Kids Daf Quest

Daf Yomi for kids · Talmud Bavli · Masechet Keritot

Keritot 19 for kids: What Did He Know?

כריתות י״ט

🤔 This daf asks what happens when someone knows they did something forbidden but is unsure exactly what happened. The sages discuss when that uncertainty requires an offering.

Daf Yomi day:

📖 Open Keritot 19a in Daf QuestOpen Keritot 19b in Daf Quest

In the app: the Gemara with Rashi and Tosafot, the printed page, games made from this daf, play coins and treasure chests.

Stories from Keritot 19

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Keritot 19 in simple English

Rashi on Keritot 19a, in English Tab translation (21)
  1. Rabbi Shimon exempts him in this case — The two instances of impurity are separate. For each entry into the Temple, the path he had just taken might have been the pure one, so he had no definite knowledge of impurity at the outset. For impurity in the Temple, liability requires knowledge at the outset and at the end, with a lapse of awareness in between. The first tanna’s reason for holding him liable is explained below.
  2. Even in the first case — You mean even in the first two cases? Surely, by his second entry into the Temple he had definite knowledge of impurity.
  3. He forgot that he had walked on the first path — Although he was certainly impure, he had only partial knowledge because he had forgotten the first path. These two tanna’im disagree about Rabbi Shimon’s view. The first tanna says Rabbi Shimon exempts him only in the last case: in the first case, having walked both paths means he was certainly impure. Even though he forgot the first path, partial knowledge counts as knowledge at the outset. In the last case, however, he had no definite knowledge of impurity.
  4. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda holds — Although the impurity is certain, partial knowledge is treated as no knowledge at all.
  5. Rabbi Yishmael, etc. — His opinion is discussed in the second chapter of Shevuot (14b).
  6. And Reish Lakish contradicts Reish Lakish — Why did he not explain the baraita according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and say that uncertain knowledge counts as definite knowledge?
  7. And it was concealed from him that he is impure — This implies that he is liable even when his awareness of the impurity was only partly obscured.
  8. And it was concealed, etc. — Since he uses both occurrences of “and it was concealed” for this interpretation, he evidently does not require knowledge at the outset. The requirement of knowledge of impurity at the outset and at the end is derived only from those two occurrences, as explained in the first chapter of Shevuot (4a).
  9. Mishna: Forbidden fat and leftover sacrificial meat were before him — He thought both were permitted fat.
  10. His menstruating wife and his sister were with him in the house — He had intercourse with one of them, thinking she was his wife and that she was ritually pure. His wife was in fact menstruating, and he was also uncertain which woman he had been with.
  11. And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him — The Gemara explains the phrase “the sin that he committed in it” to mean that he must know what he sinned in.
  12. Or he performed — Labor on Shabbat but does not know which labor he performed, whether plowing or sowing.
  13. Even from a provisional guilt offering — This is explained in the Gemara.
  14. They did not disagree — Rabbi Eliezer says he need not know what he sinned in, while Rabbi Yehoshua says he must know.
  15. About something that falls under one category — For example, two trees of the same kind were before him, and he does not know which one he picked from.
  16. That he is liable — He knows what he sinned in: the labor he performed was picking figs.
  17. What did they disagree about? About something that falls under two categories — For example, he is unsure whether he reaped or ground, or whether he picked figs or grapes. The same applies when he intended to do one act but did the other. For Rabbi Yehoshua, the verse’s word “in it” applies both to the act and to knowledge of it: he must have intended to commit that particular prohibited act and, when he learns of his sin, know what it was. For Rabbi Eliezer, it is enough that he intended an act involving a prohibition and later learned that he had sinned.
  18. And I wonder whether he would exempt him in that case — That is, why would Rabbi Yehoshua exempt him? He intended to do something prohibited.
  19. If so — If someone acting without intending this particular act is liable in such a case, why does the verse say “in it”?
  20. To exclude someone acting without intending a prohibited act — For example, he intended to cut something detached from the ground but cut something still attached. Here, however, he was engaged in a prohibited act and is liable.
  21. Gemara: He needs it to exclude someone acting without intending that act — For example, he intended to do one act but did another. One might ask: If Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Rabbi Naḥman, why does he need to derive this exemption from “in it”? He could derive it from Rabbi Naḥman’s teaching that the Torah forbids only deliberate labor on Shabbat. It seems to me that Rabbi Eliezer does not accept Rabbi Naḥman’s interpretation of that phrase. Rabbi Naḥman is cited only because he explicitly says that one who acts without intending that act is exempt on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehoshua, however, who derives from “the sin that he committed in it” that one must know what he sinned in, does interpret the requirement of deliberate labor as Rabbi Naḥman does.
Tosafot on Keritot 19a, in English Tab translation (2)
  1. Rather than attribute it to Rabbi Yishmael, attribute it to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi — The question cannot mean that the person had the awareness gained from studying the law, which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi considers sufficient. That question could be asked even without the contradiction between Reish Lakish’s statements. Rather, it asks: Instead of attributing the baraita to Rabbi Yishmael and reading it as a case with no prior awareness at all, attribute it to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and read it as a case of partial awareness, such as uncertain awareness, which he considers sufficient.
  2. But it is a mishna, as we learned — Rabbi Shmuel of Verdun asked: How does this mishna prove that Rabbi Yishmael never requires awareness at the outset? Although he uses both instances of “it was concealed” for other teachings, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does so too, yet requires the awareness gained from studying the law. He derives that requirement from the implication of “it was concealed”: the person must previously have known. One answer is that we find elsewhere that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi requires such awareness, so he requires it here too; we find no such requirement anywhere for Rabbi Yishmael. Alternatively, if Rabbi Yishmael required it, he should have said explicitly that “it was concealed” implies prior awareness.
