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Meilah 13 for kids: Filled Before or After?

מעילה י״ג

🕊️ This daf asks when you can get in trouble for misusing something holy. It matters if a cistern, dovecote, or tree was already full when it was consecrated, or filled afterward. It also looks at animal milk, a working ox, and exactly how much holy water in a jug makes you liable.

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Stories from Meilah 13

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Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 13 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 13a, in English Tab translation (17)
  1. A cistern full of water — It is fit for Temple maintenance, for building, to make clay from it, but not for the altar; it is also not fit for the water libation, since they would only pour water from the Siloam spring, which is living (flowing) water.
  2. A garbage dump full of manure — The dump itself is not fit for the altar or for Temple maintenance.
  3. A tree full of fruit — My teacher told me that this tree is a grapevine, which is fit for the altar and for the wine libation, but is not fit for Temple maintenance, since vine wood is thin and not fit for any construction. This cannot refer to first fruits (bikkurim), since those are not offered on the altar.
  4. A field full of grass — It is fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance.
  5. And he is not liable for misusing what is in it — (regarding one that was empty and was later filled with water) — because all these are growths that developed after consecration.
  6. Rabbi Yosei says, etc. — He disagrees only with these two cases. The first tanna holds that there is no liability for misuse of enhancements to consecrated property that developed after it was consecrated, but Rabbi Yosei holds that one who consecrates a field or a tree is liable for misusing their growths as well, since they grew directly as part of the consecrated property. However, regarding a cistern, a garbage dump, or a dovecote, since their contents are not 'growths' of them, Rabbi Yosei does not disagree.
  7. The offspring of a tithed animal may not suckle from the tithed mother — because she is consecrated, as it is written, 'the tenth shall be holy' (Leviticus 27:32), while her offspring is non-sacred; thus it would be benefiting from the milk of consecrated property.
  8. And others stipulate this — That is, without any stipulation it is certainly forbidden to suckle from the tithed animal; but 'others stipulate' means that beforehand they make a condition: 'I bring this female into the pen to be tithed on condition that, if she becomes consecrated, her milk will remain non-sacred, so that her offspring may nurse from her permissibly.' And I have heard that this condition works for them because they are able to prevent this female from entering the pen until a later time; therefore the condition is effective and is treated like a voluntary gift. For this reason they are called 'others,' since they are not as stringent with themselves as they properly should be. And likewise, regarding the offspring of consecrated animals, people would not consecrate the mother's milk.
  9. The laborers — Those who do work with Temple property may not eat from consecrated dried figs. Even though it is written, 'When you come into your neighbor's vineyard, you may eat...' (Deuteronomy 23:25), and we say in the chapter 'HaSocher et HaPoalim' (Bava Metzia 87b) that this verse speaks of a laborer, nevertheless with Temple property they may not eat, for the Torah says 'your neighbor's vineyard' — and not a vineyard belonging to the Temple.
  10. And likewise a cow — A non-sacred cow that plows with Temple property may not eat from the Temple's vetch.
  11. GEMARA: It is derived through the verbal analogy of 'passing' and 'passing' — It is written regarding the firstborn (Exodus 13:12), 'And you shall cause to pass every firstborn,' and it is written regarding tithe (Leviticus 27:32), 'Whatever passes under the rod...' Just as with a firstborn offering one is liable for misusing it in its entirety, since it is a male and has no milk, so too with the tithe, which also applies to females, one is liable for misusing it entirely, even its milk.
  12. It is derived through the verbal analogy of 'its mother' and 'its mother' from the firstborn offering — It is written regarding the firstborn (Exodus 22:29), 'so you shall do with your ox and your flock: seven days it shall be with its mother,' and regarding consecrated animals it is written in Parashat Emor, 'seven days it shall be under its mother.' Just as with the firstborn, which is male, one is liable for misusing it entirely, so too with sacrificial animals, one is liable for misusing them entirely.
  13. Regarding the laborers, etc. — what is the reason? — 'may not eat from the Temple's vetch.' Concerning laborers, that they may not eat from consecrated dried figs, there is no need to ask for a source, since the verse explicitly limits it: 'your neighbor's' — and not the Temple's; but concerning the cow, since this is not written explicitly, the Gemara needs to ask.
  14. Its threshing — That is to say: when it threshes your own grain, you may not muzzle it, but when it threshes Temple produce, you may muzzle it, since the whole passage is discussing non-sacred produce.
  15. Kelilin — A type of legume. If non-sacred legumes grow in a consecrated field, one who derives benefit from them has committed misuse, since he is deriving benefit from consecrated property.
