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Meilah 6 for kids: Before or After Sprinkling

מעילה ו׳

🩸 This daf asks what removes an offering from the laws of misuse (me'ilah) - is it the sprinkling of the blood, or the fact that the meat becomes fit to eat? The Mishna then brings a new case: meat that left the Temple courtyard before its blood was sprinkled, and whether sprinkling can still help it.

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Stories from Meilah 6

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 6 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 6a, in English Tab translation (13)
  1. Keitzad lan — How was it left overnight: for example, the blood was received [in the vessel] that day but not sprinkled until the next day. If one ate the meat before the sprinkling, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property; if he ate it after the sprinkling, he is not liable, since Rabbi Shimon holds that the sprinkling of leftover blood removes the offering from the laws of misuse just like a valid sprinkling. In any case, it teaches that before the sprinkling he is liable for misuse — does this not mean there was time in the day to sprinkle it, so that he could have sprinkled it if he wished? Yet even though it was already collected in the vessel, the offering does not leave the category of misuse until after the actual sprinkling. This shows that it is the fitness for eating that we learned [as the criterion in the mishna].
  2. Lo dekablei samukh l'shki'at hachamah — No, rather the case is that he collected the blood close to sunset, and therefore it was left overnight because there was no time left to sprinkle it, and he ate the meat at night before the sprinkling. That is why he is liable for misuse: since the blood was not yet fit to be sprinkled, we cannot say that something destined to be sprinkled is treated as already sprinkled.
  3. Aval i hava she'hut — But if there had been time [in the day to sprinkle it], since it was fit to be sprinkled, we would say it is considered as already sprinkled, and there would be no liability for misuse, for it is the fitness of sprinkling that we learned [as the criterion].
  4. Ee hachi — If so, instead of teaching 'before the sprinkling,' let it rather teach: if he collected it before sunset, so there was time to sprinkle it, and it was left overnight — there is no liability for misuse, since being fit for sprinkling makes it considered as sprinkled, for it is the fitness of sprinkling that we learned. If he collected it after sunset, so it was slaughtered at night and left overnight and he ate the meat, he is liable for misuse, since the blood was not fit for valid sprinkling and is not considered as sprinkled.
  5. Hachi nami katani kodem she'yira'eh lezerika — Indeed, this is just what it teaches: 'before the sprinkling' means before the blood became fit for sprinkling — that is, it was collected after sunset when it was not yet fit for sprinkling; if one ate the meat, he is liable for misuse. 'After the sprinkling' means after it became fit for sprinkling — that is, it was collected before sunset, so there was time in the day to sprinkle it; there is no liability for misuse, since being fit to be sprinkled makes it considered as sprinkled, confirming that it is the fitness of sprinkling that we learned.
  6. Come and hear, Rabbi Shimon says, etc. — The entire passage can be resolved in the same way as the discussion above concerning notar (blood left overnight).
  7. After the sprinkling there is no liability for misuse — because Rabbi Shimon holds that the sprinkling of piggul-intent removes the offering from the laws of misuse for offerings of the most sacred order, just like a valid sprinkling, and this disagrees with Rav Gidel. Here, however, one cannot deduce Rabbi Shimon's reasoning the way it was deduced above regarding notar — that liability applies only when it is piggul, implying that if it were not piggul there would be no liability — since Rabbi Shimon holds that the sprinkling of piggul-intent removes the offering from misuse just like a valid sprinkling.
  8. Mai lav dezarak — Is this not referring to a case where he actually sprinkled the blood? And the reason [for liability] is specifically because of the piggul-intent that the sprinkling does not remove it from misuse — but in a valid case, once he sprinkled, there is no liability for misuse. This would show that it is the fitness for eating that we learned [as the criterion], since we require that he actually sprinkled.
  9. Lo delo zarak — No, rather the case is that he did not sprinkle, but only collected the blood in the vessel; and it is specifically regarding piggul that we do not say it is considered as sprinkled, but in a valid case we do say it is considered as sprinkled, for it is the fitness of sprinkling that we learned.
  10. Aval zarak mai, hachi nami — But if he did sprinkle, what would the law be? Indeed, it would be the same [no liability]. If so, why does the baraita specifically teach this distinction concerning offerings of lesser sanctity? Let it instead teach it concerning offerings of the most sacred order: before the sprinkling there is liability for misuse, after the sprinkling there is none.
