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Bechorot 52 for kids: Who Gets the Land?

בכורות נ״ב

🌾 This daf asks what a firstborn son receives from an inheritance, and whether he shares in growth that comes later. It also asks which lands return in the Jubilee Year.

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Stories from Bechorot 52

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Bechorot 52 in simple English

Rashi on Bechorot 52a, in English Tab translation (11)
  1. And neither does a woman collect for her marriage contract — If her husband’s property was worth less than her marriage contract when he died and later increased in value, she collects only what it was worth at his death. She does not collect from property due to him but not yet in his possession.
  2. Nor do the daughters — If a man undertook to support his wife’s daughter from another man for five years, after his death she receives support based only on the value of his property at his death, not on later increases in value or property due to him but not yet in his possession.
  3. Nor does the levirate brother — Although he receives two shares of their father’s inheritance, his own and that of the brother whose wife he married, he does not receive his brother’s share of later increases in value or of property due to their father but not yet in his possession.
  4. And none of them take, etc. — The Gemara explains why the mishna states this.
  5. For he is the first fruit of his strength, and the right of the firstborn is his — This implies that the right concerns the father himself: it applies to his property, not his wife’s.
  6. His — The father’s, at the time of his death.
  7. A creditor — If someone lends money and the borrower sells his property, the creditor can seize both the land and improvements made by the buyers. A woman collecting her marriage contract is also a creditor.
  8. A leniency concerning a marriage contract — This is one of the leniencies that apply to a marriage contract.
  9. The Torah calls him a firstborn — The verse says, “And it shall be, the firstborn whom she bears.” The Gemara in Yevamot explains that this refers to the levirate brother: the Torah says that the eldest brother should perform the levirate marriage.
  10. Shall succeed in his brother’s name — This refers to inheritance, as the Gemara in Yevamot explains. The Torah calls the levirate brother a firstborn, so, like a firstborn, he does not receive property due but not yet possessed, or increases in value between their father’s death and the levirate marriage.
  11. He has already succeeded him — From the time he marries his brother’s wife, his right to two shares is established. Property that then increases in value does so while it is under his right, and he receives two shares of the increase.
Tosafot on Bechorot 52a, in English Tab translation (2)
  1. Neither the wife for her marriage contract, nor the daughters for their sustenance, nor the levirate husband — Why does the mishna not also list a husband inheriting his wife? Rav Pappa says that a husband does not inherit property merely due to his wife as he inherits property she possessed. But he does receive an increase in value: as her sole heir, he acquires her property immediately at her death, so it increases in value while already his. It follows that he does not inherit money owed to her, even if she lent it from her own property during their marriage. This is supported by the discussion of compensation owed to a wife for an injury: her husband does not inherit the claim because it is like a loan. That discussion compares property due to a firstborn with property due to a husband. In Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s view, a loan is not considered merely due to a firstborn, so the case must involve a divorced woman; the Sages, by contrast, regard it as merely due. This is so even though compensation received during her lifetime would have become her own property. When the Gemara elsewhere states the rule about loans in terms of a firstborn rather than a husband, it is not suggesting that a husband inherits loans. It uses the firstborn because the sages there dispute his case. Nor should the two have been taught together: the rule about a firstborn is stated explicitly in this mishna, whereas the rule about a husband is transmitted as a statement by Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rabbi Yannai, also attributed to Rabbi Yehoshua, and derived from a verse.
