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Meilah 20 for kids: Stones, Coins, and Liver

מעילה כ׳

🥩 This daf teaches about misusing items consecrated to the Temple treasury, like a stone, a beam, or a coin. It also looks at an agent sent to give out meat, and what happens when he gives liver instead.

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Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 20 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 20a, in English Tab translation (16)
  1. נתנה לחברו הוא מעל — The giver is liable for misuse, since he caused the consecrated item to be treated as non-sacred [by transferring it out of the Temple's possession].
  2. מה נשתנה — What is different about retaining the item [that there is no misuse] and what is different about giving it to another [that there is misuse]?
  3. בגזבר המסורות לו — We are dealing with that stone or beam being in the charge of a treasurer to whom consecrated property is entrusted: when he merely takes it, it is still in his possession and remains under the status of consecrated property as before; but when he gives it to another, he has transferred it from the domain of consecrated property to that of non-sacred property, and so he is liable for misuse.
  4. כיון דשינה — Since he altered it — by chiseling or cutting it, or by building it into a structure — he has committed misuse, for he has changed it.
  5. שהניחה על פי ארובה — Meaning: while the stone was still whole, he did not build anything with it but merely placed it [over a skylight opening], which is not considered a change. Therefore he is not liable for misuse until he lives beneath it and benefits a peruta's worth — for example, by sealing the skylight opening so that produce beneath it, which once would have been exposed to the rain, is now protected; since he shielded it with a peruta's worth of benefit, he has committed misuse.
  6. וכיון דבני לה מיהת מעל — This is what was taught [earlier]: once he has built it in, he has committed misuse. Even though it is attached as part of the building, it is nevertheless considered as detached, and so misuse applies to it.
  7. לימא — Shall we say, that here he is liable for misuse even though it is attached, as it is deemed detached — and this supports Rav's view that one who bows down to a house [in idolatrous worship] renders it prohibited. Even though it is attached to the ground, with regard to idol worship it is considered as detached. For if you say it is considered attached, it would not become prohibited, as we derive: 'their gods upon the mountains' — but the mountains themselves do not become their gods [i.e., attached items are not subject to the prohibitions of idol worship, being compared to a mountain]. And if it is considered attached, it would likewise not be subject to misuse, for there is no misuse that applies to something attached to the ground.
  8. לעולם אימא לך — Actually, I can tell you that [the law of] one who bows to a house does not render it forbidden, because it is considered attached. Similarly here, once he has built it with plaster, it is considered attached. And if you ask: if so, why is there misuse in this case? [The answer is] because the Torah prohibited, with regard to misuse, any benefit that is visibly apparent, and this beam that he built into the structure constitutes a visibly apparent benefit — therefore misuse applies to it.
  9. לימא — Shall we say: since we said here that he is liable for misuse even though he built it in, implying it is considered detached — this supports [the case of] one who lives in a house belonging to the Temple treasury, who is liable for misuse, since it is considered detached.
  10. אמר ריש לקיש — Actually, I can tell you that a house is considered attached, and this case does not support that proof. And if you ask, if so, why is he liable for misuse there? That case is speaking of where he consecrated the stones while they were still detached, and only afterward built with them. Since at the time of consecration they were detached, therefore even though he subsequently built with them so that they are now attached, misuse still applies to them.
  11. וקא דייק אבל בנאו ולבסוף הקדישו — The Gemara infers: but if he built it and only afterward consecrated it — after it was already attached — what is the law? Evidently there is no misuse. If so, why does the baraita go on specifically to teach the case of one who lives in a consecrated cave-dwelling, that there is no misuse [there]?
  12. אמרי כו' — Indeed, this could certainly have been taught as well [regarding an ordinary built house consecrated afterward] — that there is definitely no misuse. But the reason the baraita chose the case of a cave-dwelling is that it wanted to state a case where the rule is absolutely clear-cut, that misuse never applies to it at all; therefore it phrased it that way, since that case was unambiguous to teach.
