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Keritot 12 for kids: Witnesses and Offerings

כריתות י״ב

📖 This daf asks when a person must bring a sin offering, even if he disagrees with witnesses. It also asks how separate acts of eating count, and how much time may pass while eating forbidden food.

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Stories from Keritot 12

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Keritot 12 in simple English

Rashi on Keritot 12a, in English Tab translation (13)
  1. A person is believed about himself — In matters requiring atonement, he would not refrain from bringing a sin offering to atone before God.
  2. Because, if he wished… — If he wanted to lie, he could say, “I acted intentionally.” He could explain “I did not eat” to mean “I did not eat unwittingly; I ate intentionally.”
  3. In a case of ritual impurity — For example, witnesses tell him, “You became impure and immediately entered the Temple.”
  4. Old impurity — The witnesses say, “You became impure yesterday and entered the Temple today.”
  5. New impurity — He cannot claim, “I immersed,” as an alternative explanation: the witnesses say he entered while impure. Even if he immersed, the sun had not set, and one who enters the Temple unwittingly before sunset must bring a sin offering. As stated in Menachot, if one who still requires an atonement offering enters the Temple, he must bring a sin offering; all the more so one who has immersed but awaits sunset. Nor can he claim he became impure intentionally: his words must allow that explanation. Had he said, “I did not enter,” he could explain, “I did not enter unwittingly; I entered intentionally.” But “I did not become impure” cannot be explained as “I did not become impure unwittingly; I became impure intentionally,” because how he became impure does not matter when his entry into the Temple was unwitting.
  6. You became impure — And entered the Temple.
  7. He is exempt — As explained below from “he shall confess”: one who acknowledges the matter is liable, but one who does not acknowledge it is exempt.
  8. The Rabbis’ reasoning is indeed based on what he could have claimed — They disagree with Rabbi Meir only about old impurity. The text should read, “This is what it teaches.”
  9. If so — If Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree about ritual impurity over whether an alternative claim is available to him, that is the same dispute as in the mishna’s case of forbidden fat. Why teach both?
  10. You ate forbidden fat — The Rabbis accept his alternative claim because he can explain his words: “I did not eat unwittingly; I ate intentionally.” But with impurity, one might think that “I did not become impure” cannot be explained as “I did not become impure unwittingly; I became impure intentionally.” The baraita therefore teaches that he can explain it another way: “I did not remain impure.”
  11. And he shall confess — The verse continues, “the sin that he committed in it.” It is written in Leviticus concerning impurity in the Temple.
  12. The Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda — And disagree with Rabbi Meir in cases such as these: witnesses say, “You ate forbidden fat,” and he says, “I did not eat”; or they say, “You entered the Temple while impure,” and he says, “I did not enter.”
  13. But concerning impurity — If he says, “I did not become impure,” the Rabbis do not agree with Rabbi Yehuda that he is exempt. This shows that their reasoning depends on an alternative claim that can explain his words, such as “I did not do it unwittingly; I did it intentionally.” That cannot explain “I did not become impure.” The question is thus resolved: their reasoning rests on the alternative claim.
Tosafot on Keritot 12a, in English Tab translation (5)
  1. Rather, isn’t it a case of one witness? — The baraita teaches that the witness is believed when the person does not contradict him, but not when he does. This must mean that the person says, “I do not know.” If he explicitly says, “I did not eat,” he is plainly exempt: as explained concerning the mishna, one witness can establish only an obligation to take an oath.
  2. Or perhaps the Rabbis’ reason is that he could have said, “I acted intentionally” — At first this sounds like an ordinary *miggo*, but that is difficult: witnesses say he ate, so his claim “I did not eat” contradicts them, and a *miggo* does not prevail against witnesses. Nor would “I acted intentionally” seem to be a claim he would make, since people do not portray themselves as wicked. Rather, his words can be interpreted as “I did not eat unintentionally; I ate intentionally.” Saying this to avoid bringing an unwarranted offering does not make him wicked. Why not ask what he meant? Rabbi Meir holds that if he argued all day, “I did not eat,” without explaining himself, a later explanation does not exempt him; had he said at the outset that he acted intentionally, it would have been accepted. Although a person cannot ordinarily be compelled to bring a sin offering against his will, that rule applies when he does not want atonement. Here he wants atonement but thinks he is exempt, so he can be compelled.
  3. The practical difference is a case of ritual impurity — The Gemara could also have given a case in which he says, “I ate neither unintentionally nor intentionally.”
