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Meilah 21 for kids: Bring Me an Etrog

מעילה כ״א

🛍️ This daf asks: when someone sends a helper to buy or bring consecrated things, who becomes liable if the job isn't done exactly right? It also asks about a purse with one holy coin mixed in with ordinary ones.

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Stories from Meilah 21

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Rashi and Tosafot on Meilah 21 in simple English

Rashi on Meilah 21a, in English Tab translation (19)
  1. Lemma — This explains the Gemara's statement: one might have thought that the agent uprooted the homeowner's agency [by adding his own condition], so that the homeowner would not be liable for misuse; this teaches us otherwise: since the homeowner said 'take it,' and his intent was for this very agency to be carried out, he is liable.
  2. MISHNA: 'From the deluskema' — this is a bag used by old people, called 'taska' in the vernacular (Old French).
  3. 'Even though the homeowner said: It was not my intent' — that you bring it from the place you actually brought it from, but rather from that other place — nevertheless the homeowner is liable for misuse, since his agency was in fact fulfilled; for unspoken matters that one says were not his true intent have no legal significance.
  4. '[If] they did not perform his agency' — meaning not according to what the homeowner instructed: the homeowner is not liable for misuse, since his agency was not fulfilled, and they (the deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor) are not liable either, since they lack halakhic competence. Rather, the storekeeper becomes liable for misuse when he spends it — when he gives that peruta to anyone — since at that point he converts it from sacred to non-sacred use.
  5. '[If the homeowner] sent' — a consecrated peruta by the hand of a halakhically competent person, and the homeowner remembered that it was consecrated before it reached the storekeeper's hand.
  6. 'The storekeeper is liable for misuse' — but not the homeowner and not the agent. The homeowner is not liable, because since he remembered that the money was consecrated before it reached the storekeeper, this counts as intentional misuse, and the law of misuse applies only to unwitting acts, as it is written: 'and commits a trespass in error against the sacred things of the Lord.' The agent is also not liable, since he did fulfill his agency. But the storekeeper is liable for misuse when he spends it, since he does not know it is consecrated, making his act unwitting.
  7. 'But what should he do' — when the homeowner remembers, in order to exempt the storekeeper from liability for misuse, he takes a non-sacred peruta (or vessel) and recites the formula [of desacralization], before the storekeeper spends the consecrated money.
  8. GEMARA: 'But they are not fit for agency' — referring to the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor; so why is the homeowner liable for misuse once they carry out his errand?
  9. 'They were rendered [like a vat]' — the Sages rendered the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor like the vat of olives, as we learned: From when do olives become susceptible to ritual impurity? From when they exude the moisture of the vat — for, being pressed together tightly in the vat, they heat up and exude drops of oil, and the homeowner is pleased with that moisture, since he has already begun gathering them in order to press them. Since he is pleased with that moisture, the olives become susceptible to impurity.
  10. 'But not the moisture of the basket' — the moisture exuded in the basket when the olives are being gathered is not significant or pleasing to him, and does not render them susceptible to impurity. Nevertheless, regarding the moisture of the vat, which pleases him, we say it is considered as though done with his intent; even though the vat itself cannot exude moisture, this moisture is deemed significant and causes susceptibility to impurity. Likewise, the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor: even though they lack halakhic competence, when his errand is accomplished through them, since it pleases him, he is liable for misuse.
  11. 'And Rabbi Yoḥanan says' — he derives this from the teaching: If one placed the eiruv food on a monkey and it carried it [to the proper place], it is taught that it is a valid eiruv. Evidently, even though the monkey lacks halakhic competence, since the task was accomplished, the eiruv is valid. So too with the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor.
  12. 'Even though the agent did not remember' — the agent is not liable for misuse, but rather the storekeeper is.
