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Meilah 7 for kids: Blood That Left

מעילה ז׳

🩸 This daf asks when sprinkling the blood of an offering can still help, even if the meat already left the Temple courtyard or was lost. The sages argue about Rabbi Akiva's opinion using a tricky story about two sin offerings and one old man's hard question.

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Stories from Meilah 7

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Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 7 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 7a, in English Tab translation (18)
  1. Lemma — 'One has intention regarding the lost and the burned': meaning that if the sacrificial portions were burned, and at the time of sprinkling one had intention to burn them after their proper time, the offering becomes piggul, so that one who eats from the meat, or if the portions are later found, one who eats them is liable for karet.
  2. Lemma — 'But the lost and burned are not present in the world, and even so it is taught that one has such intention': this shows that intention at the time of sprinkling is effective for the lost and burned to render the meat piggul. Here too, even though the entire offering left the courtyard - which makes it as though it does not exist - the sprinkling should nevertheless be effective to remove it from the laws of misuse.
  3. Lemma — 'But did Rav Asi really say this?': that sprinkling is effective when the entire offering left the courtyard.
  4. Lemma — 'But did Rav Asi not raise before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one had intention regarding the remnant of blood to be poured out tomorrow, what is the halakha?': 'Nishpakhin' refers to the remaining blood poured onto the base of the altar. The question was whether, having intention at the time of pouring out the remnant, with intent to eat an olive's-bulk of the offering after its proper time, tomorrow, is such intention considered like the intention at the actual sprinkling, or not. Alternatively, the question was whether having intention at the time of the main sprinkling that the leftover blood be poured onto the base tomorrow is considered equivalent to having intention during the sprinkling itself - as though one intended to sprinkle part of it tomorrow, after its proper time - and thereby renders it piggul, or not.
  5. Lemma — 'And Rabbi Zeira said to him: You already taught us this regarding meat-residue (alal)': as we learned in a mishnah that the hide, the gravy, the congealed fat, and the meat-residue combine to constitute the measure for food impurity, but not for the impurity of a carcass, since, having no substance, it does not transmit the impurity of a carcass.
  6. Lemma — 'This blood-remnant too is destined for loss': since it is poured to the base and not onto the top of the altar, intention regarding it does not render the offering piggul. This case, too - where the entire offering left - stands to be burned and is considered as though it does not exist at all; it is logical that sprinkling does not help to remove it from the laws of misuse.
  7. Lemma — 'But does it not teach: one has intention regarding the lost and the burned?': meaning, this baraita seems to indicate that intention at the sprinkling is effective for the lost and burned to render piggul, even though they are no longer in the world; so too it should be logical that sprinkling is effective when the whole offering left, even though it is considered as not being in the world.
  8. Lemma — 'Rava said: Say instead - intention regarding that which stands to be lost and that which stands to be burned': since at the time of sprinkling, when he had the intention, they were still present, even though they were later lost or burned, the intention is effective. But here, the meat left entirely before the sprinkling, so it is as though it did not exist; at the time of sprinkling, the sprinkling does not help remove the meat from the laws of misuse. And when it says 'stands to be lost or burned,' it does not mean that they were destined to be lost or burned, but that they were in fact later lost or burned - even though they were present at the time of sprinkling - their end revealed about their beginning, that they had been destined for loss or burning.
  9. Lemma — 'But if the blood left': even though it was brought back and sprinkled, the sprinkling does not help that which left; the sprinkling of that blood which left does not help remove the meat from the laws of misuse.
  10. Lemma — 'He slaughtered in silence': meaning, with proper intent, without having thought anything invalid, and afterward the blood left the Temple courtyard. Even though it was returned [and sprinkled], one is liable for misuse, since this sprinkling does not render the meat permitted to the priests; and if it is an offering of lesser sanctity, one is not liable for misuse regarding the sacrificial portions because of this sprinkling, since this sprinkling is considered as nothing.
  11. Lemma — 'Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Akiva did not say': that just as the blood of an offering exempts its own meat [from misuse], so does it exempt the meat of another offering.
  12. Lemma — 'Rather, where he slaughtered both of them simultaneously': for example, where two priests slaughtered them at the same time, so that it is considered like a single body, since the slaughter of one did not precede that of the other.
  13. Lemma — 'But where he slaughtered them one after the other, Rabbi Akiva did not say this': because at the moment the first was slaughtered, the second immediately became a sin offering whose owner need not bring - and there, the sprinkling of the blood of one does not exempt the meat of the other.
