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Keritot 17 for kids: When You’re Not Sure

כריתות י״ז

🤔 This daf asks when two small acts count together and when they stay separate. It also asks what happens when someone does not know whether they broke a rule.

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Stories from Keritot 17

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Keritot 17 in simple English

Rashi on Keritot 17a, in English Tab translation (20)
  1. And as for the teaching that he is liable — This is when he did not know it was Shabbat but knew the labors were prohibited. Even if the intervening days normally count as awareness, they cannot separate the two half-measures here, because Rabban Gamliel holds that awareness does not apply to a half-measure.
  2. Neither in one case nor in the other — The exemption cannot apply when he knew it was Shabbat but did not know the labor was prohibited: as stated above, Rabbi Akiva holds that the Shabbatot are not separate entities, so the letters combine. Nor can it apply when he did not know it was Shabbat: even if the intervening days normally separate the acts, Rabban Gamliel holds that awareness does not apply to a half-measure, since he holds one liable for two letters written during separate lapses of awareness.
  3. Granted, if he follows Rabbi Akiva — Rabbi Akiva also holds that Shabbatot are separate entities. Thus, the statement that Rabban Gamliel concedes to Rabbi Akiva implies that they disagree when someone writes one letter on each Shabbat, unaware that it is Shabbat but aware that writing is prohibited. Rabban Gamliel holds him liable, as in the other baraita, because awareness during the intervening days does not apply to a half-measure. Rabbi Akiva is the Sage who exempts him because he holds that it does.
  4. But if you say he follows Rabbi Eliezer — Then the statement that Rabban Gamliel concedes means that he concedes to Rabbi Eliezer in the case where the person knew it was Shabbat but did not know the labor was prohibited. That necessarily implies that they disagree in some other case.
  5. Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable — This must refer to someone who did not know it was Shabbat; the ruling thus shows that awareness does not apply to a half-measure. If he knew it was Shabbat but did not know the labor was prohibited, everyone agrees that Rabbi Eliezer treats the Shabbatot as separate entities and exempts him.
  6. Rather, concerning one thread added to a woven fabric — Perhaps Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer disagree there. Rabban Gamliel concedes to Rabbi Eliezer that writing one letter on each Shabbat, while knowing it is Shabbat but not that writing is prohibited, does not incur liability: the Shabbatot are separate and the letters do not combine. Although adding a thread to a fabric also seems like adding a half-measure to what came before, Rabban Gamliel could hold one liable there because the new thread joins the fabric already woven. By contrast, letters written on separate Shabbatot are like half-measures of two different labors, which do not combine. The Sage who disputes Rabban Gamliel’s rule about awareness of a half-measure is not Rabbi Eliezer; nevertheless, the concession could refer to Rabbi Eliezer and a disagreement about adding a thread. It is taught here because the discussion concerns writing in two parts. But Rabbi Eliezer, too, holds one liable for adding a thread.
  7. Rava said — The teaching does mean that Rabban Gamliel concedes to Rabbi Eliezer, and it refers to the disagreement under discussion here.
  8. For two lapses of awareness, he is exempt — Awareness does apply to a half-measure.
  9. Into two domains — Even if both are public domains, he is exempt because the separate domains divide the acts. The earlier baraita says Rabban Gamliel concedes to Rabbi Eliezer that separate Shabbatot prevent two written letters from combining. They disagree about separate domains: Rabban Gamliel holds that domains do not divide the acts.
  10. This is why he says, ‘And what of a menstruating woman?’ — In her case, awareness arises during the intervening days, as explained below.
  11. But according to Rava, who says — The question concerned distinct persons. What does the case of a menstruating woman resolve? Where is there a distinction between persons in that case?
  12. Read ‘menstruating women’ — Although this prohibition has fewer derivative forms, a man who has intercourse with five menstruating women is liable separately for each because they are distinct persons. All the more so should Shabbatot be treated as distinct entities.
  13. Shmuel reads ‘a menstruating woman’ — He agrees with Rav Hisda.
