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Meilah 4 for kids: Two Cuts, Two Minds

מעילה ד׳

🔪 This daf asks when an offering becomes piggul, a disqualified sacrifice, through wrong thoughts. It also explores misuse (me'ilah) of holy things, and when an offering first had a 'time of permission' for the priests before something went wrong.

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Stories from Meilah 4

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Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 4 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 4a, in English Tab translation (15)
  1. But did Ulla not teach [concerning the handful] — This refers to the teaching about the handful (kometz) regarding piggul: it states, 'if it brings others to piggul,' meaning the remainder, through intent during the taking of the handful alone — then the handful itself, is it not all the more so [piggul]? And we say there in Tractate Zevachim: what does this mean? It means: if the handful is not considered as rendered piggul by this intent — [intent] during the taking alone — as full piggul, [the difficulty is] that since it was brought up to the altar, its piggul status would depart from it like other items that were piggul but properly burned, how could it bring the remainder into the status of misuse? Rather, certainly its piggul status does not depart from it, and it brings the remainder into misuse. This shows that intent during the taking of the handful alone is full piggul, and the same should apply to intent during slaughter alone; and it is taught that the bread becomes sanctified, which brings it to misuse — and this is difficult for Rav Giddel.
  2. Rav Giddel said — This too, where it teaches 'if it brings others into the status of piggul,' means that a prohibited act was brought about [but not full piggul] — for he did not mean that with the taking of the handful alone it is [full] piggul, but rather here too he had piggul intent during the taking AND also had piggul intent during the burning, as we said above.
  3. But did Ilfa not say — This is found in the chapter 'Kol HaZevachim' (Zevachim 29b).
  4. The dispute, etc. — Rabbi Yehuda says in the mishnah: if the intent of time preceded the intent of place, it is piggul and they are liable for karet for it; and if the intent of place preceded the intent of time, it is [merely] disqualified and they are not liable for karet, since the primary piggul for which one is liable for karet involves intent of eating outside its appointed time. The Rabbis say that in either case it is [merely] disqualified and there is no karet. And Ilfa said that the dispute, etc. means that Rabbi Yehuda holds that if the intent of time [came first, it is piggul], while the Rabbis hold that there is no karet because mixing the intents is considered as both outside its time and outside its place within a single offering, and therefore even with two rites it is merely disqualified and carries no karet, since it was not entirely intent of outside its time. Therefore he calls the two throat-organs [involved in slaughtering] 'two rites,' because he holds that the act of slaughtering persists from beginning to end, so that slaughtering one organ accomplishes half of the slaughtering.
  5. But in one rite — such as with a single organ, where he had intent in half of it for outside its appointed time and in half of it for outside its designated place.
  6. All agree this is a mixture of intents, and there is no karet — though it is disqualified. In any case, we find that according to Rabbi Yehuda, if the intent of time preceded [as the sole intent] during slaughtering alone, it is piggul. If so, even according to the Rabbis, if he had intent only for outside its appointed time alone during slaughtering, it would be piggul and liable for karet. This shows that intent during slaughtering alone creates piggul status, and it is taught that the bread becomes sanctified — meaning piggul brings offerings of lesser sanctity to the status of misuse — and this is difficult for Rav Giddel.
  7. Rav Giddel could say to you — Here too, he did not mean that intent during slaughtering alone creates piggul; rather, when he sprinkles the blood, the matter is revealed — whether he mixed the intents within one rite or within two rites. If he had intent during two rites, then when he sprinkles the blood with piggul intent, it becomes piggul according to Rabbi Yehuda or the Rabbis as each holds. But if it was within one rite, all agree it is not piggul. In any case, it is never established as piggul until the sprinkling. And there, this is why the bread becomes sanctified: the mishnah is silent about sprinkling, implying he had piggul intent only during slaughtering alone; but had he also had piggul intent during sprinkling, it would not bring offerings of lesser sanctity to the status of misuse, per Rav Giddel's view.
