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Meilah 2 for kids: Slaughtered in the Wrong Place

מעילה ב׳

🐑 This daf talks about sacrifices of the highest holiness that were slaughtered in the wrong place or at the wrong time. The Mishna teaches that someone who benefits from these ruined offerings is still guilty of misuse. The Gemara then asks a hard question: if such an offering already went up on the altar, must it come back down?

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Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 2 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 2a, in English Tab translation (23)
  1. Mishna — Offerings of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the south: even though they are required by law to be slaughtered in the north, they do not thereby lose their sanctity with regard to misuse — one who derives benefit worth a peruta from them has committed misuse. 'How so? He slaughtered them…' — do not think that only if he slaughtered them in the south but collected the blood in the north (is he liable), for the collection is the primary rite, and from the collection onward is the service of the priesthood, and the collection onward is to be done in the north. Rather, even if he slaughtered them properly in the north but collected the blood in the south — even though the collection, which is the primary rite, was performed improperly in the south — nevertheless misuse applies to them.
  2. And likewise if he slaughtered during the day and sprinkled the blood at night — even though night is not the proper time for offering, misuse still applies to them.
  3. And likewise if he slaughtered at night and sprinkled during the day — this is all the more so obviously subject to misuse, since the sprinkling, which is the primary rite, was performed during the day; this case and the previous one are stated even though one might have thought it unnecessary to state both.
  4. Or he slaughtered them — in the south, during the day, intending to eat them beyond their appointed time, which is piggul and carries the penalty of excision (karet).
  5. Or outside their designated place — this is also piggul, but does not carry excision. Nevertheless misuse applies to them. Both forms of piggul — beyond its time and outside its place — are derived from a single verse (Zevachim 28a): 'And if it shall indeed be eaten of the flesh of his peace offering...' from which 'outside its place' is compared to 'beyond its time' and is called piggul, though it is not full piggul so as to incur excision for it.
  6. Rabbi Yehoshua stated a principle: any offering that had a period of fitness for the priests — and was then disqualified from them.
  7. Misuse does not apply to it — because it is no longer included in the phrase 'from the sacred things of the Lord' (Leviticus 5), since it had already been fit for the priests.
  8. Which is the one that had a period of fitness for the priests? One that remained overnight, or became impure — since the slaughter and sprinkling were performed properly, it had been fit for the priests; even though it was later disqualified through remaining overnight or through impurity, so that now it has no fitness for the priests, misuse does not apply to it.
  9. 'Remained overnight' — the meat, after the sprinkling, or it became impure, or it left the Temple courtyard after the sprinkling — even though it is now unfit for the priests, since it had a period of fitness before being disqualified (misuse does not apply).
  10. And which is the one that did not have [a period of fitness]... that was slaughtered beyond its designated time, etc. — and the same applies to all the cases taught in the first clause, such as one slaughtered in the south or at night — they had no period of fitness for the priests. The reason the two cases of 'beyond its time' and 'outside its place' are mentioned here, more than all the cases taught earlier where misuse applies, is that these two are compared to each other and are derived from a single verse in Tractate Zevachim (28a), from the phrase 'and if it shall indeed be eaten...'.
  11. 'Or that those unfit collected and sprinkled its blood' — this refers to impure persons, and concerns individual offerings, where impurity was not permitted.
  12. 'That those unfit collected' — meaning blemished priests; and the same applies to this case as was taught in the first clause.
  13. Gemara — 'It might enter your mind to say, since Ulla says' — later, in the chapter 'Offspring of a Sin-Offering' (Meilah 12a): offerings that died are excluded from misuse by Torah law, but by rabbinic law misuse does apply to them, as stated there.
  14. 'As though they had been strangled' — meaning, they should be treated like offerings that died, which are excluded from the category of misuse, since they are fit neither for the Most High nor for ordinary use — for one may not redeem consecrated items in order to feed them to dogs. The mishna teaches us that this is not so.
  15. 'Offerings that died, etc. — but it is fit for offerings of lesser sanctity' — as we learned in 'Where They Are Slaughtered' (Zevachim 55a): offerings of lesser sanctity may be slaughtered anywhere in the courtyard.
