Kids Daf Quest

Daf Yomi for kids · Talmud Bavli · Masechet Meilah

Meilah 12 for kids: Blood, Milk, and Eggs

מעילה י״ב

🥚 This daf asks where leftover ashes from the altar and the Candelabrum must be placed. It also explores which holy things lose their special 'misuse' rules once they die, spill, or are left behind, like blood, milk, and eggs.

Daf Yomi day:

📖 Open Meilah 12a in Daf QuestOpen Meilah 12b in Daf Quest

In the app: the Gemara with Rashi and Tosafot, the printed page, games made from this daf, play coins and treasure chests.

Stories from Meilah 12

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 12 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 12a, in English Tab translation (15)
  1. אלא דישון מזבח הפנימי מנלן — But from where do we derive [the law of] the ashes of the inner altar? [Answer:] that one would place it beside the outer altar, and that it becomes subject to misuse once it comes [to rest] together with the removed ash of the outer altar.
  2. והסיר את מוראתו בנוצתה וגו' אל מקום הדשן אם אינו ענין — If the phrase 'to the place of the ashes' is not needed to teach about the ash-removal of the outer altar — since that is already taught by the other verse, 'and he shall remove the ashes' (Leviticus 6:3) — then apply this phrase, 'to the place of the ashes,' to the ash-removal of the inner altar and of the Candelabrum, teaching that their place was there, and that one is liable for misusing them just as with the removed ash of the outer altar that rests there.
  3. אימא אידי ואידי — Say that both verses deal with the ash-removal of the outer altar, and Scripture described it with 'and he shall cast it...' merely in order to fix a place for it — that the casting of the bird's crop should be to the east, beside the altar. But we would still not know why there is liability for misuse regarding the ash-removal of the inner altar, since no ash-removal verse is written about it at all; for the verse 'and he shall remove the ashes' [elsewhere] refers to the time when the camp journeyed.
  4. אם כן — If so, as you say, that the verse comes only to fix a place for it, then it should simply state: 'and he shall cast it beside the altar, to the east,' and nothing more, for we would know on our own that this is 'the place of the ashes' by the verbal analogy of 'beside... beside' from where it is placed 'beside the altar.' Thus one could say both verses deal with the outer altar's ash-removal. But since the verse needed to add the word 'the ashes,' this teaches it also refers to the ash-removal of the inner altar — in line with the principle 'if it is not needed for...' And since the word 'ashes' is written there, by extension there is liability for misusing the removed ash of the outer altar [and likewise of the inner altar].
  5. הדשן — The inclusion of the ash of the Candelabrum is derived from the extra definite article 'the,' [teaching that] the ash-removal of the Candelabrum [is placed there as well].
  6. מתני' רבי שמעון אומר תורים שלא הגיע זמנן מועלין בהן — [Rabbi Shimon rules that one is liable for misusing] doves whose time has not yet arrived, because they will be fit for the altar once they grow and mature.
  7. גמ' בשלמא לרבי שמעון — Granted, one can understand the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who rules that there is liability for misuse of [birds] whose time has not yet arrived.
  8. כדקתני טעמא — As the reason is taught in the chapter 'Oto Ve'et Beno' (Zevachim 112b).
  9. שהיה רבי שמעון אומר — For Rabbi Shimon would say: one who slaughters outside [the Temple courtyard] a sacrificial animal and its offspring, [slaughtering] the second one on the following day, violates a prohibition but incurs no liability for karet — because Rabbi Shimon holds that regarding anything fit to be sacrificed only after time passes (such as an animal fit to be slaughtered tomorrow inside the Temple, which one instead slaughtered outside today), the person violates a prohibition but incurs no karet, since it is not currently acceptable for sacrifice inside (for the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day applies also to sacrificial animals — see Chullin 78a). So too these doves: since he consecrated them before their time, but they will become fit later, there is already liability for misusing them now.