  16. But don't we require that it be detached? — As we say below, in the chapter 'HaNehene' (Meilah 18b), that there is no liability for misuse regarding something attached to the ground, and all the more so regarding the ground itself.
  17. From the fact that it says 'he has committed misuse,' learn from this that it refers to the dust — The dust of the field benefits those legumes; and since the dust rises from the ground and mixes with the legumes, it is considered detached, and therefore he has committed misuse.
Tosafot on Meilah 13a, in English Tab translation (10)
  1. They are liable for misuse of them and of what is in them — Rashbam explains, in tractate Bava Batra (79a), that misuse can apply to a cistern in a case where one stored items inside it. But this is problematic, since we state below (Meilah 18b) that there is no liability for misuse of something attached to the ground [and a cistern is part of the ground]. Therefore Rabbeinu Tam explains that it refers to a case where one detached a block of earth/stone from it and derived benefit from it, since that block is then considered detached.
  2. But if one consecrated an empty cistern and it was later filled... one is liable for misusing them but not what is in them — and the same applies to the pigeons, because of the principle that a courtyard effects acquisition of ownerless items (comparable to a 'hand,' as derived in Gittin 21a), but consecration does not have the status of a 'hand' that can acquire. And regarding the tree that became filled with fruit, the reason is that there is no liability for misuse of growths that developed on consecrated property. Rabbi Yosei disagrees, holding that there is liability for misuse even of such growths.
  3. The offspring of the tithed animal — meaning it was born before its mother entered the pen to be tithed, so the offspring itself is non-sacred. Therefore the mishnah states that it may not suckle from its tithed mother, as the Gemara will explain the reason from a verse.
  4. And others volunteer to do so — meaning there are people who volunteer and stipulate, before the mother enters the pen [to be tithed], that she may nurse her offspring, which is non-sacred. The same applies to the offspring of a consecrated animal that is non-sacred, having been born before its mother was consecrated.
  5. The laborers may not eat from consecrated dried figs — even though ordinarily a laborer may eat his employer's produce, whether detached or still attached to the ground, as stated in Bava Metzia (87a), nevertheless he may not eat from consecrated produce, as the Gemara will derive from a verse. Likewise, a cow may not eat from consecrated vetch, though it is permitted to muzzle it. This raises a difficulty with the explanation of 'and others volunteer to do so,' since that wording doesn't fit; it should have said 'and others stipulate about this.' It is also difficult because the Tosefta states this regarding both the laborers and the cow, and there, what good would a stipulation do regarding something already consecrated? Therefore it seems that 'and others volunteer to do so' means that other generous, wealthy people would volunteer to let the offspring nurse from their own non-sacred animals; and similarly, since the laborers and cow work for the Temple's sake, wealthy people would volunteer to support them.
  6. It is derived by the verbal analogy of the word 'passing' used in both places — for regarding the firstborn it is written (Exodus 13:12), 'And you shall cause to pass all that opens the womb,' and regarding animal tithes it is written (Leviticus 27:32), 'Whatsoever passes under the rod.' [The comparison] 'just as one is liable for misusing all of the firstborn' does not refer to its milk, since nursing is not relevant to a firstborn, which is male; rather it means: just as one is liable for misusing the firstborn entirely, so too one is liable for misusing the tithed animal entirely, including by nursing its young from it. This is not liability in the strict sense, since we already said above (Meilah 12b) that there is no liability for misuse of the milk of consecrated animals; rather, it means that the milk is forbidden for nursing. The milk of consecrated animals is likewise forbidden for nursing, derived by the verbal analogy of the term 'its mother' used regarding both the firstborn (in Exodus, 'seven days it shall be with its mother') and consecrated animals (in Leviticus, 'seven days it shall be under its mother'). One might ask: why do we need this verse to forbid the milk of consecrated animals? It could be derived from the teaching in Bekhorot (15a) regarding disqualified consecrated animals: 'flesh, but not milk.' One cannot say that this teaching applies only after the milk has been separated, but that nursing directly would be forbidden without this verse here, for the straightforward implication is that the milk of disqualified consecrated animals is forbidden in every respect. Some explain that the Torah's prohibition of the milk of disqualified consecrated animals refers only to eating it, as it is written (Deuteronomy 12:15), 'and you shall eat flesh, but not milk,' but deriving benefit from it [such as nursing] is permitted; therefore the verbal analogy of 'its mother, its mother' is needed here to forbid even the benefit of nursing. But this does not seem right, for we say in Chullin (36a), in the chapter 'HaShochet': 'Since they are forbidden for shearing and labor, one might think the blood requires burial'—implying that even the