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Meilah 10 for kids: The Handful and the Incense

מעילה י׳

🔥 This daf finishes discussing misuse of items already burned on the altar, and when leftover money goes to the Dead Sea. Then a new mishna lists offerings burned completely, like the handful and incense, and explains the rules of piggul and impurity.

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Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 10 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 10a, in English Tab translation (18)
  1. The first clause — where it states that the money is cast into the Dead Sea, this follows Rabbi Shimon, who says (Temurah 15a) that a sin offering whose owner has already achieved atonement elsewhere is left to die.
  2. And the latter clause — which states that all offerings go to the altar even though the owner has achieved atonement, follows the Rabbis, who say that a sin offering is left to die only in the case of one that was lost and then found after atonement was already achieved (and the same applies to the money).
  3. Everyone concedes — meaning Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan, who disagree about ash that has puffed up [from the altar fire].
  4. That if one derived benefit from offerings of the most sacred order that became impure — even before the sprinkling of the blood — or from the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity after they were placed on the altar — even before they turned to ash — but once the fire has taken hold of them, one is exempt from liability for misuse.
  5. Isn't this obvious? — that he is exempt, for what loss did he cause? Since the meat of the most sacred offerings became impure, it is fit neither for the priests nor for the altar, and regarding the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, they have already been placed on the altar and their mitzva has already been fulfilled. And if you ask: but we said above in this chapter (Meilah 5b) that one is always liable for misuse of piggul, and we did not ask there what loss was caused — the reason one is liable there is that since it is capable of becoming piggul [through improper intent], which requires the sprinkling of blood to establish it as piggul, it is considered significant enough that one is liable for misuse even though no loss is caused.
  6. Lest you say — that offerings of the most sacred order that became impure still retain a measure of sanctity, requiring burning within the sacred precinct like other items disqualified from sacred use, and that the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, even after being placed on the altar, still carry a mitzva to turn them with a fork so that they burn completely — and therefore one should be liable for misuse regarding them.
  7. This teaches us that he is not liable — and if you find it difficult why Rava says that one who derives benefit from the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity after they have been placed on the altar is exempt from misuse, when we said above that before the removal of the ashes everyone agrees that one is liable for misuse — this is not difficult: there, above, the discussion concerns the ash of a burnt offering and the sacrificial portions of the most sacred offerings, which are treated more stringently, and therefore one is liable for misuse until they are removed to the ash heap; but the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, which are not treated as stringently, are exempt from misuse once they have been placed on the altar.
  8. This statement applies only when it became known to him that he had misused consecrated property before atonement — before his sin offering was sacrificed. For since he should have added this money as the principal and the fifth to the value of his sin offering when he set it aside, the setting aside was not for loss; rather, he could have offered it, and its law is like that of a sin offering whose owner achieved atonement elsewhere, so it is cast into the Dead Sea.
  9. But — if it became known to him that he had misused consecrated property after atonement, after his sin offering had already been sacrificed, then the principal and the fifth that he now sets aside cannot be used again to bring his sin offering, since the owner already achieved atonement; and if they were to be cast into the Dead Sea, they would be lost. Rather, they are allocated for communal gift offerings, for one does not set something aside at the outset for loss — meaning, with the intent that it be cast into the Dead Sea; therefore it is allocated for gift offerings.
  10. MISHNA — the meal offering of priests, as it is written: 'And every meal offering of a priest shall be wholly burned.'
  11. The meal offering of the anointed priest — this refers to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest.
  12. And the meal offering with the libations — this refers to the meal offering that accompanies an animal offering along with its libations, which has no leftover portion, since all these items listed in the mishna are consumed entirely [on the altar].
  13. One is liable for misuse from the moment they were consecrated — meaning mere verbal consecration.
  14. But there is no liability for piggul in them — since they have no permitting factor.
  15. [An item that has a permitting factor] — such as peace offerings, a sin offering, and a guilt offering, whose blood permits the sacrificial portions to be burned and the meat to be eaten by the priests; or an item that has a permitting factor for the altar alone, such as a bird burnt offering or an animal burnt offering, whose blood permits it for the altar; or the two loaves [of Shavuot], which are permitted by the blood of the lambs; or the showbread, which is permitted by the frankincense dishes; and meal offerings that are permitted through the taking of the handful.
