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Keritot 25 for kids: An Offering Every Day

כריתות כ״ה

❓ This daf asks when a heifer becomes forbidden to use. It also explores offerings for uncertain sins and what Yom Kippur atones for.

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Stories from Keritot 25

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Keritot 25 in simple English

Rashi on Keritot 25a, in English Tab translation (21)
  1. The boundary I heard — the point from which the heifer becomes prohibited.
  2. Rabbi Shimon exempts — from liability for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day.
  3. Slaughter that is not fit — to permit eating, as here, where eating the animals is prohibited because all of them were prohibited while alive.
  4. Why does Rabbi Shimon exempt him? It is a slaughter that is fit — to permit eating.
  5. And if you say Rabbi Shimon holds that slaughter is valid for the heifer — to achieve atonement, its slaughter would not permit eating. This implies that slaughter can take the place of breaking its neck.
  6. What is valid for the heifer — for the red heifer.
  7. That is not so — unlike a provisional guilt offering. The Rabbis do not disagree that if the killer is identified before the heifer’s neck is broken, it goes out to graze with the flock.
  8. It was already prohibited while alive — when it descended to the rough stream.
  9. Before it became fit for the breaking of its neck — before it descended to the rough stream.
  10. After its neck was broken, it is buried in its place — this applies if its neck was broken, but not if it was not broken.
  11. It is a dispute between tanna’im — whether the heifer is prohibited while alive. The tanna of Rabbi Yishmael’s school holds that it is.
  12. An offering that enables, inside the Temple — the leper’s guilt offering.
  13. An offering that atones — sin offerings and guilt offerings.
  14. An offering that enables, outside the Temple — the birds used in a leper’s purification.
  15. An offering that atones, outside the Temple — the scapegoat and the heifer whose neck is broken.
  16. Just as with an offering that enables inside the Temple, He treated the enabling offering — the leper’s guilt offering — like an atoning offering, such as other sin offerings and guilt offerings.
  17. So too, with offerings that enable and atone outside the Temple, He treated the enabling offering — the leper’s birds, which are prohibited for benefit while alive — like the atoning offerings, the scapegoat and the heifer whose neck is broken. Thus this tanna holds that the heifer is prohibited while alive: just as he derives the law of the enabling offering from the atoning offering, he derives the law of one atoning offering, the heifer, from another, the scapegoat. The scapegoat is certainly prohibited while alive, like other consecrated animals. This is explained at the end of the chapter “A Man Who Betroths” in tractate Kiddushin.
  18. Until it enters a period of uncertainty — during the rest of the year, there is reason to wonder whether one has sinned or committed some other transgression. But immediately after Yom Kippur there is no such concern, because Yom Kippur has atoned.
  19. Gloss: What is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason, if you think it is obligatory, etc. — Why does Rabbi Eliezer say that a provisional guilt offering may be brought voluntarily? If it were obligatory, why would a person bring a sin offering upon learning that he had definitely sinned? He would already have fulfilled his obligation. Rather, the provisional guilt offering must be voluntary, like a burnt offering or a peace offering brought as a gift.
  20. To protect him — from suffering until he learns whether he sinned.
  21. Perhaps a provisional guilt offering — since it is lenient enough to be brought when the sin is uncertain, one could say that it is like burnt offerings and peace offerings, which can be obligatory, as with a pilgrimage burnt offering and a festival peace offering, or voluntary. A provisional guilt offering too could be brought either way.
Tosafot on Keritot 25a, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. Why does Rabbi Shimon exempt him? It is valid slaughter — Rabbi Moshe asks: Why not say that he slaughtered the heifer’s mother and then broke the heifer’s neck? Breaking its neck could count as its slaughter, just as pushing the scapegoat off the cliff counts as its slaughter in Yoma 64a. The answer is that the tanna would not have called breaking its neck “slaughtering it.” The baraita in Yoma does not use that wording; it only seeks a case in which the scapegoat is sent too early.
  2. It was already prohibited while alive — But why should that matter? A guilt offering brought for a definite transgression is sent to graze if it becomes unnecessary before slaughter. The heifer should instead be compared to a provisional guilt offering, which comes to atone for uncertainty: it has served the purpose for which it originally came. Thus, if the heifer became prohibited while alive, discovering the murderer would leave its original prohibition in place.
  3. This is a dispute among tanna’im: a rite that enables and a rite that atones — The comparison treats the leper’s birds, which enable his purification, like the heifer, which atones. But how does that show that they are prohibited while alive? Perhaps the birds become prohibited only after slaughter, like the heifer. The same difficulty arises in Kiddushin 57a, which uses this teaching to prove that the birds are prohibited while alive. The commentary here explains that if a rite that enables is learned from one that atones, then all the more so the heifer can be learned from the scapegoat, another atoning rite. The scapegoat is certainly prohibited while alive, like other consecrated animals. But this is strained. Rabbi Yitzhak explains that the rite outside the Temple that enables purification means the bird that is released; some texts say so explicitly. The teaching first makes that bird prohibited for benefit, like the heifer. We then learn from the released bird, which is prohibited while alive, that the heifer is too; the bird to be slaughtered is likewise prohibited while alive. This also resolves the passage in Kiddushin. Another answer is that the comparison there must teach that the birds are prohibited while alive: if it concerned only the period after slaughter, the inclusion of the slaughtered bird in ‘you shall not eat’ would already teach its prohibition. But how can ‘you shall not eat’ imply a prohibition on benefit when it is written about nonkosher birds, from which benefit is permitted? Once Scripture shows that the slaughtered bird is prohibited, it is reasonable that the released bird is also prohibited until its release, since the two should have the same status until their rites are complete. The released bird is prohibited for benefit, so the slaughtered bird must be as well. The passage there must be understood this way.