  13. 'And they raised a contradiction: If the homeowner remembered but the agent did not, the agent is liable for misuse' — since once the homeowner remembered, his continued misuse is considered intentional, exempting him from liability; but the agent, acting unwittingly, is liable. This is what is stated in tractate Chagigah: that the agent's liability for misuse is like 'mountains hanging by a hair' [a severe law with a slender basis] — for what did the poor agent actually do? He only carried out the homeowner's errand.
  14. 'Rav Sheshet [explains] the mishna' — this is the reason that only the storekeeper is liable: in a case where both the homeowner and the agent remembered [that the money was consecrated] but the storekeeper did not, both the homeowner and the agent are deemed to have acted intentionally and are therefore exempt, while only the storekeeper, who acted unwittingly, is liable.
  15. MISHNA: 'If he gave him a peruta and said to him: Bring me with half of it...' — referring to an earthenware vessel in which lamps are lit, and with the other half, wicks.
  16. 'And he went and brought lamps with the whole [peruta], or wicks with the whole [peruta]' — neither party is liable for misuse: the homeowner is not liable because his instructions were not fulfilled, and the agent is not liable either, because the amount involved in his deviation was only half a peruta, and there is no liability for misuse regarding half a peruta.
  17. 'Or if he said to him: Bring me...' [the reverse case] — here too, neither is liable for misuse, for the same reason as in the first clause.
  18. 'But if he said to him: Bring me with half of it lamps from such-and-such place...' — the agent is liable for misuse, since his deviation involved a full peruta, making him liable.
  19. 'And he went and brought him a citron with the peruta... Both of them are liable for misuse' — since the homeowner's instructions regarding the peruta were fulfilled, and the agent also deviated with respect to the peruta, for the homeowner can say: I wanted a large citron for two perutot, but you brought me a small, inferior one, which was not what I requested.
Tosafot on Meilah 21a, in English Tab translation (11)
  1. He said to him: Bring me [the item] from the window — and he brought it from the chest; or he said: bring it from the chest, and he brought it from the window — and he did not specify which window or which chest, and there were many windows or many chests there. Even though the homeowner said, 'My intention was not for this one but for that one' — meaning, my intent was not for that window but for the other one — nevertheless the homeowner is liable for misuse, since the agent fulfilled his agency, for unspoken matters in the heart are not considered significant.
  2. 'Bring me from the window and he brought from the chest, etc. — the agent is liable for misuse' — Explanation: this means once he spends it, since he is presumably considered a treasurer (gizbar), for the item has not yet left consecrated status until it is actually spent.
  3. 'If he sent it by the hand of a deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor, and they fulfilled his agency, the homeowner is liable for misuse' — The Gemara asks: but they are not capable of serving as agents.
  4. 'If they did not fulfill his agency, the storekeeper is liable for misuse' — because the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor are not subject to the laws of misuse, so the consecrated item does not become non-sacred until it reaches the storekeeper's hand and he spends it. And when it says the storekeeper is liable for misuse, this too means once he spends it.
  5. 'What should he do?' — Explanation: what should the homeowner do so that the storekeeper not become liable for misuse.
  6. 'Rabbi Elazar said: The Sages made them like a vat (ma'atan)' — Explanation: since it is beneficial to the homeowner what the deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor does, it is considered as though he acted as his agent, as we learned: From when do olives become susceptible to ritual impurity? From when they exude moisture into the vat. A 'ma'atan' is a vat into which olives are placed, and 'moisture' refers to the liquid that seeps from them. The Gemara states that the moisture exuded into the vat is considered a liquid (that transmits impurity) because it is beneficial to the owner, but not the moisture exuded into the basket, which is not considered a liquid since it is not beneficial to him, as it goes to waste. One might question: don't we already know from several places the exposition of 'yutan,' compared to 'ki yitten' (Bava Metzia 22b), that since it is beneficial to the owner it is treated as liquid even though it would not otherwise be considered so? Why was it necessary to cite this mishna? It should also have cited the case of dew lying on produce. Perhaps there, some human action is involved, so instead the Gemara cited the case of the olives' moisture, which occurs on its own, similar to sending money by the hand of a deaf-mute — which likewise is considered as happening on its own, since they are not capable of agency.