  14. Lemma — 'He said to him': in the form of a question.
  15. Lemma — 'Rabbi Akiva used to say, etc.': this is the implication of the mishnah.
  16. Lemma — 'But is it not disqualified?': since it had left [the courtyard].
  17. Lemma — 'Would you not say so': that sprinkling would be effective for that which left, even though it is disqualified?
  18. Lemma — 'And behold, one who set aside [an animal], etc., and behold, their blood is placed in the vessels': as long as it has not been sprinkled, both are subject to the laws of misuse, since the meat of offerings of the most sacred order is subject to misuse before the sprinkling.
Tosafot on Meilah 7a, in English Tab translation (6)
  1. Chishev lanishpakhin l'machar mahu — One should not explain that he had intention at the time of pouring the remainder [of blood] onto the base, intending to eat from the offering tomorrow — for that is obviously not piggul, as taught in the first chapter of Zevachim (13a), which excludes the pouring of the remainder and the burning of the sacrificial portions, since these do not prevent acceptance. Nor is the dilemma about one who intends during the sprinkling to pour the remainder tomorrow — for that is also obviously piggul to him, as stated there, the reason being that intention must occur during one of the four sacrificial rites regarding something eaten by a person or by the altar; pouring the remainder is 'eating by the altar' but is not one of the four rites. Rather, the Ri explains that the dilemma concerns one who has intention during the sprinkling to sprinkle tomorrow blood that spilled from the vessel — for we learned in Zevachim (25a, 32a): if it spilled onto the floor and he gathered it, it is invalid; if it spilled from the vessel and he gathered it, it is valid. Do we say that since he could gather and sprinkle it if he wished, [intention regarding it is effective]? Or perhaps, since there is no obligation to gather it, it is considered as lost.
  2. Amar lo Rabbi Zeira l'Rav Asi, Rabbi kevar shanita lanu alal — In Zevachim, chapter 'Kol HaPesulin' (35a): one who slaughters an offering intending to eat from the 'alal' is not liable for piggul on its account; 'alal' is the neck sinew, as explained in tractate Chullin, 'HaOr VeHarotev' (121a). This shows that since this alal has no substance, intention regarding it is not effective — meaning it is insignificant and destined to be wasted, so it is not rendered piggul, even though one could eat it if he wished. The spilled blood is similar. In most texts the reading is: this alal, since it has no substance, does not contract impurity of foods. If so, this is cited from the Chullin passage — which seems to be an error, since it would make more sense to cite the piggul source itself rather than the impurity source.
  3. Ela d'katani al ha'avud v'al hasaruf kashya — Meaning: this poses a difficulty from Rav Asi against Rav Asi himself, since above he says intention is effective, yet here it is obvious that intention is not effective regarding spilled blood, since it is considered lost. Rava said: emend it to read 'regarding that which stands to be lost,' etc. — meaning that when it teaches that intention is effective 'regarding the lost,' it does not mean something already lost, but something that stands to be lost. For example, if he had intention at the time of receiving the blood regarding something destined to be burned or lost before the sprinkling, and at the time of the intention it had not yet actually been lost — such as if he threw a piece of meat or sacrificial portions toward a dog's mouth or a furnace's mouth, and it had not yet arrived there at the time of intention. Nonetheless, this is compared above to the case where the entire offering left the courtyard — following the reading that has: Rav Asi said to Rabbi Yochanan, since it was already lost or burned before the sprinkling.
  4. Aval dam — Meaning: if the blood itself left and he sprinkled that very blood that had left, Rabbi Akiva agrees that the sprinkling is not effective for that which left.
  5. Lo amar Rabbi Akiva ela sheshachat chu' — Meaning: Rabbi Akiva did not say, regarding the sin offering that was lost, etc., that the sprinkling of one exempts the meat of the other from the laws of misuse, except in a case where he slaughtered both together. There is room to question whether this means with a long knife (slaughtering both simultaneously), or even one after the other, calling it 'together' because it could have been sprinkled together — for example, he slaughtered one and then the other, and received the blood of one and then the other, before sprinkling either, so that he could choose to sprinkle whichever one he wished. But if he did it strictly one after the other — for example, he received the blood of one and sprinkled it before receiving the blood of the other — Rabbi Akiva did not say his ruling applies, and he agrees that in such a case the sprinkled blood does not exempt the meat of the other from the laws of misuse.
