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Keritot 24 for kids: When Things Change

כריתות כ״ד

🔍 This daf asks what happens when new information changes a decision about an offering. It also asks who owns a gift that is refused, and when a special heifer may no longer be used.

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Stories from Keritot 24

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Keritot 24 in simple English

Rashi on Keritot 24a, in English Tab translation (21)
  1. As a backup — If one animal is lost, he will offer the other.
  2. Since he needed to designate only one — We know he revealed his concern: he needed to designate only one animal, yet he designated two.
  3. A provisional guilt offering whose witnesses were proved to be conspiring — Two witnesses told him he had unwittingly eaten a piece of fat whose status was uncertain, so he designated an offering based on their testimony. Other witnesses then testified that the first pair had been with them that day. He had not relied on the first pair, since he knew he had not eaten it and thought he could bring witnesses to discredit them. His offering therefore becomes non-sacred.
  4. Rather, is it not a case of conspiring witnesses? — In the case of the ox sentenced to stoning, the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Meir that it goes out to graze with the flock. Unlike a provisional guilt offering, there is no reason to say its owner was troubled by doubt.
  5. And likewise — The Rabbis also disagree in a corresponding case of a provisional guilt offering: even when the witnesses are proved to be conspiring, they say the animal remains sacred because the person's conscience troubled him.
  6. Perhaps the ox sentenced to stoning — Its innocence became known when the supposedly killed person appeared before us on his feet, alive and well. In that case, the Rabbis agree that the ox goes out to graze with the flock.
  7. And likewise, they disagree about an offering when the piece was identified — The remaining piece proved to be forbidden fat, showing that the piece he ate was permitted fat. In that case, the Rabbis say the offering remains sacred because his troubled conscience led him to consecrate it wholeheartedly.
  8. But — When the designation was based on witnesses, he may not have been troubled by doubt: he thought he could bring witnesses to discredit them. In that case, the Rabbis do not disagree.
  9. They dispute the same issue — Just as Rav Yehuda said above that the Rabbis agree when the witnesses for a provisional guilt offering are proved to be conspiring, and Rava challenged him from the case of the ox sentenced to stoning, so Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree here.
  10. A meal offering of jealousy — The meal offering of a sota, a woman suspected of adultery.
  11. Her witnesses were found to be conspiring — Those who said she had secluded herself with the man.
  12. To clarify the sin — To determine whether the accusation is true or false.
  13. And its witnesses were proved to be conspiring — After the ox had been sentenced to stoning.
  14. He acquired it — The ox became ownerless when it was sentenced.
  15. His ox was subjected to bestiality — It was sentenced to stoning on their testimony. Presumably, he then relinquished ownership because he believed the witnesses were telling the truth; the ox was therefore ownerless.
  16. And he took the trouble to bring witnesses — To prove the first witnesses were conspiring.
  17. A city condemned for idolatry, etc. — Although each innocent resident knows he did not sin, so one could argue that he did not relinquish ownership of his property. This poses a challenge to Rava.
  18. Others sinned — As stated in tractate Sanhedrin: The righteous residents of a city condemned for idolatry leave it without their possessions, and their property is lost.
  19. And the other person said — That is, the recipient said.
  20. The recipient of a gift — The recipient spoke after the deed gifting him land had come into his possession.
  21. Read the text this way: ‘Let it be void,’ ‘It is void,’ or ‘I do not want it’ has no effect; but ‘It was void’ or ‘It is not a gift’ is effective. This is the reading in tractate Gittin. The first three expressions refer to the future; since he has already accepted the gift, they have no effect, and a creditor may collect the land from him. This does not challenge Reish Lakish: he spoke of a gift of movable property, which becomes ownerless if the recipient relinquishes it after receiving it. Here, the recipient has not relinquished the field; he merely does not want the gift to remain in force. Rather, the latter part raises the question for Reish Lakish. ‘It was void’ and ‘It is not a gift’ refer to the past: the recipient is saying, ‘When I received it, I did not accept it as a gift.’ Since a party's admission is as strong as one hundred witnesses, his statement is effective.
