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Meilah 5 for kids: The Period of Fitness

מעילה ה׳

🩸 This daf asks what exactly the Mishna's phrase 'a period of fitness' means for an offering: is it about proper slaughtering, proper sprinkling of the blood, or proper eating of the meat? The sages debate this using many examples, like blood collected by unfit priests and leftover blood.

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Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 5 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 5a, in English Tab translation (11)
  1. Or was it fitness of sprinkling that we learned — That even though he slaughtered properly, we also require that the collection of the blood be without disqualification. Once it was collected properly, it became fit for sprinkling, so even though its blood was not yet actually sprinkled, it is as though it were sprinkled permissibly, for anything that is ready to be sprinkled is considered as if it had already been sprinkled. Since it was collected in the vessel properly and is fit for sprinkling, the offering is no longer subject to misuse.
  2. Or was it fitness of eating that we learned — That even though it was slaughtered and collected properly, it never leaves the category of misuse until the blood is actually sprinkled, for the exemption applies only once there is a period in which the priests may eat it. And if some disqualification occurred, even so one is not liable for misuse once that period existed. And they answered: Bar Kappara said that Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree about this matter.
  3. Is it not referring to a case where the blood remained overnight — meaning the blood, which had been collected properly in the vessel, then remained overnight before being sprinkled, and the mishna teaches that one is not liable for misusing it, because anything ready to be sprinkled is considered as if sprinkled. This shows that it is fitness of sprinkling that we learned.
  4. No, rather the meat remained overnight — beyond its designated time.
  5. But the blood had been sprinkled — and therefore one is not liable for misusing it, because there was a period of fitness for the priests to eat it, in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan's view.
  6. Why do I need there to be two factors — In the case of those unfit collecting and sprinkling, it would suffice that it was collected by those unfit alone, since the offering is already disqualified by that act.
  7. Rather, is it not referring to a case where it was collected by those unfit — and even though it was sprinkled by those fit, one is liable for misusing it, since because the collection was improper there was no period of fitness for sprinkling. The reason is specifically that it was collected by those unfit and sprinkled by those fit; but if it had been collected by those fit, even if sprinkled by those unfit, one would not be liable for misusing it, since from the moment of proper collection it became fit for sprinkling. This shows that it is fitness of sprinkling that we learned.
  8. Rav Yosef objects — Actually, I will say to you that even if it was collected by those fit and sprinkled by those unfit, one would still be liable for misusing it, for it is fitness of eating that we learned. For if it occurs to you that one may distinguish in this way—that collection by those unfit with sprinkling by those fit incurs liability, but collection by those fit with sprinkling by those unfit does not—implying the mishna's wording is exact, this would conflict with what we learned in the mishna in tractate Zevaḥim: a disqualified sin offering whose blood splashed onto a garment does not require laundering, as derived from the verse regarding a valid sin offering, 'and when its blood is sprinkled upon a garment, it shall be washed' (Leviticus 6:20).
  9. 'Remained overnight' — [refers to] the blood or the meat that remained overnight, which counts as a period of fitness, whether according to the one [Ḥizkiyya] who holds it is fitness of slaughter, or according to the one [Rabbi Yoḥanan] who holds it is fitness of eating.
  10. [Implying that] only when collected by those unfit and sprinkled by those unfit does its blood not require laundering — but if collected by those fit and sprinkled by those unfit, or the reverse, its blood does require laundering. And the mishna's wording 'collected by those unfit' is precise — meaning unfit for both acts, not fit.
  11. Here it is read as 'from its blood that is to be sprinkled,' not that it has already been sprinkled — meaning, from blood that is ready to be sprinkled, whose mitzvah has not yet been performed: this is the case where, if it splashed onto a garment before or during sprinkling, it requires laundering, but not after it has already been sprinkled, since once sprinkled—whether sprinkled validly or invalidly—it no longer requires laundering. Rather, certainly, the mishna's statement that a sin offering was collected by those unfit and sprinkled by those unfit is not exact, for even if it were collected by those fit and sprinkled by those fit, its blood would not require laundering after sprinkling, even though it is a valid sin offering, since it has already been sprinkled; but before sprinkling it requires laundering, just like the law of a valid sin offering, which requires laundering [if splashed] at any point between collection and sprinkling.