milk is forbidden for benefit and requires burial, since it is certainly compared to blood rather than to shearing and labor, as I explained above in the mishnah. Therefore it seems, according to my teacher, that were it not for this verse here forbidding the milk of consecrated animals, we would not have derived from the teaching about disqualified consecrated animals that 'flesh' comes to exclude milk, since we wouldn't know what the exclusion of 'flesh' was meant to teach. But now that the milk of consecrated animals is [already] forbidden, 'flesh' comes to teach that the milk remains as it was [already forbidden]. Proof of this: the Torah had to write 'you shall not shear the firstborn of your flock,' forbidding shearing of consecrated animals; why was this necessary, if it could be derived from the statement regarding disqualified consecrated animals, 'you shall sacrifice, but not shear'? Clearly, we would not have known what the exclusion of shearing from 'you shall sacrifice' was meant to teach; but now that shearing of consecrated animals is forbidden, 'you shall sacrifice' comes to teach that shearing remains as it was. And if one asks, based on the passage in Bava Kamma (77b) in the chapter 'HaMarubeh,' which states that wherever the term 'seh' (lamb) is used it serves only to exclude diverse kinds (kilayim)—for what purpose then do we derive the firstborn from tithed animals via the analogy of 'passing-passing,' and tithed animals from consecrated animals via 'under-under'? Why not derive the firstborn directly from consecrated animals via the analogy of 'its mother, its mother'? The answer is that this analogy is used only to teach something dependent on the mother, such as nursing here, or such as the matter of birth at the beginning of the chapter 'HaYotzei Dofen' (Niddah 40a), but it is not used to teach other matters. With this answer, another difficulty is also resolved: how can we derive [the prohibition of nursing] from the firstborn, which cannot be subject to nursing at all (since it is male)—for we do not derive something possible from something impossible? According to what we explained, it works out that we must derive from the firstborn regarding 'liability for misuse of all of it,' and also regarding deriving via the verbal analogy of 'passing-passing'; nevertheless, since consecrated animals cannot be derived from the firstborn regarding nursing—even though it is deriving the possible from the impossible—the same applies regarding tithed animals; yet we still derive properly from the firstborn. [The commentator] thus worked hard to reconcile the Tosafot's position precisely, but all of this is quite forced. Furthermore, it is a difficulty that it is obvious that the offspring of a tithed animal should not nurse from the tithed mother, since it is non-sacred—for we already learned above that one may not benefit from the milk of consecrated animals. Also, it says 'and others volunteer to do so,' and I explained in the mishnah that wealthy people would volunteer to let the offspring nurse from their own [non-sacred] animals—but what kind of 'volunteering' is this, since there is no benefit at all to the Temple? Therefore it appears, according to my teacher Rabbi Peretz (may he live long), that the mishnah is discussing the offspring of a tithed animal and of consecrated animals that were born after the mother was already tithed/consecrated—this is the novelty, that even so, the offspring may not nurse from them. This explains 'and others volunteer to do so': since these offspring belonged to the Temple, people would volunteer to nurse them [with their own animals' milk]. The Gemara then asks: from where do we derive that the offspring may not nurse from its mother? Is it not written 'under its mother,' implying that even if the mother is consecrated, the offspring may still nurse from her? Rather, it is derived from the verbal analogy of 'passing-passing' with the firstborn: just as one is liable for misusing the firstborn—meaning it is forbidden to nurse a firstborn from an animal of tithe or consecration, since we do not find a firstborn status applying to animals of tithe or consecration, as they are exempt from the firstborn law—so too, a tithed animal: meaning that even the offspring sanctified with tithe status, born from a tithed animal, may not nurse from its mother, who is tithed. The same applies to the milk of consecrated animals, derived by the analogy of 'its mother, its mother' with the firstborn: just as 'its mother' stated regarding the firstborn does not refer to a consecrated animal (since a consecrated animal is exempt from the firstborn law), so too 'its mother' stated regarding consecrated animals, in the verse 'seven days it shall be under its mother,' would seem by its plain meaning to permit the offspring of consecrated animals to nurse from their consecrated mother—but this is not so; rather, that mother must be non-sacred, and therefore nursing from her is permitted, but if she is consecrated, the offspring may not nurse from her. Now it fits well why the verbal analogy was needed here: to teach that even when the offspring is itself consecrated, it may not nurse from the [consecrated] mother. It also fits that we do not derive elsewhere [i.e., regarding other laws] from this analogy of 'its mother, its mother,' since this analogy is expounded only to teach that 'its mother' regarding consecrated animals means the mother is non-sacred, just as 'its mother' regarding the firstborn means the same, as we explained.
