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Meilah 3 for kids: Offerings That Died

מעילה ג׳

🕊️ This daf asks when sacred offerings become subject to meilah, the rule against misusing holy things. It also follows a big argument about offerings slaughtered in the wrong place, and whether wrong intent during sprinkling ruins an offering's holiness.

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Stories from Meilah 3

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Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 3 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 3a, in English Tab translation (12)
  1. And they distance themselves from it — Now too, when it dies, people distance themselves from it, so there was no need to decree misuse regarding it.
  2. This teaches us — the Tanna of misuse, and all the more so regarding other offerings that do not come for atonement, which are subject to misuse, since people do not distance themselves from them so greatly while alive.
  3. Sin offerings that are left to die — such as the five sin offerings that are left to die.
  4. And money that goes to the Dead Sea — this refers to cases discovered after atonement [had already been achieved].
  5. One may not derive benefit from them — by rabbinic law there is a prohibition.
  6. And one is not liable for misuse — even by rabbinic law. For one cannot explain it as 'not liable by Torah law, but liable by rabbinic law,' since the first clause already stated 'may not derive benefit' by rabbinic law, meaning there is only a prohibition without a Torah-level liability for misuse. If so, how could it then continue 'but liable for misuse'? Rather, it must mean: 'may not derive benefit' is by rabbinic law, and 'not liable for misuse' is also by rabbinic law — there is only a prohibition, no liability for misuse. This poses a difficulty for Ulla's statement.
  7. They say: Sin offerings that are left to die — since they are not meant for sacrifice but only to die, people distance themselves from them even while alive, and all the more so after death, when they become repulsive, so that no one would come to derive benefit from them. Therefore there was no need to decree misuse for them. This excludes other sin offerings, which are meant for sacrifice, and from which people do not distance themselves while alive — therefore there was a need to decree misuse for them after death.
  8. Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rabba, one source from another, and that one from another — meaning he did not find a difficulty from a single mishnah, but had to examine three mishnayot in relation to one another, ultimately applying the third one to a case of improper place of slaughter, which teaches: 'if they ascended [the altar], they do not descend.' These mishnayot are in tractate Zevachim — two of them in the chapter 'Chatat HaOf' (66b and 68b), and the third in the following chapter. There it teaches: a bird sin offering performed in the manner of a bird burnt offering, or a bird burnt offering performed in the manner of a bird sin offering, etc. And we established there in the Gemara that all these cases involve a change in the place of pinching the neck or sprinkling the blood. It teaches: 'and all of them' — even though their procedure was altered — are not treated as a carcass, but rather as validly pinched, so they do not render garments impure when swallowed, and one is liable for misusing them, since they have not left their sanctity — except for a bird sin offering performed below the red line, in the proper manner of a bird sin offering for the sake of a sin offering, which is performed correctly (since its proper place is below the red line); regarding this one is not liable for misuse, since it now has a permitted time for the priests [to eat it]. And although that same mishnah also mentions a bird burnt offering performed above [the red line] correctly, it does not say one is exempt from misuse for it, because a burnt offering is wholly consumed [on the altar], and even when performed correctly there is no permission for the priests to eat from it — therefore one remains liable for misuse regarding it.
  9. And it teaches — in that same mishnah: anything whose disqualification occurred within sanctity, such as these cases involving a change in the place of pinching or sprinkling, does not render garments impure when swallowed. This is the 'one [inferred] from another' — just as the mishnah teaching 'and all of them do not render garments impure' was established to refer to a change in the place of pinching, so too this one, teaching 'anything whose disqualification occurred within sanctity does not render garments impure,' must also refer to a change in the place of pinching.
  10. And anything whose disqualification did not occur within sanctity — such as one whose time [for offering] had passed, or whose wing had dried up, or whose leg had been severed — this is a disqualification that occurred 'not within sanctity,' but rather something happened to it before it was consecrated, and it was then pinched — such a case does render garments impure when swallowed.
  11. And it teaches — in the following chapter: anything whose disqualification occurred within sanctity, if it ascended [the altar], it does not descend. This is the other 'one [inferred] from another' — just as the earlier teaching, 'anything whose disqualification occurred within sanctity does not render garments impure,' refers to a change in the place of pinching (which is the beginning of the service), so too this teaching, 'anything whose disqualification occurred within sanctity, if it ascended it does not descend,' also refers to a change in the place of pinching. And just as regarding a change in the place of pinching alone — which is merely the beginning of the service — it teaches 'if it ascended it does not descend,' the same must apply in our mishnah regarding a change in the place of slaughter alone, which is likewise the beginning of the service: if it ascended, it does not descend. This is the conclusive refutation of Rabba's opinion.