  11. Vadai hachi nami — Indeed, it could have taught it that way, and the latter clause would not have been necessary.
  12. Ela ha ka mashma lan dekol le'aituyei lidei me'ilah — Rather, this teaches us: anything that brings an offering to liability for misuse — such as the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity — is brought to liability by a proper sprinkling that has no piggul in it, but not by a sprinkling done with piggul-intent.
  13. Kol le'afukei midei me'ilah — Anything that removes an offering from liability for misuse — such as the meat of offerings of the most sacred order that was sprinkled improperly, as with piggul-intent — removes it from liability for misuse. This is against Rav Gidel's view, and this is what is stated in tractate Menachot, that Rav Gidel was refuted, since both the anonymous mishna and Rabbi Shimon hold that a sprinkling done with piggul-intent removes an offering of the most sacred order from liability for misuse.
Tosafot on Meilah 6a, in English Tab translation (5)
  1. How so? If the blood was left overnight — this teaches that before the sprinkling one is liable for misuse, and this is not limited to a case where there was time left to sprinkle it, such that had he wished he could have sprinkled it. But is this not referring to actually before the sprinkling, where he had not yet sprinkled, and yet one is liable for misuse even though the possibility of becoming permitted through sprinkling existed? In any case, the reason for liability must be that fitness for eating is the criterion. The Gemara answers: No, rather this is a case where there was no time, because he collected the blood close to sunset, so that the collection was not performed in a state of fitness.
  2. Why does it specifically teach 'before sprinkling'? — meaning, why distinguish only between before and after sprinkling? Let it rather draw a finer distinction within 'before sprinkling' itself, between before the blood became fit for sprinkling and after it became fit for sprinkling, and teach: before sunset one is not liable for misuse, since the blood was fit for sprinkling, and after sunset one is liable for misuse, since the blood was not fit for sprinkling. The Gemara answers: indeed this is what it teaches — 'before it became fit for sprinkling,' etc. That is, 'before sprinkling' is not meant literally, but rather means 'before it became fit for sprinkling.'
  3. Come and hear: Rabbi Shimon says there is a case of piggul [where one is liable for misuse] and a case of piggul [where one is not], etc. — meaning, the topic of piggul parallels that of notar (blood left overnight). However, there is a difficulty: how can this be explained as a case where there was time to sprinkle the blood? One cannot say this refers to piggul intent formed during the collection of the blood, since that case has already been established as collection performed validly; nor can one say it refers to intent formed during the conveying of the blood, since Rabbi Shimon is the one who validates piggul intent formed during the conveying, in the first chapter of Zevachim (13a), because that is a service that could have been omitted, such as one who slaughters beside the altar and then sprinkles. Therefore it seems that the case is where he formed piggul intent at the end of the collection, when there had been time to sprinkle from the start of the collection, and the baraita teaches that the offering is subject to misuse — proving that the criterion is fitness for eating. But then the latter clause, that it is not subject to misuse, must refer to a case of actual sprinkling. This raises a difficulty: this would contradict Rav Gidel, who holds that the sprinkling of piggul does not remove the offering from liability for misuse. One can answer that Rav Gidel would explain this baraita as the Gemara concludes — that here 'before sprinkling' means before it became fit for sprinkling and 'after sprinkling' means after it became fit, and in fact sprinkling has not occurred, the criterion being fitness for sprinkling. But even so there is a difficulty: if this baraita is meant to support the view that the criterion is fitness for eating, then it would be inconsistent with Rav Gidel's position; but this cannot be, for according to the view that the criterion is fitness for eating, one cannot reconcile the baraita except according to Rav Gidel. For above, regarding the mishnah that states 'slaughtered with intent of eating outside its designated time or place,' it must refer to a case where sprinkling had already occurred — since it states 'liable for misuse,' which would make no sense to attribute specifically to piggul intent unless sprinkling had occurred; otherwise, even without piggul intent the offering would be subject to misuse, since the criterion is fitness for eating. In any case, when piggul intent was present, even though sprinkling occurred, the offering is not removed from liability for misuse — proving that even according to the view that the criterion is fitness for eating, Rav Gidel's position still holds. Yet here it seems that Rav Gidel's position does not hold unless we say that the criterion is fitness for sprinkling. The Sar of Coucy says this is not difficult at all: according to the view that the criterion is fitness for eating, one can say that everyone agrees that the criterion is fitness for eating; in the mishnah, Rabbi Yehoshua holds like Rav Gidel, as explained, that it necessarily refers to a case where sprinkling occurred, while Rabbi Shimon of the baraita does not hold like Rav Gidel. Alternatively, Rav Gidel would say that everyone agrees that the sprinkling of piggul does not remove the offering from liability for misuse, and the dispute is rather this: Rabbi Yehoshua holds the criterion is fitness for eating, and his case refers to where sprinkling occurred, as explained above, while Rabbi Shimon of the baraita refers to a case where sprinkling did not occur, holding that the criterion is fitness for sprinkling.