  16. One is not liable for them due to notar, impurity, or piggul until the permitting factors are sacrificed — for so it is written regarding the piggul of peace offerings: 'it shall not be accepted,' and we say (Zevachim 28b) that just as acceptance applies to a valid offering, so it applies to piggul, etc. [And the laws of notar and impurity are derived from piggul, so that regarding notar and impurity as well, one is not liable until the permitting factors are sacrificed, just as with piggul — for notar is derived from piggul through a verbal analogy of 'holy'-'holy,' and impurity is derived (ibid. 45a) through a verbal analogy of 'profane'-'profane' from notar.]
  17. And any item that has no permitting factor — such as the handful and the frankincense, etc. — for they themselves serve as the permitting factor for other items.
  18. One is liable for them due to notar and impurity — liability for impurity, as will be explained below in the Gemara: 'and his impurity is upon him, and he shall be cut off' — the verse speaks of all consecrated items; and liability for notar is derived through a verbal analogy of 'profane'-'profane' from impurity. But there is no liability for piggul in these, since liability for piggul is found only in an item that has a permitting factor, as it is written regarding peace offerings: 'piggul.'
Tosafot on Meilah 10a, in English Tab translation (2)
  1. The first clause follows Rabbi Shimon and the latter clause follows the Rabbis — This refers to the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis regarding a case where one set aside his sin offering and it was lost, then set aside another, and the first one was later found, and he had already achieved atonement with the lost one: the Rabbis hold that since it is no longer lost, it should graze [until blemished, then be sold], while Rabbi Shimon holds it should die. Their dispute appears in the second chapter of Temurah (15a). The case here, where it became known to him before atonement, resembles this dispute. If you ask: why doesn't the Gemara attribute the first clause to Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi], since Rabbi holds in Temurah, in the chapter 'Vlad HaChatat' (23a), following Rabbi Abba, that if atonement was achieved with the lost animal, the non-lost one should die? The answer is that it was more fitting to cite Rabbi Shimon, since his position includes Rabbi's view and goes further: Rabbi only says the animal should die when it was lost at the time of setting aside (i.e., not found until afterward), but when it was lost not at the time of setting aside (found before the setting aside), Rabbi agrees it should merely graze, not die. Rabbi Shimon, however, disputes the Rabbis even when it was found before the setting aside, as proven in the chapter 'Yesh Bekorbanot' (Temurah 15a) regarding the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, which is understood as referring to a case lost not at the time of setting aside. Therefore the Gemara cites Rabbi Shimon — not because it could not follow Rabbi, but because Rabbi Shimon's view is broader than Rabbi's. But this explanation seems difficult: since the case resembles Rabbi's view, the Gemara should have explicitly said the first clause follows Rabbi. Therefore Rabbeinu Meir holds that the first clause follows specifically Rabbi Shimon and not Rabbi. For when Rabbi says (below) that the animal should die, this applies only where both animals were not simultaneously fit for the altar — such as when the first was found before the second was offered, so they were never both fit at the same time. But here, had the sin offering not yet been sacrificed, he could have added money to it and brought a more expensive sin offering; so once the sin offering was sacrificed and the extra money rejected, the money should not go to the Dead Sea but should go to communal gift offerings. However, this case is well derived from Rabbi Shimon, who disputes the Rabbis even regarding one who sets aside a sin offering as a guarantee [i.e., a backup], holding that if atonement is achieved with one, the other must die — even though at the time of atonement, both were equally fit to be offered. So too here with the money for the sin offering: even though, had the sin offering not been sacrificed, the money could have been added and used, nevertheless once the sin offering was sacrificed, we do not say the money goes to the Dead Sea. And if you ask: doesn't Rabbi Shimon concede in the case of one who sets aside two collections of money as a guarantee, as shown in Temurah (23b)? The answer is that case is different, since his intent was to bring the sin offering from only one of the two collections; but here, where he intends to add to the existing sin offering funds, the money should go to the Dead Sea.