  4. I did not remain impure — Rabbi Meir does not accept this interpretation of his words, because a claim based on what he could have said does not prevail against witnesses. Elsewhere, too, such a claim fails when the witnesses’ testimony fully establishes the contrary—even if one tries to reinterpret one’s words. Riva distinguishes this case: reinterpreting one’s words cannot prevail against witnesses to cause another person a loss, but it can prevent an unwarranted offering from being brought into the Temple courtyard. It appears that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir specifically when the person says, “I did not eat.” If he says, “I ate permitted fat,” they agree with Rabbi Meir, as the Tosefta suggests. Why, then, does the Gemara give ritual impurity as the practical difference rather than this distinction within the case of eating forbidden fat?
  5. The Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda concerning forbidden fats and entering the Temple, but not concerning impurity — Rabbi Yitzḥak offers a reading different from Rashi’s: the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda where the person’s words can be reinterpreted, but not in the case of recent impurity, where he cannot claim that he subsequently immersed. Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a person is believed about himself, exempts him in both cases. This would show that the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Meir rely on an interpretation of the person’s words. Ravina rejects the proof: the dispute may concern earlier impurity. If witnesses say that he ate sacred food while impure and he replies, “I did not become impure,” the Rabbis may refuse to interpret that as “I immersed,” because he denied becoming impure rather than addressing the eating. Tosafot then questions a passage in Bava Metzia that treats a person’s admission as stronger than witnesses for obligating a sin offering. If witnesses do not contradict his admission, it can obligate him; and if he does not contradict witnesses, even one witness can obligate him. Indeed, witnesses can obligate him when he contradicts them, provided his words cannot be reinterpreted. Why, then, does that passage present their testimony as weaker—even according to the Rabbis?
Rashi on Keritot 12b, in English Tab translation (29)
  1. Ravina said: It is still possible — The reason is that he could have offered another explanation. For eating forbidden fat or entering the Temple, he could say he acted intentionally rather than unwittingly. But the Rabbis do not agree with Rabbi Yehuda about impurity because, in a case involving an offering, there can be old impurity for which he has no such explanation—for example, when the witnesses say, “You ate sacrificial food…”
  2. Another version: The Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda about eating forbidden fat and entering the Temple — These acts can require an offering. But they do not agree with him about impurity alone, without entering the Temple, which does not require an offering.
  3. Concerning impurity — He touched ritually pure food.
  4. What case are we dealing with? If it is old impurity… — Since the teaching says without qualification that the Rabbis do not agree with him about impurity, their reason cannot be the availability of another explanation: with old impurity, he could offer one. Rather, a person is believed about himself where an offering is at stake, but not concerning impurity alone.
  5. The Gemara asks: What case is this? — What case of impurity leaves him no alternative explanation? If it is old impurity, he has one; why, then, do the Rabbis not agree with him?
  6. Ravina said: It is still possible — There is a case of old impurity in which he has no alternative explanation. The witnesses say, “You became impure yesterday and ate sacrificial food today,” making him liable for a sin offering. He replies, “I did not become impure,” denying both that he ate and that he touched sacrificial food while impure. If he later explains, “I meant that I did not remain impure,” he can deny liability for eating, which requires an offering, but not impurity from touching. On that point, his original statement has been contradicted.
  7. Rabbi Yehuda did not say — He is believed and considered pure only when eating ritually pure food in private. He should not eat it before others, lest they come to treat the purity rules lightly.
  8. For himself — He is believed when eating ritually pure food he has touched, because a person is believed about himself. He may not feed it to others.
  9. Rabbi Meir concedes — But he does not accept the alternative explanation offered in the mishna. A person would rather lie and say, “I did not eat,” than admit he acted intentionally and make himself out to be wicked.
  10. I consulted a sage — I asked a sage to release me from my nazirite vow, so I became impure when it was permitted. By “I did not become impure,” I meant, “I did not become impure while still bound by my vow.”
  11. Do you know testimony? — He was put under oath and denied knowing it, making him apparently liable for an offering for a false oath of testimony. But he could avoid liability by explaining, “When I said I did not know, I meant that I had not intended to serve as a witness.”
  12. Forbidden fat and forbidden fat — Two olive-bulks of forbidden fat.
  13. The text should read: Separate lapses of awareness create separate liabilities.
  14. From one kind, he is liable — This refers to the end of the mishna: two half-olive-bulks from one kind make him liable. That seems obvious.
  15. You might have thought that Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement — Later in this chapter, he says that separate serving dishes divide the food for purposes of liability.
  16. For leniency — If he ate two half-olive-bulks from separate serving dishes, you might think they do not combine.