  13. בית של אבנים דעלמא לא פסיקא ליה — Regarding an ordinary stone house, the matter is not clear-cut, since there is a difference between a case where he built it and then consecrated it, and a case where he consecrated it and then built it. Therefore the baraita did not teach that case. In truth, specifically where he consecrated it and then built it is there misuse, since it is considered as detached.
  14. מתני' השליח שעשה — Introduction to the next mishnah, concerning an agent who carried out [his mission].
  15. לא עשה שליחותו — Rather, he deviated from what the homeowner told him; the agent has committed misuse.
  16. תן בשר — [Meaning] consecrated meat. [If the homeowner] told him, 'Give them one piece each,' and he said, 'Take two each,' and they took three each — then all of them have committed misuse. The homeowner is liable for misuse because his mission was fulfilled with one piece; and the agent and the guests are liable for misuse because each of them added more on his own initiative.
Tosafot on Meilah 20a, in English Tab translation (11)
  1. נתנה לחברו הוא מעל — This refers to the treasurer [gizbar]. [He becomes liable] because once he gives the item to another, it is considered to leave consecrated status [as though taken for his own use], since he has thereby removed it from his own domain.
  2. בנאה בתוך ביתו הרי זה לא מעל — This is explained in the Gemara: it refers to a case where he did not alter the item at all, but merely placed it over a skylight. For had he made a change in it, the treasurer would have thereby acquired it [through that change], and it would already have left consecrated status.
  3. נתנה לבלן אע״פ שלא רחץ מעל — In the chapter HaZahav (Bava Metzia 48a) this is cited as support for Reish Lakish, who holds that the Torah's requirement of an act of "meshikha" (physically drawing/taking possession) applies by Torah law. From this case it is inferred that specifically with a bathhouse attendant — who does not require such an act, since payment alone secures him the use of the bathhouse — [the giver] is liable; but with other craftsmen, one is not liable for misuse until there is an act of meshikha [i.e., the craft is actually performed]. However, according to Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that by Torah law money itself effects acquisition, this cannot be brought as a challenge, since the case can be understood as referring to a non-Jewish bathhouse attendant. There, certainly, with other craftsmen one is not liable until meshikha occurs, for just as with a Jew money effects acquisition, with a non-Jew acquisition requires meshikha, as stated in Bekhorot (13a): the word "amitecha" (your fellow) teaches one law for a Jew and another for a non-Jew. Nevertheless, this remains support for Reish Lakish, since it would not make sense to interpret the case as a non-Jewish attendant, parallel to the earlier case of "if he gave it to another," which clearly speaks of a Jew, since it uses the term "chavero" (his fellow).
  4. שהוא אומר לו הרי המרחץ פתוח הכנס רחוץ — That is, the attendant in effect says: "There is no obstacle on my part, for everything is ready" — and therefore he has already acquired the coin.
  5. אכילתו ואכילת חברו — Meaning: one eats half a peruta's worth [of consecrated food] and feeds another half a peruta's worth; similarly, "his benefit and another's benefit" refers to a case where he anoints himself with consecrated oil worth half a peruta and anoints another with half a peruta's worth. These combine with each other [to reach the minimum of one peruta required for liability], even if much time passed between them.
  6. מאי שנא הוא ומאי שנא חברו — [Asking] why, when he himself takes it, he is not liable for misuse, but if he gives it to another he is liable. [The answer] refers to the treasurer, to whom the entire item is entrusted, as explained in the mishnah.
  7. למה לי עד שידור — Since he already built it [into the house], one might think he is liable right away, if "building it" means he chiseled and shaped it [as material for building] — that itself is already a change, through which he acquired it [and it left consecration]. The Gemara answers: Rav said it refers to a case where he merely placed it over a skylight — meaning it had already been shaped beforehand, and he made no further change, but just placed it over the opening and sealed it with mortar until it was firmly set. And since he has at least built it in, [the Gemara] states affirmatively: once he has built it, he becomes liable for misuse if he resides beneath it and benefits to the value of a peruta — even though the law is that there is no misuse with an item attached to the ground; that exemption applies to an item that was always attached, not to one that was detached and later attached, which [Rav] holds retains the status of detached.