Tosafot on Meilah 5a, in English Tab translation (6)
  1. Chizkiya says: It was fitness of slaughtering that we learned; Rabbi Yochanan says: It was fitness of consuming that we learned. The mishna is not precisely in accordance with the opinion of Chizkiya nor with the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan — meaning: there is a difficulty for Rabbi Yochanan's view from the mishna, but regarding Chizkiya's view, the mishna is not precise either.
  2. Isn't it referring to where the blood remained overnight, yet it teaches that one is not liable for misuse — learn from this that it was fitness of sprinkling that we learned — because if it were fitness of consuming, one would be liable for misuse even regarding the meat until after the sprinkling, since only then is it fit for consumption. This poses a difficulty for Rabbi Yochanan. As for Chizkiya, the mishna is not precise, since it mentions only that the blood remained overnight, and does not mention a greater novelty, such as a case where the blood was collected improperly — for even though there was only valid slaughtering, one would still not be liable for misuse, since it was fitness of slaughtering that we learned. This inference is not considered significant by the Gemara, which was concerned only with the difficulty it raises for Rabbi Yochanan.
  3. The meat did not remain overnight — yet one is not liable for misuse, since there is fitness of consumption. If you ask: what made the Gemara assume this difficulty, when it is obvious one could simply answer that the case involves the meat remaining overnight? One can answer: it stands to reason that the mishna deals with the blood remaining overnight, similar to the latter clause, which discusses a case of no period of fitness for the priests, understood as disqualified people having collected and sprinkled the blood — showing that case deals with disqualified blood. Thus the first clause should be understood similarly to the latter. So it appears to my teacher, Rabbi Peretz, may he live.
  4. That disqualified people collected and sprinkled its blood — the text should read: What are the circumstances? If it means that either they collected it improperly or sprinkled it improperly [disqualifies], why do I need both to occur? Rather, is it not that 'collected by disqualified people' is the precise requirement, and from this we learn that it was fitness of sprinkling that we learned? This is what the passage comes to teach. The explanation: if the mishna meant that either improper collection or improper sprinkling (after valid collection) makes one liable, since there is no fitness of consumption, why would it need both together? That is, why mention disqualified collection at all—let it teach only disqualified sprinkling, implying that even with valid collection one would still be liable, because fitness of consumption is what we learned. It is unsatisfactory to say the mishna is merely stacking cases as one unit. Rather, 'collected by disqualified people' is precise—meaning if collected validly, since there is fitness of sprinkling, one is not liable, showing that fitness of sprinkling is what we learned. If you ask: why then mention 'sprinkled by them' at all, since collection alone is the precise requirement? One can answer: the Tanna taught 'sprinkled by them' to teach that collection is indeed the precise requirement—meaning even if sprinkled validly, if collection was by disqualified people, one is liable, since there was no fitness of sprinkling; but if collected validly, even if sprinkled improperly, one is not liable, despite lacking fitness of consumption, since there is fitness of sprinkling. Still this is difficult: had the mishna taught only 'collected by disqualified people,' one would understand well enough that fitness of sprinkling is what we learned—just as one would ask why mention disqualified collection at all if fitness of consumption were what we learned. My teacher, Rabbi Peretz, may he live, explains that it was indeed necessary to teach 'sprinkled by disqualified people' as well, for had the mishna taught only 'collected by disqualified people,' one might think the same applies even if collected validly but sprinkled improperly—that one would be liable because fitness of consumption is what we learned. The mishna mentions 'collected by disqualified people' first because it refers to the first stage of service, teaching that from collection onward is the responsibility of the priesthood. The fact that it also mentions 'sprinkled by disqualified people' shows that fitness of sprinkling must be what we learned—for if fitness of consumption were meant, why mention disqualified collection at all? Rather, certainly fitness of sprinkling is what we learned, and the Tanna added 'sprinkled it' to indicate that only when both collection and sprinkling were by disqualified people is one liable; but if collected validly, one is not liable—thereby excluding both the view that fitness of consumption is what we learned, and the view that fitness of slaughtering is what we learned, since even with disqualified collection there is still fitness of slaughtering, yet one is liable.
