it bears another name, such as ‘widow.’ The baraita therefore includes the widow. Another reading of the text answers instead that the baraita follows Rabbi Akiva, who holds that marriage cannot take effect where intercourse violates a prohibition punishable by lashes. Why, then, does the Gemara add an explanation of what the baraita teaches? It must explain why the baraita specifies a widow with a High Priest rather than stating only its general rule. Without that example, one might think it refers to a woman who had already become a prostitute and whose payment is forbidden even for intercourse otherwise permitted to her. The example teaches that, as with a widow and High Priest according to Rabbi Akiva, the prohibition concerns intercourse where marriage cannot take effect. For Rava, who forbids payment even where marriage can take effect, the Gemara gives another reason for the example: just as a widow and High Priest do not incur lashes without a warning, payment to a woman who was already a prostitute is forbidden only if he explicitly says, ‘Here is this lamb as your payment.’ This excludes Rabbi Elazar’s view, under which even a single encounter between an unmarried man and woman makes her a prostitute and payment can be forbidden without an explicit statement. Rashi explains that payment to a woman who was already a prostitute is forbidden even without such a statement. That is difficult: under the other sages’ view, when would a statement change the result? They do not treat payment to an unmarried woman as forbidden at all, yet on Rashi’s reading payment to an established prostitute is forbidden even without a statement. It therefore seems better to explain that, for the other sages, payment to a woman who was already a prostitute is forbidden only when he expressly identifies the lamb as her payment. But if this very act of intercourse makes her a prostitute—for example, intercourse with his sister—payment is forbidden even without an explicit statement. That accords with the reasoning given for Rabbi Elazar: because the intercourse itself makes her a prostitute, its payment is forbidden even without one.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Temura 29.