  8. לימא מסייע לרב דאמר המשתחוה לבית אסרו — For [Rav] holds that something detached and later attached retains the status of detached (and indeed, the Gemara could equally have answered this way). This is rejected: [rather, the reason is] that the Torah forbids benefit that is visibly apparent — meaning that in truth, something detached and later attached is considered attached, but here it is different because of "benefit that is visibly apparent," since the skylight is noticeably visible from outside.
  9. הדר בבית של הקדש כיון שנהנה מעל — This shows that something detached and later attached is considered detached, and the Gemara could equally have answered that "benefit that is visibly apparent" is what makes this case different; instead it answers: Reish Lakish said that there [the baraita] speaks of a case where he first consecrated [the materials while detached] and only afterward built [the house] — for there, even according to the view that it is considered attached, [he is liable] since he consecrated it beforehand. There is a difficulty: accordingly, above, when it said "since he built it, he is liable — let us say this supports Rav," why did the Gemara not reject this by saying the mishnah speaks of a case where he first consecrated and then built? But if he built and only afterward consecrated it, this reasoning [that it is still considered detached] would not apply. [The answer is:] even in the case of "he built it and then consecrated it," they hold it does not create liability except through the reasoning of "benefit that is visibly apparent" being forbidden. With this, it fits well that they brought support from "one who resides in a house of consecrated property," since that case could not be rejected with "benefit that is visibly apparent is different," because at that point it was understood as speaking of "built it and then consecrated it," where that reasoning would not apply; and when Reish Lakish does reject it by positing "consecrated it and then built it," he does so based on the reasoning of "benefit that is visibly apparent."
  10. מתני׳ השליח שעשה שליחותו בעל הבית מעל — As stated above in another chapter (Me'ila 18b), that we derive this through the verbal analogy of "chet"–"chet" from the law of teruma.
  11. אמר לו תן בשר לאורחים ונתן להם כבד כבד ונתן להם בשר שליח מעל — Since he did not carry out the homeowner's instructions as commanded.
Rashi on Meilah 20b, in English Tab translation (14)
  1. Who is the tanna who says that anything about which the agent would consult is considered two separate items — this is what [the Gemara] is saying: Which tanna is the source of the mishna, which implies that anything requiring the agent to consult and ask the homeowner whether he should buy it instead of what he was told to buy — for example, if the homeowner told him to buy meat in the market and he found only liver, so that he now needs to go back and ask whether he should buy it or not — is considered two separate items, even though both are types of meat, since the agent would need to consult about it? The mishna likewise implies that they are two separate items, since it teaches that the agent is liable for misuse. For if they were one and the same item, why would the agent be liable — he performed the homeowner's agency! Rather, since it teaches that he is liable, this shows they are considered two separate items. [The Gemara now asks] which tanna holds this view.
  2. Rav Chisda said: this is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva — as we learned in a mishna: One who vows against vegetables is permitted to eat gourds, but Rabbi Akiva forbids it, holding that gourds are considered the same category as vegetables. And it is stated in tractate Nedarim: They said to Rabbi Akiva — doesn't a person say to his agent, 'Buy me vegetables,' and the agent comes and says, 'I found only gourds'? This shows that once the agent must consult, it is considered a different item, and therefore gourds should be permitted. And Rabbi Akiva replied to them, 'That is exactly my point' — meaning, I learn from this very fact that even though the agent must consult, it is still the same item. For does the agent say, 'I did not find vegetables, but I brought legumes instead'? Rather, since he says, 'I did not find vegetables, but I found only gourds,' and does not say 'legumes,' this shows that gourds are included in the category of vegetables. Even though the agent must consult about them, Rabbi Akiva holds that they are a single category — and this is why [the law of the mishna] is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.
