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Bechorot 51 for kids: Five Sela Questions

בכורות נ״א

🪙 This daf asks what a father can give a priest to redeem his firstborn son. It also asks what happens if the money is returned or lost, then begins a discussion of the firstborn son’s inheritance.

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Stories from Bechorot 51

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Bechorot 51 in simple English

Rashi on Bechorot 51a, in English Tab translation (27)
  1. An impaired dinar — its design had worn away.
  2. He would not accept it — that is, the dinar could not be spent in town, so it had no value to him.
  3. Why do I need this too? — The mishna has already taught the point made by “all of them.”
  4. The rapist and the defamer made it necessary — The mishna needed to say “all of them are paid in the shekel of the Sanctuary” because its opening clause did not say so. In the other cases, it is clear that the payments are in shekels: the Torah specifies five shekels for each firstborn son, thirty shekels for a slave, and weighed silver for a seducer. But it does not say “shekels” for a rapist or a defamer. One might therefore think that the opening clause means each pays Tyrian coins of the denomination required in his case—shekels where the Torah says “shekels,” but otherwise dinars. The closing clause teaches that these fixed payments are derived from one another, as Rav Asi explained above. Some texts instead ask: “Are all these cases matters of redemption?” They object to the mishna’s wording, “All are redeemed,” since redemption applies only to a firstborn son. On that reading, the text should say: “All things subject to redemption may be redeemed with money or its equivalent,” such as a firstborn son, consecrated property, and tithe. Second tithe, however, may be redeemed only with minted coins, not with items of equivalent value; even minted small coins are acceptable.
  5. The appearance offering — The money is for buying the pilgrimage burnt offering. Its minimum cost is two silver ma’a, as stated in Tractate Ḥagiga, and those two ma’a must be minted coins.
  6. They exchange shekels for darics — Residents sending their shekels to Jerusalem may exchange them for darics, which are minted gold coins. They may not exchange them for unminted gold. Tractate Shekalim explains the reason: valuables such as pearls might fall in price. The same concern applies to anything worth money; if its price falls, the Temple treasury loses, whereas coins do not lose value in that way.
  7. And bind up the money — This means something bearing an engraved design.
  8. The appearance offering: Rav Yosef also taught, ‘He must not bring silver mixed with impurities’ — He must bring minted coinage, not impure silver. Rav Yosef’s teaching supports the baraita rather than explaining it.
  9. Mishna: One may not redeem a firstborn son with slaves, and so on — This is despite what we said above, that redemption may be made with money or its equivalent.
  10. Nor with promissory notes — If the father gives the priest a note for a debt of five sela coins owed to him by someone else, so that the priest can collect it as redemption for his son, the son is not redeemed.
  11. Nor with consecrated items — The Gemara explains this.
  12. He wrote to the priest that he owed him five sela coins — This was for the redemption of his son.
  13. But his son is not redeemed — As the Gemara explains, this is lest people say that redemption may be made with promissory notes.
  14. Therefore — Since the father must give the priest five sela coins, the priest may give them back to him as a gift if he wishes; there is no other remedy.
  15. Shall be yours, and you shall surely redeem — Once the priest has the redemption payment, the son is redeemed. God addressed this verse to Aaron.
  16. Restricted — It specified silver and no other item.
  17. It excluded promissory notes — They are not considered tangible value.
  18. ‘You shall redeem’ generalized again — Although these words appear before the specific term, we nevertheless treat them as the second general statement, as explained below.
  19. They are compared to land — This follows from the verse, ‘You may leave them as an inheritance,’ concerning slaves.
  20. The sul — A skewer.
  21. The sira — A thorn.
  22. The mikhtav — A stylus.
  23. And we say — In Tractate Kiddushin.
  24. What is the basis of their disagreement? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi interprets general and specific terms — ‘You shall take’ is general; ‘an awl’ is specific; and ‘put it through his ear’ is general again. Just as the specified item is made of metal, so too any suitable item must be made of metal.
  25. Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda interprets amplifications and restrictions — What does the amplification include? Every kind of item. What does the restriction exclude? A drug.
  26. Here — The reason he uses amplification and restriction is the rule taught in the school of Rabbi Ishmael (Ḥullin 67a): When two general statements stand together and a specific statement follows, they are not interpreted as a generalization followed by a detail. For example, the Torah says fish must have fins and scales “in the water,” repeating “in the water,” and then specifies “in the seas and in the rivers.” If read as generalizations followed by a detail, this would imply that fish from collected water need no fins or scales. Instead, the specific statement is treated as though it stood between the two general statements, and the passage is interpreted through amplification and restriction. Here too, “and its redemption from one month” and “you shall redeem” are two adjacent general statements, followed by the specific statement about five silver shekels. Therefore, he interprets them through amplification and restriction.
  27. And the Rabbis — They interpret these verses through generalizations and details, following what is said in the West.