Tosafot on Keritot 24a, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. One who designates two provisional guilt offerings as a safeguard — Some texts add, “and he achieved atonement with one of them,” but this is unnecessary. Even if both are still alive, when he learns that he either did not sin or definitely sinned, they graze until they become blemished.
  2. If it had not yet been stoned, it goes out and grazes with the flock; what makes you prefer one pair of witnesses? — One might ask: Why is this a challenge? Sanhedrin 15a says that an ox is put to death under the same rules as its owner. When witnesses contradict one another, the owner would not be executed, so neither would the ox. Nor can the issue be whether benefit from the ox is forbidden: according to Rabbenu Tam’s explanation in Kiddushin 57b, benefit from an ox sentenced to stoning is not forbidden while it is alive. Rather, the challenge comes from the mishna’s next clause, which permits benefit from the ox after it was stoned. Why would the first witnesses be heeded to forbid benefit from it? The case must involve witnesses proved to be conspiring. The mishna’s general statement alone would not challenge Rav Yehuda: it could concern merely contradicted witnesses. Someone who brings a provisional guilt offering on their testimony does not count on later witnesses contradicting them, whereas Rav Yehuda speaks of witnesses proved to be conspiring, a possibility he does count on. That is why the Gemara examines the case in detail. My teacher.
  3. They told him that his ox had been used for bestiality — This challenges Rabbenu Efraim’s view that an animal involved in bestiality is not forbidden for benefit, since its law is not derived from that of an ox sentenced to stoning. A separate verse is needed to require a court of twenty-three judges for such an animal; that rule is not derived from the ox sentenced to stoning. Here, however, “whoever takes possession of it acquires it” seems to mean that its owner abandoned it because benefit from it is forbidden. One can answer that the owner abandoned only the difference between its value alive and its carcass value, so that the court could put it to death; he did not abandon the value of the carcass. But Kiddushin 57b objects to the claim that living creatures cannot be forbidden for benefit by citing an animal involved in bestiality, and the Tosefta to Bava Kamma explicitly says that benefit from such an animal is forbidden.
Rashi on Keritot 24b, in English Tab translation (17)
  1. Does this not mean that his words are effective and it returns to its owner? — If his words have an effect, this suggests that the gift returns to its previous owner.
  2. No, his words are effective — The recipient does not acquire the gift, but it does not return to the previous owner either. The Gemara could also have answered that this differs from Reish Lakish’s case: here, by saying, “I did not receive it as a gift,” the recipient shows that he never accepted it, so it returns to the giver. A person gives a gift expecting its recipient to accept it; without acceptance, it is no gift. In Reish Lakish’s case, the recipient renounced it after accepting it as a gift. The Gemara gives that answer to a later objection, but rejects this first objection differently.
  3. One who says to another — The other person was his partner in this field.
  4. I have no legal dealings with this field; he has said nothing — He has not lost his ownership rights.
  5. And it teaches that he has said nothing — This suggests that “I do not want it” is neither a declaration that the property is ownerless nor a gift. It therefore challenges Reish Lakish and Rav Sheshet, who say his words are effective.
  6. He removed himself from legal dealings — Here he said all these phrases together. We therefore understand them all as referring to legal dealings: “I will not litigate or argue with anyone over this field, because it is firmly mine. I have no legal dispute with anyone about it, and my hand is removed from such disputes.”
  7. One who wrote over his property — This was a person on his deathbed. In tractate Chullin, the dispute is explained as a case where a deed of gift was handed to someone else on the recipient’s behalf, and the recipient was silent at first but later protested. The Rabbis hold that his initial silence showed acceptance and that he changed his mind afterward. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that his later protest shows he never accepted it.
  8. Granted — Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s view does not challenge Reish Lakish. Since the recipient’s later protest shows he never accepted the gift, it never left the giver’s ownership: a person gives a gift expecting it to be accepted. Reish Lakish, however, speaks of someone who renounced a gift after acquiring it.