  8. If so — this should also be difficult for him: since he says piggul is not established until sprinkling, by his own reasoning, regarding a thanks offering too it should not be piggul until sprinkling. If so, what does 'the bread becomes sanctified' mean, if not to make it liable for misuse — even though it is now full piggul, since he had piggul intent during sprinkling? This shows that sprinkling with piggul intent brings offerings of lesser sanctity to the status of misuse.
  9. No, what does 'the bread becomes sanctified' mean — [It means] sanctified in the sense that it requires burning, so it is not treated as ordinary food, but not sanctified in the sense of being subject to misuse — consistent with Rav Giddel's view.
  10. Let us say this supports him — supports Rav Giddel.
  11. 'One is always liable for misuse regarding piggul' — is this not even when the blood was sprinkled with piggul intent? This would be consistent with Rav Giddel, who says that [piggul intent during sprinkling] does not remove the most holy offerings from the status of misuse.
  12. No — when it teaches 'one is always liable for misuse,' it is dealing with a case where the blood was not yet sprinkled, and it does not support him.
  13. If it is a case where he did not sprinkle with piggul intent — it is obvious that one is liable for misuse!
  14. Rather, it is actually dealing with a case where he did sprinkle — and even so it does not support him, for when it is taught that one is always liable for misuse even after sprinkling, this refers to a burnt offering, since it belongs entirely to the Most High with no permitted portion for the priests, and it is not dealing with a sin offering or guilt offering.
  15. Actually, it is dealing with a sin offering and guilt offering — for if it referred to a burnt offering, it would be obvious; what would be the point of stating it?
Tosafot on Meilah 4a, in English Tab translation (6)
  1. But doesn't Ilfa say: The dispute applies when there were two sacrificial rites, etc. — This is found at the end of the second chapter of Zevachim (29b), regarding the mishna which states: Rabbi Yehuda says that if the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time preceded the intent to eat it outside its designated place, it is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for it; but if the order was reversed, it is merely disqualified. The Rabbis say that in either case it is merely disqualified. And Ilfa said that this dispute applies only when the two intentions occurred during two different rites — for example, where one declared, while severing the first organ in slaughtering, an intent beyond its designated time, and then, while severing the second organ, an intent outside its designated place. Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree about whether an act that only partially validates the offering can impart piggul: Rabbi Yehuda holds that it can, and the Rabbis hold that it cannot. But if both intentions occurred within a single rite, everyone agrees this is a mixture of intentions and there is no piggul. This shows that piggul status takes effect already from the time of slaughtering — for if it did not take effect until the sprinkling, then even in the case of two separate rites it should also be considered a mixture of intentions, since the piggul status of the first organ would not take effect until the sprinkling, by which time the intent of place had already preceded. The Gemara answers that once he sprinkles, the matter becomes retroactively clear — meaning, we say that at the moment of sprinkling it is revealed retroactively that the piggul took effect already from the time of the first organ. Therefore the time-intent is considered to have preceded, whether in one rite or two rites — that is, in whichever way one explains the mishna, whether as Rabbi Yochanan explains it (one rite) or as Ilfa explains it (two rites).
  2. If so, also regarding the thanks offering — meaning, let us say likewise that once he sprinkles, it becomes retroactively clear that the piggul took effect from the time of slaughtering. If so, why doesn't sprinkling performed with piggul intent bring the offering into the halakhot of misuse, just as we say that the loaves become sanctified?
  3. Rather, what does it mean that the loaves 'become sanctified' — is it not to make them liable for misuse? — This does not refer to misuse applying to the loaves themselves, for I explained above that misuse does not apply to them. Rather, it means: do not say [that they are sanctified] in the way we answered above, that it depends on the sprinkling; rather, the loaves become sanctified only to the extent that they can be disqualified — by contact with one who immersed that day, by one lacking atonement, or by being left overnight — as a result of the slaughtering having been done with piggul intent. In any case, the sprinkling does not render an offering of lesser sanctity liable for misuse.
  4. Let us say this supports him: 'An offering that is piggul is always subject to the halakhot of misuse' — is this not so even though it was sprinkled? Meaning, this shows that once the offering has become piggul, the sprinkling does not remove it from the halakhot of misuse — and this is referring to offerings of the most sacred order, which would support Rav Giddel.