  10. אלא לרבנן — But according to the Rabbis (the first, anonymous opinion), who say one may not derive benefit but is not liable for misuse — how is this case different from an animal whose time has not yet arrived, which (as we hold, Bekhorot 56a) enters the pen to be tithed together with other animals? [This is derived by] verbal analogy of 'passing' and 'passing' from a firstborn: just as a firstborn is sanctified before its time, since it is sanctified from the womb, so too an animal whose time has not yet arrived is sanctified before its time and sacrificed afterward. So too these doves should be able to be consecrated before their time and become subject to misuse.
  11. אמרי — They answer: the case of an animal whose time has not yet arrived cannot be compared to that of a bird whose time has not yet arrived. The reason an animal whose time has not yet arrived can be sanctified is the same as with a blemished animal, which is subject to redemption — since it is significant enough to retain sanctity even when blemished, it likewise retains sanctity when its time has not yet arrived. But regarding birds, this comparison cannot be made, since a blemish does not disqualify a bird (there being no concept of blemish or sex-distinction disqualifying birds), and birds have no redemption. Therefore, there is likewise no sanctity for a bird whose time has not yet arrived.
  12. יצאו מידי מעילה דבר תורה — They are excluded from the halakhot of misuse by Torah law, because they are not 'the sacred items of the Lord,' not being fit for the Most High; nor do they retain monetary sanctity, since one may not redeem sacrificial animals in order to feed them to dogs.
  13. ותיקשי לך מתני' כו' — Let the mishna itself pose a difficulty for you: just as regarding the mishna we do not say 'where has the sanctity in them gone,' so too here [regarding animals that died] one should not say this, and therefore they are excluded from the halakhot of misuse by Torah law. But I concede that there is Rabbinic liability for misuse in the case of sacrificial animals that died and in the case of doves whose time has not yet arrived, and one must pay the principal.
  14. וקשיא לי — And this is difficult for me, regarding the doves, according to Rav Chisda, who said 'but where has the sanctity in them gone,' implying that he holds they retain sanctity: is there such a case where initially there is no liability for misuse at all by Torah law, yet afterward there is Rabbinic liability? Granted, where there was liability for misuse initially by Torah law — such as with sacrificial animals that died, which then have Rabbinic liability — that makes sense. But regarding doves whose time had not yet arrived, where at the time of consecration there was no Torah-law liability for misuse, since they were not fit to be 'the sacred items of the Lord,' can we say that Rabbinic liability should apply to them afterward?
  15. והא איכא דם דמעיקרא — But is there not the case of blood, which initially — immediately when the animal is slaughtered, before the blood is sprinkled — carries no liability for misuse at all, since one is never liable for misusing blood?
Tosafot on Meilah 12a, in English Tab translation (6)
  1. Ve'eima iddi ve'iddi lamizbe'ach hachitzon ule'kvo'a lo makom — And say that both this and that refer to the external altar, to fix its place: Explanation: to fix a place for the crop and feathers, that it should be in the place of the ash-removal of the altar. But this is difficult, since it implies that the verse comes to fix the place for the ash-removal of the external altar itself. Furthermore, it is difficult what the Gemara answers: 'if so, let the verse say "beside the altar"' — it should have said accordingly; if so, let it not write 'to the place of the ashes' but simply 'and cast it beside the altar, on the east' and nothing more. Rather, the meaning is: say that both verses refer to the ash-removal of the external altar, and [the second verse comes] to fix the place of that ash-removal as being on the east, since in the other verse ('and he shall put it') the word 'east' is not written, and we would not know whether it is in the east or the west. The Gemara answers: if so, let the verse say 'beside... beside' [the same word in both verses] — meaning, why do I need it to write 'to the place of the ashes'? Let it just say 'beside the altar, on the east,' and I would learn through verbal analogy ('beside... beside') that the ash-removal of the external altar is in the place where the crop and feathers are cast. What then does 'the place of the ashes' teach? That even [the ashes of] the inner altar [belong there] — meaning that the fixed place for the ash-removal of the inner altar was also there, beside the external altar.