  16. 'Why do I need the mishna to teach all these cases?' — It could have taught just one of them, that misuse applies even though the rite was not performed as commanded, and I would know on my own that the same applies to all the others.
  17. 'That the collection was in the south' — since that is the primary rite.
  18. Because daytime is the proper time for sacrificial offering.
  19. The correct text is: 'But if he slaughtered at night and sprinkled during the day' — but night is not the time for offering, and as for the case where he slaughtered at night, one might say...
  20. 'And if the mishna had taught [only the case of] slaughtering at night, etc., but [not the case where] he slaughtered during the day and sprinkled at night' — the same applies also if he both slaughtered and sprinkled at night, since the sprinkling, which is the primary rite, was performed at night.
  21. 'Say that it is as though they had been strangled — this teaches us [otherwise]' — that misuse applies, for night is not considered 'lacking its appointed time.' And the Gemara here deduces this from the mishna itself, not holding that the two clauses were stated merely for emphasis without added teaching.
  22. 'Beyond its designated time and outside its designated place — for what are they fit?' — meaning, as for all the cases taught in the mishna, it is reasonable that misuse applies to them, since slaughtering in the south is fit for offerings of lesser sanctity, as stated above, and slaughtering or sprinkling at night is likewise reasonably subject to misuse since night does not count as 'lacking its appointed time.' But if one slaughtered intending to burn the offering beyond its time or outside its place — for what is it fit? For the slaughter itself, misuse would apply, but since it becomes piggul, it is fit neither for the sacrificial portions to the Most High nor for the meat to the priests, and is not a fit offering at all — so why does misuse apply to it?
  23. And the Gemara answers: Since the sprinklings are what create the piggul status — meaning, since this piggul-slaughter is considered so significant that piggul status, bringing with it the penalty of excision, is not fixed until all the sprinklings that permit the offering are performed for its sake, as stated in Tractate Zevachim (28b): 'It is piggul, it shall not be accepted' — and we say, just as acceptance of a valid offering is described by the word 'accepted' (to atone), so too the 'acceptance' of a disqualified offering (i.e., the fixing of its disqualified piggul status) does not take effect until all the sprinklings that permit it are performed for the sake of piggul. This is the meaning of 'the sprinklings bring about [the piggul status]' — that the sprinkling is what determines (and completes) the fixing of the piggul status. And since this sprinkling is so significant that the sprinklings are required to fix the piggul status, the offering has not yet departed from its sanctity, and therefore misuse still applies to it.
Tosafot on Meilah 2a, in English Tab translation (7)
  1. Mishna: Offerings of the most sacred order — for example, a sin offering, a guilt offering, and communal peace offerings, which are subject to the law of misuse until they reach a time of permissibility for the priests, meaning after the sprinkling of the blood. For until the time of sprinkling they are called 'offerings of God,' and this applies even to the sacrificial portions (eimurim) after sprinkling. But with offerings of lesser sanctity, there is no misuse until after the sprinkling, for only then is God's portion determined, and only then does misuse apply to their sacrificial portions.