  3. You may even say that it is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva — and the reason [the agent is liable] when he gave them liver is that he gave it on his own initiative. Does he not need to consult the homeowner as to whether to give them liver or not? Since he failed to consult, the agent is liable, as it is as if he gave it on his own initiative — not because meat and liver are considered two separate items, but because they are really one category.
  4. Nachmani is saying well — this refers to Abaye, who explained it this way: Even according to Rabbi Akiva, the agent still needed to consult.
  5. Who is the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Akiva — holding that anything about which the agent would need to consult is considered two separate items?
  6. It is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as we learned: One who vows against meat, etc., [but] Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits meat of the head, the feet, the windpipe, and the liver — this shows that he holds they are two separate items.
  7. Innards are not meat, and one who eats them is not a person — meaning, one who eats them and buys them for the price of ordinary meat; for if one could buy a pound of meat for a dinar, and instead leaves the meat and buys a pound of innards for a dinar, he would not be considered a normal person by anyone's standard.
  8. And according to the first tanna, what is different about meat of birds — that he forbids it more than fish — because it is common [for an agent to substitute it for regular meat], and it is a type of meat; therefore he forbids it.
  9. Rav Pappa said: This is why bird meat is forbidden — because we are dealing with the day of bloodletting, as one who vows [against meat] vows against whatever kind of meat is fit for him to eat that day; but foods not fit for him that day of bloodletting, he certainly did not intend to include, such as fish.
  10. If so, why is bird meat forbidden — let him eat bird meat too! For Shmuel said: One who has let blood through the shoulder-vein and eats bird meat — [his heart races], showing that one does not eat it that day, and so he would not have intended to vow against it. [Some texts read: Let him also eat bird meat — according to that reading, bird meat likewise is not commonly eaten on the day of bloodletting, and so one would not have vowed against it either.]
  11. Concerning salted meat — meaning meat salted for two days and one night, which no longer restores the spirit [i.e., is no longer nourishing].
  12. Rather, Rav Pappa said — this is why bird meat is forbidden: the vow against meat was made on a day when his eyes hurt him, a day on which he does not eat fish, since fish is harmful to the eyes; but he does eat other kinds of meat, even bird meat. Therefore he is forbidden from every type of meat fit for him to eat, but permitted fish. And that which is taught elsewhere (Nedarim 54b) with the mnemonic 'nun, samech, ayin' — implying that fish harms the eyes — refers to the onset of the eye ailment; but at the end stage, fish is in fact harmful to them.
  13. Learn from this that one who adds to his words is still considered an agent — since it is taught that all of them are liable, implying that the homeowner, too, is liable, from which it follows that the tanna of the mishna holds that the agent did not uproot the homeowner's agency. This shows that he is considered to have added to his words, for had he uprooted the agency, the homeowner would not be liable. Rather, he certainly added to the agency. And from here one can resolve the question raised in tractate Ketubot (98b): one who tells his agent, 'Go buy me an eighth of a field,' and the agent buys a quarter — which is double — do we say he added to the words of the one who sent him, so that the agency was not uprooted and [the buyer] acquires the whole quarter, or do we say he transgressed his words, so that the buyer acquires nothing?
  14. Rav Sheshet said — one cannot conclude this from here, for here the reason the homeowner is also liable is that the agent said [to the guests] on his own initiative: this is why the agent said to the guests, 'Take two pieces each — one on behalf of the homeowner and the other on my own behalf,' and the third piece they took on their own initiative. Here, certainly, it is a case of adding, and the agency was fulfilled, and therefore he is liable. And if you ask, isn't it obvious that the homeowner is liable [in that case]? — [this is what the Gemara proceeds to clarify].