  5. Rav Yosef objects: If it enters your mind that there is a way to distinguish in this manner — meaning, to distinguish as above, saying that 'collected by them' is the precise requirement, based on the difficulty of why the mishna needs to teach both cases.
  6. A disqualified sin-offering, its blood does not [require laundering] — as it is written: 'And when any of its blood is sprinkled upon a garment, that garment shall be washed' (Leviticus 6:20), and we expound this as referring to blood that is fit to be sprinkled, excluding a disqualified sin-offering. Only when it was collected by disqualified people and sprinkled by disqualified people does its blood not require laundering; but if collected validly and sprinkled validly, its blood does require laundering. Regarding misuse, one might likewise infer that if collected validly but sprinkled by disqualified people, one is not liable for misuse. And since you have concluded that both conditions are precise requirements there, one should make the same precise inference here, asking: why does the verse say 'that its blood is sprinkled' (implying it was already sprinkled) rather than 'that was fit to be sprinkled'? Rather, this is not precise — meaning: one should not draw a precise inference from this, for the mishna's mention of 'sprinkled by disqualified people' is not exact, but is mentioned merely incidentally to 'collected by them.' Likewise, regarding misuse, both conditions mentioned are not exact requirements, and it remains true that fitness of consumption is what we learned; the mishna's mention of 'collected by them' is incidental to 'sprinkled by them.'
Rashi on Meilah 5b, in English Tab translation (14)
  1. So too — Regarding misuse of consecrated property, when the mishna teaches that the unfit collected the blood, this is not exact, such that one cannot say: this teaches that if the fit collected it but the unfit sprinkled it, there is no liability for misuse. Rather, even if the fit collected it and the unfit sprinkled it, there is liability for misuse, for we learned that fitness for consumption is required with regard to sprinkling, and that is lacking here. And if you ask: since it is not exact, why does it teach it this way? Answer: Because it taught the case of unfit ones with regard to an offering slaughtered beyond its designated time or place, it also taught the case of the unfit collecting and sprinkling, but in truth it is not exact, and one cannot infer from it, as you inferred initially, that if the fit collected it, even though the unfit sprinkled it, there is no liability for misuse.
  2. Rav Asi said: If so — that it is not exact, why would I need it taught in two places as inexact?
  3. Rather, it is indeed precise regarding misuse — and we infer from it that fitness of sprinkling is what we learned. Here, where it teaches 'unfit' regarding an invalid sin offering, this is not exact; rather, it is as we said, that the same applies even if the fit collected and sprinkled. But it teaches 'those unfit collected and sprinkled' specifically to teach us that an unfit person renders it leftovers — that if the blood was received in two cups, even though an unfit person collected and sprinkled first, and afterward a fit person collected and sprinkled, the fit person's act of collecting and sprinkling counts as nothing; rather, the unfit one's act renders all the remaining blood after his sprinkling into leftovers (just as with blood that is validly sprinkled, in that if some of it splashes on a garment either before or after the invalid sprinkling, it does not require laundering) — or alternatively, that blood's law is to be poured onto the base like the law of leftovers; for if we were to say that it does not create leftovers, it would require pouring onto the base.
  4. The text should read: this teaches us — meaning: this teaches us the law regarding an invalid sin offering, etc. And that which we learned in tractate Zevachim (32a): 'and all of these, if they collected its blood beyond its designated time or place, if there is still life-blood in the neck, the fit priest should go back and collect it' — implying that it does not create leftovers — this is referring to a case where the unfit person had intent for invalidity while collecting it beyond its designated time or place, for intent for invalidity does not create leftovers so as to render it invalid. But if he had intent for validity while collecting it beyond its designated time, even though there is still life-blood in the neck, the fit priest should not go back and collect it, for intent for validity disqualifies the leftovers.
  5. And how can you say that this teaches us that an unfit person creates leftovers? But didn't Reish Lakish ask Rabbi Yochanan in the chapter 'Kol HaPesulin' (Zevachim 34b): an unfit person [who sprinkled], etc., and he said to him: 'You have nothing,' etc., 'except beyond its designated time or place' — meaning that if he sprinkled some of the blood with intent to eat it beyond its designated time or place, and sprinkled the rest without intent for piggul, this counts as nothing; rather, all the remaining blood becomes leftovers and invalid.