  12. And this matter over which Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree — regarding a change in the place of slaughter — is not a point of dispute according to Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar states: in the case of a burnt offering [consecrated] for a personal altar that one brought inside [the Temple courtyard] — for so we learned there in tractate Zevachim, in the final chapter (112b): what is the difference between a personal altar and the communal altar (that is, the Temple altar)? [An offering on] a personal altar does not require facing north, nor waving, nor bringing near [the altar], nor is it described as a pleasing aroma, and it is not disqualified by being taken outside, etc. [The case is where] one consecrated an animal to be offered as a burnt offering on a personal altar during the time such altars were permitted, but then reconsidered and brought it inside the Temple courtyard to offer it on the [Temple] altar instead.
Tosafot on Meilah 3a, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. One from another, one from another, etc. — Rav Yosef brought three sources (bavot), as he goes on to explain, namely the teaching 'and all of them do not render garments impure,' etc. This is a mishna in Zevaḥim, chapter 'Ḥatat HaOf' (66b), and it follows the clause before it, which lists all the disqualifications of pinching (melikah). Now it states that even though the pinching was performed with a disqualification, nevertheless the pinching is effective to remove the bird from the status of ritual impurity of a carcass of a kosher bird, and one is liable for misuse of them, 'except for a sin offering,' etc. This phrase 'except for a sin offering' refers only to the law of liability for misuse, because in the case of a burnt offering one is liable for misuse even when it was performed properly; here it means: except for a sin offering that was performed below [the red line] in the manner of a sin offering procedure and for the sake of a sin offering, since it was performed in accordance with its law, and therefore one is not liable for misuse of it, since it has a time of permissibility for the priests. And it continues: 'anything whose disqualification occurred in sanctity does not render impure,' etc., meaning anything that has a possibility of validity elsewhere, such as any deviation in pinching mentioned in the first clause — this shows that it calls anything disqualified 'in sanctity' with regard to not rendering garments impure at the throat. And there it teaches: a bird burnt offering performed below is disqualified and does not render garments impure at the throat. And in the chapter 'HaMizbe'aḥ Mekadesh' (Zevaḥim 84a) we learn, in the statement of Rabbi Shimon: anything whose disqualification occurred in sanctity, the sanctified area accepts it, and if it ascended [the altar] it does not descend — this shows that the deviation of a bird burnt offering performed below, meaning that it was pinched below, is what Rabbi Shimon refers to when he says if it ascended it does not descend; and this is like the deviation of performing the southern rite in an animal offering, since pinching a bird is equivalent to slaughtering an animal. But he does not bring a sin offering performed above [the line], since he said that a sin offering may be pinched anywhere on the altar and remains valid. And that which is taught in the chapter 'Ḥatat HaOf' (66a), that a sin offering performed above is disqualified, refers to a deviation in the sprinkling of blood; and from the deviation of the placement of the blood one cannot derive a disproof, since it is not at all similar to the deviation of the southern rite of slaughter. But one can properly disprove from the burnt offering performed below, as it is stated: just as the burning is at the top of the altar, so too the pinching must be at the top of the altar; therefore pinching below is disqualified, and this deviation of pinching is like the deviation of slaughter. Accordingly, it fits that it calls this 'one from another' — that is, the ruling that if it ascended it does not descend, which could not be proven except through the law of 'anything whose disqualification occurred in sanctity' from the chapter 'Ḥatat HaOf' (68b) — this gives you 'one from another.' And that law itself, 'anything whose disqualification occurred in sanctity' from the chapter 'Ḥatat HaOf,' cannot be proven except from the earlier teaching about a bird burnt offering performed below — and this gives you yet another 'one from another.' Some texts read: 'one from another, and one from two' — meaning: 'one from another' refers to the law of 'anything whose disqualification occurred in sanctity' from the chapter 'Ḥatat HaOf,' since it depends on the clause before it; and the teaching from 'HaMizbe'aḥ Mekadesh' is called 'one from two,' since it depends on the teaching in the chapter 'Ḥatat HaOf' (66b), which contains two clauses: 'anything whose disqualification occurred in sanctity,' and the first clause about a bird burnt offering performed below, as we explained above.