  5. 'If it was not yet sprinkled, what need is there to state this? It is obvious that one is liable for misuse' — And if you ask: perhaps this teaches us that we do not say the offering is considered as though it had been strangled [and thus no longer sacred], so that it would not be called 'the sacred items of the Lord' — one can answer that this is what the Gemara means by asking 'what need is there to state this': why does the baraita say 'always'? Let it simply teach 'piggul is subject to misuse' and nothing more.
  6. 'If it is referring to a burnt offering, what need is there to state this? It is obvious that one is liable for misuse' — since even if it had not become piggul, one would be liable for misuse of a burnt offering until it is taken out to the ash heap, as stated later (Meilah 9a); and it is also taught elsewhere, etc. Rather, if you say it refers to a sin offering, there is a need to state it — meaning, it is obvious that sprinkling does not remove it from liability for misuse even when the blood did not remain overnight; rather, the baraita must be referring to a sin offering whose blood did remain overnight, in which case the sprinkling is performed improperly, and therefore the sprinkling does not remove it from liability for misuse — whereas one might have thought the same would apply to sprinkling done after piggul. [The Gemara suggests:] the latter clause of the baraita certainly supports this, since it surely speaks of a sin offering, yet states that an improperly performed sprinkling does not remove the offering from liability for misuse. What of the first clause? That is, let us say that since the latter clause speaks of a sin offering, the first clause does too — which would make it support the case of sprinkling after piggul. [The Gemara questions:] is it certain that the latter clause supports this? Perhaps sprinkling after the blood remained overnight differs from sprinkling after piggul. It then asks what the difference is, and answers that overnight-leaving comes about through an act performed directly — meaning, not literally 'by hand,' but that it results from a deficiency in the performance of the service — and therefore the sprinkling does not avail to remove the offering from liability for misuse. And if you ask: what difference does it make if the latter clause does not support this — the first clause would still support it, since it must be referring to a sin offering after sprinkling, for if it were a burnt offering, what need would there be to state it? Rabbi Peretz says that one can indeed reject the proof from the first clause as well: it is referring to a sin offering and sprinkling, teaching that even though the slaughtering was performed validly and the offering did not become piggul until the time of receiving the blood, one is nevertheless liable for misuse — this comes to exclude the view of the one who holds, later (Meilah 5a), that we learned the rule only in the case of 'the permissibility created by slaughtering.'
Rashi on Meilah 4b, in English Tab translation (17)
  1. And furthermore — This is also inferred from the latter clause, which teaches about 'its blood' [being left overnight]; the same applies to piggul: even though the priest later sprinkled it, one is liable for misuse of consecrated property, since the sprinkling does not remove it from the category of misuse.
  2. Granted, if you say it is referring to a sin offering — this is why we infer that the same applies to piggul: that if one rendered it piggul, even though it was later sprinkled, one is liable for misuse.
  3. But if you say it is referring to a burnt offering — need it be said that one is liable for misuse of it? After all, it belongs entirely to God. Rather, this shows that it is referring to a sin offering, and the same applies to the first clause of the baraita.
  4. The latter clause certainly supports him — regarding 'its blood' etc., which explicitly speaks of a case after the sprinkling, and from this we infer that the same applies to piggul: that sprinkling does not remove the offering from the category of misuse.
  5. Shall we say that since the latter clause supports him, the first clause also supports him — meaning, shall we say that the first clause also speaks of a sin offering, teaching that one is always liable for misuse, implying even though the priest sprinkled it?
  6. And it asks: but is it even clear that the latter clause supports him? — Perhaps, in fact, it does not support him, for one could say that the disqualification of overnight blood is not comparable to the intent of piggul.
  7. And it answers: why are they not comparable, and what is the difference — meaning, what distinguishes the disqualification of overnight blood from the disqualification caused by piggul?