Tosafot on Meilah 20b, in English Tab translation (5)
  1. Who is the tanna who taught that any item about which [the agent] would consult is considered two [separate] items — For example, liver and meat: when the homeowner instructed his agent to bring meat, the agent would consult him as to whether, if he wanted liver, he should bring it instead; but without consulting, he would not bring it. And here, where the homeowner said, 'Bring meat,' and he brought liver, we learned in the mishna that he did not perform his agency. If so, they are two separate items. Rav Chisda said: this is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in the chapter 'One who vows from vegetables' (Nedarim 54a): one who vows from vegetables is permitted gourds, for the Rabbis hold that gourds are not considered vegetables, while Rabbi Akiva prohibits them, holding that they are considered vegetables. There the dispute is explained: they said to Rabbi Akiva — doesn't a person say to his agent, 'Buy me vegetables,' and the agent says, 'I found none but gourds'? This shows that gourds are a different matter, for if gourds were vegetables, why would the agent need to consult at all — he should simply buy them, since the Rabbis hold that anything about which the agent would consult is considered two separate items. Rabbi Akiva answered them: 'So are your own words' — meaning, do I bring proof from this for my own position? Does the agent say, 'I found none but legumes'? That is, he would never answer that way — so why does he not answer with reference to another category? Rather, because it is not the custom of the world that if a person asks for one type, one responds about a completely different type — but gourds are included within the category of vegetables, while legumes are not included in the category of vegetables. This shows that gourds are, perforce, within the category of vegetables, and that is why the agent responds, 'I found none but gourds,' since gourds are included in 'vegetables,' but he would not respond with legumes, since they are not included in 'vegetables.' This shows that Rabbi Akiva holds that even an item about which the agent would consult is not considered two separate items. Thus the mishna [in our tractate, about meat and liver] is not in accordance with his view.
  2. Abaye said: You may even say this is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva — doesn't he require that the agent consult first? — Meaning: since the agent did not consult and brought liver though he was not told to, he deviated from the homeowner's intent on his own. Therefore, with regard to misuse of consecrated property, he is considered not to have performed his agency.
  3. Innards are not meat — And the practical difference is that if they were fit only for dogs to eat, there would be no case of a transaction made in error [mekaḥ ta'ut], since it is not the normal way for a person to eat them; and 'one who eats them is not a person' means that one who eats them is not considered among ordinary people.
  4. We are dealing with a day on which his eyes hurt him — for on such a day one does not eat fish. And that which is stated in the chapter 'One who vows from vegetables' (ibid.), that fish is harmful to the eye, is raised there as a difficulty and resolved: there it refers to the beginning of the eating, here to the whole meal. Some explain this as referring to the beginning stage of the eye ailment, and others explain 'the eating' (okhla) as referring to the meal — meaning, in one case the fish comes at the start of the meal, and in the other case it is eaten throughout the whole meal.
  5. From this we learn that one who adds to his agency is still considered an agent — This question appears in tractate Ketubot, chapter 'A Widow Is Supported' (Ketubot 98b), where it is phrased: If one said to his agent, 'Buy me a litecha [a measure],' and he went and bought a kor [a larger measure] — what is the law? Is he considered to have merely added to his words, so that the litecha at least is acquired [on behalf of the sender]? Or is he considered to have overridden his words entirely, so that even the litecha is not acquired [on his behalf]? Similarly here in our mishna: when [the homeowner] said to his agent, 'Give them one [piece] each,' and the agent said, 'Take two,' if, as in the case in Ketubot, this is considered overriding his words, then here too we should say he did not perform his agency at all. Yet there, in Ketubot, this case [from our mishna] is cited [as a proof]. Rav Sheshet said: this is referring to a case where the agent said to them, 'Take one piece according to the homeowner's intent, as I was instructed,' and 'the second piece according to my own intent' — and that they took three pieces is likewise understood: the first in virtue of the homeowner's agency, the second in virtue of the agent's own agency, and the third on their own account; and so they understood it in taking them. And the reason this needs to be stated is: lest you say that the agent thereby uprooted the homeowner's agency entirely — meaning, even when he explicitly said 'on my own account' — this teaches us that this is not so.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 20.