  2. And the matter about which Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree is obvious to Rabbi Elazar — meaning, from Rabbi Elazar's words it is clear that he holds definitively like either Rabba or Rav Yosef, as Rabbi Elazar says: a burnt offering [consecrated] for a personal altar, etc. — meaning a burnt offering that was consecrated to be sacrificed on a personal altar, such as after they came to Nov, Giv'on, and Gilgal, when personal altars were permitted, and anyone wishing to build an altar on the roof of his house could do so.
  3. That he brought it inside — Rashi explains in the last chapter of Zevaḥim (119b) that this means, for example, after slaughtering it. But this is difficult: how could Rabbi Elazar say that the partition is effective for every purpose, since the requirement of the northern side does not apply once it has already been slaughtered? Rather, it seems that the correct explanation is that he brought it inside while it was still alive, after it had been consecrated to be sacrificed on a personal altar, and he brought it into the public altar area — [in that case] the partition is effective for every purpose, meaning for all the matters stated in the chapter 'Parat Ḥatat' (112b), where it is taught: what is the difference between a personal altar and a public altar? Priestly service, sacred vessels, slaughtering in the north, etc. And then Rabbi Elazar raises the question: if it ascended, what is the law as to whether it descends, etc. This burnt offering [originally consecrated] for a personal altar, whose law would be to be slaughtered in the north since it was brought inside [to the public altar area] — if it was slaughtered in the south and ascended [the altar], what is the law as to whether it descends? Now the Gemara infers from this: since he raises the question specifically about this case, implying that the other case [about which Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree] is obvious to him — for if it were uncertain to him, he should have raised this very question first; rather, we see that it is obvious to him. And the Gemara explains it thus: the question arises equally according to both Rabba and Rav Yosef; it is a question of 'one from another' — meaning, he raises the doubt about a burnt offering for a personal altar based on [his certainty about] a burnt offering for a public altar, about which he is certain. [One might ask:] does not Rabba hold there that if it ascended it descends only because the partition, as originally intended, disqualifies it — meaning that since the offering was vowed to be sacrificed on the public altar, there the partition of the public altar functions as intended, and when the place was changed, by slaughtering it in the south, it became disqualified — but when the partition does not function as intended, such as a burnt offering for a personal altar that was slaughtered on the public altar in the south, where the partition is 'not as intended' (since he had not vowed to sacrifice it on the public altar), perhaps even Rav Yosef, who says if it ascended it does not descend, would agree that here one may raise the doubt, since there may be room to distinguish: there, where the partition functions as intended, it is effective — meaning that since he had consecrated it so fully, it is effective such that if it ascended it would not descend; but a partition that is 'not as intended,' as here with a burnt offering for a personal altar, is not effective, etc.
Rashi on Meilah 3b, in English Tab translation (15)
  1. Lemma: 'קלטוה מחיצות' — The partitions of the courtyard admit it for all matters, meaning it is as though it had been consecrated from the start to be sacrificed on the (main) altar, so it requires [slaughtering in] the north, and all the requirements applying to offerings sacrificed on the altar apply to it, and it becomes disqualified by leaving [the courtyard], by [slaughtering in] the south, and by other disqualifications that apply to offerings sacrificed on the altar.
  2. Lemma: 'שנפסלה' — [This refers to a case] where he slaughtered that burnt offering [consecrated] for a personal altar after he had brought it into the courtyard, in the south, and the priest brought it up onto the altar, whether inadvertently or intentionally. What is the halakha as to whether it should descend? Is it not that from the fact that he raises this dilemma specifically in the case where the offering was not originally consecrated for the (Temple) altar, one may conclude that in the other case — an offering consecrated for sacrifice within [the Temple] — he holds definitively either in accordance with Rabba or Rav Yosef?
  3. Lemma: 'לא לעולם לא פשיטא ליה אי כרבה אי כרב יוסף' — Rather, [the truth is that] it is not obvious to him whether the halakha follows Rabba or Rav Yosef, but he raises one dilemma dependent on the other — an offering [consecrated] for a personal altar [is raised as a dilemma] contingent on [the case of] an offering [consecrated] for sacrifice within [the Temple]. And this is what he is asking: Rabba did not say, regarding an offering consecrated for sacrifice within [the Temple] that had its mode of slaughter changed or that left [the courtyard], that if it ascended the altar it must descend, except because a properly established partition disqualified it — meaning that where originally, when it was consecrated with sanctity for sacrifice within [the Temple], it was consecrated to be sacrificed there itself, i.e., through a properly established partition — there, if there was a change in the manner of slaughter, it is therefore disqualified. But an offering [consecrated] for a personal altar, since it was originally consecrated not in the proper manner, to be sacrificed outside [the Temple], then when he later brought it inside and slaughtered it in the south, or it left [the courtyard], it is not disqualified, and if it ascended [the altar] it need not descend. For when we say that it becomes disqualified by [slaughtering in] the south or by leaving, that is when it had originally entered the partition of the courtyard properly established, i.e., in the standard manner.