  8. He said to him: they certainly are not comparable — for one may say that leaving the blood overnight involves an active disqualification by the priest's own hands, since he should have sprinkled it and instead let it remain overnight; this counts as an act performed with his hands. Therefore he is penalized, so that the sprinkling does not remove the offering from the category of misuse — rather, one remains liable for misuse even after the sprinkling.
  9. But the intent of piggul involves no action performed with the hands — rather, it is merely a disqualification of thought. Regarding this, one may say that he is not penalized, and the sprinkling does remove the offering from the category of misuse — contrary to the opinion of Rav Giddel. And the first clause of the baraita is speaking of a burnt offering, as established above.
  10. Indeed, one is not liable for misuse — since the sprinkling of piggul does not remove the offering from the category of misuse, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Giddel.
  11. Why does the latter clause teach — that in the case of piggul with offerings of lesser sanctity one is not liable for misuse — meaning, even after the sprinkling, since such offerings are not consecrated to God?
  12. Let it distinguish within the first clause itself — and teach: before the sprinkling one is liable for misuse, after the sprinkling one is not liable — rather, since it did not make this distinction in the first clause but only in the latter one, shall we say that the first clause speaks of a case where the blood was sprinkled, meaning one is liable for misuse, and that the latter clause supports Rav Giddel?
  13. That certainly — refers to the latter clause, which teaches that with offerings of lesser sanctity one is not liable for misuse.
  14. Supports — Rav Giddel's opinion, for he too maintains that one is not liable for misuse in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity.
  15. Shall we say that since the latter clause supports him — as stated, it certainly supports him — let us also say that the first clause refers to a case where the blood was sprinkled?
  16. He said to him: the first clause certainly does not support him — for the first clause speaks of a case where the blood was not yet sprinkled, as explained. And as for your inference, 'but if it was sprinkled, what then — is one not liable? If so, why does the latter clause state this; let it distinguish in the first clause' — indeed, it could have made that distinction in the first clause. But the reason it instead taught in the latter clause that with offerings of lesser sanctity one is not liable for misuse is that this matter is clear-cut: both before and after the sprinkling, one is never liable for misusing the sacrificial portions of piggul offerings of lesser sanctity. This is preferred over the distinction in the first clause, which is not clear-cut, since there, before the sprinkling one is liable and after the sprinkling one is not, as inferred. Therefore he did not state it there, and in fact this does not support Rav Giddel.
  17. See what you are asking me — he asked him about the mishna's teaching, 'the time of fitness for slaughter': we learned that once the offering was properly slaughtered without disqualification, this constitutes its time of fitness, and even though it was later disqualified, it is removed from the category of misuse.
Tosafot on Meilah 4b, in English Tab translation (4)
  1. The piggul offering among the most sacred offerings, one is liable for misuse — This does not refer to a case where the priest sprinkled the blood, and it supports [Rav Giddel's view] that the sprinkling of piggul does not remove an offering of the most sacred order from liability for misuse.
  2. No, [it refers to a case] where the priest did not sprinkle — And if you ask: if so, why specifically piggul? Even without piggul [the same should apply, since it hasn't been sprinkled]. One can answer: specifically piggul [remains liable for misuse before sprinkling], but without piggul there is no liability, since there is already a 'permission of sprinkling' or a 'permission of slaughter,' and a permission of eating is not required to remove it from liability for misuse. But the latter clause teaches that regarding offerings of lesser sanctity there is no liability for misuse — and this supports Rav Giddel, since it must mean that sprinkling of piggul there does not cause liability, for this clause certainly refers to a case where the priest did sprinkle (otherwise, why mention piggul specifically?). Moreover, since the baraita does not distinguish between sprinkled and unsprinkled but rather distinguishes between offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity, this shows that the first clause too refers to a case where the priest sprinkled — supporting Rav Giddel's view that piggul does not remove liability for misuse even after sprinkling in the most sacred order. The Gemara states that this [latter clause] certainly supports him, referring to the fact that sprinkling of piggul removes liability for misuse in offerings of lesser sanctity, since that clause must refer to a case of sprinkling. The Gemara then asks whether the first clause (about the most sacred order) is likewise supported, and answers that the reason the baraita does not distinguish between sprinkled and unsprinkled within the most sacred order itself is that some most sacred offerings (such as a burnt offering) are always liable for misuse regardless, so it is simpler to state the clear-cut rule about lesser sanctity offerings instead. Thus, in the end, there is support for Rav Giddel only from the case of lesser sanctity offerings, not from the most sacred order. This is difficult, since the reasoning should be identical, as both depend on whether the sprinkling counts for piggul. My teacher, Rabbi Peretz, answers that there is indeed a difference: removing an offering of the most sacred order from liability for misuse requires that it be fit for human consumption. Since the Torah established that piggul, despite requiring an intent paralleling that of a valid offering, likewise applies to an invalid act of sprinkling — meaning the one performing it intends that people eat from it permissibly — the Torah treated the sprinkling of piggul as included in the category of 'acceptability for eating.' Therefore, logically, this should remove an offering of the most sacred order from liability for misuse. But for offerings of lesser sanctity, where the sprinkling would need to be considered as designating a distinct portion belonging to God, we have no such basis for considering it significant.