  9. But according to the first tanna — This challenges Reish Lakish. The first tanna does not regard the later protest as proof of an initial refusal, so the recipient acquired the slaves. If “I do not want them” makes them ownerless, as Reish Lakish holds, they acquire their own freedom. They would then be non-priests eating teruma. Their permission to eat it therefore seems to show that the recipient’s words had no effect, contrary to Reish Lakish and Rav Sheshet.
  10. Into a situation of uncertainty — There must be some possibility that he committed an offense punishable by karet, though he does not know whether he did.
  11. A definite guilt offering — Had he known he did not need it, he presumably would not have consecrated it; its consecration was therefore mistaken. With a provisional guilt offering, he knew from the outset that he might not have sinned, yet consecrated it anyway. This shows that his uncertainty troubled him and that he fully intended to consecrate it. It is not a non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, but a consecrated animal that became disqualified and must be burned.
  12. Read the text this way: Rav Ashi said, because it looks like a disqualified offering — Rav Ashi is explaining the rule for a definite guilt offering: it could look as though the offering became disqualified after the blood was sprinkled, leading people to think that disqualified offerings are buried.
  13. It counts as knowledge — But the Torah says that one brings a provisional guilt offering when one “does not know”; if he knows, he does not bring it.
  14. Atonement — Sprinkling the blood is the essential act of atonement, as the verse says: “I have given it to you upon the altar.”
  15. Anything ready for its blood to be sprinkled is treated as though it has been sprinkled — This principle is stated in tractate Bava Kamma.
  16. But it is not ready for its blood to be sprinkled — He did not sin, and this will become known before the sprinkling. It is then clear in retrospect that the blood was never ready to be sprinkled.
  17. A service vessel — As in this case, where the blood was collected in a service vessel.
Tosafot on Keritot 24b, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. This shows that an unconsecrated animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is burned; but the case of a definite guilt offering contradicts this — Rabbi Yitzhak explains that the question is not about the Rabbis’ view. In their view, a provisional guilt offering remains consecrated for its monetary value even if the person learns before slaughter that he did not sin. Its flesh would obviously be burned after slaughter, so it would not be called unconsecrated. The question is about Rabbi Meir’s view: if the person learns before slaughter, the animal returns to the flock as wholly unconsecrated, yet the mishna says its flesh is burned. The Gemara first answers that the rulings come from different teachers. Rabba then answers that both can follow Rabbi Meir. A definite guilt offering was designated for a definite obligation; once that obligation proves mistaken, the animal is unconsecrated and is buried. A provisional guilt offering was designated because of uncertainty. Although Rabbi Meir does not hold that the person’s pangs of conscience make him fully consecrate it before slaughter, after slaughter he does fully resolve to consecrate it, so it is burned.
  2. Rav Ashi said: There is no contradiction — In the first case, where the blood was sprinkled, the animal looks like a disqualified offering, so it is burned. But when a definite guilt offering was slaughtered and its blood has not yet been sprinkled, it does not look like a disqualified offering and is buried. A provisional guilt offering, brought because of uncertainty, looks more like a disqualified offering even before its blood is sprinkled, so it is burned.
  3. Rabbi Yosei holds that Temple service vessels sanctify an unfit offering from the outset so it can be offered — But in Zevahim, Reish Lakish asks Rabbi Yohanan whether these vessels can sanctify an offering from the outset, and Rabbi Yohanan answers that they cannot. Why not say his answer disagrees with Rabbi Yosei? Ordinarily, Rabbi Yosei agrees that they cannot. This case differs: the animal was initially an offering, brought because of the person’s pangs of conscience. It is not unconsecrated and still bears the status of a guilt offering. Nor is there a difficulty with the Rabbis, who say the blood must be poured out. Even if vessels ordinarily sanctify unfit offerings, that applies to offerings that were consecrated and then became unfit. Here the animal proves to have been unconsecrated, so the vessels cannot sanctify it.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Kerisus, Kritot, Kerithoth 24.