  4. Lemma: 'או דילמא אפילו לרב יוסף דאמר' — Even according to Rav Yosef, who said that regarding an offering [consecrated] for sacrifice within [the Temple], if its mode of slaughter was changed, and if it ascended [the altar] it need not descend — the reason is that since he consecrated it to be sacrificed within the properly established partition of the courtyard, i.e., in the standard manner, the altar has 'absorbed' it, so that if it ascended it need not descend. But an offering [consecrated] for a personal altar, which was originally consecrated not in the proper manner, and he then brought it inside — i.e., into a partition not properly established — and it left [the courtyard] or was slaughtered in the south, if it ascended [the altar] it must descend, since the altar did not 'absorb' it, nor did it originally enter the properly established partition of the courtyard.
  5. Lemma: 'תיקו' — And from the fact that he raises the dilemma according to both opinions, one may learn that even regarding the change in the place of slaughter of an offering [consecrated] for sacrifice within [the Temple], it is not obvious to him whether the halakha follows Rabba or Rav Yosef.
  6. Lemma: 'אמר רבי גידל אמר רב: זריקת פיגול' — [This refers to a case] where he had the intent during the sprinkling to render the offering piggul, and he also rendered it piggul during the slaughter, and now it has become established as piggul, which carries the punishment of excision (karet). [Rav's statement is that] this does not remove [the meat] from the halakha of misuse (me'ilah) in the case of offerings of the most sacred order — meaning that a sprinkling performed with piggul intent is not significant enough to remove the meat of offerings of the most sacred order from the halakha of misuse, the way a valid sprinkling does. For we hold that once the blood has been properly sprinkled, the meat becomes permitted to the priests and misuse no longer applies to it; but here, since he rendered it piggul through the sprinkling, the meat does not leave the status of being subject to misuse, since it is not fit for the priests [to eat].
  7. Lemma: 'ואותה זריקה אינה מביאה לידי מעילה' — [meaning] the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity [are not subject to misuse] through [a sprinkling with piggul intent] the way they would be through a valid sprinkling, as we learn in the latter part of the mishna: regarding offerings of lesser sanctity, after their blood has been sprinkled, misuse applies to the sacrificial portions but not to the meat — [implying] that [an invalid sprinkling, such as one done with piggul intent,] is not considered a sprinkling at all for the purposes of misuse.
  8. Lemma: 'וקאמר להא שמעתא' — [Abaye] stated this teaching of Rav Giddel.
  9. Lemma: 'ולחמה חוץ לחומה לא קדש הלחם' — As it is written, 'with the sacrifice of the thanks offering... loaves' (Leviticus 7:12), and we require that [the loaves] be near [the offering, i.e., within the proper area] at the time [of slaughter].
  10. Lemma: 'ואפילו קרמו כולן חוץ מאחת מהן לא קדש הלחם' — For we require that at the time of slaughter all the loaves be fit.
  11. Lemma: 'שחטה חוץ לזמנה' — [This means] that he had intent during the slaughter to eat it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area. [One might have thought] that even though he sprinkled [the blood] with piggul intent, the loaves would become sanctified for this purpose, so that misuse would apply to them — implying that piggul intent does bring offerings of lesser sanctity into the status of misuse, which is difficult for Rav Giddel, who said it does not bring [such offerings] into the status of misuse.
  12. Lemma: 'כי אתא' — When Abaye came before Rabbi Abba, [Rabbi Abba] said to him: This [objection] of Rav Pappa does not contradict [the ruling of] Rav Giddel.
  13. Lemma: 'אמר ליה: בזריקה' — [Rabbi Abba] said to him: the reason the loaves became sanctified when he rendered [the offering] piggul during the slaughter [alone] is that he was silent during the sprinkling — that is, he did not have piggul intent during the sprinkling — so it was not a complete piggul through the slaughter alone, and therefore the loaves became sanctified and are subject to misuse. But what Rav Giddel said, that it does not bring [the offering] into the status of misuse, refers to a case where he actually rendered it piggul through the sprinkling itself, which constitutes a complete piggul.