  3. My nephew, see what you are asking me — tomorrow — meaning: tomorrow, when we are engaged in studying this halakha, you should ask me so that we can clarify the matter; take care to examine it well so that we can discuss it properly tomorrow.
  4. We learned [that there is] a permission of slaughter — meaning that once the slaughter was performed properly, there is no liability for misuse; or alternatively, a permission of sprinkling — meaning we require that the offering be fit for sprinkling (e.g., the blood was received properly) before it is removed from liability for misuse. And if you ask: granted, if we say a permission of eating was taught, this explains why it is called 'a permission for the priests,' since that occurs only after sprinkling, when eating becomes permitted. But if we say a permission of sprinkling was taught, what permission for the priests exists before the sprinkling? One can answer that even before sprinkling it is called a permission for the priests, since once it is destined to be sprinkled, it is treated as if already sprinkled. And if you ask: if so, shouldn't the Gemara ask whether the halakha follows Rabbi Shimon or the Rabbis, who disagree (Menachot 102b) about whether something destined to be done is treated as already done? And if you say this is indeed left as a doubt, that cannot be, since then why would the Gemara cite proof later for 'a permission of sprinkling,' and simply say it follows Rabbi Shimon? Moreover, the Gemara later cites proof even from Rabbi Shimon himself, showing the question applies to him as well. One can answer that this question applies according to everyone, since Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree only about the impurity of foods, not about misuse. The question can be raised on either side: perhaps Rabbi Shimon's view that it is treated as already sprinkled applies only to impurity of foods, but sacred status does not lapse until actual sprinkling; or conversely, perhaps the Rabbis' view that it is not treated as already sprinkled applies only to impurity, since the verse 'which may be eaten' does not apply until after sprinkling, but here, since it is destined for immediate sprinkling, the sacred status to God lapses as if already sprinkled. And if you ask: just as it says 'a permission of sprinkling' was taught when the receiving of blood was done properly, so too it should say 'a permission of receiving' was taught when the slaughter was done properly, meaning it reached a state of permitted receiving. One can answer that this is not comparable: regarding sprinkling, the term 'permission of sprinkling' fits well, since once the blood is received properly, sprinkling becomes permitted, but if received improperly, sprinkling is forbidden. But even if the slaughter was done improperly, receiving the blood is not forbidden; therefore 'permission of receiving' is not an apt term — rather, 'permission of slaughter,' meaning the slaughter itself was done permissibly, is called 'a permission for the priests' since it is a permission for the priestly service. And if you ask: according to the opinion that 'a permission of slaughter' was taught, if one slaughtered in the north [as required] but received the blood in the south, why would there be liability for misuse, since the slaughter was done permissibly? One can answer that this refers to a case where the blood was received before the slaughter was completed, so the slaughter was not yet finished properly. But if so, in the case where one slaughtered during the day and sprinkled at night, what can be said, since the slaughter was completed properly by day? One can answer that there too, the case is where the slaughter was performed so close to sunset that sprinkling had to be done at night, so that the slaughter was not truly a permission for the priestly service.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 4.