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Keritot 16 for kids: One Mistake or Many?

כריתות ט״ז

🤔 How many offerings are needed when someone makes several mistakes? The daf looks at pieces from one offering and at forbidden work done on several Shabbatot.

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Stories from Keritot 16

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Keritot 16 in simple English

Rashi on Keritot 16a, in English Tab translation (25)
  1. And yet it does not teach about uncertain cases — In the final clause, concerning misuse of consecrated property.
  2. Whose opinion is this? — That is, whose opinion does the first tanna follow?
  3. Rabbi Akiva deems one liable for uncertain misuse — This is taught in the chapter “The Blood of Slaughtered Animals” (Keritot 22a).
  4. And it teaches five lapses of awareness — This implies that lapses of awareness create separate liabilities, but separate offerings do not. We can therefore infer that Rabbi Yehoshua changed his mind.
  5. Rather, what must you say? — Must you say that this baraita reflects a dispute between tanna’im? The first tanna’s ruling about lapses of awareness suggests that Rabbi Yehoshua accepted Rabbi Akiva’s argument, while the ruling that five offerings create five liabilities even during one lapse of awareness would be from another tanna, who holds that he did not accept it. But even that cannot be established from the baraita: the first tanna could follow Rabbi Akiva about lapses of awareness, though he does not teach a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property.
  6. This tanna holds, etc. — The ruling that eating from five offerings during one lapse of awareness creates five liabilities is from another tanna, who follows Rabbi Yehoshua.
  7. Five items from a burnt offering combine — They combine to make up an olive-bulk for the prohibition against offering them outside the Temple; one who does so is liable to excision. The example specifies a burnt offering because the meat of other offerings does not combine with these items, since it is not wholly burned on the altar. Here, too, the person ate from those five items.
  8. From the shoulder — There are five parts: the hoof, the lower bone up to the knee, two other bones, and the shoulder itself.
  9. Five kinds of cooked dishes — For example, leeks, onions, cabbage, squash, and turnips, each eaten separately.
  10. Five kinds of preparation — Roasted, boiled, pickled, thoroughly cooked, and pot-roasted.
  11. Mishna: Many labors of one kind — These are several subcategories of one primary category of Shabbat labor. He performed the same ones on several Shabbatot, all during one lapse of awareness. The Gemara asks why the question mentions both several Shabbatot and several subcategories, and why it specifies subcategories rather than primary categories.
  12. Many kinds of transgression — Many distinct forms, as with Shabbat, which has primary categories of labor and their subcategories.
  13. A menstruating woman has few kinds of transgression — The only act that creates liability is intercourse. According to Rabbi Eliezer, each act during one lapse of awareness creates a separate liability, as stated earlier in the Gemara.
  14. And the menstruating woman is prohibited to him — As the verse says, “Both of them shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 20:18).
  15. With regard to minors — This means one minor; the plural refers to minors generally. The argument is: A man who has intercourse repeatedly with a minor while she is menstruating creates a separate liability with each act, even though she herself is not subject to the prohibition.
  16. One who has intercourse with an animal proves it — He is liable for each act, as explained earlier: the acts cannot be combined.
  17. An animal is like Shabbat — The Gemara disputes Rabbi Akiva’s meaning. According to one view, he accepted Rabbi Eliezer’s argument: Just as each act with an animal creates a separate liability, so does each Shabbat violation; he had no reply. According to the other view, he did not accept it and meant that the case of an animal was itself as much in question as Shabbat.
  18. Gemara: What was he asking him? — Why did Rabbi Akiva mention both several Shabbatot on which he performed the same labor and subcategories rather than primary categories?
  19. Was he asking whether separate Shabbatot are like separate acts? — If he repeated the same labors on several Shabbatot without learning of his violation in between, do the Shabbatot count as distinct transgressions, like reaping and sowing during one lapse of awareness, or as repetitions of one labor during one lapse, which require only one offering? If this was his question, why mention subcategories? He could have asked about one primary labor performed on several Shabbatot.
  20. Was he asking about subcategories of labor? — Was the question whether performing several subcategories of one primary category creates one liability or a separate liability for each? If so, why mention several Shabbatot? He could have asked about several such labors on one Shabbat.