  6. And why is it different with 'beyond its designated time or place,' that it creates leftovers to render it invalid? Since it effects acceptance for rendering it piggul — meaning the sprinkling of the blood is so significant that it effects acceptance regarding piggul, that it establishes piggul, for piggul is never established with the punishment of excision until the time of sprinkling.
  7. But doesn't it mean — these cases alone create leftovers, to the exclusion of an unfit person who collected but did not intend to render it piggul, who does not create leftovers?
  8. No, even an unfit person — but doesn't it teach 'You have nothing,' implying these alone and not an unfit person?
  9. This is what he meant: 'You have nothing that does not effect acceptance for the community' — such as piggul, notar [leftover meat], and that which goes out [beyond its boundary] — which creates leftovers to render it invalid, except for beyond its designated time or place; for even though 'beyond its designated place' does not effect acceptance for the community, it creates leftovers since it effects acceptance for its piggul status.
  10. But an impure priest — that is, an unfit person who also effects acceptance for the community, since impurity is permitted when the majority of the community is impure — he too creates leftovers.
  11. Unfit ones — other unfit persons, such as those with blemishes, do not create leftovers. And that which was said, 'this teaches us that an unfit person creates leftovers,' refers to an impure priest; and that which we infer, 'to exclude an unfit person who does not create leftovers,' refers to other unfit persons.
  12. The piggul — one who had intent for it during slaughter: one is always liable for misuse regarding it, and this is discussing offerings of the most sacred order, and therefore there is liability, for even though the blood was collected properly, we do not say 'anything that is destined to be sprinkled is considered as though already sprinkled' (Menachot 102b), because the collection associated with piggul is not considered a valid collection and is not equivalent to sprinkling so as to remove it from liability for misuse. And the reason that the collection of blood that is invalid due to piggul does not remove it from liability for misuse implies that the collection of valid blood, which is not piggul, does remove it from liability, for we say it is considered as though already sprinkled — proving that we learned fitness of sprinkling.
  13. It is not referring to where he sprinkled — rather, the reason it is piggul is that his sprinkling counts as nothing, to exclude it from liability for misuse; but a valid sprinkling does remove it from liability for misuse — proving that we learned fitness for consumption, in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan.
  14. And what does 'indeed' mean? — This is asked affirmatively. And here too, one could have asked this even when establishing it as referring to where he had not yet sprinkled, but he waited until he finished his statement and then asked about it. And the answer is: it comes only to teach us that the halakha follows Rav Gidel, who said that the sprinkling of piggul does not remove it from liability for misuse.
Tosafot on Meilah 5b, in English Tab translation (5)
  1. Rav Asi said: Why do I need to teach it in two places — i.e., here in [tractate] Meila and there in the chapter 'Dam Chatat' (Zevachim 92a). Rav Asi is uncomfortable saying that in two places the tanna would teach the same redundant point without reason. Rather, it must be that the mishna in Meila is precise. Nevertheless, you still cannot prove from it that 'period of fitness' refers to fitness of sprinkling, since perhaps it really means fitness of eating, and the essence of the mishna deals with a case where unfit priests both collected and sprinkled the blood. And if you ask, why do I need both conditions — why must unfit priests both collect and sprinkle? — this teaches us that an unfit [sprinkling] creates leftover status (shirayim). That is, specifically because unfit priests both collected and sprinkled is there neither fitness of eating nor fitness of sprinkling, since even if a fit priest were to come afterward and collect from the blood remaining on the neck and sprinkle it, it would accomplish nothing, since an unfit priest already sprinkled. But had it not been that unfit priests sprinkled, but rather the blood was simply spilled, you would have said, as in Zevachim (32a), that if there is life-blood remaining, a fit priest should go back and collect it. And that mishna about the blood of a sin offering mentions both collecting and sprinkling by unfit priests on account of this one here [in Meila] — since there are not two mishnayot redundantly repeating the same thing for no reason, there is no need for concern. Alternatively, one can say that the mishna there [in Zevachim] teaches, just as here, that an unfit action creates leftover status; and even though we already derive this from here, there is no difficulty if another mishna teaches something not strictly necessary. Originally this was difficult because it would mean two mishnayot repeating each other for no reason, but now this is resolved, since in the end nothing is proven from the original question, and therefore the Gemara goes on to bring other proofs, as follows.