  7. 'If one placed it on a monkey and it carried it, or on an elephant and it carried it, this is a valid eiruv' — Rabbi Ephraim raised a difficulty: in tractate Eruvin (31b) it is stated that this is not a valid eiruv. He answered that there the case is where the monkey itself places the food down for the sake of the eiruv, but here the case is where he told a person to take it off the monkey or camel once they reach the place, and that person places it down for the eiruv. But this is difficult, for if so this proves nothing, since it was a person of intelligence who placed it down. Therefore it seems that here the case is where he stood and watched as the elephant placed the bread at the place designated for the eiruv, and he said, 'May the bread acquire an eiruv for me' — showing that the agency was accomplished even though the elephant acting as agent lacks intelligence. So too with the deaf-mute, the agency for misuse was accomplished despite his lacking intelligence. One might ask: on the contrary, let us derive the laws of agency for misuse from the laws of agency for terumah, where a competent agent is required — this would actually be a better derivation, since the entire concept of agency for misuse is derived from terumah! The answer is: since the agency for misuse operates through spending and a change of ownership, and here the change of ownership occurs through an agent lacking competence, it made more sense to compare it to the cases cited (monkey, elephant), where competence is not a concern. Regarding matters of personal benefit, agency does not apply where the liability comes about through benefit, as stated in Kiddushin (43a): we do not find anywhere in the Torah that 'this one benefits and that one becomes liable.' Nevertheless, it was necessary to derive the concept of agency from terumah, so one should not say there is no agency for a transgression.
  8. 'Bring me — with half of it, lamps' — a 'ner' is a vessel of iron or clay in which oil and wicks are placed; and he went and brought him lamps with half of it and wicks with the other half.
  9. 'And he deviated, bringing him lamps from the place designated for wicks, and wicks from the place designated for lamps — the agent is liable for misuse' — because he deviated from the homeowner's intent, since he went to buy lamps from a different place than he was instructed.
  10. 'And he went and bought him an etrog with one peruta and a pomegranate with another peruta — both are liable for misuse. Rabbi Yehuda says: the homeowner is not liable, etc.' — The Gemara will explain their dispute regarding a cloak, and similarly they disagree regarding an etrog.
  11. 'He gave him a golden dinar' — Explanation: this is worth twenty-four [dinars] of silver.
Rashi on Meilah 21b, in English Tab translation (25)
  1. And he brought for three — silver dinars, which is half a gold dinar.
  2. Both of them are liable for misuse — because the homeowner's agency was fulfilled with more than a peruta's worth [of deviation from his request], and the agent is liable for misuse with more than a peruta's worth [of unauthorized purchase].
  3. Small and inferior — meaning: you did not fulfill my agency at all.
  4. Gemara: You can learn from this the resolution to the dilemma of one who tells his agent to sell, etc. — meaning: you can learn from the mishna, which teaches that if the agent brought him a robe for three sela, both are liable for misuse, even the homeowner, even though he instructed him to buy a robe for a gold dinar and the agent bought him less than instructed. From this you can resolve the case of one who tells another [to sell a kor of land and he sold a half-kor] — that the buyer acquires it, even though he bought him less [than the full amount commissioned].
  5. They say: Here, for example, he brought him something worth a dinar for three — meaning: one cannot derive the resolution from this case, because here, why is the homeowner liable for misuse? It is a case where the agent brought him a robe worth a gold dinar for three silver dinars; since it is worth a gold dinar, his agency was fulfilled, and that is why he is liable for misuse.
  6. If so — as you are now explaining it.
  7. Say the latter clause: Rabbi Yehuda says the homeowner is not liable for misuse, as he can say... — But if the agent indeed brought him something worth a gold dinar, how could the homeowner say "you brought me a small, inferior one"? He wanted something worth a gold dinar and received something worth a gold dinar!
