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Meilah 11 for kids: Blood, Wine, and Coins

מעילה י״א

🩸 This daf looks at money a nazirite sets aside for offerings, and asks what happens if he dies before using it. It also explores when blood and wine poured at the altar stop being holy enough to cause liability for misuse.

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Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 11 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 11a, in English Tab translation (22)
  1. ואם עד שלא כיפרו הבעלים — If, before the owners achieved atonement: this refers to a case where another animal was found, and they wish to achieve atonement with it. The proceeds of the one that is blemished — since it has become unfit and stands to be sold — shall be sold immediately, and with its proceeds he shall bring a sin offering. The one whose year had passed shall graze until it becomes blemished, then be sold, and with its proceeds he shall bring another animal. And it creates a substitute, and one is liable for misusing it, since its sanctity is a sanctity of monetary value [rather than of the body].
  2. ומאי שנא הני רישא דלא קא מפליג בהו — And what is different about these cases in the first clause, that the mishna does not distinguish between them, but rules that they always die, whether before or after atonement.
  3. רישא פסיקא ליה — The first clause is absolute: they always die. What distinction could possibly be made there between 'before atonement' and 'after atonement'? One cannot say this about the offspring of a sin offering or the substitute of a sin offering, since they themselves were never actual sin offerings; nor about a sin offering whose owners died, since the owners have died regardless. But in the latter clause, such a distinction can be made.
  4. הא תנא ליה גבי תמורה — But this same halakha was already taught in connection with substitution.
  5. תנא התם משום תמורות — It is taught there [in Temura] because that tractate deals with substitution, and since it deals with substitution, it also mentions misuse.
  6. והכא תנא משום מעילה — And here [in Meila] it is taught because this tractate deals with misuse, and since it deals with misuse, it also mentions substitution.
  7. מתני' המפריש מעות לנזירותו — MISHNA: One who set aside money for his naziriteship, but did not specify which money was for the sin offering, which for the burnt offering, and which for the peace offering.
  8. לא נהנין ולא מועלין — One may not derive benefit from any of that money ab initio, and one is not liable for misusing it.
  9. מפני שהן ראויין להביא בכולן שלמים — Because with any given sum, one can say it was designated for the peace offering; and peace offerings are offerings of lesser sanctity, which are not subject to misuse before the sprinkling of the blood, as taught earlier (Meila 7b): offerings of lesser sanctity, before the sprinkling of the blood, are not subject to misuse. The ruling is lenient because, although all the money could be said to be fit for a burnt offering (which would entail liability for misuse), nevertheless some of it might be peace-offering money, which is not subject to misuse; and if one were to bring a guilt offering for misuse using such funds, it would amount to bringing non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard. Therefore the ruling is lenient: no benefit may be derived ab initio, but there is no liability for misuse after the fact.
  10. מעות סתומות — Undesignated money, i.e., he did not specify its purpose.
  11. יפלו לנדבה — It shall be allocated to communal gift offerings, for this is the halakha governing a nazirite.
  12. דמי חטאת ילכו לים המלח — The money set aside for the sin offering must be disposed of in the Dead Sea, since it is the money of a sin offering whose owner has died.
  13. דמי עולה יביאו עולה — With the money for the burnt offering, one shall bring a gift burnt offering, since it is merely a gift offering and does not come for atonement, as stated in tractate Kinnim (ch. 2, mishna 5): if a woman died, her heirs bring her [obligatory] burnt offering.
  14. ונאכלין ליום א' — And it is eaten for one day [and the following night], in accordance with the law of a nazirite's peace offering.
  15. ואינן טעונין לחם — And it does not require the accompanying loaves, because Scripture states regarding them (Numbers 6:19), 'and place them on the hands of the nazirite' — and here there is no nazirite, since he has died.
  16. גמ' מתקיף לה ריש לקיש — GEMARA: Reish Lakish raises an objection: Since the mishna teaches that one may not derive benefit and is not liable for misuse because the money is fit to bring a peace offering, let it likewise teach the case of one who set aside money for bird offerings: that one may not derive benefit and is not liable for misuse, since the money is fit only for pigeons whose time has passed (already turned yellow) or doves whose time has not yet come (still too young) — and since these are not fit for sacrifice, being disqualified, they are not included in the category of 'sacred to the Lord,' so there is no liability for misuse.
  17. אמר רבא — Rava replied: The two cases are not comparable. Regarding naziriteship, the Torah stated that with undesignated money one is to bring a peace offering, since the nazirite is in any case obligated to bring a peace offering from part of the funds; therefore we say that since it is fit to bring a peace offering with all of it, there is no liability for misuse. But here, regarding one who set aside money for bird offerings, did the Torah say to bring doves whose time has not yet come, which are entirely unfit for the altar? For what purpose would he bring them? Therefore the mishna does not include this case.