  2. Minora minalan — From where do we derive [the law] regarding the Candelabrum? That its ash-removal was there, beside the altar: 'ashes... the ashes' — meaning, through the verbal analogy of 'ashes... ashes,' we derive it from the altar.
  3. Rabbi Shimon omer torim shelo higi'a zemanan mo'alin bahen — Rabbi Shimon says: doves whose time has not yet arrived are subject to misuse, as is explained in the Gemara. And pigeons whose time has passed: one may not derive benefit from them, nor are they subject to misuse. This is not comparable to a sin-offering whose year has passed, about which it was stated above that one is liable for misuse before atonement — for there, it is because the animal goes out to pasture and has the possibility of redemption, but here there is no redemption for birds, and they are not called 'the sacred items of the Lord.'
  4. Beshlama leRabbi Shimon — Granted, according to Rabbi Shimon: this is why doves whose time has not yet arrived are subject to misuse, as the reason is taught in the chapter HaShochet (Zevachim 112b) regarding 'it and its young,' namely that an animal lacking its proper time is subject to a prohibition if one slaughters it outside [the Temple courtyard]. Since slaughtering it outside constitutes a transgression of a prohibition, it is significant enough to be subject to misuse. But according to the Rabbis, who hold there is no such prohibition for slaughtering it outside, in what way does this differ from an animal lacking its time, which is subject to misuse even before its time arrives? Initially, the Gemara could have simply said: granted, according to Rabbi Shimon, this is just like the law of an animal lacking its time, without this reason involving a prohibition. But it wanted to state a reason that would work well even according to the conclusion, which ultimately compares the case to a blemished animal and distinguishes between an animal lacking its time and birds. I explained a similar point in the first chapter of Shabbat (5b) regarding 'granted, according to Ben Azzai, walking is considered like standing.'
  5. Aval gabei ofot keivan de'ein hamum posel be'ofot ein la'of pidyon — But in the case of birds, since a blemish does not disqualify them, there is no redemption for a bird: this is not stated precisely because a blemish does not disqualify them, for even a missing limb, which does disqualify birds, likewise has no redemption, as is implied in tractate Menachot (100b), that redemption applies only to animals [behemah].
  6. Vechi kedusha shebahen le'heichan halcha — And to where has the sanctity in them gone?: meaning, the sanctity that was in them before they died, which carried Torah-level liability for misuse. Ulla said this, and [Rav Chisda] should have challenged him from our mishna: doves whose time has not arrived and pigeons whose time has passed — one may not derive benefit from them, nor are they subject to misuse — and this applies even when they were consecrated before their time passed. Why not say: 'to where has the sanctity in them gone,' since there was sanctity in the pigeons before their time passed, carrying liability for misuse? By the same reasoning one could have raised this challenge from the five dead sin-offerings. [Ulla] said to him: I concede to you that there is Rabbinic-level liability for misuse. Rav Chisda retracted from his question, meaning he was saying: I concede to you that certainly there is no Torah-level liability for misuse, but only Rabbinic-level, just as with consecrated items that died. And the question I had asked, 'to where has the sanctity in them gone,' is not actually a difficulty, since regarding pigeons there is not even Rabbinic-level liability for misuse. But I still have a difficulty: 'is there such a thing' — meaning, I still have a difficulty with the mishna regarding doves whose time has not arrived, which implies that once their time arrives they become subject to misuse. Is there such a thing, that initially there is no liability for misuse before the time arrives, but once the time arrives there is liability for misuse? This interpretation has difficulties: first, what proof does [Ulla] bring afterward from blood — that once it flows out to the Kidron Valley one becomes liable for misuse regarding it — surely liability for misuse regarding blood is only Rabbinic, whereas regarding doves, once their time arrives, the liability would be by Torah law? Furthermore, it