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Keritot 11 for kids: Who Brings an Offering?

כריתות י״א

📖 This daf asks who the Torah means by an espoused maidservant and when a guilt offering is brought. It also asks what happens when witnesses say someone ate forbidden fat, but that person disagrees.

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Stories from Keritot 11

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Keritot 11 in simple English

Rashi on Keritot 11a, in English Tab translation (21)
  1. Rabbi Yishmael says, a maidservant — a full-fledged maidservant.
  2. All forbidden relations are explicitly stated — the women are free. The only unusual case not accounted for is a woman who is half-maidservant and half-free.
  3. It means a recitation — verses are recited over her, including “The Lord will make your plagues extraordinary,” as is done for people receiving lashes, as described in tractate Makkot.
  4. She shall be assessed — if she cannot withstand forty lashes, they determine through careful assessment how many she can withstand.
  5. Lashes that can be divided into thirds — for example, eighteen, twenty-one, or twenty-four: two portions were administered in front and one behind, as derived from a verse in tractate Makkot.
  6. When the woman is flogged — when she is an adult and subject to punishment.
  7. Perhaps the verse excludes him — this returns to the mishna’s statement that the Torah did not equate the woman and the man regarding an offering. Perhaps “there shall be” excludes him from lashes, but she is flogged and also brings an offering.
  8. It denotes a change — she has changed from her original condition.
  9. Groats — something changed by pounding. Here too, the change is caused by the male organ during intercourse.
  10. They pledged to send away — these words are a verse in the book of Ezra.
  11. Redeemed and not redeemed — “she was redeemed, but not fully redeemed” implies that she is partly redeemed and partly not.
  12. For Rabbi Yishmael, how do we know she is designated for a Hebrew slave? — Rabbi Akiva, who understands her to be half-free, needs no verse: since the Torah imposes liability for intercourse with her, she must be betrothed to a Jew, as betrothal can take effect for her. She could therefore be designated for a Hebrew slave, whom his master may give her against his will, as explained in tractate Kiddushin. She could not be designated for a Canaanite slave, to whom she is forbidden. But for Rabbi Yishmael, who considers her a full maidservant, how do we know she is designated for a Hebrew slave? Perhaps she is designated for a Canaanite slave, to whom she is entirely permitted.
  13. If it is not needed for her own case — because the verse already says, “She was not fully redeemed.”
  14. All forbidden relations — if either the man or the woman is an adult, that person is liable and the other is exempt. The law of the maidservant is different, as the Gemara explains.
  15. Unwittingly, a sin offering; intentionally, excision — with a maidservant, if he acts intentionally and she unwittingly, both are exempt, since she is not flogged and therefore he brings no guilt offering. But if he acts unwittingly and she intentionally, she is flogged and he brings a guilt offering, for the unwitting and intentional man are treated alike in intercourse with a maidservant.
  16. And here he is liable? — Is a minor liable for intercourse with a maidservant?
  17. For they are linked to each other — as stated above: if the woman is not flogged, the man does not bring a guilt offering.
  18. Is someone who is asleep liable? — This is a rhetorical question.
  19. For initial penetration, he is not liable — because the verse specifies an emission of semen.
  20. Is he liable only if he intends the act, and otherwise not? — An emission of semen is required. Someone who falls from a roof and accidentally penetrates is not capable of ejaculating.
  21. But if it refers to other forbidden relations, it should say the opposite — for those relations, initial penetration incurs liability just like complete intercourse, and intercourse in an unnatural manner just like intercourse in the usual manner, since the verse speaks of “lying with a woman.”
Tosafot on Keritot 11a, in English Tab translation (6)
  1. Subject to the recitation of verses — But why assume the verses must be recited while the lashes are administered? That requirement is not stated elsewhere; perhaps it is derived from here.
  2. If the woman is not flogged — For example, if she acted unwittingly or is a minor, the man does not bring an offering. The statement that an unwitting act is treated like an intentional one refers to the man; the woman must have acted intentionally.
  3. Betrothed to a Canaanite slave — This is not literal, since betrothal with her does not take effect.
  4. And Rabbi Yishmael: Granted, ‘and she was redeemed,’ and so forth, for the Torah speaks in ordinary human language — The Jerusalem Talmud likewise says that the Torah uses doubled expressions, such as ‘you have indeed gone,’ ‘you have greatly longed,’ and ‘I was surely stolen.’ Rabbi Akiva disagrees. Thus, when the Gemara contrasts the view that the Torah speaks in ordinary human language with the opposing view, it refers to Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva.
  5. For they are equated with each other — This wording is imprecise: the man’s liability is linked to the woman’s, not the woman’s to the man’s. The Sifra derives from ‘and a man’ that a minor is excluded, but a boy aged nine years and one day is included. The woman is therefore not equated with the man.
  6. One who acts without intent is exempt — Rashi explains that the verse mentions an emission of semen, and someone who acts without intent—such as a person who falls from a roof and penetrates a woman—is incapable of emitting semen. But how do we know that? Rather, he is exempt because he acted under compulsion.
Rashi on Keritot 11b, in English Tab translation (12)
  1. One who intentionally begins intercourse with a maidservant — He is exempt, just as one who unintentionally has intercourse with someone with whom relations are forbidden is exempt. The definition of the initial stage of intercourse is disputed in Sanhedrin 55b: some say it is sexual contact, while others say it is insertion of the corona.
  2. They told him — The Gemara explains this.
  3. If they could have made him liable — For example, by testifying that he killed someone.