  21. He asked him two questions — Rabbi Eliezer answered both strictly by saying that he is liable for each one, even though the case of a menstruating woman can resolve only one question, since it has no subcategories.
  22. And which Shabbatot? — Under what circumstances did he perform the labor on several Shabbatot? If he was unaware that each day was Shabbat but knew the labor was prohibited, Rabbi Akiva plainly held him liable for each Shabbat. The intervening weekdays count as awareness that separates the violations, as though he had learned between them that it was Shabbat.
  23. But he knew it was Shabbat — He mistakenly thought the labor was permitted. Here the intervening weekdays cannot count as awareness of his mistake about the labor; that would require learning the law. Rabbi Akiva therefore asked whether performing the same labor on two Shabbatot creates separate liabilities because the Shabbatot are distinct, like sowing and reaping during one lapse of awareness, or not.
  24. Or not — Perhaps the Shabbatot are not distinct in that way, and this is like performing one labor ten times during one lapse of awareness, which requires only one offering.
  25. Or perhaps he plainly held that separate Shabbatot are distinct — When a person knows it is Shabbat but is unaware that the labors are prohibited, separate Shabbatot create separate liabilities, like distinct labors. His question instead concerned someone who was unaware it was Shabbat but knew the labors were prohibited. In that case, even treating the Shabbatot as distinct would not itself create separate liabilities: performing two primary labors during one such lapse requires only one offering. Rabbi Akiva was asking whether the intervening weekdays count as awareness that it was Shabbat and so separate the violations.
Tosafot on Keritot 16a, in English Tab translation (4)
  1. Rather, it must be Rabbi Yehoshua’s view — The baraita says that five lapses of awareness require five sin offerings, implying that it is the separate lapses that create separate liabilities. Rabbi Yitzhak explains that the Gemara could also have cited the earlier clause: five pieces from one offering, prepared as five dishes, require only one sin offering. It does not cite that clause because the question was not about different dishes.
  2. You may even say it is Rabbi Akiva’s view — The earlier clause may follow Rabbi Akiva, while the ruling that five offerings eaten during one lapse of awareness require a separate sin offering for each follows Rabbi Yehoshua.
  3. From the shoulder of a burnt offering — It contains seven bones.
  4. As five kinds of cooked dishes — Rabbi Yitzhak explains: for example, roasted, boiled, fried, pot-roasted, and pickled. Five different flavors could come from pepper, ginger, aromatic cane, cinnamon, and cassia. Rashi did not explain it this way.
Rashi on Keritot 16b, in English Tab translation (20)
  1. It stands to reason — from the mishna cited below.
  2. One who forgets the essence of Shabbat — he thinks Shabbat is not written in the Torah. Thus he is unaware both that it is Shabbat and that these labors are prohibited.
  3. One sin offering — for all the acts, because they stem from a single lapse of awareness. The intervening days cannot count as awareness: he never knew the essence of Shabbat until he learned it.
  4. One who knows the essence of Shabbat — he knows that the forty primary categories of labor are prohibited on Shabbat, but does not know that today is Shabbat. He performs many labors on many Shabbatot without learning in between that he has sinned.
  5. Liable for each Shabbat — one sin offering per Shabbat, because the intervening days count as awareness when his mistake concerns which day is Shabbat. He is not liable for each labor on each Shabbat, since he knew the labors were prohibited. Nor can the separate offerings be explained by treating the Shabbatot as separate entities: the last clause shows that this mishna does not take that view. The intervening days are what separate the offenses.
  6. One who knows it is Shabbat and performs many labors on many Shabbatot — he repeats the same labors on each Shabbat, mistakenly thinking they are permitted. He is liable for each category of labor performed on the first Shabbat, since he knew it was Shabbat but did not know these labors were prohibited.
  7. But it does not teach that he is liable for each labor on each Shabbat — in this last clause, where he knows it is Shabbat but not that the labors are prohibited. Since he repeats the same acts under one continuing lapse of awareness, the Shabbatot are evidently not treated as separate entities. Repeating one prohibited labor under one lapse incurs only one sin offering.
  8. For several acts within one category of labor, he is liable only once — because they all fall under one primary category.
  9. And learn from this — from the mishna’s middle clause, which says he is liable for each Shabbat: Rabbi Akiva clearly holds that, when one does not know it is Shabbat but knows the labors are prohibited, the intervening days count as awareness.
  10. And he accepted neither answer from him — for the mishna does not say he is liable for each primary category of labor on each Shabbat. Nor did he accept the ruling about subcategories, since the last clause says that acts within one category incur only one offering.