  2. Everyone agrees that if one derived benefit from the meat of the most sacred offerings that became impure, or from the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity after they were raised to the altar, he is exempt — Explanation: because their mitzva has already been accomplished. The Gemara then asks: isn't this obvious, since there is no further mitzva to be performed, even had they remained fit? It answers: one might have thought that there remains a mitzva for the priests to burn the impure meat, and likewise a mitzva to turn the sacrificial portions with a fork (called 'kroichet') over the coals so they burn properly; this teaches that there is still no liability. It seems that 'everyone agrees' here does not refer to Rav and Levi, since they do not dispute whether there is liability at all, but only into whose domain the misused item falls — according to both, there is liability — so it would make no sense to say 'everyone agrees he is exempt.' Rather it refers to Rav and Rabbi Yochanan, who disagree about one who benefits from the ashes of the raised ash-heap; Rabbi Yochanan holds he is liable there because removing the ashes requires priestly garments, so the mitzva is considered incomplete. But regarding the meat of the most sacred offerings, even though the mitzva of burning remains, it is considered that the mitzva was completed, since burning does not require priestly garments and is therefore not a sacrificial service. If you ask: why is it different for the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, since turning them with a fork surely is a sacrificial service, as stated (Shevuot 17b) that a non-priest who turns them with a fork is liable to death [by Heaven]? The answer: it is not comparable, since removing the ashes cannot be done otherwise, but turning with a fork is not strictly necessary — one could simply leave the portions to burn on their own without turning them. If you ask: this case of meat of the most sacred order that became impure — how so? If it became impure before the sprinkling of the blood, why would there be no liability for misuse? We learned elsewhere that disqualified meat before sprinkling still carries liability for misuse (Rabbi Elazar, above, Meilah 6b), even though it requires burning, and even Rabbi Akiva disputes this only for benefit derived after sprinkling, since sprinkling removes it from the category of misuse; before sprinkling, he agrees there is liability, since the meat is unfit yet still 'holy to the Lord.' It seems that this case must be discussing impurity occurring after the sprinkling, teaching that even though the mitzva of burning remains, once sprinkling has occurred, the mitzva is considered accomplished, since burning does not require priestly garments, as explained. If you ask: if so, what novelty does this teach, since the mishna already states (above, Meilah 6b) that Rabbi Akiva holds there is no liability for misuse in the case of disqualified meat, even though it requires burning, since sprinkling removes it from misuse? The answer: the case of disqualified meat is different, since not all of it was disqualified and only part requires burning, so sprinkling is sufficient to complete its mitzva; but here, all the meat became impure, and one might have thought that since burning is required for the entire quantity, liability for misuse would continue even after sprinkling, since the mitzva (burning) has not yet been performed — hence the teaching. If you ask: why does the text speak of impurity rather than disqualification? The answer: because the main source for the law of burning is written regarding impurity. However, there is a difficulty: the mishna teaches that liability for misuse of a burnt offering continues until it is taken out to the ash heap — so why does the meat of the most sacred offerings differ? The answer: a burnt offering is different, as it is entirely consumed by fire with no human consumption, so its mitzva is not complete until taken to the ash heap; but offerings of the most sacred order, which are eaten by people, are properly considered to have completed their mitzva once sprinkled, provided it is done in purity. If you ask: still, there is a further difficulty, since here it is stated that there is no liability for the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity after being raised to the altar, yet the mishna teaches that for a sin offering and guilt offering, liability for misuse of the sacrificial portions continues until they are taken to the ash heap? The answer: those sacrificial portions belong to offerings of the most sacred order, and their mitzva is not considered complete merely by being raised; but for the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, the mitzva is considered complete once raised. If you ask: what is the basis for this distinction? My teacher Rabbeinu Peretz, may he live, said that the difference can be shown either from a verse or from logic. From a verse: it is written 'and he shall take out the ashes' regarding a burnt offering; without this verse, logically we would say that for both the most sacred offerings and those of lesser sanctity, the mitzva would be complete once raised to the altar — but the verse reveals that for a burnt offering, this is not so, since it still must be taken to the ash heap. From this we derive that other offerings of the most sacred order follow the same rule — liability for misuse of their sacrificial portions continues until they are taken to the ash heap — but offerings of lesser sanctity are not derived from this verse. Alternatively, from logic: offerings of the most sacred order, which carry liability for misuse from the outset, do not lose that liability until the process is fully completed — that is, until taken to the ash heap. But offerings of lesser sanctity, which have no liability for misuse until after sprinkling, logically lose liability for misuse immediately once their sacrificial portions are raised, since it is reasonable to say that in every case, the mitzva is considered complete immediately after being raised — except for the most sacred offerings, where, since liability for misuse exists from the start, it departs only at a later, identifiable point, namely being taken to the ash heap. However, there is some difficulty with this logical argument, since the incense, which is of the most sacred order and carries liability for misuse from the start, is said in Pesachim (26a) to lose liability for misuse once it rises in smoke, not only once it is taken to the ash heap. Yet according to the explanation based on the verse, this poses no difficulty, since the incense is not a type of animal offering and therefore cannot be compared to or derived from the burnt offering.