  4. If he wishes to say, “I acted intentionally” — If he wanted to exempt himself by lying, he could say that he acted intentionally; one who acts intentionally is exempt from a sin offering.
  5. It is Rabbi Meir’s view — He is the one who says, “If two witnesses could have made him liable,” and so on.
  6. What does this teach us? We already learn it from the latter clause — That clause says, “Two witnesses say he ate,” and so on.
  7. This is what the latter clause means: This matter — The earlier ruling, “They told him, ‘You ate,’ and he brings a sin offering,” is disputed by Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rabbi Meir says, “If two witnesses could have made him liable,” and so on; the Rabbis disagree. Thus, the latter clause explains the first.
  8. Some say — This is how the Gemara poses its question: “They told him” can refer even to one person, and so on.
  9. She may return to him — She may return to her first husband. She remarried because two witnesses told her he had died, so she acted under duress; an Israelite woman who has relations under duress remains permitted to her husband.
  10. It follows that in the first clause — Where the mishna says she must leave both men, she remarried with the court’s permission on the testimony of one witness. She should have carefully checked whether her husband had died. The Sages permitted remarriage on one witness because a woman checks carefully before remarrying: the severe consequence if her husband returns—having to leave both men—allowed them to be lenient at the outset, as explained in Yevamot 88a. Since she did not check and her husband proved to be alive, she must leave both men. As Sotah 27b explains, “and she was defiled” is stated twice: once concerning her husband and once concerning the other man.
  11. It is still a case where he does not contradict the witness — The mishna means that when they tell him he ate, he brings a sin offering if he remains silent. But if he contradicts the witness—for example, the witness says he ate and he says he did not—he is exempt.
  12. It becomes known to him — This implies that he learns it himself, not that others inform him.
Tosafot on Keritot 11b, in English Tab translation (11)
  1. This is what it teaches: They equated… — The baraita means that they treated completing intercourse like its initial stage, and intentional intercourse like unintentional intercourse. As the Gemara explains, these rules concern both typical and atypical intercourse. It remains somewhat difficult why the baraita does not also mention awake and asleep together with these, but instead teaches them after typical and atypical intercourse.
  2. It follows that intentional intercourse… — Why does the Gemara explain this at such length? It is not explaining the baraita, whose meaning has already been established.
  3. Like unintentional intercourse with those with whom relations are forbidden — Rashi explains this as a man who thinks he is approaching his wife in bed but instead approaches his sister. He is exempt from lashes but liable to bring a sin offering: although he acted without intending this intercourse, he experienced pleasure. But in such a case he would also owe a sin offering for intercourse with an espoused maidservant, since intentional and unintentional acts both require one. So the comparison cannot mean that they are equally exempt. Rather, it refers to someone who falls from a roof and accidentally penetrates a forbidden partner; he is entirely exempt because the act was beyond his control.
  4. They told him: One witness says he ate… — The two opposing witnesses must have testified at the same time. If they testified one after the other, then where the Torah accepts one witness, his accepted testimony counts as two, and the later contradiction does not matter. The person they testify about must be silent: if he says, ‘I do not know,’ he is exempt, as the Gemara derives from ‘or it becomes known to him.’ Where the discussion concludes that a single witness cannot obligate him to bring an offering, it must concern his saying, ‘I do not know.’ If he says, ‘I did not eat,’ it is obvious that one witness is not believed against him, as the verse says, ‘One witness shall not rise against a man’; a single witness appears able to impose only an oath.
  5. And a woman says: He did not eat — This suggests that a woman is more credible than someone accused of robbery. Elsewhere, a man was told to divorce his wife if he trusted the person who reported her adultery not to be a robber, despite his own silence; his silence was not treated as an admission. Here, if he is silent, the woman’s testimony is accepted.
  6. One witness says he ate, and he says, ‘I did not eat’: He is exempt — The same applies if he says, ‘I do not know,’ as explained above.
  7. If he ate half an olive-bulk and then another half from one type, he is liable; from two types, he is exempt — But elsewhere it says that piggul and notar combine for eating, though not for impurity of the hands. That may concern lashes, or their combining to impart a forbidden taste if both fall into one pot: they share a single prohibition. Here, however, the question is liability to bring an offering.
  8. Consider the middle clause: One witness says he ate, and he says, ‘I did not eat’… — The Gemara could likewise have cited the preceding clause: one witness says he ate and another says he did not, so he brings a provisional guilt offering. This implies that without the second witness he would bring a sin offering, because silence counts as an admission. He must be silent in that case: if he contradicts the witness, he is entirely exempt, even if he says, ‘I do not know,’ as explained above.
  9. Rather, he contradicts them; whose opinion is this? Rabbi Meir’s — The case cannot be one where he says, ‘I do not know.’ With two witnesses, that is plainly like remaining silent, and he is liable.
  10. This matter is disputed by Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis — Why was it necessary to state the first clause without naming an authority? If the aim was an anonymous ruling followed by a dispute, it is already obvious that the law follows the majority rather than an individual.
  11. It follows that the first clause concerns authorization by the court and one witness — With two witnesses, authorization by the court is unnecessary.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Kerisus, Kritot, Kerithoth 11.