  7. What is the reason — this refers to the ruling that laborers may not eat [from consecrated produce]: the verse says 'your [fellow's],' excluding Temple property. And a laborer is juxtaposed with an ox, as stated in Bava Metzia (89a): the one who muzzles is juxtaposed with the one muzzled, and the one muzzled is juxtaposed with the one who muzzles.
  8. Vetch — this is a type of legume.
  9. But don't we require that it be detached — since there is no liability for misuse regarding land that is still attached to the ground.
  10. Its dust benefits it — meaning the dust of the ground, which is detached, enhances the legume; when the cow threshes on consecrated ground, dust rises from the ground [and so benefits the produce].
Rashi on Meilah 13b, in English Tab translation (18)
  1. The roots of an ordinary person's tree that enter into consecrated [land], one may not benefit nor is one liable for misuse — This is because we follow the tree [trunk itself], and the tree stands in non-sacred land.
  2. And [the roots] of a consecrated tree that enter into non-sacred [land] — Here too one may not derive benefit nor is one liable for misuse, since its main trunk stands in consecrated [land].
  3. A spring that flows within a consecrated field — The spring actually issues from a non-sacred field, but flows onward into the consecrated field. One may not derive benefit from it as long as it is within the consecrated field, but one is not liable for misuse, even for one who drinks from it while it is within the consecrated field.
  4. The water in the golden jug — This refers to the jug that they would fill for the purpose of the water libation, as we learned in the chapter of Lulav VeAravah (Sukkah 48b): just as it is performed on a weekday, so is it performed on Shabbat — except that on the eve of Shabbat they would fill it from the Siloam pool into a golden vessel that was not consecrated, so that it would not become disqualified by remaining overnight. Regarding that water in the non-consecrated golden vessel, one may not derive benefit from it, because it was drawn for a sacred purpose.
  5. But one is not liable for misuse — Because the water was not consecrated for the water libation in a way that incurs liability for misuse until it is placed into the golden flask, which is the vessel consecrated for this purpose.
  6. Willow branch — These were arranged on the Temple Mount. One may not derive benefit from it before it was set up beside the altar, since it stands ready for that purpose; but once it has been set up, since its mitzva has been fulfilled, one may derive benefit from it.
  7. The elders used to derive benefit from it for their lulavim — Even before it was set up beside the altar.
  8. One is not liable for misusing all of it — This means that if the golden jug contains more than three log, one is not liable for misusing [any of] it; but if the jug contains exactly three log, no less and no more — the precise measure for the libation — one is liable for misusing it.
  9. But the latter clause teaches: once he placed them into the flask, one is liable for misuse — By inference, this implies that in the first clause, when the water is still in the golden jug, one is not liable for misuse even if it contains exactly three log.
  10. That there is a fixed measure for the water — [Reish Lakish holds] that there is a measure for the libation water, namely three log; therefore one is liable for misuse only regarding exactly three log, the amount appropriate for the libation. But Rabbi Yochanan holds there is no fixed measure for the water; therefore he says one is liable for misusing all of it.
  11. But didn't we learn: Rabbi Eliezer says one who pours the festival water libation on the festival outside [the Temple courtyard] is liable — He is liable on the grounds of offering outside the Temple, for anything that may be brought inside incurs liability for offering it outside, as stated in tractate Zevachim.
  12. And Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Menachem Yodafa — This is stated there, in the chapter 'One who slaughters and offers up outside' [in tractate Zevachim].
  13. And one of them is the water libation — Since the obligation of the water libation is derived from the Torah, he therefore rules that one is liable for it on the grounds of offering outside the Temple courtyard.
  14. And Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yochanan — Since you said that Rabbi Eliezer followed the opinion of his teacher Rabbi Akiva, who interprets the word 'their libations' [as including water], and that the water libation is thus a Torah obligation just like the wine libation, then one should say: just as the measure for wine is three log, so too for water. From the fact that Reish Lakish said this, one might infer that he himself holds there is no fixed measure for the water libation.
  15. He said this according to the reasoning of Rabbi Menachem Yodafa — Reish Lakish spoke to Rabbi Yochanan following the reasoning of Rabbi Menachem, who holds there is no fixed measure for the water and who interprets 'their libations' to mean: just as wine is three log, water should also be three log. We have heard Rabbi Yochanan state, in the name of Rabbi Menachem Yodafa, that one is liable for misusing all of it, implying there is no fixed measure for the water. But Reish Lakish himself actually holds that there is a fixed measure for the water, as stated above.