  6. L'khaper Pa'ani — the name of a place. And he said to me: Rabbi Akiva used to say that sprinkling is effective for that which left [the courtyard]; the elder was astonished at Rabbi Akiva's words. He said to him: Yes. And when I came and presented the matter — meaning, when I told Rabbi Akiva of the elder's astonishment — he said to me: 'And do you not say so?' — meaning, in a questioning tone, implying that when you present the elder's words to me, it seems you are hesitant about my own ruling. Some texts read that after he said 'Yes,' he said to him: 'But is it not invalid?' Or the elder answered him thus, and the meaning is: when I presented before Rabbi Akiva what the elder had challenged him with, Rabbi Akiva said to him, 'And do you not say so?' — meaning, why are you silent about this; do you not agree with me?
Rashi on Meilah 7b, in English Tab translation (24)
  1. נזרק דמה וכו' — The other sin offering becomes disqualified as 'leftover sin offering' [its owner already achieved atonement through this one].
  2. דין שיפטור את בשרה — And this is so even though there is a disqualified item emerging [from this reasoning].
  3. תשובה גנובה השיבו — Meaning, Rabbi Akiva's reply, 'and he slaughtered both of them,' was not entirely proper. This implies that only when slaughtered simultaneously does the blood of one exempt the meat of the other from misuse, even though it is disqualified — just as Rabbi Elazar explained above that Rabbi Akiva only said this when both were slaughtered at the same time. So too here, 'he slaughtered both of them' means simultaneously; but if slaughtered one after the other, it would not apply. This is the deceptive response, since once the blood of one is sprinkled, the other becomes disqualified as a leftover sin offering [regardless of timing].
  4. מה לי בבת אחת מה לי בזה אחר זה — Since Rabbi Akiva holds that the blood of one exempts the meat of the other from misuse despite its being disqualified due to being a leftover sin offering, just as you consider them one entity when slaughtered simultaneously, so too when slaughtered one after another the blood of one should exempt the other. Rather, it must be that this was indeed a deceptive response, for there is no difference.
  5. א״ל ר' יוחנן לר״ל ואתה אי אתה אומר כן — For you too consider them as one entity even when slaughtered one after the other, such that the blood of one exempts the meat of the other.
  6. אילו הפריש שני אשמות לאחריות — Meaning, that if one of them were lost, he could achieve atonement through the other. The Gemara mentions two guilt offerings, and certainly the same would apply with greater force to two sin offerings, since the sanctity of a sin offering is greater than that of a guilt offering.
  7. ושחט את שניהם וקדם והעלה אימורין של אחד מהן קודם זריקה — And afterward sprinkled the blood of the guilt offering whose sacrificial portions had not yet been brought up.
  8. אי אתה מודה שאם עלו — those sacrificial portions, that they must descend, since the sprinkling of the blood of the other offering does not avail for these portions, which are not its own, because they belong to a different body [a different animal].
  9. ואי ס״ד — As you say, that even when slaughtered one after another the blood of one exempts the meat of the other because, as you say, they are considered one body — then here too, if the sacrificial portions already ascended, why should they have to descend?
  10. האמר עולא — Regarding a single body, the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that were brought up before the sprinkling of the blood do not descend, because they have become 'food of the altar' – the altar has absorbed them. Since it is one body, when the blood is later sprinkled after the portions were already brought up, that sprinkling is considered valid and they do not descend. But if, as you say, Rabbi Akiva's reasoning is that they are considered one body, then here too — where the portions of one were brought up before the blood of the other (which had no portions brought up) was sprinkled — they should likewise not have to descend. Since we say that they do descend, it shows that Rabbi Akiva's reasoning was not that they are one body, but rather that when both are slaughtered simultaneously, the blood of one exempts the meat of the other, since whichever one he chooses to sprinkle from, he may sprinkle — and we do not establish the reason as 'one body,' nor was it a deceptive answer.
  11. אישתיק — Reish Lakish fell silent.
  12. אמר רבי יוחנן קצצתינון לרגליה דינוקא — Reish Lakish calls him 'the child' because he was younger than him, meaning: he posed this difficulty to him and he had no answer. Another version explains it as meaning that he precisely assessed the matter so [i.e., established the halakha accordingly]. And if you ask: what is the difference between the case of the sin offerings slaughtered simultaneously, where the sprinkling of the blood of one exempts the meat of the other, and this case, where the sprinkling of the blood of one does not render fit the sacrificial portions of the other, such that if they ascended they must descend — this is not a difficulty. Indeed, regarding misuse, we say that the blood of one exempts the other from misuse, but to render the sacrificial portions fit for the altar, certainly only the sprinkling of its own blood can do so, even though both were slaughtered at the same time.