  2. That he slaughtered them in the south — whereas the law is that they should be slaughtered in the north, as stated in tractate Zevachim (47a). One is liable for misuse; the Gemara will explain what novelty this teaches. One might ask: what exactly is the case of 'slaughtered in the south'? If the blood was collected in the north, why is this needed here, since it will be taught later in the mishna? And if the blood was also collected in the south, then the first clause should have taught 'slaughtered in the south, collected in the north' and 'slaughtered in the north, collected in the south,' since these are less novel than 'slaughtered in the south, collected in the south' — for the order of our mishna is to teach the more novel case later, as the Gemara does when working out the necessity of each clause. Accordingly, since this novel case is taught first, it should be understood as implying 'this case is included, and certainly that one,' then 'not only that one, but also this one' — but this is not the style of the Tannaim, who state the general rule of a change of place (south) first, and then explain what this means in detail: the mishna specifies that a change of place means, for example, one slaughtered in the south and collected in the north, etc. But the mishna does not discuss the case of slaughtering in the south and also collecting in the south. At first glance it seems that in such a case there is no liability for misuse, since the mishna does not mention it, and there would be a reason for this, since such a case involves a greater degree of deviation. However, Rabbi Peretz holds that this reasoning is incorrect, for the Gemara explains the reason the mishna holds one liable for misuse even though the service was altered — because the act is still fit for offerings of lesser sanctity — and so what difference does it make whether there was one disqualification or two? Therefore it seems that the same law applies when one both slaughtered and collected the blood in the south — one is liable for misuse — and the reason the mishna does not state this case, even though it would be a greater novelty, is simply the style of the mishna, which, since it teaches each case separately, did not bother to combine them, just as we find in tractate Yevamot (53b), which teaches 'one who has relations with his yevama' whether unwittingly or intentionally, etc., and in the Gemara it is taught that this applies even to both together, while the mishna omits this case — even though it would be a greater novelty — because once you hear the lesser case, you understand the more severe case applies as well.
  3. He slaughtered them in the south and collected their blood in the north; he slaughtered them in the north and collected their blood in the south — the Gemara explains that the mishna's teaching of 'collected in the south' is the greater novelty, since although he deviated in the collection of the blood — which is the primary service — one is nevertheless still liable for misuse. [Regarding the case:] 'He slaughtered during the day and sprinkled at night; he slaughtered at night and sprinkled during the day' — this is the text found in most manuscripts, but Rabbi Yitzchak (the Ri) thinks this is an error, since the mishna should teach the greater novelty last, as it does with the case of the south. Rather, the correct text is the reverse: 'he slaughtered at night and sprinkled during the day; he slaughtered during the day and sprinkled at night' — for sprinkling is the primary rite, and it is a greater novelty when the deviation occurs in the sprinkling, since there is liability for misuse despite this. This is why the mishna omits 'collection' with regard to the nighttime case and instead mentions 'sprinkling' — because it is impossible to have precise timing such that the slaughter occurs exactly at the end of the night and the collection occurs immediately as day begins, since collection and slaughter must be performed in close succession to one another.
  4. Any offering that had a time of permissibility for the priests — meaning that it reached the stage where its blood had been properly sprinkled — in such a case there is no liability for misuse, since such an offering is no longer called 'an offering of God.'
  5. Isn't it obvious? [Shall we say] that because he slaughtered them in the south, they are removed from the category of misuse? — One might ask: why not answer instead that this teaches us that sprinkling does not help to remove them from the category of misuse? One can answer that this is obvious, since the sprinkling itself was performed in a disqualified manner and therefore accomplishes nothing at all. Furthermore, one can answer that, according to our teacher's explanation (to be given below, please God), this works out well.
  6. Offerings that died are excluded from liability for misuse, etc. — because, since they are destined to be lost, they are not called 'offerings of God.'
  7. '[Slaughtered] outside its designated time and outside its designated area — for what are they fit?' — meaning, one should say that this is considered as if it had been strangled, so that it is fit for nothing at all. But this raises a difficulty: why does the Gemara pose this question now, regarding all the cases taught in the mishna, when there is an opinion that holds 'if it went up [onto the altar], it should not be brought down,' meaning it is not considered as if strangled? This would apply all the more readily to the cases of 'outside its designated time' and 'outside its designated area,' where we should certainly not say it is considered as if strangled, for according to everyone, if it went up, it should not be brought down, as will be explained below. Therefore, it seems to me that the correct reading is: 'Why do I need [to mention] outside its designated area?' — meaning, it is obvious that this is not considered as if strangled, for the reason that 'if it went up, it should not be brought down,' as explained, is the strongest reason of all. The Gemara answers: since the sprinkling can render the offering piggul [if the intent was to eat it beyond its time] — this teaches us that the sprinkling, though invalid, does not remove the offering from the category of misuse. One might have thought that even though it is invalid, it nevertheless has enough effect to establish the status of piggul and create liability for excision (karet) — and although piggul requires a valid-type acceptance of the blood, one might think this would also serve to remove it from liability for misuse. The Gemara therefore teaches that this is not so. It seems forced to explain that the questioner did not know the true answer, that sprinkling does not remove the offering from liability for misuse, for this was already explained above as following necessarily from Rabbi Yehoshua's own statement. Therefore, our teacher prefers the reading: 'For what are they fit?' — meaning, I certainly know the novelty is due to the sprinkling, as explained above. However, what is the novelty here, given that the sprinkling has no validity at all — why would one think that it removes the offering from liability for misuse? The Gemara answers: since the sprinkling can render it piggul, one might have thought that sprinkling does remove it from liability for misuse — this is why the Gemara needed to teach that it does not.