Rashi on Meilah 10b, in English Tab translation (13)
  1. Gemara: From where are these matters [derived] — that one is liable for notar and for eating sacrificial food in impurity, both for an item that has permitting factors and for an item that does not have permitting factors.
  2. As the Sages taught, etc.: And if piggul, which is — so severe that one is liable to bring an offering based on a single awareness, when it became known to him afterward that he had eaten piggul, he does not need two awarenesses as is required for impurity in connection with the Temple and sacred items. For regarding impurity and sacred items, two awarenesses are required — an initial awareness and a later awareness, with forgetfulness in between — as it is written (Leviticus 5), "and it is hidden from him," implying that he had known, and then it is written "and he knows," indicating two awarenesses here.
  3. And its offering is fixed — meaning that one who unwittingly eats piggul brings a fixed animal sin offering.
  4. And its general prohibition was not permitted — meaning that even for the community, people are not rendered liable, etc.
  5. And its general prohibition was permitted — such as the Paschal offering that is brought in impurity; is it not logical, etc.
  6. To include all sacred items regarding impurity — whether they have permitting factors or do not have permitting factors.
  7. One might have thought — that if it is an item that has permitting factors, people would be liable for it on account of impurity immediately, even before the permitting factors are sacrificed, and that those items without permitting factors would be liable for impurity right away, even before they are placed into a vessel.
  8. The verse states, "that approaches" — and this term "approaches" implies mere touching, since touching alone would make one liable, for the phrase "when he touches" (Leviticus 11) is translated [in Aramaic] as "ari yikrav." And Rabbi Elazar said: But is there a case of one who merely touches that is liable to excision? If so, why does it say "that approaches," which implies mere touching? Rather, it does not mean mere touching; rather, the meaning is that one is not liable for impurity until the item becomes fit to be sacrificed, meaning until the permitting factors have been sacrificed.
  9. How is this possible — [meaning] any item that has permitting factors, etc. And notar [i.e., its law] is derived through a verbal analogy of "profanation–profanation" to render it capable of becoming impure, as we say in tractate Zevachim (45a).
  10. Mishna: The offspring of a sin offering, the substitute of a sin offering, and a sin offering whose owners have died — shall die — for these belong to the five sin offerings that are left to die; and these three die permanently, whether before or after atonement [was achieved through another offering]. The offspring of a sin offering dies for this reason: it is not fit for atonement, since it was not originally set aside for that purpose. The substitute of a sin offering likewise dies for this reason: it came about through a transgression, since it is written, "he shall not exchange it." And a sin offering whose owners have died also dies for this reason: there is no atonement for the dead, since their death atones for them.
  11. Whose year passed, and the one that was lost — while unblemished, and was afterward found to be blemished: if the owners achieved atonement through another animal, not wishing to be atoned for by the value of this one that passed its year or was lost and later found blemished, it shall die — even if it was found before atonement and the owners were atoned for through another, it shall die, since it was found blemished. But if it was found unblemished before atonement, even though the owners were atoned for by another, it does not die, but rather goes out to pasture [until it develops a blemish and is then sold]. And so we say in tractate Temurah, chapter "Vlad Chatat" (Temurah 22a).
  12. And it does not render [an animal exchanged for it] a substitute — since, once the owners were atoned for by another, they no longer attribute sanctity to this one — neither sanctity of value nor sanctity rendering it fit for the altar. Therefore it is not potent enough to render another animal a substitute through exchange. And even though ordinarily a blemished animal can render a substitute, as it is written, "or a bad one for a good one," here it does not take effect.