  14. Lemma: 'אמר ליה רב אשי לרבא: והא אמר עולא' — In tractate Zevachim, in the chapter 'Beit Shammai' (43a): regarding a handful [of a meal offering] that was rendered piggul, where he had intent to render it piggul during the taking of the handful, and it was placed upon the altar — once the fire has taken hold of it, its piggul status is removed from it. [This means] that if it were removed from the altar immediately [before the fire took hold], it could be placed back; and the same applies to the limbs of a piggul offering that were placed on the altar: once the fire has taken hold of them, their piggul status is removed. The reason the text mentions 'the handful' specifically rather than only the limbs is that had it taught only about the limbs, one could not have derived the law of the handful from it, since one might have said: this applies only to a limb, which is a single connected entity, so that once the fire has taken hold of part of it, it is as though it has taken hold of all of it, removing its piggul status; but a handful, which is scattered [into separate particles], might not be governed by the same rule. Hence it specifically mentions the handful, to teach that even though it is scattered, its piggul status is removed once the fire takes hold of it — and all the more so for a limb rendered piggul, since being a single connected entity, once the fire has taken hold of part of it, it is as if it has been entirely consumed, and its piggul status is removed. In any case, it teaches 'a piggul handful' that was rendered piggul through the taking of the handful, and piggul through the taking of the handful is equivalent to piggul through the slaughter — so just as piggul can become established through the taking of the handful alone, so too it can become established through the slaughter alone. This shows that slaughter alone can create a complete piggul, and [the mishna] teaches that the loaves become sanctified, thus bringing them into the status of misuse — implying that piggul [intent during slaughter alone] does bring offerings into the status of misuse, which is a difficulty against Rav Giddel.
  15. Lemma: 'אמר ליה' — [Rabbi Abba replied]: This is not a difficulty, for what is meant by 'a piggul handful' is not that piggul [status] is established through the taking of the handful alone; rather, 'a piggul handful' means a prohibition that leads to piggul — that is, he began the process of piggul through the taking of the handful, which is the beginning of piggul, but it does not become complete piggul until he also has piggul intent during the burning [of the handful on the altar]. The same applies to slaughter: it is the beginning of the prohibition of piggul, but it is not complete piggul unless he also rendered it piggul through the sprinkling alone. And what Rav Giddel said — that it does not bring [the offering] into the status of misuse — refers to one who rendered it piggul through the sprinkling.
Tosafot on Meilah 3b, in English Tab translation (5)
  1. Rav Giddel said that Rav said: sprinkling with piggul intent does not remove [the offering] from the status of being subject to misuse in the case of offerings of the most sacred order — Explanation: if one slaughtered with piggul intent and then sprinkled the blood without any specific intent, the sprinkling does not remove it from the halakhot of misuse, because it is called something for which permission to the priests to partake has not yet occurred. Even though the sprinkling is effective to fix the status of piggul — as we derive (Zevachim 28b) that just as a valid sprinkling confers full offering-status, so does an invalid sprinkling fix the piggul status, since with regard to piggul we require that the permitting rites (such as sprinkling) must be offered in a valid manner — one might have thought that the Torah likewise treats the sprinkling as removing the offering from the halakhot of misuse, making it comparable to one who claims a portion belonging to the Most High [i.e. already permitted for human use]. Rav Giddel teaches that the two effects do not go together: the sprinkling fixes the piggul status, but it does not remove the offering from the halakhot of misuse.
  2. 'and its bread, which was outside the wall, the bread was not sanctified' — This is because the bread is sanctified only through the slaughtering of the offering, and since at the time of the slaughtering it was not inside the wall, the bread was not sanctified. And even if the loaves' surface had formed a crust in the oven except for one of them, the bread is still not sanctified, because the slaughtering of the thanks offering sanctifies the bread only once the surface of the loaves has formed a crust, since Scripture says 'bread' (Leviticus 7), implying that the crusting of the surface is what sanctifies the bread.