  14. Minors in general — Many men having intercourse with many menstruating minor girls.
  15. Not like this Sage — This Sage takes the rule for Shabbat as obvious and asks about the rule for a menstruating woman.
  16. Liable for each one — If he performed five primary categories of labor during a single lapse of awareness.
  17. With the animal — Many acts of intercourse with one animal.
  18. An animal — Its status, like that of a menstruating woman, is the subject of the question.
  19. Mishnah: Uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat — The Gemara explains that one sage understands this as involving one piece, while another understands it as involving two pieces.
  20. Even if he ate — For example, he thought it was permitted fat and later learned that it was forbidden fat, but remained unsure whether he had eaten an olive-bulk of it.
Tosafot on Keritot 17a, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. Rabban Gamliel is like the first tanna — This is difficult: how can the two be alike? For Rabban Gamliel, separate lapses of awareness do not divide the acts, but the first tanna says that when the acts occur in two lapses of awareness, he is exempt.
  2. He said to him: One who has intercourse with an animal proves the point, for separate bodies do not divide the acts — He could likewise have cited intercourse with a menstruating woman, since Rabbi Eliezer holds one liable for each act. But he had heard the ruling about an animal from his teachers, not the ruling about a menstruating woman, so he cited the animal.
  3. The Mishnah: It is uncertain whether he ate, and so on — This concerns someone who thought, when he ate, that it was permitted fat. If he knew it might be forbidden fat, how could he bring an offering? He had not refrained from the act despite what he knew.
Rashi on Keritot 17b, in English Tab translation (26)
  1. He ate one of them — He thought it was permitted fat. Later he learned that one piece was forbidden fat, but he did not know which he had eaten, so he brings a provisional guilt offering. If he knew of the doubt when he ate it and deliberately ate it anyway, he is exempt from this offering.
  2. He unwittingly had intercourse with one of them — He thought she was his wife, but afterward became unsure which woman she was, so he brings a provisional guilt offering. If he learns she was his sister, he brings a sin offering.
  3. So too, when he later learns of their uncertain status — For example, he ate two pieces thinking both were permitted fat, then learned that their status was uncertain. He brings only one provisional guilt offering, since he did not learn of the doubt between the two acts of eating.
  4. If he learned in between — He learned that the fat’s status was uncertain.
  5. Just as he brings a sin offering for each one — This applies if he learned with certainty between the acts that he had eaten forbidden fat.
  6. So too — If he learned of the doubt in between, he brings two provisional guilt offerings.
  7. Gemara: We learned about one piece — He ate one piece thinking it was permitted fat, then learned its status was uncertain. This is what the mishna means by ‘uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat.’
  8. One piece out of two — As the latter clause explains: Forbidden fat and permitted fat were before him. But for a single piece, he is exempt.
  9. ‘Mitzvat’ is written — In the verse about a provisional guilt offering: ‘If he does one of the Lord’s commandments that must not be done, without knowing it, and becomes guilty and bears his iniquity, he shall bring his guilt offering’ (Leviticus 5:17–18). The word for ‘commandments’ is written in the singular.
  10. ‘Mitzvot’ is read — The plural reading implies one out of two.
  11. Does the case of two pieces even need stating? — One might distinguish a single piece because its prohibited status cannot later be determined, or because no definite prohibition was present. Neither reason applies to two pieces.
  12. Koy — An animal whose status is uncertain: it may be a domesticated or a wild animal.
  13. A provisional guilt offering — Even though there are not two pieces, if he unwittingly ate its fat thinking the koy was a wild animal, he brings this offering.
  14. Uncertain whether a nine-month child, and so on — This concerns a woman who entered a levirate marriage within three months of her first husband’s death; it is uncertain which husband fathered her child.
  15. And they are liable for a provisional guilt offering — The child might be the first husband’s. If so, the woman had children by him, and intercourse with his brother is punishable by excision. Yet the uncertainty here concerns one woman, like the case of one piece.