  18. מתני' יצא לנחל קדרון מועלין בו — MISHNA: If [the blood] went out to the Kidron Valley, one is liable for misusing it — by rabbinic decree; but within the Temple itself, one is not liable for misuse even by rabbinic decree, since decrees are not enacted within the Temple. This reference to the Kidron Valley follows the sprinkling of the blood, as we learned (Yoma 58b): both types of blood are mixed together in the channel and flow out to the Kidron Valley, where they are sold to gardeners as fertilizer, and one is liable for misusing them. This liability for misuse is by rabbinic law, not by Torah law; by rabbinic law, however, one is liable for misuse once it has reached the Kidron Valley.
  19. גמ' וקבעי עלה מ"ט דמ"ד אין מועלין — GEMARA: And the Gemara asks concerning this: What is the reasoning of the one who holds that there is no liability for misuse by Torah law? [Alternate version: Until this point they do not disagree, etc. — From where do we know that there is no liability for misuse regarding blood by Torah law?]
  20. מה לאחר כפרה אין בו מעילה — Just as after atonement has been achieved there is no liability for misuse, since its mitzvah has already been performed.
  21. ואימא הכי לאידך גיסא מה לפני כפרה יש בו מעילה — But one could argue the opposite: just as before atonement there is liability for misuse, since its mitzvah has not yet been performed. [The Gemara] establishes that there is liability for misuse both before and after, in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan's reasoning, who derives it homiletically; and his opponent said to him: What makes you interpret it this way?
  22. אמר ליה ר' יוחנן וכי יש לך כו' — Rabbi Yochanan said to him: Do you have [a comparable case, etc.]? Rather, indeed, this is the more reasonable understanding, as I have said.
Tosafot on Meilah 11a, in English Tab translation (14)
  1. ואם עד שלא כיפרו בעליה תרעה עד שתסתאב — This does not refer to the case of 'found already blemished,' for what would 'until it becomes blemished' mean if it is already blemished? Rather, it refers to the case of 'its year passed.' Alternatively, it does refer to the blemished animal, and 'it shall graze' means: it was found with a temporary blemish, which immediately disqualifies it from the altar, and the text says it shall graze until it becomes permanently blemished, at which point it may be sold and rendered non-sacred, and with its proceeds another animal fit for the altar may be purchased.
  2. ועושה תמורה ומועלין בה — Since its owners have not yet achieved atonement, [it retains sanctity] because it is not sent to destruction, as stated: 'it shall graze,' etc.
  3. מאי שנא סיפא דמיפלגי — That is, why does the mishna distinguish 'its year passed' and 'found blemished' from these three cases in the first clause, and not teach them all together? It answers: the first clause is absolute — in every case the animal is left to die, whether or not the owners achieved atonement. But the latter clause is not absolute, since in those cases the animal is left to die only if the owners achieved atonement; if not, it says the animal grazes, as the mishna explains. Therefore it was necessary to divide them into two clauses.
  4. הא תני גבי תמורה — In the chapter 'Valad Chatat' (Temura 21b) this same law appears; why state it in both places? It answers that there it is stated in connection with substitution — that is, since it is taught there incidentally, because the halakha that these animals do not create a substitute belongs there, substitution being the main subject, the law was taught there too.
  5. המפריש מעות לנזירותו לא נהנין ולא מועלין — Because all the money is fit to be used entirely for peace offerings, since, as he did not specify, he may if he wishes use all of it for peace offerings, and there is no liability for misuse regarding offerings of lesser sanctity.
  6. מת הנזיר והיו לו מעות סתומין יפלו לנדבה — For a voluntary burnt-offering for the altar; the reason is explained in tractate Nazir (25a).
  7. דמי חטאת ילכו לים המלח — Like the law of a sin offering whose owner has died.
  8. ואין טעונין לחם — Because it is written 'on the hands of the nazirite' (Numbers 6:19), and here there is no nazirite [since he has died].
  9. מפני שהם ראויין להביא תורים שלא הגיע זמנן — That is, they are small and not yet fit for the altar, but will become fit when they grow; thus the mishna taught that one is not liable for misusing them. As for 'pigeons whose time has passed,' mentioned here, since they will never become fit for the altar once their time has passed, this is taught incidentally alongside 'doves whose time has not yet arrived.'
