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Keritot 20 for kids: Candles, Coals, and Blood

כריתות כ׳

🕯️ This daf asks how a person’s intention affects responsibility for work done on Shabbat. It then begins a discussion about which kinds of blood carry liability if eaten.

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Stories from Keritot 20

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Keritot 20 in simple English

Rashi on Keritot 20a, in English Tab translation (20)
  1. What are two categories? — At this point, the Gemara assumes that black and white figs also count as two categories. If Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, like Rabbi Yehuda, place the dispute in a case where someone intended to pick one item but picked another, what does Rabbi Yehuda add?
  2. Rather, do they differ about acting unawares? — Rabbi Yehuda heard Rabbi Shimon Shezuri place the dispute in a case where the picker forgot what he had intended to pick, while holding that everyone exempts someone who acts unawares. Rabbi Yehuda instead says that even intending to pick one item and picking another counts as acting unawares: Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him only when the items are of two categories. But then what does the verse’s exemption for acting unawares cover? Perhaps handling something permitted, or intending one principal labor and performing another.
  3. The picker forgot his intention with items of one category — He intended to pick this fig, forgot, thought he wanted a nearby fig, and picked the first one. Everyone holds him liable, since he originally intended to pick it and, even after forgetting, was still thinking of the same kind of fruit.
  4. With items of two categories — He intended to pick figs, forgot and thought he wanted grapes, but picked the figs.
  5. Rabbi Yehuda holds — They disagree even when the items are of one category. He considers black and white figs one category because they are the same kind of fruit. An added comment asks why Rabbi Yehoshua would exempt someone in such a case, since his original intention was fulfilled.
  6. The order is the difference between them — He intended to pick one item first and then another, but picked them in reverse order. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri hold that, if both are of one category, everyone finds him liable: he intended and managed to pick both, and their order does not matter. With two categories, Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable for the same reason, but Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him because, when picking each item, he intended the other. Rabbi Yehuda holds that they disagree even with one category. Rashi wonders why Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him when he did intend to pick both. But if he intended to pick only one item and picked another, everyone exempts him.
  7. But isn’t it taught? — The following teaching supports treating a reversal of the intended order as significant.
  8. To light this one — He was unaware either that it was Shabbat or that lighting was prohibited.
  9. And instead lit that one, he is exempt — This is acting unawares: he intended to light only one candle, but lit the other.
  10. To light and extinguish — One candle was lit and the other unlit. He intended first to light the unlit one and then extinguish the lit one, but did them in reverse order.
  11. If it was with one breath — He blew, thereby extinguishing one candle and lighting the other. He is liable, because one cannot say which happened first.
  12. With two breaths, he is exempt — He did not perform the acts in the intended order.
  13. His intention was not carried out — One could say that he extinguished the candle before lighting the other.
  14. One who stokes — One who fills vessels from a pile of coals.
  15. He extinguishes the upper coals — They become lower coals and go out under the weight above them. He also ignites the lower coals, which had gone out under that weight and now burn when moved to the top.
  16. Why does one opinion hold him liable for two offerings? — He did not intend one of the labors, so with respect to it he acted unawares.
  17. In order to ignite the lower coals — That is, his main intention was to extinguish the larger upper coals for charcoal, not to ignite the lower ones. As a blacksmith who needed charcoal, he intended to extinguish the upper coals even though he knew this would ignite the lower ones and damage them for his purposes.
  18. Damaging through kindling — For example, he is a blacksmith. As Rabbi Yoḥanan said, the case concerns a blacksmith, who does not want his coals to burn up.
  19. One is liable for damaging through kindling — Although other destructive acts are exempt, we hold that one is liable for wounding and kindling even when they cause damage.
  20. Ami bar Avin said: For example, he intended — He intended both to extinguish and to kindle. Nevertheless, the first sage exempts him for kindling, following Rabbi Yosei’s view that kindling was singled out as a prohibition for which no sin offering is brought.
Tosafot on Keritot 20a, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. That is identical to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri — Their statement must mean that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua agree he is liable when the fruits are of one kind—such as two figs—and he loses track of which he meant to pick. They disagree when the fruits are of two kinds, such as grapes and figs, and he loses track of his intention. It cannot mean that he picked either figs or grapes and does not know which he picked; that would teach us nothing new.
  2. Rather, they differ over one who acts unawares — On this reading, Rabbi Shimon holds that one who acts unawares is exempt: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree only when the picker loses track of his intention and picks a different kind of fruit. If both fruits are of one kind and he loses track, all agree he is liable; if he does not lose track but picks a different fruit of that kind, he is exempt because he acted unawares. Rabbi Yehuda, by contrast, places their disagreement even where the picker did not lose track and picked a different kind. This implies that, with one kind, all agree he is liable—but why, when he acted unawares? Thus the original difficulty returns. The Gemara reads them this way because the mishna’s wording suggests that Rabbi Yehuda holds a person liable in more cases: Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say there is certain liability with one kind but a possible exemption with two; Rabbi Yehuda replies that even when he intended to pick figs and picked something else, there is a disagreement and a possible liability. His words, ‘I wonder whether Rabbi Yehoshua exempted him in this case,’ point the same way.