  4. Come and hear: 'Piggul among the most sacred offerings is subject to misuse,' etc. — this is not referring to a case where sprinkling occurred, and this shows that the criterion is fitness for eating, implying that specifically with piggul intent is one liable for misuse, but without piggul intent one is not liable — specifically because sprinkling occurred and there is fitness for eating; but if sprinkling did not occur, even without piggul intent one would be liable for misuse, since there is no fitness for eating. One might ask: how do we know this necessarily refers to a case where sprinkling occurred, in order to deduce that without piggul intent there is no liability? Perhaps the same would be true even without sprinkling. The answer is that the intended meaning is: 'this is not [a case] where sprinkling occurred' means there was time to sprinkle, yet sprinkling did not actually take place, and therefore the offering remains subject to misuse, since the criterion is fitness for eating — for if the criterion were fitness for sprinkling, then once it became fit, it would immediately be removed from liability for misuse. And when it mentions piggul, this refers to a case where piggul intent was formed at the end of the collection, as explained above. The Gemara then answers: No, sprinkling did not occur — meaning, it was not yet fit for sprinkling, since there was then no possibility of sprinkling. But this explanation is quite forced, since 'that sprinkling occurred' implies actual sprinkling. Rather, the Ritzva explains it this way: 'Is this not [a case] where sprinkling occurred,' etc. — meaning that the baraita presumably comes to teach, as Rav Gidel holds, that the sprinkling of piggul does not remove the offering from liability for misuse, and it necessarily refers to a case where sprinkling occurred; only when piggul intent was present does the offering remain subject to misuse, but without piggul intent one is not liable — proving that the criterion is fitness for eating. For if the criterion were fitness for sprinkling, the baraita should have stated 'always,' as above, to indicate that it refers to after sprinkling, in accordance with Rav Gidel. Rather, certainly the criterion is fitness for eating, and so it must refer to a case where sprinkling occurred — for if it did not refer to sprinkling, why would piggul be mentioned specifically? Even without piggul intent one would be liable, since fitness for eating is required. Rather, it certainly refers to sprinkling, which supports Rav Gidel's position. As for the Gemara's reply, 'No, sprinkling did not occur' — on the contrary, this means that Rav Gidel's position does not hold here, for the case does not refer to sprinkling (since that would remove the offering from liability for misuse); rather, it refers to a case where sprinkling did not occur, and the criterion is fitness for sprinkling.
  5. 'Kol' ['all'] serves to include, etc. — this comes to include a case that was not performed in the proper manner, in accordance with Rav Gidel's view that the word 'kol,' which excludes the offering from liability for misuse, also includes a case performed improperly as removing the offering from liability for misuse. I explained the correct reasoning for this earlier, in the discussion of Rav Gidel's teaching.
Rashi on Meilah 6b, in English Tab translation (19)
  1. Mishna: The meat of offerings of the most sacred order — [this discusses a case] that left [the courtyard] before the sprinkling of the blood, and afterward it reentered, and then the blood was sprinkled.
  2. Rabbi Eliezer says — Even though the blood was sprinkled, one is liable for misusing it, for Rabbi Eliezer holds that the sprinkling is not effective for [meat] that left [the courtyard] to remove it from the halakhot of misuse.
  3. And one is not liable for it due to piggul, notar, or [eating while] impure — Since it left [the courtyard], [the sprinkling] does not create liability for piggul, notar, or impurity; only valid sprinkling does so.
  4. Rabbi Akiva says — Even if they did not bring it back in, once the blood was sprinkled, one is not liable for misusing it, since the sprinkling is effective for [meat] that left [the courtyard].
  5. And they are liable for it, etc. — For the sprinkling of [blood for meat] that left [the courtyard] creates liability for piggul and notar just like valid sprinkling. Some texts read 'aval' [but] instead of 'they are liable,' and this 'aval' means 'indeed,' as in 'aval ashemim anachnu' (Genesis 42).
  6. Rabbi Akiva said — He wished to bring proof for the one who holds that the sprinkling is effective for [meat] that left [the courtyard].