  2. 'What is the law as to whether an unfit [priest's sprinkling] creates leftover status' — meaning: once he has sprinkled, what is the law regarding the rest of the blood that remains on the neck of the animal — does it become leftover blood?
  3. This is the correct text: 'Is it not referring even to an unfit priest?' — meaning, is an unfit priest also included in the statement 'you have nothing that creates leftover status [except piggul]'? The Gemara answers: No, with the exception of the particular unfit priest about whom we hold [that he does create leftover status], namely an impure priest, as will be explained below. Some have the reverse reading: 'Is it not excluding an unfit priest?' — which amounts to the same meaning. The word 'except' in the baraita refers to 'beyond its designated time' and 'beyond its designated area.' The Gemara answers: No, even an unfit priest [creates leftover status] — meaning an unfit priest here is equivalent to a sprinkling done beyond its time or place. And the phrase 'you have nothing' seems to state clearly that only beyond-its-time and beyond-its-place create leftover status; rather, this is the intended meaning: you have no case of an invalid sprinkling that fails to effect acceptance for the community yet still creates leftover status, except for beyond-its-time and beyond-its-place. That is, any invalid sprinkling that does not effect acceptance for communal offerings does not create leftover status, except for the cases of beyond-its-time and beyond-its-place. An impure priest, however, who does have effect for communal offerings [when the majority of the community is impure], does create leftover status, since his sprinkling carries some significance, as it has validity for the community. Other unfit priests, who have no validity for communal offerings, do not create leftover status, since their sprinkling has no significance and is as if nothing were sprinkled at all. Therefore, the 'unfit priest' said to create leftover status refers specifically to an impure priest.
  4. 'Come and hear: Piggul — one is always liable for misuse of consecrated property' — does this not mean a case where he has not yet sprinkled? And indeed [the baraita] teaches this whether the intent of piggul was formed during the slaughtering or during the collection of the blood — and even if the piggul intent was formed during collection, which would be a case of 'fitness of slaughter' [already attained], it still teaches that one is liable for misuse. The reason is because it is piggul; but if there were no piggul, even though he did not yet sprinkle, one would not be liable for misuse. This shows that 'fitness of sprinkling' is what was taught in the mishna — not that he actually sprinkled. And that is why the baraita specifies piggul: for if not for the piggul intent, one would not be liable for misuse, since 'fitness of eating' [of the offering] removes liability for misuse.
  5. 'And what does the word "always" [come to add]? It teaches us [the law] like Rav Gidel' — this is difficult: what is the force of the question 'what does "always" come to teach'? On the contrary, it would make more sense [to interpret the baraita] as referring to a case where he did sprinkle; and on the contrary, according to the assumption that it refers to a case where he did not sprinkle, the question would be even stronger, since Rav Gidel's view would then find no support — for above, the Gemara brought support for Rav Gidel's position specifically from the word 'always,' implying that the case involves a sprinkling that already took place, since if he had not sprinkled, what would be the point of saying 'always'? The Rav of Coucy explains it this way: even if you maintain that 'fitness of sprinkling' is what the mishna taught, Rav Gidel's ruling can still stand, and this is the meaning: 'Is it not referring to a case where he did not sprinkle?' — the word 'always' implies that the statement applies both before and after sprinkling, and so it teaches two things. When he did sprinkle, one is liable for misuse, which shows — according to Rav Gidel — that the sprinkling [with piggul intent] does not remove the offering from the laws of misuse. And when he did not sprinkle, it teaches that 'fitness of sprinkling' is what was meant by the mishna — meaning specifically that if piggul intent was present, one is liable for misuse, but if there was no piggul intent, one would not be liable, which could not be explained by saying 'he sprinkled.' So what would 'always' mean in that case? Since it would then refer to actual sprinkling, there would be nothing novel in the inference, since it is obvious that fitness for eating removes the offering from the laws of misuse. And the Gemara answers: this comes to teach us the law like Rav Gidel — namely, that a piggul sprinkling does not remove the offering from the laws of misuse.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 5.