Rashi on Meilah 2b, in English Tab translation (21)
  1. A dilemma was raised before the Sages — this refers to the cases taught in the mishna where the rite was changed, for example, where one slaughtered the offering in the south or received its blood in the south, etc.
  2. If they ascended the altar, what is the law as to whether they descend — must one remove them, or not?
  3. According to Rabbi Yehuda — who says there, in the chapter 'HaMizbeach Mekadesh' (Zevachim 84a), that the verse 'this is the burnt offering' comes to exclude certain cases — excluding an offering whose blood was spilled, or that remained overnight, or that went outside the courtyard (and similarly offerings whose blood should be placed above but was placed below, or should be placed below but was placed above) — that if these ascended the altar, they descend. Everyone agrees that in these cases too, if they ascended, they descend.
  4. They disagree when the dilemma is raised according to Rabbi Shimon — who disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda and says that the verse 'this is the law of the burnt offering' teaches that the Torah includes one law for all offerings that ascend the altar: that if they ascended, they do not descend.
  5. Rav Yosef holds like Rabbi Shimon — for just as Rabbi Shimon said that offerings whose blood should be placed below but was placed above, etc. (that is, a change in the place where the blood was placed), the rule is that if they ascended they do not descend, the same applies when one changed the place of slaughter, slaughtering them in the south: if they ascended, they do not descend.
  6. Rabba could say to you — Rabbi Shimon only said there that if they ascended, they do not descend, in that specific case.
  7. 'Rather, with regard to offerings whose blood should be placed below,' etc. — meaning, he said they do not descend only in that case of a change in the place where the blood was placed, since the slaughter and the collection of the blood were performed in the north.
  8. 'But here,' etc. — and if they ascended, they descend.
  9. Granted, according to Rav Yosef — who says that if they ascended, they do not descend, since they have not lost their sanctity, therefore one is liable for misusing them.
  10. But according to Rabba — who says that if they ascended, they descend, since they have left their sanctity, it is difficult: why is one liable for misusing them?
  11. 'What is the meaning of: he is liable for misuse?' — By rabbinic law; but by Torah law they have no sanctity, and if they ascended, they descend.
  12. For misuse by rabbinic law, one pays only the principal and not the additional one-fifth, because the one-fifth payment is brought on account of the guilt offering for misuse; but with a rabbinic violation there is no requirement to bring an offering, since it would be like bringing a non-sacred animal into the Temple courtyard — therefore one also does not bring the one-fifth. But with misuse by Torah law, one brings the principal, the one-fifth, and a guilt offering for misuse.
  13. 'By Torah law' — since it says 'by Torah law,' this indicates that by Torah law there is no misuse in these cases, but only by rabbinic law. So too, according to Rabba, the mishna's ruling that 'he is liable for misuse' means by rabbinic law.
  14. 'Let us say that according to Rabba, we already learned this ruling of Ulla, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan' — for we can derive it from the mishna itself as well: do we not say that offerings of the most sacred order slaughtered in the south are considered as though they were strangled, and are therefore like sacrificial animals that have died? And the mishna teaches that one is liable for misusing them, and we explained that this means by rabbinic law, since by Torah law there is no misuse in these cases — for we say that if they ascended, they descend, since they are considered like animals that have died. If so, this is the same ruling as that of Ulla, so what is Ulla teaching us that is new?