  16. A nest atop the tree — The Gemara will explain from what kind of wood [the nest] is made.
  17. He should knock it down with a pole — If he cannot reach the nest by hand, he should knock it down to the ground with a pole, but he should not climb the tree to take it, so that he not derive benefit from the tree by climbing it. The Gemara will explain the meaning of 'knock down.'
  18. One who consecrates the forest — one is liable for misusing all of it — This includes the wood, the branches, and the foliage.
Tosafot on Meilah 13b, in English Tab translation (10)
  1. Lemma: שרשי אילן של הדיוט — In tractate Bava Batra, chapter 'Lo Yachpor' (26b), this matter is explained well.
  2. Lemma: מים שבכד של זהב — This is discussing the Celebration of the Place of the Water-Drawing. They would fill the jug the day before from the waters of the Shiloah and place it into a barrel that was not consecrated, so that the water would not become invalid through remaining overnight, as stated in the chapter 'Lulav VeAravah' (Sukkah 48b). And one should not raise the difficulty that 'kad' (jug) is the same as 'chavit' (barrel) (Bava Kamma 27a).
  3. Lemma: נתנו לצלוחית — That flask was a service vessel, and therefore one is liable for misusing [the water] in it.
  4. Lemma: ערבה היו מקיפין המזבח — And they did not derive benefit from it, nor were they liable for misuse, because it had not been consecrated.
  5. Lemma: נהנין היו מהם זקנים בלולביהם — He holds that mitzvot were not given for the sake of deriving benefit.
  6. Lemma: אבל מועלין בג' לוגין — The Gemara's initial assumption is that this refers to the first clause of the mishna, which states that one is not liable for misuse of the water in the jug, and that Reish Lakish is saying that with three log one is liable for misuse. Therefore the Gemara asks: but doesn't the latter clause teach that once the water is placed in the flask one is liable for misuse — implying that in the first clause (the jug) there is no liability at all, since the water in the jug was never consecrated? Rather, if anything was stated, it was stated as follows: Reish Lakish says this ruling (liability for misuse) applies only to the flask, and only if it contains three log, for he holds there is a fixed measure of three log for the water; if there is more than three log, one is liable for misuse only with those three log, since the water is consecrated only to the extent of the measure required for the water libation. But if one drinks from the final three log, he is liable for misuse. Some explain that the vessel contained a large amount of water, and Reish Lakish means that one is not liable for misuse until one drinks three log, which is the requisite measure.
  7. Lemma: רבי אליעזר בשיטת ר"ע רבו אמר — The verse does not say 'nisko' (its libation, singular) but 'u'nesakheha' (its libations, plural), implying two libations, and this juxtaposes the water libation to the wine libation, since both are derived from the same verse: just as one who pours the wine libation outside [the Temple] is liable, so too with water. And Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yochanan: just as wine has a measure of three log, so too water should have a measure of three log. In tractate Zevachim, chapter 'HaShochet VehaMa'aleh' (110b), the Gemara later concludes: but doesn't the mishna say 'the water of the Festival,' implying there is no fixed measure for water? This is the conclusion of the question — that is, if you say there is indeed a measure, doesn't the mishna's phrase 'the water of the Festival' imply there is no measure? This would indicate that Reish Lakish holds there is no measure for water. But if he holds there is a measure, why does he ask 'just as wine is three log, so too water should be three log' — doesn't he himself hold this already? The Gemara answers that he stated this according to the reasoning of Rabbi Menachem Yodafa. That is, Reish Lakish himself holds there is a measure for water, and his question there follows the line of reasoning that explained Rabbi Eliezer's position — that Rabbi Eliezer holds there is no measure for water. Therefore Reish Lakish asks: since Rabbi Eliezer juxtaposes water to wine, why does he say there is no measure for water? Some explain that the earlier teaching, that one is liable for misuse with three log, follows Rabbi Menachem's view, who derives this from the verse juxtaposing the water libation to the wine libation, meaning there is indeed a measure for water. But this does not seem correct, for here who mentioned Rabbi Menachem Yodafa? Moreover, in the chapter 'HaShochet VehaMa'aleh' (ibid.) it seems that Rabbi Menachem does not require a fixed measure, so Reish Lakish's question would not make sense.
  8. Lemma: הקן שבראש האילן — This is explained well in the Gemara.
  9. Lemma: יתיז בקנה — He should not take it with his hand, but rather shake it loose with a stick so that it falls.
  10. Lemma: המקדיש החורש — 'Ya'ar' (forest) in the language of the Targum (Aramaic translation).

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 13.