Rashi on Keritot 25b, in English Tab translation (23)
  1. Comes for an animal carcass — That is, for uncertainty about violating a prohibition.
  2. Did you not learn — Are you unfamiliar with the mishna and baraita?
  3. Marginal note: Did you not learn — Why did you not study before Rabba? Then you would have known, as I do. End of marginal note.
  4. Into a situation of uncertainty — Some possibility of a prohibition, however slight, is required.
  5. What is the reason of those who said to him — They hold that a provisional guilt offering is brought for uncertainty about any prohibition, such as the prohibition against eating an animal carcass.
  6. As it is written — Regarding a provisional guilt offering, the verse says, “which may not be done, and he did not know, and he is guilty.” Thus, even if the uncertainty concerns only a prohibition—something “which may not be done”—he is liable.
  7. Five guilt offerings — The guilt offerings for robbery, misuse of sacred property, relations with a betrothed maidservant, a nazirite, and a person with tzaraat.
  8. A provisional guilt offering does not provide complete atonement — If he later learns that he sinned, he brings a sin offering.
  9. And not according to Rabbi Eliezer — For if it followed Rabbi Eliezer, who says a provisional guilt offering is brought for uncertainty about eating an animal carcass, that offering would provide complete atonement: even if he later learned he had eaten it, he would not be liable to bring a sin offering.
  10. Nothing else provides their atonement — If someone unwittingly misused sacred property, did not know it, and Yom Kippur passed before he found out, he still brings a guilt offering for misuse of sacred property. The same applies to the other definite guilt offerings.
  11. From where is this derived — That Yom Kippur does not atone for sins requiring definite guilt offerings?
  12. Just as transgressions are not subject to an offering — “Transgressions” means acts of rebellion against one’s master, as in “The king of Moab has rebelled against me” (II Kings 3:7).
  13. So too, sins not subject to an offering — Yom Kippur atones for sins such as eating an animal carcass, but not for sins requiring sin offerings or definite guilt offerings. The reason it atones for sins requiring provisional guilt offerings is explained later.
  14. Which does not come to atone for a known transgression — As stated in the first chapter of Shevuot: If a person knew he was impure when he became impure, but did not know he was impure when he entered the Temple, and still did not know afterward, the goat offered inside the Sanctuary and Yom Kippur suspend punishment until he learns that he entered while impure and brings a sliding-scale offering. But they do not atone once he knows he sinned by entering the Temple while impure. Their atonement is therefore limited and does not cover sins requiring an offering. The scapegoat, however, provides broader atonement: as stated there, it atones for deliberate and unwitting sins, whether they have become known or not. One might therefore think it also atones for sins requiring an offering.
  15. And he shall confess over it — This refers to the scapegoat.
  16. And Scripture excludes them concerning the scapegoat — This teaches that, despite its broader atonement, the scapegoat does not atone for sins requiring an offering.
  17. For intentional conduct as for inadvertent conduct — This is discussed in the chapter “Four Who Lack Atonement” (Keritot 9a).
  18. It was also stated — In support of Abaye.
  19. From the beginning of the verse — The beginning is needed for its plain meaning, leaving the end available for this interpretation.
  20. His iniquity is upon him — This concerns an intentional sinner, as the beginning of the verse says, “Because he has despised the word of the Lord.”
  21. To compare sins, etc. — One can no longer challenge Rav Dimi by saying: If the verse addresses sins requiring an offering, why write “their transgressions” when it already says “iniquities”? It should instead write “their sins,” which ordinarily implies sins requiring an offering. Rather, “their transgressions” is available to teach that the verse speaks of most transgressions.
  22. Of which he is unaware — He has not learned that he sinned.
  23. The first ruling too — The ruling that those liable for sin offerings or definite guilt offerings must still bring them after Yom Kippur cannot be proved from either Rav Dimi or Abaye. The proposed resolution is forced, since the original objection can still be raised.
Tosafot on Keritot 25b, in English Tab translation (2)
  1. A provisional guilt offering comes for a carcass — Rashi explains that this concerns a possible violation of a prohibition. Those who spoke to Bava ben Buta rely on the verse, “which may not be done inadvertently, and he is guilty.” They do not mean that one must bring this offering for a possible violation of any prohibition: since the verse says “he did not know,” would one bring it for possibly eating a carcass but not for definitely eating one? Rather, that phrase governs when the offering is obligatory: the act must be one for which, if the person learned he had done it inadvertently, he would bring a sin offering. They also accept the verbal analogy based on the word “mitzvot.” But “which may not be done” allows a person to bring the offering even for a possible violation of a prohibition. The Rabbis use the verbal analogy to exclude such violations altogether.
  2. Requires further study — I found no more Tosafot.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Kerisus, Kritot, Kerithoth 25.