  7. And both of them are standing [fit for sacrifice] — He slaughtered both of them and sprinkled the blood of one of them, and the other thereby became a sin offering whose counterpart was already atoned for, from the moment the blood of the one was sprinkled.
  8. Is it not so that just as its blood exempts... — That is to say, must you not agree that just as the one whose blood was sprinkled exempts its own meat from misuse, so too it exempts the meat of its counterpart, whose blood was not sprinkled, from misuse? For they are considered as one offering, since he could have sprinkled the blood of whichever one he wished.
  9. If it exempted the meat of its counterpart from misuse — Even though that counterpart is disqualified, since it is a sin offering whose counterpart was already atoned for, it stands to reason that the sprinkling of its own blood should exempt its own meat from misuse, even though it has the disqualification of having left [the courtyard] — since we find that it exempts the meat of its counterpart from misuse even though that one has a disqualification.
  10. The sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left [the courtyard] — and were brought back, and the blood was then sprinkled.
  11. Rabbi Eliezer says: one is not liable for misusing them — for they are like [the state] before the sprinkling, since sprinkling after [the portions] left does not bring the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity into the halakhot of misuse, just as [it does not with] valid sprinkling.
  12. Rabbi Akiva says: one is liable for misusing them — for sprinkling after [the portions] left does bring the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity into the halakhot of misuse.
  13. Gemara: These two [disputes] — the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva regarding the meat of offerings of the most sacred order and regarding the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity.
  14. Why do I need [both]? — Since the mishna taught one case, we would know the other, for since Rabbi Eliezer holds that the sprinkling is not effective for [meat] that left [the courtyard] to remove the meat of offerings of the most sacred order from misuse, it likewise is not effective to bring the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left [the courtyard] into the halakhot of misuse. And just as Rabbi Akiva holds that the sprinkling is effective for [meat] that left [the courtyard] to remove the meat of offerings of the most sacred order from misuse, so too it is effective to bring the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity into the halakhot of misuse. So why do I need them to disagree in both cases?
  15. And proper sprinkling — without disqualification, removes [the offering] from the halakhot of misuse.
  16. Improper — such as [sprinkling for meat] that left [the courtyard].
  17. But to bring the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity into [the halakhot of] misuse — which is a stringency, one might say he [Rabbi Eliezer] concedes to Rabbi Akiva [in this case]. [The mishna] therefore teaches us that they disagree in this case as well.
  18. It was stated: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When Rabbi Akiva says the sprinkling is effective for [meat] that left [the courtyard] — this refers to a case where part of the meat left and not all of it, for since the sprinkling is effective for the part that remained inside, it is also effective for that part which left.
  19. But if all of it left, Rabbi Akiva did not say [that the sprinkling is effective] — that it would be effective, etc., for then it is considered as though the meat were nonexistent.
Tosafot on Meilah 6b, in English Tab translation (6)
  1. The meat of the most sacred offerings that left [the courtyard] before the sprinkling of the blood; Rabbi Eliezer says one is liable for misuse — According to the one who holds the mishna speaks of permission through eating [this is straightforward]; but according to the one who holds it is permission through sprinkling, one must explain that the case is before the meat became fit for sprinkling, and according to the one who holds it is permission through slaughter, that it is before it became fit to receive the blood. Therefore one is liable for misuse, because Rabbi Eliezer holds that sprinkling does not work for meat that left, so as to remove it from the category of misuse. And they are not liable for piggul, notar, or impurity, because we require 'more for the permitted ones,' and here, since it left, it cannot become notar 'for the permitted.' Regarding notar we derive its disqualification from impurity, as stated in the chapter 'Beit Shammai' (Zevachim 44a); and regarding piggul too it is stated in Zevachim (28b): 'Just as the acceptance of a valid offering [governs piggul], so too the acceptance of an invalid one' — for we require that all its enabling rites be brought properly, and since it left, it is no longer called 'all its enabling rites.' Rabbi Akiva says one is liable, for he holds sprinkling is effective for meat that left. 'Rabbi Akiva said: in the case of one who set aside his sin offering, etc., and behold both are standing' — meaning he slaughtered both simultaneously, as the Gemara states, that he may choose to sprinkle from either one. 'Is it not so that just as its blood exempts its meat from misuse, etc.' means: do you not agree that just as the blood exempts its own meat from misuse, so too it should exempt the meat of its counterpart, even though that counterpart is unfit? And if so, 'it is also right that it should exempt its own' — meaning, all the more so should it exempt its own meat, even though that meat left. And specifically from the disqualification of 'that which left' do you learn that sprinkling helps, as explained; but other, more severe disqualifications — Rabbi Akiva agrees are not comparable to the case of 'one who set aside,' for there are many disqualifications in Zevachim where Rabbi Akiva agrees sprinkling does not help. Only regarding the disqualification of 'that which left' does he reason that sprinkling is effective.