  8. This is not difficult — for this is why Rabbi Yehuda says the homeowner is not liable for misuse: he can still say to the agent, "Had you given the merchant the entire gold dinar as I told you, you would have brought me a robe worth two gold dinars."
  9. (Because the homeowner could say to him: "Had you given..." etc.) As it is taught: "And Rabbi Yehuda concedes in the case of legumes that both are liable for misuse" — meaning: if the agent brought him legumes worth a gold dinar for three silver dinars, the homeowner too is liable for misuse. Why? Because the amount of legumes sold for a peruta is proportionally the same as the amount sold for a sela; so the homeowner cannot say to him, "Had you given the whole dinar, you would have brought double the value, since buying more would have been cheaper for you" — because the price of legumes does not go down for one who buys with a dinar compared to one who buys with a peruta. This shows that Rabbi Yehuda's reasoning in the case of the robe — that the homeowner is not liable even though the agent brought him something worth a dinar for three — is because he can say "Had you given the dinar..." etc.
  10. Worth more to him — because he would have brought more legumes, since buying in bulk would have been cheaper for him.
  11. Rav Pappa said: in a place where they sell by... — by measure, there the matter is fixed: each container for a peruta, with no reduction in price at all. Another version: "What are the circumstances," etc. — this now analyzes the reasoning behind Rabbi Yehuda's concession regarding legumes: if it is in a place where they sell by appraisal/estimate without fixed measure, the homeowner could still claim to the agent, "Had you given the whole dinar, you would have received more, since they would have added extra for the dinar, and you did not bring me any of that extra" — similar to the case of the robe, where he says "Had you given the dinar..." etc.
  12. Rav Pappa said — you cannot say this, for we are dealing with a place where they measure and sell by containers.
  13. Because each and every container is sold for a peruta, for there the matter is fixed — and they give no extra at all; therefore the homeowner cannot claim anything, and whenever the agent brings him legumes worth a dinar for three, both are liable for misuse.
  14. Mishna: One who deposits money — of consecrated property, with a money changer.
  15. If he deposited them bound, he may not use them — because he deposited them bound specifically so that the money changer would not use them; therefore, if the money changer spent them, he is liable for misuse.
  16. And if he deposited them unbound, he may use them — because by depositing them unbound, his intention was that the money changer would handle and exchange them; therefore the money changer is not liable for misuse, but rather the depositor is.
  17. If he deposited them with a homeowner, either way — whether bound or unbound, he may not use them, because one deposits with a homeowner knowing that a homeowner does not typically make change or exchange money, and so the depositor was not concerned whether they were bound or unbound; therefore, if the homeowner spent them, he is liable for misuse, since he used them without the depositor's knowledge.
  18. If he deposited them with a storekeeper, he is like a homeowner — since a storekeeper is not accustomed to exchanging money like a money changer, and either way he may not touch them.
  19. Rabbi Yehuda says: like a money changer — because a storekeeper is sometimes also accustomed to exchanging money like a money changer; therefore his law is like that of a money changer.
  20. Once he spent the first one, he is liable for misuse — because we say perhaps that was the consecrated one.
  21. Until he spends the entire purse — because the act of misuse occurs with the last peruta.
  22. Gemara: What is different in the first clause — where Rabbi Akiva disagrees — and what is different in the latter clause, where Rabbi Akiva concedes to the Rabbis?
  23. He said to him: the latter clause deals with one who says, "This purse shall not be exempt from consecration" — meaning that not even the smallest amount in it should remain non-sacred; since he said this, it implies he means that the last peruta should be the consecrated one, and therefore he is liable for misuse only with the last peruta.