  15. The Gemara answers: even though we learned it — in the mishna.
  16. Ulla's statement was still necessary — for you might have thought that here, in the mishna, with regard to offerings of the most sacred order slaughtered in the south, people do not distance themselves from them, because even though the rite was changed, they were nonetheless slaughtered in a generally valid manner and people do not keep away from them; therefore they are subject to misuse — according to Rav Yosef, by Torah law; according to Rabba, by rabbinic law.
  17. 'But sacrificial animals that died' — since they are carcasses and repulsive, and people distance themselves from them, you might say that they are not subject to misuse even by rabbinic law, since people keep away from them.
  18. '[Ulla] teaches us' — that they are removed from the halakhot of misuse by Torah law, but by rabbinic law there is misuse even with regard to sacrificial animals that died.
  19. But still, what is Ulla teaching us? If it is because of the case of animals that died, we have also learned this — that there is misuse in them — as taught further in the chapter 'One Who Derives Benefit from Consecrated Property' (Meilah 18a).
  20. 'One who derives benefit from the sin offering' — this refers to a blemished sin offering.
  21. 'While it is alive, he is not liable for misuse until he causes it to lose value' — meaning, until he diminishes it. Since it has sanctity relating to its monetary value, one is not liable for misuse until he diminishes its value — for example, by plucking some of its wool, or by plowing with it and thereby weakening it — since, being blemished, it stands to be redeemed for its monetary value, and we hold that anything that stands to be redeemed for its value, one is not liable for misusing it until he diminishes its value. But anything that does not stand to be redeemed for its value — such as a golden cup belonging to the Temple treasury — once one derives benefit from it, even without diminishing it, he is liable for misuse. And when it is dead — since it no longer stands to be redeemed for its value, as one does not redeem consecrated animals once dead in order to feed them to dogs — once one derives a peruta's worth of benefit from it, he is liable for misuse even without diminishing it. And this liability for misuse is by rabbinic law, for once it has died, all agree there is no misuse in it by Torah law; rather, what is meant by 'he is liable for misuse'? By rabbinic law. And here the case is of a dead sin offering, where he is liable, because its sanctity is severe, since it comes for atonement. But with other offerings, such as a burnt offering, a guilt offering, or communal peace offerings, since they do not come for atonement, once they have died there is no misuse in them even by rabbinic law — and this is difficult for Ulla's ruling. Ulla could say to you: the same is true for all offerings of the most sacred order — the tanna also holds that there is misuse in them even after death. And why did he specifically mention the sin offering rather than other offerings of the most sacred order? Because you might have thought that since it comes for atonement, this status applies to the sin offering only while it is alive, so the tanna teaches that even when dead there is misuse.
Tosafot on Meilah 2b, in English Tab translation (6)
  1. If they ascended, what is [the law as to] whether they descend — This must be referring to [an offering slaughtered in] the south, but not to [one performed] outside its designated time or outside its designated place, for it is implied in the chapter 'HaMizbe'ach Mekadesh' (Zevachim 84a) that everyone agrees that in that case they do not descend. Nor does it refer to [an offering slaughtered] at night, for there is an explicit dispute about that between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon.
  2. According to Rabbi Yehuda everyone agrees that if they ascended they descend — For now, regarding [an offering] slaughtered at night — where he did not slaughter it in the south — it is said that they descend; all the more so where he slaughtered it in the south, having changed its place, they should descend. They disagree according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds regarding [an offering] slaughtered at night that it does not descend. Rav Yosef follows Rabbi Shimon's stringent view, since he likens a change of place to a change of time.