  2. But doesn’t Shmuel say that a creditor collects the increase in value? This is one of the leniencies of a marriage contract — The mishna concerns heirs, as does its ruling about daughters’ sustenance. A wife and daughters cannot collect sustenance from property sold by the father. Rashi explains ‘daughters’ as a wife’s daughters whom a man undertook to support. But such an undertaking could equally concern a son, and the mishna’s plural ‘daughters’ points instead to daughters supported under the standard marriage-contract provision. Moreover, the Gemara calls this entitlement a marriage-contract condition, whereas a promise to support a wife’s daughter for five years is an ordinary obligation to a creditor: it would bind him even if the child were someone else’s. The daughters here, therefore, cannot collect from sold property. The ruling that they collect the original value but not the increase concerns collection from heirs. The wife’s marriage contract is treated the same way: the leniency of a marriage contract prevents her collecting the increase, though Shmuel’s ruling means an ordinary creditor can collect it even from heirs. Elsewhere, the reason given for a creditor’s collection of an increase from a buyer is that the seller undertakes to reimburse the buyer for it; a recipient of a gift has no such recourse. One might think heirs likewise have no recourse. But an heir stands in his father’s place, and a creditor may collect from him as from his father. Allowing collection from heirs also protects the availability of loans, unlike collection from an unrelated gift recipient. Another passage suggests that a creditor cannot collect an increase made by the heirs themselves. That concerns a field designated as the sole source of repayment: once payment falls due, it is treated as already collected by the creditor, so an heir or buyer who improves it must be paid for the improvement. Designating the field this way thus weakens the creditor’s position. The passage treats heirs and buyers alike on this point. Its earlier distinction between whether the debt covers the value of both field and increase is not its final explanation: even when it does, the creditor must pay heirs or buyers for an increase they made to such a designated field. Indeed, if the debt did not cover both, the creditor could not collect the increase even if the father had made it. The earlier distinction addresses Shmuel’s apparently conflicting statements, not the case where the heirs say, ‘We made the improvement.’
Rashi on Bechorot 52b, in English Tab translation (19)
  1. Enhancement that occurs by itself — an increase in value for which the brothers did no work.
  2. For example, fodder that became ears of grain — the crop was still fodder when the father died, but has since grown ears.
  3. Or date flowers that became dates — they were immature blossoms and have since become full-grown dates. This teaches that even from such an increase in value, the firstborn receives only the same share as each brother. They assess what the produce was worth when the father died, and he takes a double portion of that value. Otherwise, we might have thought the rule applies only to improvements the brothers worked to produce, such as fertilizing, loosening, or hoeing the soil.
  4. Property of the father’s father — if the grandfather was alive when their father died, his property was expected to pass to them when he died. Even if the grandfather had another son, these brothers would receive their father’s share. We might therefore have treated it as property their father already possessed. This statement teaches otherwise. Without it, we might have thought the earlier rule concerned only a less certain inheritance: property of their father’s brother, whose sons were alive when their father died but died before their own father.
  5. And one who marries his brother’s widow through levirate marriage — the share he takes from his brother’s estate is a full inheritance, and he does not return it in the Jubilee Year.
  6. A gift is like a sale — and the land returns in the Jubilee Year.
  7. One who inherits his wife’s property must return it — he returns the land to her family in exchange for payment, deducting an amount from what they pay him. The Gemara explains this.
  8. A husband’s inheritance is by Torah law — the verse says, “His nearest relative from his family shall inherit her.” The passage in Bava Batra 111b derives from this that a husband inherits his wife.
  9. You shall return — the words “every man to his possession” are unnecessary here, since the Torah has already said, “You shall return, every man to his possession.” They therefore include a gift among the lands that return.
  10. And the others — the Rabbis agree that the other cases in the mishna do not return because they are all inheritances.
  11. A double portion — the verse links the firstborn’s two shares: just as his ordinary share is an inheritance, as it says, “On the day he causes his sons to inherit,” so is his extra share.
  12. So too his firstborn’s share is an inheritance — a husband’s inheritance is by Torah law, and the Torah calls the man who marries his brother’s widow a firstborn.
  13. And they return them to one another — then they divide the property again.
  14. They do not return so as to cancel it — the firstborn does not lose his extra share. Rather, they return the property, divide it again, and he takes a double portion as before.
  15. Does this imply that Rabbi Elazar says they return so as to cancel it? — This is a rhetorical question.
  16. Wisdom is good with an inheritance — it is good to have the sharp reasoning mentioned here alongside a store of teachings. Rav Sheshet knew many teachings; had he heard this teaching from his teacher, he would not have raised an objection.