  24. The largest of them is consecrated — the reasoning is that, since there is a larger coin present, he says the larger one is consecrated, because one who consecrates does so generously [choosing the better/larger one]; but if the coins are equal, then the first one that comes to hand is the consecrated one. So why does Rabbi Akiva concede in the latter clause that the last peruta is the consecrated one?
  25. He said to him: the latter clause deals with one who says... etc.
Tosafot on Meilah 21b, in English Tab translation (7)
  1. For example, where he brought him something worth six — meaning sela, for a payment of three, so that the agent earned the homeowner a profit of three sela. [The Gemara then says:] say the latter clause — Rabbi Yehuda says, etc., 'you brought me a small, inferior robe.' Now it asks: what is 'inferior' about it, since according to this explanation — bringing something worth six for a cost of three — it is actually a large profit? It answers that the homeowner could say to the agent: had you given him the whole dinar, [you would have gotten something worth] double — two dinars' worth — for every gold dinar, meaning: I would have profited even more, since they would have given you, according to the rate at which you obtained something worth twelve for six, so that I would have profited double what I am profiting now.
  2. And why not say that [the reason Rabbi Yehuda concedes in the case of legumes is] that if he did not vary [the price] for him regarding legumes, he [the seller] gives more [quantity for the same price]? We find a similar formulation in Ketubot, chapter 'Almanah Nizonet' (Ketubot 99b): 'If in a place where they sell by appraisal [in bulk] — is it not worth more?' which is the same question. The Gemara's reasoning is: one might think it is discussing a place where they sell by bulk appraisal, i.e., a large amount sold together, and therefore it asks why Rabbi Yehuda would concede [that both are liable], since there too it is the way of sellers to reduce the price for a buyer purchasing more. It answers: Rav Pappa said it is discussing a place where they sell by fixed containers — meaning measure by measure — that is, not by appraisal as one might have thought, but in small fixed amounts, where the price is set and the seller does not reduce it for the buyer.
  3. 'One who deposits money with a money changer, if bound, he may not use it,' etc. — This requires examination: in Bava Metzia, chapter 'HaMafkid' (Bava Metzia 43a), the Gemara cites this same teaching, but does not cite it in the same wording that we have learned it here.
  4. 'A consecrated peruta that fell into the purse, or where one said: a peruta in this purse is consecrated — once he spent the first [peruta], he has committed misuse' — this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Even though it is a case of doubt whether he benefited from consecrated property, Rabbi Akiva follows his own position that one is liable for a conditional guilt-offering in cases of doubtful misuse, as stated in Keritot (22a). A difficulty: why should this fallen consecrated peruta not be nullified [in the majority of ordinary coins]? And if you say that it is 'a matter that has a means of permission' through redemption, and such a matter is not nullified even by a thousand [ordinary coins] — this cannot be said, since the rule that 'a matter with a means of permission is not nullified' is only rabbinic [and would not explain non-nullification on the Torah level]. One must therefore say that there is only one [consecrated coin] in the purse, so the concept of nullification does not apply, or alternatively, that a coin is considered significant and so is not nullified.
  5. 'And Rabbi Akiva concedes in the case of one who says: a peruta from [the coins in] this purse is consecrated, that he may continue spending until he has spent the entire purse' — meaning, the last coin will be the consecrated one. And in the Gemara it asks: what is different between the first clause and the latter clause?
  6. [The Gemara] answered him: the latter clause is discussing a case where he said, 'this purse is not released from consecration' — meaning, this purse is not exempt until the consecrated peruta has been spent with [the spending of] the entire purse. This wording certainly implies that the consecrated coin is the last one.
  7. 'If there were two [consecrated perutot in question], the larger of them is consecrated' — meaning, in the latter clause of the mishnah too, one should say that the finer coin will be the consecrated one. But on the first clause [the Gemara] does not raise this question, since perhaps the wording of the first clause already implies this on its own. And one cannot say that the question is also raised on the first clause, for if so, [the Gemara] would have asked: why is the first clause different from the latter clause?

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Me'ilah, Meila 21.