  10. אמרה תורה הבא (תורים) [שלמים] במעות סתומים הבא תורין כו' — This is said in the form of a question: are they not unfit for the altar, so for what purpose would one bring them? If so, one cannot say there is no liability for misuse of such money on the grounds that 'they are fit,' etc.
  11. יצא לנחל קדרון מועלין — This is stated as a rabbinic law, as is explained in the Gemara.
  12. ירדו לשיתין אין מועלין — Because we say its mitzvah has already been performed; the Gemara explains the case in which one derives benefit from them.
  13. מאי טעמא דמאן דאמר אין מועלין — We do not read the text this way, for if we did, it would imply that the opinion that there is liability for misuse holds this to be a Torah law and rejects the homiletical derivations mentioned below — but this is not so. For at the start of 'Hotzi'u Lo' (Yoma 59b) it states that they disagree only about rabbinic law, but by Torah law there is no liability for misuse. Moreover, Rabbi Shimon here says there is liability for misuse, while in the mishna he says there is no liability except at the end — meaning that Reish Lakish's view concerns only rabbinic law. Rather, the correct reading is: 'they disagree only about rabbinic law, but by Torah law there is no liability for misuse' — from where do we derive this?
  14. אין לך דבר שנעשית מצותו ומועלין — And if you would say the opposite — that there is no case where the mitzvah was not yet performed and there is no liability for misuse — one can answer: the heifer whose neck is broken (egla arufa) proves otherwise, for its being brought down to the hard valley (nachal eitan) is what forbids it, and before that it is not forbidden.
Rashi on Meilah 11b, in English Tab translation (18)
  1. And there is the removal of the ashes — [the ashes placed] next to the altar, whose mitzva has already been performed, and yet one is liable for misusing them, as it is written 'and he shall put it' (Leviticus 6:3); and [the questioner wishes to] derive the general principle from this case.
  2. Because — for this reason we do not derive [the general rule] from it, since the removal of the ashes and [the limbs of the scapegoat], etc. [are two verses that come as one, and such verses do not teach a general principle].
  3. This works out well according to the one who said — there (Yoma 67a), that the limbs of the Yom Kippur scapegoat are subject to misuse even though their mitzva has been performed, because it is written 'to a cut-off land' (Leviticus 16:22) [which teaches this]. According to this, it works out well that we do not derive the rule from the removal of the ashes, since the removal of the ashes and the scapegoat sent away are two verses that come as one.
  4. But according to the one who said that one may derive benefit — from the limbs, deriving this from the word 'wilderness' (Leviticus 16:22).
  5. What can be said — [according to this opinion] the rule should be derived from the removal of the ashes [as a general principle], since they would not be two verses that come as one, etc.
  6. But according to Rabbi Dosa, who said, etc. — that there is no misuse that applies to them [the priestly vestments], and the meaning of 'and he shall leave them there' (Leviticus 16:23) is simply that he may not use them on a subsequent Yom Kippur.
  7. What can be said — even according to the one who holds that two verses that come as one do teach their common aspect to other cases, here they do not teach it, because two exclusionary expressions are written regarding these two cases.
  8. 'The one whose neck was broken' — for the extra definite article at the beginning [of the Hebrew] is superfluous, indicating exclusivity.
  9. And it is written there, 'and he shall put it' — the extra letter vav [in the word] is superfluous, to teach you that only these [two cases] are subject to misuse after their mitzva has been performed, but nothing else is.
  10. Let us say that the mishna — which teaches that once the libations have descended into the drainpipes one is no longer liable for their misuse — is not in accordance with Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok, who holds that even though they descended into the drainpipes, their burning must be in sanctity; and since he requires that their burning be in sanctity, he also holds that one is liable for their misuse.
  11. Just as notar [leftover sacrificial meat] must be burned in sanctity — for anything disqualified within a state of sanctity must be burned in sanctity, which is derived (Pesachim 82b) from the sin-offering, as it is written: 'And any sin-offering, some of whose blood is brought... shall be burned in fire' (Leviticus 6:23) — meaning its burning must be in sanctity.
  12. Even if you say that it is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok — regarding the teaching that once they descended into the drainpipes one is no longer liable for their misuse —
  13. This is referring to a case of 'catching' — meaning that they did not reach the floor of the drainpipe; rather, before they reached it, he extended his hand below and caught it from the air — in that case one is not liable for misuse. But if they did reach the drainpipe, one is liable for misuse, since the floor of the drainpipe keeps them in their sanctified status.
  14. Some say: Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok — meaning that since the tanna found it necessary to teach that once they descended into the drainpipes one is not liable for misuse, this shows he holds like Rabbi Elazar, who said there was a small gap there through which one could retrieve it. For if he held like the Rabbis, who say the drainpipes are hollow and descend down to the depths, how could one gather them and be liable for their misuse? After all, they would have descended to the depths.