seems that [Ulla] comes to resolve his earlier question, yet it does not seem to relate to the case of doves that was raised. Therefore it appears the correct explanation is: 'I concede to you that there is Rabbinic-level liability for misuse' means — not as you think from your question, that there is Torah-level liability; rather, I concede to you that there is specifically Rabbinic-level liability, not Torah-level. And 'I still have a difficulty: is there such a thing' means: nevertheless, I would have raised this challenge against your words, namely: you stated a general rule that all consecrated items that died are excluded from Torah-level liability for misuse, but are subject to Rabbinic-level liability even in the case of items of lesser sanctity. But why, if there was no liability for misuse regarding items of lesser sanctity before they died, should there be Rabbinic-level liability for misuse after they died? This is what was meant above by 'to where has the sanctity in them gone' — meaning, the sanctity in them that carried no liability for misuse at all — to where did it go, that a stricter sanctity should now take hold? Now it fits well that [Ulla] brings proof from blood, that there is Rabbinic-level liability for misuse in the end — the same should apply regarding consecrated items that died, that there is Rabbinic-level liability for misuse in them, even though initially there was no liability for misuse in them at all. The Gemara then rejects this: there, regarding blood, there is liability for misuse even by Torah law in the case of one who lets blood [from a consecrated animal]. If so, it would follow that even once the animal was slaughtered, there would be Rabbinic-level liability for misuse in it.
Rashi on Meilah 12b, in English Tab translation (13)
  1. המקיז דם לבהמת קדשים — One who lets blood from a sacrificial animal: that blood which he let out is forbidden for benefit and one is liable for misusing it, since it is not fit to be sprinkled on the altar it is considered like the body of the animal itself, and one is liable for misusing it. And since it already carries this liability for misuse from the start, that is why it also carries liability for misuse later, after it flows out to the Kidron Valley. But doves [whose time has not yet come] never had any liability for misuse from the start at all — this is difficult for me.
  2. איתיביה רב המנונא חלב המוקדשין וכו' — And we do not say [regarding milk] that it is considered like the animal's body itself; so too, one could ask the same about one who lets blood — why should he be liable for misusing it?
  3. דלא מתקיימת הבהמה בלא דם — Because the animal cannot survive without blood, since blood is the life-force; therefore we say it is considered like the animal's body itself, and one is liable for misusing it.
  4. הא מתקיימא בלא חלב — But the animal can survive without milk; therefore one is not liable for misusing it.
  5. הזבל והפרש — Of consecrated animals, found in the Temple courtyard — the same law would apply anywhere, but typically it is found in the Temple courtyard. One may not derive benefit from it, but one is also not liable for misusing it.
  6. ויפלו דמיו ללשכה גרסינן — The text reads: 'and its proceeds go to the Temple treasury chamber.'
  7. הכא נמי לא מקיימא הבהמה בלא פרש — Here too, the animal cannot exist without at least some waste matter in its stomach, so it should be considered like its own body, and one should be liable for misusing it!
  8. אמרי — They say: This is not comparable. Dung is not like blood, because the dung comes to the animal from an outside source — from the ordinary (non-sacred) food it eats. Even if it is entirely expelled from the body, another portion comes in its place when the animal eats again. It is therefore not considered like the animal's own body, and so one is not liable for misusing it.
  9. לאפוקי דם — This excludes blood, which is literally part of the animal's body, since it was created together with it; therefore one is liable for misusing it.
  10. קתני לא נהנין ולא מועלין ודמיו ללשכה — The baraita teaches: one may not benefit from it, nor is one liable for misusing it, and its proceeds go to the Temple treasury chamber. This supports Rabbi Elazar, who said: Wherever the Sages said an item is 'consecrated and not consecrated' — meaning one may not benefit from it but is also not liable for misusing it — its proceeds go to the Temple treasury chamber.