  11. Abaye said to him: They are not treated as separate entities — as shown by the mishna’s failure to say he is liable for each labor on each Shabbat.
  12. And he accepted his answer — as shown by the middle clause, which says he is liable for each Shabbat. The mishna’s last clause means: ‘An animal is like Shabbat; you are right that the same law applies to both.’
  13. And he did not accept his answer — as shown by the last clause, which says that acts within one category of labor incur only one offering. Abaye and Rabba disagree about Rabbi Eliezer’s view when one knows it is Shabbat but does not know the labors are prohibited: according to Rabba, Rabbi Eliezer requires two offerings for the same labor performed on two Shabbatot; according to Abaye, even Rabbi Eliezer requires only one. What Rabba says Rabbi Akiva was unsure about, Abaye says was clear to him. Both agree, however, that Rabbi Akiva does not treat Shabbatot as separate entities, and that when one does not know it is Shabbat, the intervening days count as awareness that separates the offenses.
  14. Rav Ḥisda said: Even Rabbi Akiva holds that Shabbatot are treated as separate entities when one knows it is Shabbat but does not know the labors are prohibited — the mishna’s statement that such a person is liable for each labor means each labor on each Shabbat. Even if he repeats the same labor under one lapse of awareness, he is liable separately because the Shabbatot are separate entities. That is why the mishna specifies ‘many Shabbatot.’
  15. And he accepted his answer — as shown by the middle clause, about one who knows the essence of Shabbat.
  16. And he did not accept his answer — as shown by the last clause, about acts within one category of labor.
  17. From where do we know — that Rabbi Akiva holds Shabbatot are treated as separate entities?
  18. Rabban Gamliel holds him liable — because awareness after only half the required measure does not count as awareness that separates offenses, so the two halves can combine.
  19. We initially assume Rabban Gamliel agrees with Rabbi Akiva — as explained below. He cannot be following Rabbi Eliezer, since the teaching says, ‘And he concedes.’
  20. And where it teaches that he is exempt when he knows it is Shabbat but does not know the labors are prohibited — since Shabbatot are treated as separate entities, performing half the required measure on each of two Shabbatot is like performing halves of two different labors under one lapse of awareness. They do not combine, so he is exempt.
Tosafot on Keritot 16b, in English Tab translation (5)
  1. Rabba said: It stands to reason — Rabbi Eliezer answered that separate Shabbatot are like separate entities. But Rabba said earlier that, according to Rabbi Eliezer, someone who reaps twice is liable twice even on one Shabbat. Why, then, does it matter whether the Shabbatot are separate entities? Likewise, regarding a menstruating woman, why does it matter whether the women are separate entities if Rabbi Eliezer holds one liable for every act of intercourse? Rabbi Eliezer was answering Rabbi Akiva on Rabbi Akiva’s own terms.
  2. As we learned: A significant principle — The mishna must follow Rabbi Akiva, so we learn that the intervening days count as awareness. Why does Rabba consider this proof clear? Because Rabbi Akiva asks whether one is separately liable for several subcategories of the same labor, Rabba understands him to be asking about the adjacent case too: someone who knows it is Shabbat but does not know the labors are prohibited. His question is whether separate Shabbatot are like separate entities.
  3. Rav Ḥisda said — Rabbi Eliezer answered that the intervening days count as awareness and separate the offenses. The proof comes from Rabbi Eliezer’s received ruling that one is liable for each act, not from his a fortiori argument, which Rabbi Akiva challenged.
  4. Rav Ḥisda said: How do I know this? As it was taught: One who writes — Rabban Gamliel agrees that if he wrote on separate Shabbatot, he is exempt. That exemption alone would not prove that separate Shabbatot are like separate entities. The case might concern someone who did not know it was Shabbat but knew writing was prohibited, and the intervening days might count as awareness that separates the acts. Although Rabban Gamliel says awareness does not separate two acts that each fall short of the required measure, he might distinguish ordinary awareness from the intervening days and agree that acts on separate Shabbatot do not combine. We therefore need another reason to show that, when someone knows it is Shabbat, the separate Shabbatot have the status of separate entities.
  5. And another baraita teaches — Its ruling that one is exempt concerns someone who knows it is Shabbat but does not know the labors are prohibited. Since separate Shabbatot are like separate entities in that case, performing part of a labor on each Shabbat is like performing two unlike half-labors during one lapse of awareness: they do not combine, so he is exempt.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Kerisus, Kritot, Kerithoth 16.