Tosafot on Bechorot 51a, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. And the money for appearance—Rashi reads this as: “Rav Yosef also taught that one must bring minted coins, not debased silver.” On that reading, Rav Yosef’s teaching supports the baraita rather than explaining it. But why bring one baraita to support another? And the wording should then be “one may not bring,” rather than “so that one will not bring.” Since the Gemara gives a reason for each of the other cases, it seems instead that Rav Yosef explains this rule: If payment in goods were allowed, someone might bring an ingot of debased silver worth less than two silver ma’a, for which he could not buy a proper appearance-offering as he could with minted coins.
  2. He wrote to the priest that he owes him five sela coins—Ketubot cites this in the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish about a document saying, “I owe you a maneh.” Rashi explains there that he wrote and handed over the document before witnesses; they dispute whether the document makes this a binding admission even though he did not say, “You are my witnesses.” Rabbenu Tam explains that he undertook a new obligation through the document, though he owed nothing beforehand. The whole passage must be reconciled with that explanation; I explained it there.
  3. Say: Nor may consecrated property be redeemed with any of these—Pesachim and Bava Metzia cite “He shall give the money, and it shall be his” to teach that consecrated property redeemed with land is not redeemed. This makes that verse appear to be the source. But the Sifra derives the rule from “All your valuations shall be in the shekel of the Sanctuary,” as Rashi explains there. Those passages cite only one of the verses mentioning money in connection with consecrated property. Elsewhere too, the primary source is not always cited: Kiddushin uses “in her youth, in her father’s house” to teach that a daughter’s gains during her youth belong to her father, though the verse concerns the annulment of vows. Likewise, Gittin says, “A document severs the marriage, and nothing else does,” though that interpretation belongs to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, not the Rabbis.
Rashi on Bechorot 51b, in English Tab translation (22)
  1. Nor may consecrated items be redeemed with any of these — With slaves, documents, or land. The source is derived from verses in the section on valuations in the Sifra.
  2. Lest people say one may redeem with documents — Even without paying anything, or with a document recording a debt owed to the father by someone else.
  3. His son is redeemed when he gives the money — For he has then given the redemption payment.
  4. All at once — He placed five sela coins before all the priests and left.
  5. One after the other — He gave the money to one priest and then another, as taught in the Tosefta. He has fulfilled his obligation.
  6. He took it — The priest took the money and returned it to the father; the father has fulfilled his obligation.
  7. Rabbi Tarfon — He was a priest.
  8. Rabbi Hanina — He was a priest.
  9. He went and sat before him — He wanted Rabbi Hanina to see him repeatedly passing by and return the five sela coins he had given to redeem his son.
  10. He said to him, ‘You did not fully resolve to give it’ — You did not mean to give it outright, but only on condition that I return it to you.
  11. You have done a bad thing — Therefore, if I return the money, your son is not redeemed. Another explanation: Your son is not redeemed even if I do not return it.
  12. From where do we derive this? — That the father bears responsibility if the money is lost. Although the mishna cites a verse, the Gemara asks for the source; Rav Pappa raises this objection below.
  13. ‘Valuation’ is derived from ‘valuation’ — The verse about a firstborn says, ‘From a month old you shall redeem him, according to your valuation.’ As with valuations, the payer remains responsible until the money reaches the Temple treasurer. Until then, the money is still in his possession.
  14. Just as one bears responsibility for a burnt offering of appearance — It is obligatory, so if it dies or is stolen, he must replace it. Otherwise he would enter the Temple courtyard empty-handed, contrary to the verse. But the similar verse about a firstborn does not itself establish this: the redemption money is given to a priest, not brought to the courtyard, so one might think setting it aside is enough.
  15. One verse to support another verse? — Why bring a verse to support the law when the mishna already cites a different verse for it?
  16. From where do we derive this? — That the father must pay even after his son dies.
  17. ‘Valuation’ is derived from ‘valuation’ — If someone pledges to pay another person’s valuation and that person dies, the one who pledged must still pay. Likewise, if a firstborn dies after thirty days, his father must still pay to redeem him.
  18. Just as with a burnt offering of appearance, the heirs are obligated — It is an obligatory offering. Likewise, when a firstborn dies after thirty days, his father has already become obligated to redeem him.
  19. So too here, the heirs are obligated — If both father and son die after the redemption obligation has taken effect, the father’s heirs must pay.
  20. The mishna concerns the mother’s property — Property belonging to the mother whose income the father had the right to use during his lifetime.
  21. Appreciation — If the property increases in value between the father’s death and its division, the firstborn does not receive a double share of that increase. The property is valued as it was at the father’s death. If the firstborn receives two shares of land, he pays for the appreciation of his extra share, and that payment is divided among all the heirs.
  22. Property the father stood to inherit — The father did not possess it when he died, though he would have inherited it. If it later passes to his children, the firstborn does not receive a double share of it.
Tosafot on Bechorot 51b, in English Tab translation (5)