  11. מתני' בד"א בקדשי מזבח — This statement [that one is not liable for misusing milk or eggs] applies to animals consecrated for the altar, since the milk and eggs are not fit for the altar; therefore one is not liable for misusing them.
  12. אבל בקדשי בדק הבית — But in the case of items consecrated for Temple maintenance, since their sanctity is sanctity of monetary value, and all of them are fit for Temple maintenance — therefore even if one consecrated a hen or the like, one is liable for misusing both the eggs and the milk.
  13. גמ' השתא קא דייק למתני' — Now the Gemara analyzes the Mishnah precisely. It teaches 'in what case is this said,' and states regarding the altar that even if one consecrated it with sanctity of value, there is still no liability for misusing the milk or eggs. This is understood to mean: 'in what case is this said — regarding items consecrated for the altar; but regarding items consecrated for Temple maintenance...' meaning even if one consecrated an animal or bird for the altar intending to use the proceeds to buy something fit for the altar, there is no liability for misusing the milk and eggs. But why should there be no liability? Rather, Rav Pappa said as follows...
Tosafot on Meilah 12b, in English Tab translation (9)
  1. Hamakiz dam bivhemat kodashim asur u'mo'alin bo (One who lets blood from a sacrificial animal, deriving benefit is prohibited and he is liable for misuse) — And if you ask: isn't it written "to atone," and we derive that the verse included [blood] for the purpose of atonement and not for misuse? One can answer: this applies to the blood of a slaughtered animal, which is designated for atonement, but the blood of a living animal, which is not fit for atonement, is not subject to that limitation.
  2. Metiv Rav Hamnuna u'veitzei turim etc. (Rav Hamnuna raises an objection from the eggs of doves) — One might have thought that blood is like milk, but the Gemara answers: when we say [misuse applies] regarding blood, it is because the animal cannot exist without blood, so blood is considered like the animal's body itself; but milk, since the animal can exist well without it, is not considered like the animal's body.
  3. Haperesh v'hazevel shebechatzer (The dried manure and fresh dung in the courtyard) — meaning, that came from consecrated animals.
  4. U'damav yagi'u lalishka mesaya lei l'Rabbi Elazar ("And its proceeds go to the treasury chamber" supports Rabbi Elazar) — who said: wherever the Sages said an item is "consecrated and not consecrated" — meaning one may not derive benefit from it, nor is one liable for its misuse — its proceeds are allocated to communal donations. This implies that the one who benefited must repay the principal value. But this does not seem correct to us, for then what is the difference between "not liable for misuse" by rabbinic law and "liable for misuse" by rabbinic law, since even when misuse applies by rabbinic law one pays back only the principal, as explained in the mishnah? Rather, every "not liable for misuse" in the mishnah means not liable even by rabbinic law. Rather, the meaning is: the Temple treasurers are obligated to deal with the manure and dung, sell them, and bring the proceeds to the treasury chamber. And this is what Rabbi Elazar means: wherever the Sages said an item is "consecrated and not consecrated," like the milk of consecrated animals and similar items from which one cannot derive benefit — what should be done with them? Their proceeds go to the fund of donations.