  3. And Rava could have said to you: Rabbi Shimon only said this regarding offerings that should be given above [the red line] which one gave below, etc. — This is difficult: why did he set aside [the cases of] 'at night,' 'its blood was spilled,' and 'its blood went out,' concerning which Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon actually disagree, and instead cite 'given above that one gave below,' where even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that they do not descend? The Ri explained that here [Rava] is dealing with a bird offering whose blood should be placed above but was placed below; here Rabbi Yehuda does not agree [they stay], because this is considered an outright disqualification, so they descend — this differs from 'given above that one gave below' stated in Zevachim (84a), where Rabbi Yehuda does not disagree, since that case involves an animal that had a valid act of slaughter and receiving the blood. But here, with a bird burnt-offering pinched below [improperly], where there was no valid act at all, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees, just as with one slaughtered at night or whose blood spilled. On this point Rava distinguishes: Rabbi Shimon said they do not descend only where the deviation was in the altar itself, meaning the slaughter and receiving of blood were done properly in the north — i.e., all its service and procedures were proper — but if one slaughtered in the south, Rabbi Shimon agrees it is as though he strangled it, considered like an offering slaughtered outside [the Temple], since he changed the place of slaughter; and regarding one who slaughters outside, all agree that if it ascended, it descends. However, my teacher Rabbi Peretz found this difficult from the fact that later Rav Yosef raises against Rava an objection 'one [point] from another,' etc. — meaning: we see regarding pinching that when one deviated, if it ascended it does not descend, and the same should apply to a deviation with an animal, and Rava is refuted. According to the Ri's explanation, why would he be refuted by a deviation in pinching? Did he not himself properly distinguish here between a deviation concerning a bird and one concerning the altar itself with an animal moved from north to south? Therefore it seems that, as is simply implied, [Rava's statement] deals with an animal, and even though Rabbi Yehuda agrees regarding it, Rava nevertheless cites it as similar to a change of place, like the change to the south, merely as an illustration. But all this is strained. Therefore it seems to my teacher Rabbi Peretz that Rava needed to bring the case of 'given above that one gave below,' for had he brought only 'slaughtered at night,' one could easily distinguish, since that is a change of time while this is a change of place, and they are not at all comparable. Still, Rava would have had difficulty from 'given above that one gave below.' And if you say: what does a deviation in sprinkling have to do with a deviation in slaughtering regarding the south? For regarding 'given above that one gave below,' even Rabbi Yehuda agrees [it stays] because it is a disqualification in the sprinkling, whereas here, regarding the south, it is a disqualification in the slaughtering — this is not a valid distinction, for according to Rabbi Shimon a disqualification in slaughtering is as effective as a disqualification in sprinkling is according to Rabbi Yehuda; for regarding [an offering] slaughtered at night, about which Rabbi Yehuda says they descend, Rabbi Shimon says they do not descend. If so, we should now compare, according to Rabbi Shimon, one who slaughtered in the south to 'given above that one gave below,' and this would be difficult for Rava. Therefore he needed to distinguish between 'given above' and 'given below' as opposed to slaughtering in the south; but between 'slaughtered at night' and 'slaughtering in the south' he did not need to distinguish, since that distinction is simple and known to all — that one is a change of time and the other a change of place.
  4. Rather, it is difficult for Rava — who said it is as though he strangled it; if so, it should be like consecrated animals that died.
  5. And what difference is there between [misuse by] Torah law and [misuse by] rabbinic law — He could have said that by rabbinic law one does not bring a guilt offering for misuse, but he answers with something even more far-reaching: that there is not even an obligation to pay the additional one-fifth, and all the more so no guilt offering, since it would be considered non-sacred [meat] in the Temple courtyard.
  6. Is there [a concept of] misuse by rabbinic law? — This is surprising: what is he questioning? Yes, there are many such cases — for example, regarding the blood, as we learn later (Me'ila 11a): 'If it went out to Nachal Kidron, one is liable for misuse,' etc. — meaning by rabbinic law. And likewise regarding the ashes of the sin offering (at the end of HaTekhelet, Menachot 52a). One can answer that there it is different, since people do not distance themselves from those items, and therefore the Sages instituted misuse [for them] by rabbinic law; but here, regarding offerings slaughtered in the south, people do distance themselves from them. About this he is surprised: is there misuse even in such a case? And he answers: yes, as Ulla said — for even regarding consecrated animals that died, from which people distance themselves, there is still misuse by rabbinic law.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 2.