  3. For example, he intended to extinguish the upper coals in order to ignite the lower ones — Rabbi Yohanan explains that this concerns a charcoal maker in the forest, not someone blowing a fire. Once the wood has become charcoal, he removes the upper coals from the fire so they will go out and can be used for ironwork. He wants the lower, fine coals to burn down to ash, not to provide heat. That burning is destructive, since the ash has no useful purpose. Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok nevertheless holds him liable for both extinguishing and kindling. Although the work is destructive and is not needed for its usual purpose, he follows Rabbi Yehuda in holding one liable for work not needed for its usual purpose, and Rabbi Shimon in holding one liable for destructive kindling. The other Sages do not hold him liable for kindling, because they exempt destructive kindling.
Rashi on Keritot 20b, in English Tab translation (10)
  1. The order matters — He intended to kindle first and then extinguish, but did both in a single stoking. The first tanna considers the order: he cannot be liable for two offerings, since he may have extinguished first; nor is he entirely exempt, since he did not extinguish afterward. He is therefore liable for one offering. Rabbi Eliezer does not consider the order and holds him liable for two.
  2. Rav Ashi said he intended to extinguish — He did not intend to kindle, because he did not know the lower coals would ignite.
  3. A labor not needed for its own sake — Here, he did not need to kindle the coals; he wanted warmth from stoking them. Still, he knew they would ignite and acted with that understanding. The kindling was therefore intentional, but it was a labor not needed for its own sake.
  4. Mishnah: One who consumed blood from slaughter — This applies to a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird.
  5. Whether blood from stabbing or blood from tearing out — In the latter case, the animal’s windpipe or gullet was torn out.
  6. And blood from bloodletting with which life departs: one is liable — One is liable to receive karet because this is lifeblood. The Gemara explains which blood from bloodletting is meant.
  7. Blood of eggs — This means the testicles of a ram or ox. Alternatively, it means blood in eggs that turned red from the warmth of a hen sitting on them.
  8. One is not liable for them — One is not liable to receive karet, which applies only to lifeblood, as it is written: “For the life of all flesh is its blood; whoever consumes it shall be cut off” (Leviticus 17:14).
  9. A light form of impurity — Impurity as food, when there is an egg-bulk.
  10. A severe form of impurity — When the animal is a carcass, it imparts impurity through carrying. Before slaughter it is forbidden to eat; after valid slaughter it is permitted.
Tosafot on Keritot 20b, in English Tab translation (7)
  1. He holds like Rabbi Yehuda, who says that one is liable for an unintended act — Rabbi Yehuda is elsewhere understood to forbid unintended acts only by rabbinic law, yet here he appears to require a sin offering. The answer is that kindling the lower coals is an inevitable result of extinguishing the upper ones. But Rabbi Shimon also agrees that an inevitable result counts as intended. The real disagreement is whether one is liable for a labor performed for a purpose other than its usual purpose: Rabbi Yehuda says yes, and Rabbi Shimon says no. Calling the kindling “unintended” is unnecessary to explain the ruling, but describes the fact that he neither wants nor benefits from it. By contrast, one who stokes coals to warm himself wants their heat; Rabbi Shimon exempts him because the labor is not needed for its usual purpose, even though ignition is inevitable. A passage in Shabbat challenges Rabbi Shimon’s exemption where work inevitably improves the ground. There the initial assumption is that the worker wants the improvement; the answer places the work in someone else’s field, where he does not want it. The Arukh likewise permits an inevitable result that one does not want, citing the permission to remove berries from a myrtle on a Festival when one has another myrtle. Alternatively, that repair is permitted because it is not needed for its usual purpose.
  2. Mishnah: One who consumed blood from slaughter, etc. — Rabbi Yitzḥak asks: The Gemara derives the prohibition from birds and animals that can convey both severe and light ritual impurity, but a non-kosher bird cannot convey the severe impurity mentioned there. How, then, do we know its blood is forbidden? The Gemara’s later derivation resolves this: the requirement applies to a kind of bird or animal whose members can convey both forms of impurity, as kosher birds and animals can. It excludes fish and grasshoppers, none of whose kinds can convey severe impurity. Likewise, although slaughter cannot make a non-kosher bird or animal permissible, the kind as a whole includes both forbidden and permitted cases. Even according to the view that biblical law does not require ritual slaughter for birds, killing them is still necessary, so there are forbidden and permitted cases. Alternatively, the contrast is between flesh forbidden while the creature is alive and flesh after its death. The impurity criterion, however, must be understood as applying to the kind. The Gemara could also have asked why the comparison to animals does not exclude non-kosher birds because they lack severe impurity. And its question concerning a mother bird with her young could have distinguished between birds that are readily available and those that are not.
  3. Blood from an uprooted windpipe or gullet — Some explain this as blood shed when those organs are torn from their attachment. But that does not kill the animal: although a tradition given to Moses at Sinai makes it unfit for ritual slaughter, it does not make it a tereifa. The blood shed then is therefore not life-blood whose consumption incurs karet. The phrase must mean blood from slaughter performed after the organs were uprooted.
  4. Bloodletting blood through which life departs — The same requirement applies to blood from slaughter, stabbing, or slaughter after the windpipe or gullet was uprooted. It is stated specifically for bloodletting because people do not ordinarily draw enough blood from an animal to reach its life-blood.
  5. Blood of eggs — The commentary explains this as blood in a hen’s egg; another explanation makes it blood from a male animal’s testicles. The latter is difficult, since the Gemara excludes egg blood on the ground that it is not a kind of meat.
  6. One is not liable for fish blood — This implies that consuming it is nevertheless forbidden. Why, then, when Rav says that collected fish blood is forbidden and a baraita is raised against him, is the Mishnah not cited in his support? It could indeed have been cited: Rav could have replied to the objection, “By your reasoning, the Mishnah also poses a difficulty.”
  7. They can convey severe and light ritual impurity, can be forbidden or permitted, and are a kind of meat — Rabbeinu Baruch asks why all these conditions are needed. Any one should suffice to exclude other blood: human beings, for example, cannot convey light ritual impurity, and the condition concerning what can be forbidden or permitted should likewise suffice.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Kerisus, Kritot, Kerithoth 20.