  15. Even if you say it is in accordance with the Rabbis, and the case is one of 'catching' — meaning that if he inserted his hand into the airspace of the drainpipes and caught them before they descended to the depths, even so, [the mishna] teaches that one is not liable for misuse. Another version: [the question is] if it follows Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok, since he says they are burned in sanctity, they must still be in a sanctified state, and so he should hold one is liable for misuse. [To this the Gemara answers:] even if you say it is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok, [this is not a problem, for] what he means by saying they are burned in sanctity is: if one comes to burn it, he must burn it in sanctity, but there is no liability for misuse once it has descended into the drainpipes.
  16. MISHNA: The removal of the ashes of the inner altar and the Candelabrum — the ash upon them would be taken out and placed next to the outer altar, in the place where the ashes of the outer altar were placed; and before it was placed there, one may not derive benefit from it, nor is one liable for its misuse, since here it is not written 'and he shall put it,' as is written regarding the removal of the ashes of the outer altar.
  17. One who consecrates the ashes at the outset is liable for misusing all of it — meaning, once the ashes of the inner altar and the Candelabrum were placed in the spot where the ashes of the outer altar are placed, since it is impossible that some mixing did not occur, one is therefore liable for the misuse of the whole amount.
  18. GEMARA: Granted, with regard to the removal of the ashes of the outer altar, it is written explicitly that one is liable for its misuse — as it is written (Leviticus 6:3) 'and he shall put it'; therefore it requires burial, since it would become absorbed in its place, so that people would not come to misuse it.
Tosafot on Meilah 11b, in English Tab translation (7)
  1. Two exclusions are written — It is difficult: one exclusion should have sufficed, for one cannot say that if the exclusion had been written in only one case, we would derive the law from the other case, since then the Torah should have omitted the exclusion altogether, as two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to other cases. It seems to our teacher Rabbenu Peretz that the Torah could not have omitted the exclusion from the case of the broken-necked heifer, because it was necessary to write 'this one' regarding the breaking of the neck, to teach that nothing else shares that law, excluding the red heifer, as stated in the first chapter of Chullin (24a). Therefore it was necessary to write 'and he shall put it' regarding the ashes, so that we would not derive the ashes law from the heifer passage, since the exclusion there was needed for that other purpose, as explained.
  2. There was a small gap between the ramp and the altar — This means a kind of skylight/opening, and it is not the same gap mentioned in Zevachim (62b) and Sukkah (49a), which is located exactly between the ramp and the altar in order to fulfill the mitzva of sprinkling the blood on the flesh. Rather, this gap was set toward the eastern corner, beyond where the width of the ramp (sixteen cubits) ended, the altar being thirty-two cubits, with the ramp centered relative to it.
  3. Just as notar's burning must be in sanctity, so too this one's burning must be in sanctity — This is not in accordance with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok, for since after it descends it still requires burning, its mitzva (the libation) would not yet be complete; so why does the mishna say that once it descended to the drainpipes there is no longer liability for misuse? The Gemara answers: even according to Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok, this refers to a case where the wine was caught in the air and did not actually reach the floor of the drainpipe; in such a case its mitzva does not require burning, and so the mishna rules there is no misuse. Some say the question is reversed: let us say the mishna follows Rabbi Elazar and not the Rabbis, for according to the Rabbis, why would the mishna say that once it descended to the drainpipes there is no misuse — what misuse could apply to something that descends into the depths and is lost? The Gemara answers: it refers to a case where it was caught before reaching the floor. According to this version, the earlier inference does not apply to Rabbi Elazar. Others say the question continues: let us say the mishna follows Rabbi Elazar specifically where the wine was caught before reaching the floor, since if it reached the floor the floor would sanctify it, requiring burning, so its mitzva would not yet be complete. The Gemara answers: No, it follows Rabbi Elazar even if it was not caught, and the burning requirement is only rabbinic. The Gemara objects: but doesn't Rabbi Elazar derive it from a verse? The Gemara answers: the verse is merely an asmachta (a scriptural support), not a true derivation.
  4. The removal of the ashes of the inner altar — Since the incense was burned on the inner altar and ash accumulated there, they would carry it to the place where the crop and feathers of bird-offerings were cast, ten cubits from the foot of the ramp, as explained in Tamid (28b), because it is written 'and he shall cast it,' and casting requires a distance of no less than twenty cubits.