  5. Chelev hamukdashin u'veitzei turin lo nehenin v'lo mo'alin (The milk of consecrated animals and the eggs of doves — one may not benefit, nor is one liable for misuse) — meaning the milk of a female sacrificial animal, and likewise the eggs of consecrated doves, whose sanctity is the sanctity of the altar, as will be explained. And if you ask: this works for the eggs of doves, where we find no prohibition, but regarding the milk of consecrated animals, we do find it forbidden even in animals disqualified from sacrifice, as it says (Bekhorot 15a): "sacrifice [but not shear]... the flesh but not the milk" — so why is there no liability for misuse? Some explain that the Torah's prohibition of milk was only against milking, just as we derive from "sacrifice, not shear" that shearing is forbidden but the shorn wool itself is permitted — likewise the milk itself would be permitted once milked. But this cannot be correct, for we say in Chullin (36a): "since they are forbidden regarding shearing and labor, their blood requires burial" — implying that the milk itself, even once milked, remains forbidden, and the mention of shearing is simply the Gemara's flowing style of grouping shearing and labor together. And one should not wonder why shearing differs from milk — that regarding shearing we derive that only the act is forbidden while the wool itself is permitted, but regarding milk even the milked product remains forbidden — because in both cases this follows from the verse: to exclude shearing, it says "sacrifice," implying "but not shear"; to exclude milk, it says "you shall eat the meat," implying "but not the milk." This is explained so in Chullin (36a), showing that the milk itself is forbidden. This is also explicit in Bekhorot (6b): since the Torah forbade the milk of disqualified consecrated animals, this implies that the milk of non-sacred animals is permitted — proving the milk itself is the forbidden item. This raises the difficulty: why then is there no liability for misuse? It seems, according to my teacher, that although forbidden, since it is not fit for the altar there is no misuse, for it is not among "the sacred items of the Lord," and the animal's life does not depend on it so as to be considered part of its body. Proof: in Rosh Hashanah (28a) it says a shofar from a burnt-offering should not be sounded, but if sounded one has fulfilled the obligation; a shofar from a peace-offering should not be sounded, and if sounded one has not fulfilled the obligation. The Gemara asks the difference and answers: regarding the burnt-offering's shofar, since misusing it removes it to non-sacred status, it is valid; but regarding the peace-offering's shofar, since there is no concept of misuse for it, it remains forbidden to use. This shows there is a prohibition regarding a peace-offering's shofar, yet no liability for misuse, because peace-offerings are not "the sacred items of the Lord."
  6. Hikdish tarnegolet mo'alin ba u'b'veitzatah (If one consecrated a hen, one is liable for misusing it and its egg) — because here it is fit to be sold and its proceeds used for Temple maintenance.
  7. Ela gabei mizbeach ki hikdish kedushat damim leit bahu me'ilah (But regarding the altar, if he consecrated it with sanctity that inheres in value, there is no liability for misuse) — One might have understood the mishnah to mean: this applies to items consecrated for the altar that he designated for the altar's needs — to sell and use the proceeds to purchase requirements for the altar and for Temple maintenance — that is, sanctity that inheres in value.
  8. Bameh devarim amurim shehikdisho kedushat haguf legabei mizbeach (In what case is this said? When he consecrated it with inherent sanctity for the altar) — meaning, to be sacrificed on the altar; thus he did not intend to consecrate something unfit for the altar, such as the milk of consecrated animals or the eggs of doves, and therefore there is no liability for misusing them.
  9. Kol haraui lamizbe'ach etc. (Anything fit for the altar, etc.) — as the mishnah goes on to explain: If one consecrated a pit full of water, the water is fit for Temple maintenance, to mix clay, but unfit for the altar, since the innards and legs of offerings were washed only in the Water Channel, and it is also unfit for the water libation, which requires "living water," as we learned in the chapter of Lulav and Arava (Sukkah 48a), that one would fill the vessel from the spring of Shiloach, derived from the verse "and you shall draw water with joy." A dungheap full of manure is fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance. A dovecote full of doves — the doves are fit for the altar for sacrifice, but the dovecote itself is unfit for Temple maintenance, since a dovecote is worth a great deal and one does not remove its stones for Temple maintenance, as that would diminish its value. Similarly with a tree and its fruit: the tree is unfit for Temple maintenance as beams, since that would diminish its value, and the fruit is unfit for the altar, as it is written (Leviticus 2:11), "You shall not burn any leaven or honey," with "honey" referring to any sweet substance. However, if it is an olive tree or grapevine, its produce is fit for the altar — olives for oil for meal offerings, grapes for wine for libations — but these trees themselves are unfit for Temple maintenance, as explained.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 12.