  13. מתני' מעשה דמים — This refers to the sprinkling [of blood].
  14. לאחר זריקת דמים אין מועלין בבשר — Since it already has a time of permissibility for the priests, this is the leniency, that there is no longer liability for misuse regarding it.
  15. על זה וזה — On the sacrificial portions and on the meat, after the sprinkling, one is liable for piggul, notar, and impurity. This is the stringency, since before the sprinkling one is not liable for any of these, but after the sprinkling they become subject to all these liabilities.
  16. לאחר זריקת דמים מועלין באימורין — This is the stringency, since before the sprinkling there was no liability for misuse regarding them at all, and now there is liability for misuse of the sacrificial portions.
  17. ועל זה ועל זה וכו' — This too is a stringency, as I explained above.
  18. נמצא מעשה דמים וכו' — [Continuation of the Mishnah's summary.]
  19. גמ' קתני — The first clause states: regarding the meat of the most sacred offerings, after the sprinkling there is no liability for misuse.
  20. מעילה הוא דליכא — This implies that although there is no liability for misuse, there is still a prohibition for the priest who eats it. But why, since it is the priest's own property?
  21. נסיב בסיפא — And the fact that it states 'there is no liability for misuse,' implying there is nonetheless a prohibition, is because the first clause had taught that before the sprinkling there is liability for misuse of the meat, since at that point there is still no permissibility for the priests. The latter clause then likewise states 'there is no liability for misuse' [even though no prohibition is implied here].
  22. אימא סיפא כו' מעילה הוא דליכא — Regarding the meat, there is no liability for misuse, but there is still a prohibition for the Israelite who eats it.
  23. והא ממונא [דבעלים] הוא וכו' — Here one cannot say that it was phrased this way merely because the first clause had said 'there is liability for misuse,' so the second clause likewise says 'there is no liability for misuse' — for in both the end of the first clause and the end of the second clause it states 'there is no liability for misuse.' Just as we infer here that there is nonetheless a prohibition, so should we infer the same in the end of the first clause—so why then is there a prohibition on eating it?
  24. א״ר חנינא ליוצא — Such as when the meat left its proper enclosure, and the blood was then sprinkled, following Rabbi Akiva's view that sprinkling is effective for meat that left [the proper area]. For when Rabbi Akiva says that sprinkling is effective for meat that left, he means that it removes it from the category of misuse and brings it to the category of burning, like other disqualified sacrificial items, which are not burned immediately but only after their form has become spoiled.
Tosafot on Meilah 7b, in English Tab translation (6)
  1. Teshuva genuva [a deceptive response] — This means hidden and concealed, for there is [a basis] to challenge it, though it does not come to overturn the reply Rabbi Akiva gave to Rabbi Shimon, since certainly he answered him properly. Rather, the wording is not well reconciled, in that he mentioned 'at the same time' — for since the second offering is unfit, yet nevertheless Rabbi Akiva says that the sprinkling of the valid one exempts it from misuse, this implies that Rabbi Akiva holds that they are considered as one slaughtered offering; and since they are considered as one, what difference does it make whether it was at the same time or one after the other? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: 'And do you not also say so?' — meaning, as a rhetorical question: Surely we require 'at the same time,' for [if slaughtered sequentially] they are not considered as one, since if one separated two guilt offerings as a guarantee and slaughtered both, and the sacrificial portions of one ascended the altar before the sprinkling of the blood of the other, would you not agree that they descend? This is to be understood as follows: the sacrificial portions of one ascended before the sprinkling of the blood of the other, and afterward the blood of the other (whose portions had not ascended) was sprinkled — would you not agree that the portions of the one that ascended without its own blood being sprinkled must descend? And if you think that it is one entity, then these portions should be considered as though they belonged to the one whose blood was sprinkled, and it should not be said that they descend, for Ulla says that the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity [that ascended before sprinkling do not descend, since they have become the food of the altar]. And the reason it mentions offerings of lesser sanctity is to teach a stronger case — all the more so with the most sacred offerings, which are more sacred and are received by the altar. Similarly above, where it mentions guilt offerings, it is all the more so with sin offerings.