  5. One who consecrates ash at the outset — Some explain this as referring to one who consecrates the ash of his own hearth, but this does not seem correct, for is it any less significant than one who consecrates the dung of his dunghill, about which it is stated below that misuse applies? If so, what would this teach us, since certainly anyone may consecrate anything for Temple maintenance? Therefore it seems that the case is of a person who took from the terumat hadeshen (the ash already set aside) and consecrated it — in that case misuse applies by Torah law.
  6. Turtledoves whose time has not arrived — For turtledoves must be mature and young pigeons must not yet be past their proper stage, since mature pigeons are unfit, as stated at the end of the first chapter of Chullin (22a). 'There is no benefit and no misuse' means there is no misuse at all, even rabbinically. One cannot explain this as meaning there is no misuse by Torah law but there is misuse rabbinically, for above, regarding blood, where it states 'there is no misuse,' it must mean no misuse at all; for if it meant specifically by Torah law, what would be meant by 'if it went out to the Kidron Valley there is misuse' — surely that too would then be only rabbinic, as explained above. Likewise regarding sin-offerings left to die, where it states 'there is no misuse,' it means not even rabbinically, as implied above at the start of the first chapter of Meila (2a). This shows that wherever it is taught 'there is no misuse,' it means not even rabbinically.
  7. This works out well for the outer altar, as it is written 'and he shall put it beside the altar' — At first glance this seems to mean: it works out well that there is no misuse in the removal of ashes of the outer altar, because it is written 'and he shall put it.' However, this cannot be correct, since there IS misuse in the removal of ashes of the outer altar, as implied above where the Gemara raised the objection 'but there is the removal of the ashes...'; indeed, 'and he shall put it' implies that misuse DOES apply, as stated above. Therefore it seems that the Gemara is inferring from the mishna, which teaches that regarding removal of the ashes of the inner altar there is no misuse because its mitzva (the removal itself) has been performed, but before it is removed there IS misuse, since its mitzva has not yet been performed — there being a mitzva to remove its ashes. This applies specifically to the inner altar; but regarding the outer altar, misuse applies even after the ashes are removed. On this the Gemara explains: it works out well for the outer altar that misuse applies even after removal, because it is written 'and he shall put it,' teaching that even once its mitzva is performed, misuse still applies, as derived above from that verse. But as for the inner altar, from where do we derive that there is a mitzva to remove its ashes, so that one might think there is no misuse from the time of removal onward since its mitzva was performed? This does not seem correct, for it would imply that before removal there IS misuse in the ash of the inner altar, which is not so, as stated in Pesachim (26a): once the smoke of the incense has risen, there is no longer misuse in it. Rather, it seems the explanation is: it works out well for the outer altar, since 'and he shall put it' teaches that there is a mitzva to remove its ashes; but as for the inner altar, from where do we derive that there is a mitzva to remove its ashes — and this does not relate to misuse at all. But this too is difficult, for then the Gemara should have cited, regarding the outer altar, 'and he shall take up the ashes' rather than 'and he shall put it.' Furthermore, shortly afterward, when the Gemara asks about the candelabrum, it does not ask about the cleaning of the lamps, since that is explicit (Exodus 30:7): 'when he cleans the lamps.' Rather, it asks from where we know there was a fixed place for removing the candelabrum's ash, beside the altar to the east. Therefore it seems that here too the question concerns a fixed place, implying from the mishna that the fixed place for the inner altar's ash-removal was beside the east side, the same place as the outer altar's ash-removal. For since it states there is no misuse regarding removal of the inner altar's ashes, this implies that regarding the outer altar, in the place where the inner altar's ash-removal was fixed, there IS misuse. If so, the inner altar's ash-removal site was beside the altar to the east; for if it were elsewhere, why would there be misuse there even for the outer altar, given that we said above there is misuse only until the ashes reach the ash-heap (beit hadeshen)? This implies that once they reach the ash-heap there is no longer misuse. Rather, certainly the inner altar's ash-removal site was beside the altar to the east, adjacent to the outer altar's ash-removal site (and some texts read: 'the ash-heaps were there'). Now it fits well: regarding the inner altar's ash-removal there is no misuse, implying that regarding the outer altar's ashes in that same place there IS misuse, since they have not yet gone out to the ash-heap outside the camp. On this the Gemara says: it works out well for the outer altar — we derive the fixed place for removing its ashes from 'and he shall put it beside the altar.' But as for the inner altar, from where do we derive a fixed place for its ash-removal? The verse states: 'And he shall remove its crop with its feathers and cast it beside the altar to the east' (Leviticus 1:16) — if this is not needed for the outer altar, since 'and he shall put it' already applies there, apply it to the inner altar.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 11.