  16. Found on his cloth — As explained in tractate Niddah: After intercourse, the man and woman each wipe with a separate cloth. If blood is found on his, it was certainly present during intercourse. They unwittingly had intercourse while she was menstruating, and each owes a sin offering.
  17. Atyom — A Greek word meaning ‘after intercourse.’
  18. After some time — The length of this interval is explained there.
  19. And they are liable for a provisional guilt offering — Why, when there are not two possibilities of the kind required by the plural reading of ‘commandments’?
  20. Its prohibited status can be determined — A provisional guilt offering protects a person from suffering until he learns the facts and brings a sin offering. Thus, if there were two pieces and he ate one, an expert might later identify the remaining piece as permitted fat, proving that he ate forbidden fat. If he ate the only piece, its status cannot be determined.
  21. What difference is there between Rava — Rava explained Rav’s view above on the basis of how the word ‘commandments’ is read.
  22. And Rabbi Zeira — Rabbi Zeira explained Rav’s view on the basis of whether the prohibited status can be determined.
  23. The correct text is: The difference is a piece measuring an olive-bulk and a half-olive-bulk — There were two pieces of these sizes. He ate the olive-sized piece, but it is unknown whether that piece was forbidden or permitted fat.
  24. According to Rava, there are not two ‘commandments’ — There are not two olive-sized pieces; less than an olive-bulk does not count.
  25. According to Rabbi Zeira, the prohibited status can be determined — The remaining half-olive-bulk piece can establish which piece was forbidden.
  26. For a koy, one is liable, etc. — But it is impossible to determine whether it is forbidden.
Tosafot on Keritot 17b, in English Tab translation (4)
  1. Since the latter clause concerns two pieces, the first clause must also concern two pieces — The earlier case, where it is uncertain whether what he ate was a sufficient quantity, must likewise involve two pieces, each containing a sufficient quantity. This follows from the Gemara’s later statement that a case involving one and a half olive-bulks makes a difference for the view requiring an established prohibition. Thus, even though he ate an olive-bulk, he may have eaten less than an olive-bulk of the forbidden piece. The mishna teaches that he brings a provisional guilt offering even for this double uncertainty. The Shabbat-and-weekday case can likewise involve two possibilities: he worked at twilight, when it is uncertain whether it was day or night. If this was near the end of Shabbat, the prohibition had been established throughout the day. It may also be possible to determine whether he worked on Shabbat from the amount of work he completed: if only a little time had passed after nightfall and he had done a great deal, some of it must have been done during the day.
  2. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: With one piece, he is exempt — But in Ketubot, when two witnesses say a woman’s husband died and two say he did not, the Gemara asks whether a man who has relations with her is liable for a provisional guilt offering. How can it ask this if two pieces are required? It may be asking according to the view here that does not require two pieces. Yet this seems to make Rav contradict himself: in Yevamot, in a discussion of a woman who remarried on the testimony of one witness, the Gemara asks the same question. One answer is that it asks whether the man faces a prohibition of the kind associated with a provisional guilt offering, not whether he must bring one. Alternatively, the question there follows Rav Naḥman’s explanation of Rav’s view here: the prohibition must have been established. That condition is met because the woman was known to be married, just as someone who eats the second piece is liable after a gentile ate the first.
  3. Abaye raised an objection to him — All these objections could also have been raised earlier against Ḥiyya bar Rav.
  4. And a baraita teaches concerning it that they are liable for a provisional guilt offering — This suggests that the baraita explains the mishna. But in Niddah, the mishna says they are exempt from an offering, while a baraita says they are liable for a provisional guilt offering; the Gemara explains that the mishna requires uncertainty between two pieces. It is also somewhat difficult to see why the Gemara does not object from the teaching in Horayot that a provisional guilt offering is brought for violations of the positive and negative commandments concerning a menstruating woman, even though there are no two pieces.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Kerisus, Kritot, Kerithoth 17.