  2. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: 'We have cut off the legs of the child' — meaning, I have overturned Reish Lakish's words, for certainly Rabbi Akiva's reasoning is not because they are one entity; for if so, in the case of one who separated two guilt offerings mentioned above, we should have said that they do not descend, as I explained, because they have become the food of the altar. Rather, Rabbi Akiva's reasoning is certainly because they were slaughtered 'at the same time.' And if you ask: since this reasoning of 'at the same time' is effective to exempt the meat from misuse, why should it not also be effective for the sacrificial portions, to make them the food of the altar, just as it is compared to the reasoning of 'one entity'? One can answer that they are not comparable: we say that the reason for exempting the meat from misuse is because of 'at the same time' — this makes sense, for since this one's blood was sprinkled willingly and that one's would have been sprinkled willingly as well, it stands to reason that it should also exempt the meat of the other, whose blood was not sprinkled, from misuse. But for the portions to become the food of the altar, so that they do not descend, this reasoning is not significant enough — rather, [it would only work] if you said that the reason is that they are one entity, which would be a significant enough reason even regarding their not descending.
  3. 'And for both this and that, one is liable due to piggul, notar, and impurity' — meaning, for both this (the sacrificial portions) and that (the meat) in the case of the most sacred offerings. Thus the act of sprinkling the blood is found to be both lenient and stringent — lenient, in that through the sprinkling of the blood, the laws of misuse no longer apply, since they are no longer called 'items consecrated to God'; and stringent, in that one becomes liable for it due to piggul, notar, and impurity.
  4. 'But there is still a prohibition' — meaning that it is forbidden to eat it, yet it is the property of the priest — this is a valid question, for it is explicitly written in the verse (Leviticus 7) that the priests eat them.
  5. 'But it is the property of the owners' — and the Gemara does not answer here as it did above, that because the case of misuse of the sacrificial portions was taught, it also taught 'one is not liable for misuse of the meat' due to that association. For above, the answer works well: since the first clause taught 'one is liable for misuse of both the portions and the meat' before the sprinkling of blood, it also taught, regarding after the sprinkling, 'one is not liable for misuse of the meat,' even though there is no prohibition at all [against eating it]. But here, regarding offerings of lesser sanctity, where there is no concept of misuse of the meat even before the sprinkling, it would not be fitting to teach 'one is not liable for misuse of the meat' due to the association with 'one is liable for misuse of the portions.' And it seems that this question is raised only according to the opinion that holds 'we learned that permission to eat [is what triggers liability for misuse of the portions]'; for according to the opinion that holds 'permission for sprinkling [is what triggers it],' then 'after the sprinkling' would mean after it becomes fit for sprinkling, even if it was not actually sprinkled — and if so, what is the force of the question 'But it is the property of the owners'? Certainly there would still be a prohibition, since the blood was not sprinkled.
  6. 'When Rabbi Akiva said [the sprinkling of the blood] is effective for [meat] that left [the courtyard]' — meaning: indeed there is still a prohibition, for he is speaking of meat that left [the courtyard] to be burned. Rabbi Akiva only said that the sprinkling is effective for meat that left, insofar as it establishes liability for piggul, notar, and impurity, and requires a change of its legal form before it may be burned, since this is not called 'its own invalidity' — as it is stated in tractate Pesachim (82a) that [normally such meat] is burned immediately, meaning the sprinkling is effective for it and renders it as though it had not left, making it a case of 'invalidity due to another factor,' as stated in Pesachim, which requires a change of legal form. But regarding eating, the sprinkling does not render it fit — meaning, regarding permitting it to be eaten, the sprinkling has no effect. However, this explanation does not seem right, for why would he mention 'change of legal form,' which Rabbi Akiva was not discussing? He should have said simply: Rabbi Akiva only meant that it establishes liability for misuse and obligates one for piggul, notar, and impurity. Moreover, there is a difficulty, for in Pesachim (82a) it seems that the sprinkling does not require a change of legal form, as it states there: 'If the Paschal offering became impure or left [the courtyard], it is burned immediately.' Therefore it seems correct to explain that this is indeed what Rabbi Akiva means: when Rabbi Akiva says the sprinkling is effective for meat that left, he means effective regarding the matters stated in the mishnah — to establish liability for piggul — but in any case, it is nevertheless burned immediately, for he does not disagree with the mishnah [in Pesachim].

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 7.