  1. Ulla said: By Torah law, his son is redeemed when he pays — At first glance, the beginning of the chapter “One Who Undertakes to Support” (Ketubot 101b) seems to reject Ulla’s view in favor of Reish Lakish’s. But it can be reconciled with Ulla’s view, even according to Rabbi Yochanan.
  2. But the Rabbis say his son is not redeemed — This is puzzling: the mishna also says that the father must pay, but his son is not redeemed. One can answer that the baraita means the son is not redeemed until the father pays. The mishna adds that even if the priest converts the amount owed into a loan, it is not as though he received the money and then lent it back. If the priest forgives the debt, the son remains unredeemed until the father pays.
  3. He said to him: You did not fully intend to give; you did a bad thing — The Aramaic mid’am can mean “anything”: “You did not fully intend to give anything.” Alternatively, mid’am bish means “a bad thing,” so the phrase means “You did a bad thing.” Some texts omit “you did” and read only mid’am bish: “It is a bad thing,” meaning this transaction is flawed.
  4. Therefore his son is not redeemed — Why is this different from a gift given on condition that it be returned? Kiddushin 6b says that such a gift takes effect and redeems the son. Here, Rabbi Chanina was willing to accept only an outright gift; arranging a return was forbidden because it makes the priest look as though he is offering favors to obtain priestly gifts, contrary to the warning against corrupting the covenant of Levi discussed earlier (Bekhorot 26b). Although the man did not state a condition, his expectation of a return was apparent, so it was not merely an unspoken intention. Still, since Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Chanina regularly returned the money, did they not disadvantage other priests by attracting gifts to themselves? The giver did not know at the time of giving whether the money would be returned, and a later return does not corrupt the covenant of Levi. They may also have returned money only to the poor, not to those who appeared wealthy.
  5. Not from assets merely due to come into possession as from assets already held; nor may a woman collect her marriage settlement from such assets — Bava Batra 125b rules that a firstborn does not take a double share of a debt owed to his father, whether the heirs collect it in money or not. That suggests a widow likewise cannot collect her marriage settlement from such a debt, since the mishna excludes assets merely due to come into possession. But Rabbi interprets the law differently: although a debt counts as such assets for a firstborn and a husband, it counts as assets already held for a widow’s marriage settlement. Evidence comes from the mishna in Ketubot 84a. If a man dies leaving a wife, a creditor, and heirs, while others hold money owed to him or deposited with them, Rabbi Tarfon says it goes to whichever claimant is in the weakest position. Rabbi Akiva says it goes to the heirs, because the other claimants must swear an oath and the heirs need not. Thus, were it not for the oath, even Rabbi Akiva would allow the widow to collect. Once the heirs collect money, however, she cannot collect it from them: movable property held by heirs is not subject to the claim. If they collect land, she may collect that land from them after taking the required oath; she can also collect the debt if her husband exempted her from the oath. The obstacle is the oath, not a rule that the debt is merely due to come into possession. No sage there limits the mishna to Rabbi’s view, which indicates that all agree on this point, even those who generally deny a marriage-settlement claim against movable property. Nor can that mishna simply be assigned to Rabbi Meir on the ground that he permits collection from heirs’ movable property. Rabbeinu Tam explains that even Rabbi Meir permits collection only from a levir’s movable property, because the levir takes the husband’s place. And if heirs’ movable property were subject to collection, Rabbi Akiva’s reason for awarding them the money would fail: the widow could collect it from them afterward. The same mishna concerns a creditor, and no tanna holds that a creditor can collect from heirs’ movable property. Rather, while the debt remains with another person, the widow and creditor have a stronger claim to it than they do to movable property already held by the heirs. This does not improperly combine two special stringencies concerning a marriage settlement. The first does not apply because the debt is held by others, not as movable property in the heirs’ hands. Nor need Rabbi Nathan’s rule be invoked: even sages who disagree with him can agree here. The heirs never held this money; they are only now claiming it by inheritance. Their claim is weaker than a living creditor’s control over a debt owed to him. The mishna’s related dispute about detached produce likewise concerns produce not held by the heirs. Now that the Geonim have instituted collection of marriage settlements and debts from heirs’ movable property, a widow can collect from a debt owed to her late husband whether the heirs receive land or money. The debt counts as already held for her marriage settlement, as explained above. Even apart from the evidence in Ketubot, the Geonic enactment supports collection after the heirs receive money: by treating movable property like land, it makes property collected on the father’s debt subject to his obligations, as though he had collected it while alive. One might object that this combines two stringencies, but the Geonim treated movable property fully like land; according to Rabbeinu Tam, their enactment reflects Torah law, so there is no such combination. Still, the analogy to land alone is not conclusive, since claims against land are stronger than claims against movable property when it has been sold. The mishna in Ketubot supplies the proof that a widow collects from her husband’s outstanding debts, and that is the practice.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Bekhorot, Bechoros, Bekhoroth 51.