Rashi on Keritot 19b, in English Tab translation (20)
  1. Acting unawares with forbidden fat — For example, forbidden fat and permitted fat are before him, and he knows which is which. He intends to eat the permitted fat, looks elsewhere, and his hand takes the forbidden fat instead. Or two pieces of forbidden fat are before him; thinking one is permitted fat, he intends to eat it but eats the other. This differs from an ordinary inadvertent sin, where he intends to eat the very piece he eats but thinks it is permitted.
  2. Acting unawares in forbidden intercourse — For example, he intends to have intercourse with his wife while she is menstruating, thinking she is ritually pure. His wife and his sister are before him; his wife slips away without his noticing, and his sister takes her place. This differs from an ordinary inadvertent sin, where he intends intercourse with the very woman involved but thinks she is his wife.
  3. Rather, acting unawares on Shabbat — The verse comes to exempt him. The Gemara explains this case below.
  4. Planned labor — He thought about and intended to perform this very act of labor.
  5. You find it — A case of acting unawares on Shabbat, such as one who intended to cut, and so on.
  6. To lift — Everyone agrees he is exempt: he acted unawares, without intending to cut anything.
  7. You examined my opinion closely — That is, you defeated me and refuted my argument.
  8. He lifted — At twilight between Shabbat and Yom Kippur, he lifted an object to carry it out. He can become liable as soon as he lifts it: for example, the object is near the public domain and he stands in the public domain. How, then, could one say that part of the act occurred today and part tomorrow?
  9. You examined my opinion closely — You thought you had defeated me, but you accomplished nothing: one can still say that part of the lifting occurred today and part tomorrow.
  10. And according to Rabbi Yosei — Even if part of the labor occurred today and part tomorrow, its completion is a stage of labor. Why does he say everyone exempts him, when we have heard that Rabbi Eliezer holds one liable for completing labor?
  11. And two threads added to existing fabric — That is the full minimum measure. At the start of a new fabric, three are required because two threads come apart and do not hold. But here one could say that he added one thread today and one tomorrow.
  12. If someone sins without knowing it and incurs guilt — This is written concerning a provisional guilt offering.
  13. What was the conclusion? — What does Rabbi Shimon hold about a case in which one is unsure whether he ate forbidden food at all?
  14. He sinned but does not know how — For example, forbidden fat and sacrificial meat left past its permitted time were before him, and he does not know which he ate. Alternatively, he is unsure whether he sinned at all, as when permitted and forbidden fat were before him.
  15. Infants: that is acting unawares — He intended to circumcise one child but circumcised another. An inadvertent sin would be intending to circumcise the very child he circumcised while mistakenly thinking that child was born on Shabbat.
  16. In an act that is not a mitzva — For example, he intended to pick one fig but picked another.
  17. One who causes damage by making a wound is liable — As stated in Bava Kamma: Those who cause damage are exempt, except one who wounds or kindles a fire.
  18. But with one kind, even Rabbi Yehoshua holds him liable — Yet you said that one who acts unawares on Shabbat is exempt without qualification, implying exemption even when both items are of the same kind.
  19. Even Rabbi Yehoshua holds him liable — This is not acting unawares: he intended to pick figs and picked figs. Abaye and Rava exempt one who acts unawares only when he intended a permitted act, such as cutting something detached. Shmuel, however, exempts even someone who intended a prohibited act. The Gemara’s citation of his reason—that the Torah forbids only planned labor—implies that one must intend to act upon the particular item.
  20. And follow my explanation — Acting unawares is exempt, but this is not such a case: he picked what he had originally intended to pick. Why, then, does Rabbi Yehoshua exempt him? His original intention slipped his mind. He first intended to pick grapes, then forgot and thought he wanted figs, but his hand went to the grapes and picked them without intending to. He got what he originally wanted, but did not do what he was thinking at the time of picking. Both are required: his original aim and his intention at the time.
Tosafot on Keritot 19b, in English Tab translation (4)
  1. He intended to lift a detached plant and cut one still attached — On our explanation, the attached plant he cut must have been the very plant he intended to lift. If he cut a different plant, why specify that he intended to lift a detached one? Even if he intended to cut one attached plant but cut another, he would be exempt, as in the case of two lamps where he meant to extinguish one but extinguished the other. Rashi did not explain it this way.
  2. For he did not intend a prohibited cutting — One might ask: Elsewhere in the Torah, too, someone who sins unwittingly does not intend to violate a prohibition. The difference is that, elsewhere, he thinks an act is permitted when we know it is forbidden. Here, if things were as he believed, everyone would agree that his intended act was permitted. He is therefore exempt as one who acts unawares.
  3. But with one type, even Rabbi Yehoshua holds him liable — That is why the question is raised against Shmuel, not against Abaye and Rava above. Shmuel discusses someone who intended a prohibited act but is exempt because Shabbat labor requires a planned act. Abaye and Rava discuss someone who intended a permitted act and is exempt because the verse’s phrase “by it” excludes one who acts unawares, as the earlier discussion explains.
  4. Here, what is the case? He lost track of what he meant to pick — This is the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, as the Gemara explains. It also resolves the question that, with one type, he should be liable: the parallel case with one type is someone who intended to pick these figs, forgot, thought he wanted other figs on the other side, but picked the original figs. He is liable because those were the figs he originally intended to pick. By contrast, the exemption for intending to cut one attached plant but cutting another applies when he never lost track of his intention: he intended only to cut the first plant.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Kerisus, Kritot, Kerithoth 19.