  2. The sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left before the sprinkling of the blood; Rabbi Eliezer says one is not liable for misuse — Because the portion belonging to the Most High has not yet been clarified, since it was disqualified by leaving, for sprinkling does not work for that which left. And one is not liable for piggul or notar, as explained above — the same reasoning applies to all of them. Rabbi Akiva says one is liable for misuse of them, for he holds sprinkling is effective for that which left.
  3. Why do I need these two [cases]? — To teach us the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer both regarding the most sacred offerings and regarding the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity.
  4. [Sprinkling performed] not in its proper manner does not remove [an offering] from the category of misuse, but can it bring it into the category of misuse — for example, regarding the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, say that he [Rabbi Eliezer] would agree with Rabbi Akiva that one is liable for misuse, etc. This is difficult: here it seems that improper sprinkling is more apt to bring an offering into the category of misuse, whereas above it seems the opposite, saying that sprinkling done improperly does not bring an offering into misuse, yet nevertheless removes it from misuse. My teacher, Rabbi Peretz, said that above there is one reason, and here another: above, the sprinkling itself was performed with a flaw — such as when he had piggul intent during the slaughter or the receiving of the blood — therefore it does not bring the offering of lesser sanctity into the category of misuse, since such offerings are not then called 'sacred to the Lord'; but it does remove the most sacred offerings from the category of misuse, for we find that the Torah gave sprinkling significance to create liability for karet in eating [piggul], which requires the offering to be in principle fit for acceptance, and nevertheless the Torah says one who eats piggul is liable for karet. Therefore, regarding misuse, the offering is considered fit for human consumption and so loses the status of 'sacred to the Lord.' This is the reason and distinction my teacher explained above regarding the case of Rav Giddel. But here the case is that the sprinkling itself was performed validly, only it was sprinkled on something unfit — namely, meat that left the courtyard. Therefore, regarding removing it from the category of misuse, the sprinkling does not help, since the meat has not yet become permitted for consumption — we do not find that the Torah gave such significance to sprinkling in a case like this, where the sprinkling is valid but performed on something unfit. But regarding bringing it into the category of misuse, say that he would agree with Rabbi Akiva that one is liable, since the sprinkling itself was performed validly, only on something unfit; therefore such offerings are called 'sacred to the Lord' with regard to misuse, since Scripture states about it 'it does not go down [in sanctity].'
  5. When Rabbi Akiva says that sprinkling is effective for that which left — this is when only part of it left — Since the sprinkling is effective for the part that remained inside, it is also effective for the part that was outside. And even though he derives this from the case of 'one who set aside [a sin offering],' that case resembles this one of 'part of it left,' since it is similar to it.
  6. Rav Assi said to Rabbi Yochanan: My colleagues have already taught me that we take intent into account regarding [an offering] that was lost or burned — If half the animal was lost or burned, and he sprinkles the blood intending to eat an olive's-bulk of that lost or burned portion [beyond its designated time], his intent is effective to establish piggul status for the rest of the meat that is still present. But [the phrase] 'and that which was lost or burned, which are not [extant]' is the conclusion of the question: that since it is entirely not in existence, yet [the law states] that his intent is effective intent to cause piggul — if so, the same should apply regarding meat that entirely left the courtyard; why doesn't sprinkling work there too? Rather, Rabbi Akiva must be speaking even of a case where the meat entirely left. But did Rav Assi really say this? This is the difficulty that the Gemara raises against Rav Assi from Rav Assi himself, as is concluded [later]. And it is difficult: what was the answer Rav Assi gave to Rabbi Yochanan's statement, which compares other disqualifications to 'that which left,' since I explained in the mishnah that they should not be compared? Therefore it seems to me, following the version of texts that read 'Rav Assi said: My colleagues have already taught me, etc.' as his own independent statement, not as a reply to Rabbi Yochanan's words. And the statement 'but the lost and burned, which are not in existence' is the beginning of the questioner's words, who comes to ask, 'but did Rav Assi really say this?' — meaning, even though they are not in existence, nevertheless we take intent into account regarding them.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 6.