  17. A place for the standing ceremony — where they perform the seven ceremonial standings for the deceased.
  18. Against his will — against the buyer’s will.
  19. The cost of his wife’s burial — because he is obligated to bury her, as stated in Ketubot 47b.
Tosafot on Bechorot 52b, in English Tab translation (5)
  1. To include an increase that occurs on its own, when unripe produce becomes full ears of grain, and so on — The mishna follows the Rabbis in their dispute with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi over whether a firstborn takes a double portion of an increase in value. The Gemara there concludes that they disagree about unripe produce becoming full ears and date flowers becoming dates. Rava also says there that one may not act according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  2. A firstborn: ‘By giving him a double portion’—the Torah calls it a gift — This is puzzling: In Yevamot, the Gemara asks why the Torah calls a man who enters levirate marriage a firstborn and answers that it limits his rights: Like a firstborn, he does not take a double portion of property that was only due to his brother, rather than already in his possession. Why not answer that it benefits him, since his firstborn’s portion does not return in the Jubilee Year? One can answer that Rabbi Elazar disagrees here and says that all the properties listed return in the Jubilee Year.
  3. Rabbi Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Brothers who divide an inheritance are treated as buyers — I have explained elsewhere both the difficulty this poses for Rabbi Asi’s statement earlier in the chapter that the brothers are half heirs, and Rabbeinu Tam’s question: If we accept Rabbi Yohanan’s view that they are buyers and Reish Lakish’s view that ownership of produce is not ownership of the land itself, how can anyone bring first fruits unless he is an only son descended from only sons all the way back to Joshua? Alternatively, although other sages too regard brothers who divide an inheritance as buyers and hold that the shares are not treated as having been theirs from the outset, only Rabbi Yohanan says the land returns in the Jubilee Year. The others hold that the Torah requires a sale to return, but not an inheritance or gift. That is why the Gemara directs this difficulty specifically at Rabbi Yohanan. Even in a division of nine animals against nine, or ten against ten, where he says we cannot regard each share as having belonged to its recipient from the outset, it is still necessary to teach separately that the brothers are buyers and that their shares return in the Jubilee Year; one might otherwise have thought that they do not return for the reason just given. Alternatively, divisions of inherited land may be learned from Joshua’s division of the land, which is called an inheritance from the ancestors. Even Rabbi Yohanan agrees that Joshua’s division did not return in the Jubilee Year; hence the example of an only-son line back to Joshua. It is reasonable to distinguish that division because it was made through prophets, the Urim and Thummim, and a decree of Scripture. The other sages disagree with Rabbi Yohanan about extending that distinction to other inheritances. This explains why Rav Oshaya challenges Rabbi Yohanan from the mishna’s statement that a firstborn’s portion does not return, but does not challenge the other sages who regard divided shares as purchases. One might ask: Why is the mishna difficult for Rabbi Yohanan? It is taught by Rabbi Meir, who accepts that a later selection can determine ownership retroactively in the case of wine bought from Samaritans. The answer is that, concerning a firstborn, the Rabbis do not disagree with Rabbi Meir; only Rabbi Elazar does. Moreover, accepting retroactive determination when a condition resolves an uncertainty does not necessarily mean accepting it in other cases, as explained earlier.
  4. Rav Hama applied to Rav Sheshet the verse, ‘Wisdom is good with an inheritance’ — Rav Sheshet was especially knowledgeable about baraitot: Eruvin says that Rav Hisda’s lips trembled before Rav Sheshet’s baraitot. Thus ‘wisdom’ refers to Ravin’s teaching in Rabbi Yohanan’s name, and ‘inheritance’ to the many received teachings Rav Sheshet had preserved in baraitot.
  5. The family comes and buries him against his will, to avoid disgrace to the family — Sanhedrin asks whether burial is required to prevent disgrace or to provide atonement. The difference is whether a person’s instruction not to bury him is binding: If burial prevents disgrace, he cannot waive it. No answer can be drawn from here, since this case does not concern a request to leave him unburied; financial pressure led him to sell his burial plot and the path to it. Nor can an answer be drawn from Ketubot, which says not to obey someone who orders that his burial not be paid for from his property. He wants to be buried but intends to shift the cost to the community and leave his sons wealthier.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Bekhorot, Bechoros, Bekhoroth 52.