  3. 'Evidently, piggul brings [the offering] to the status of being subject to misuse' — At first glance this implies that the statement that if slaughtered beyond its designated time or outside its designated area the bread becomes sanctified means that the bread becomes subject to the halakhot of misuse. But this is difficult, since certainly there is no halakha of misuse regarding bread, as it is not called 'the sacred items of the Lord' — for even with a thanks offering, misuse applies only to the sacrificial portions burned on the altar. Rabbeinu explained that this refers to the four types of thanks-offering loaves that are given to the priest, but this too does not seem correct, since the Mishnah would not omit mentioning anywhere that misuse applies to them; moreover, misuse does not apply to the breast and thigh given to the priests either. Therefore it appears that the comparison 'the bread became sanctified' means it became liable to being rendered subject to the halakhot of misuse — fit to be disqualified in a way that would bring it to the status of misuse — and the Gemara's point is: just as here the bread becomes sanctified [in this sense], so too regarding sprinkling, it likewise brings the offering to the status of being subject to misuse.
  4. He said to him: through the sprinkling — That is to say, piggul status is not fixed until the time of sprinkling, as it says (Zevachim 28b) that just as a valid conferral of permission fixes the offering, so too an invalid one fixes piggul, since we require that the permitting rites be properly offered. Therefore, regarding bread, since once it has formed a crust it becomes sanctified, we say the bread 'became sanctified'; but regarding misuse, since at the time of slaughtering the piggul status has not yet been fixed (it is the sprinkling that brings it to the status of misuse, and that is when the piggul intent formed at the time of slaughtering becomes fixed), it is not the slaughtering intent itself that generates misuse.
  5. 'A handful [that was made] with piggul intent' — meaning that he had piggul intent at the time of taking the handful, and [afterward] offered it up, [whereupon] the piggul status departed from it, as will be explained shortly. 'Taking the handful' corresponds to 'slaughtering,' as is counted in Menachot (13b) regarding the sacrificial rites of a meal offering that parallel the four rites of an animal offering — and it is taught there 'a handful [made] with piggul intent,' implying that the piggul status is fixed even before the offering-up. This is difficult, since the Gemara could have brought many other Mishnahs from Menachot that refer to the taking of the handful or the slaughtering as piggul. It therefore seems that the Gemara's challenge is based on the wording 'the piggul status departed,' implying that the piggul status had been fixed from the time of the taking of the handful, since the term 'departed' is used. And if you ask: if one were to say that piggul is fixed from the time of the taking of the handful, don't we require 'like the offering-up of a valid one' (Zevachim 28b)? The answer is that only for liability to karet is it not fixed until after the sprinkling (or offering-up), but the name 'piggul' itself applies from the time of slaughtering, just as regarding bringing the offering to the status of misuse. If so, the question was indeed well posed, and the answer given is that it brings to the status of piggul — meaning that, in truth, piggul is not fixed until the time of sprinkling for purposes of bringing to the status of misuse; and when it says 'the piggul status departed,' this refers to the prohibition that would have brought it to the status of piggul at the time of offering-up. And this is also taught in that same context — that if other factors can bring to the status of piggul, surely this factor itself can — as a concluding remark giving the reason why the piggul status departed. In chapter 'Beit Shammai' in Zevachim (43a), the Gemara there asks what is meant by this, and answers: this is what it is saying — if it [the handful] is not received inside [the Temple to begin the valid process], how can it bring others to the status of piggul? In other words, the piggul status must certainly be fixed [already at the taking of the handful], for if it were piggul when he offers it up on the altar, it would be mere dust and not an offering at all, and then how could the remainder bring the remaining parts to the status of piggul, since we require 'like the offering-up of a valid one'? This implies that the piggul status takes effect from the time of the taking of the handful, and the same would be true for an animal offering, that it takes effect from the time of slaughtering. For if you say that it does not take effect until the time of sprinkling, and similarly for meal offerings not until the time of the burning of the handful, then how does Ulla prove that it is mere dust, if not for the fact that the piggul status has departed? Perhaps it has not actually departed, yet nevertheless it is not mere dust, since the piggul status does not take effect until the time of sprinkling (or, for a meal offering, at the time of the burning of the handful, which is what permits the remainder) — and so both the permission of the remainder and the piggul status would take effect simultaneously. The answer given is that this too is 'the prohibition that brings to the status of piggul' — meaning that, in truth, the piggul status does not take effect until the time of sprinkling, yet Ulla's proof still stands: since the prohibition that brings to piggul status begins from the time of the taking of the handful (which corresponds to slaughtering), were it not that the piggul status had departed, we would have had to consider it mere dust, and the permitting rites would not have been properly offered.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 3.