  17. For stringency — If he ate two full olive-bulks from separate serving dishes during one lapse of awareness, he is liable for two offerings. The mishna teaches that two halves from one kind do combine, even from separate dishes; Rabbi Yehoshua does not disagree.
  18. It teaches us — Rabbi Yehoshua’s rule about separate dishes applies only to impose the stricter result.
  19. The text should read: From two kinds, he is exempt. That seems obvious — Since the later clause, which says the halves do not combine, concerns one kind in two serving dishes, the earlier clause must say that one kind in one dish does combine. That seems obvious.
  20. Awareness does not divide a partial measure — If he ate half the required amount and then became aware of it, that awareness does not separate the acts. If he later eats another half, they combine.
  21. One who writes two letters — That constitutes a prohibited act of labor on Shabbat.
  22. Mishna: How long may one take to eat them? — This asks about the two half-olive-bulks that are said to combine.
  23. As though eating roasted kernels — Imagine the food broken into small pieces like roasted kernels and eaten one by one. The halves combine if eaten within the time that would take.
  24. A peras — As explained in Eruvin, it is half a loaf of the size made with one-third of a kav of flour. Peras means “half,” and this half-loaf is the volume of four eggs.
  25. He ate impure foods — Eating half a peras makes a person unfit to eat teruma. As stated in Eruvin, half of that half-loaf renders the person unfit.
  26. Entered the Temple — This refers back to the quarter-log of wine, since eating impure food does not make a person liable for entering the Temple.
  27. If he paused while drinking it — He did not drink the quarter-log of wine in one stretch.
  28. The Gemara, stringently — The measure is like eating roasted grains one by one, each close to the next. Thus, if someone ate about half an olive-bulk, paused, and later ate another half, they combine when the eating was close together, even if the time from beginning to end exceeded the time needed to eat half a loaf—even if it stretched over an entire day.
  29. Some say he meant leniently — On this point he agrees with the Rabbis: portions eaten more than the time needed to eat half a loaf apart do not combine. He compares it to roasted grains because they combine if eaten one after another with no more than the usual pause between grains. If the person paused longer, they do not combine, even within the time needed to eat half a loaf.
Tosafot on Keritot 12b, in English Tab translation (7)
  1. If he wished, he could say, “I did not complete the intercourse” — The witnesses did not see the entire act. With forbidden fat, they saw the entire act but did not know what he intended. With a nazirite, even if they saw the entire act, he might never have been bound by the prohibition, unlike someone eating forbidden fat. And in a case of testimony, he might not have been qualified to testify because he had not intended to do so; the verse says, “And he is a witness.”
  2. I had not intended to testify — From here, Rabbi said, and ruled accordingly in practice, that witnesses who heard something from the people involved but had not intended to testify and were not brought there as witnesses have no valid testimony if they later come before a court.
  3. That he ate them from two dishes — The earlier case of eating forbidden fat twice concerns one dish. Eating forbidden fat, piggul, and notar also incurs liability for each even from one dish, since they are three distinct prohibitions. But why contrast eating forbidden fat twice with eating those three? Why not distinguish within the case of forbidden fat itself between one dish and two? The answer may be that the mishna wanted to conclude, “This is a stringency of one kind…” As for its statement, “This is a stringency of several kinds…,” that stringency can also occur with one kind eaten from two dishes. It may mean that with several kinds one is always liable for each, whether they were in one dish or two, unlike one kind in one dish, for which one is liable only once.
  4. Since the latter clause concerns one kind and two dishes — Earlier, when the first clause was explained as one kind and two dishes, no inference was drawn that the latter clause must concern two genuinely different kinds, such as forbidden fat and blood. The latter clause could have been phrased to contrast with the first, but the first clause would not have been phrased merely to contrast with the latter.
  5. For he holds that awareness of half the required amount does not count — It is called one lapse of awareness because, according to Rabban Gamliel, becoming aware after eating half the required amount does not count as awareness. Nevertheless, the case is taught to show that even during one lapse of awareness, one is exempt when the two half-portions are of different kinds.
  6. From beginning to end, within the time needed to eat a half-loaf — This indicates two uses of the half-loaf measure. If the pause between two acts of eating lasts that long, the amounts do not combine. Also, as stated elsewhere (Pesachim 44a), if an olive-bulk of terumah is mixed into a half-loaf measure of ordinary food and one eats it, one is liable.
  7. Impure foods — Some texts read “creeping creatures” and refer to ones that impart impurity. But why would the person not already become impure by touching them? Because someone else put them directly into his throat.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Kerisus, Kritot, Kerithoth 12.