  13. And one may not derive benefit [from it] — from these ab initio, since they are consecrated items; but if one did derive benefit from them, one is not liable for misuse by Torah law, only by rabbinic law, and he pays only the principal value.
Tosafot on Meilah 10b, in English Tab translation (7)
  1. And if piggul, which requires only one awareness — Meaning, it does not require an awareness beforehand and an awareness afterward, as is required in the case of eating sacred food, or entering the Temple, while impure (see Shevuot 2a).
  2. And its offering is fixed — Meaning it is not a sliding-scale offering, so rich and poor bring the same offering; which is not so regarding the offering for eating sacred food or entering the Temple while impure.
  3. How is this possible — That is to say: if so, the verses contradict one another, since 'which they consecrate' implies liability from the time of verbal consecration, while 'that approaches' implies actual sacrifice.
  4. Anything that has permitting factors — one is liable only once the permitting factors are sacrificed — I explained this further in tractate Zevachim (45b).
  5. The offspring of a sin-offering, the substitute of a sin-offering, and likewise a sin-offering whose owners died — they shall die; and one whose year has passed, or that was lost and found blemished — if the owners achieved atonement [elsewhere], it shall die — At first glance this seems to mean: if, after the owners achieved atonement, an animal that had been lost at the time of atonement is found, it dies; and 'found blemished' applies even if found before the atonement. But this is difficult, since if it was not found until after the atonement, everyone would agree it dies [without need for this teaching]. One can answer that the mishnah follows the view of the rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon, who say (Temura 15a) that a sin-offering dies only if it was lost at the time of atonement, and here the case is that at the time of atonement it was not lost. The phrase 'if the owners achieved atonement' does not refer to 'found,' but rather to the word 'shall die.' This is what it means: and one that was found blemished before the atonement — if the owners then achieved atonement, having come to ask what to do with it, it shall die. And even though if it had been found unblemished it would not die according to the rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon, nevertheless we should say here that it dies, since it was found blemished. But this is difficult: on the contrary, all the more so — since it has an additional disqualification along with the disqualification of being lost — we should not say it dies, just as we find in Temura (22a) that a loss occurring at night is not considered a loss, since the animal was not fit for sacrifice at night anyway. So too here we should say, all the more, that it should not die when found blemished, as opposed to when found unblemished, where it does not die according to the rabbis. Therefore it seems one must explain that certainly 'if the owners achieved atonement' refers to 'found,' and the case is one of being lost at the time of atonement; the same law applies if it was found unblemished — that it dies. The mishnah mentions 'found blemished' to teach a novel point: that although there is an additional disqualification of blemish together with the disqualification of being lost, and one might think it would not die, the mishnah teaches that it does die. Similarly we should explain regarding 'whose year has passed,' which is established in Temura, chapter 'The Offspring of a Sin-Offering' (22a), as referring to a case of being lost, so that it should not pose a difficulty against Reish Lakish, who says that an animal whose year has passed is treated as though it stands in the cemetery and grazes. And the case of 'whose year has passed' that was lost is to be read together with 'year has passed.' Now this is difficult: if so, why do I need 'year has passed' at all, since all agree that if it was lost at the time of atonement it dies? And 'if the owners achieved atonement' applies to both: to 'year has passed and lost,' and to 'lost and found blemished.' One can answer that here too the mishnah mentions 'year has passed' to teach a novel point: that although there is another disqualification together with the disqualification of being lost, nevertheless it dies. And if you ask: according to what I have explained, we do not find five sin-offerings that die as distinct cases, since 'year has passed' and 'found blemished' result in death only together with a loss, and likewise 'the owners achieved atonement elsewhere' causes death only when lost at the time of atonement, according to the rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon — though according to Rabbi Shimon this works out well, since he holds that when the owners achieve atonement, even without any loss at all, it dies. One can answer that according to the rabbis too this is not so difficult, since in any event we find five sin-offerings that die, in five scenarios all involving loss: it dies when its year has passed, and so on, in a case where it was not found until after the atonement.
  6. And it does not render [another animal] a substitute — for if one consecrated an animal by exchange for it, that animal is not sanctified, since the original one is destined to die.
  7. One may not derive benefit, nor does the law of misuse apply — since these animals are destined to be lost, the law of misuse does not apply to them, and they are not included in the category of 'sacred items of the Lord.'

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 10.