Kids Daf Quest

Daf Yomi for kids · Talmud Bavli · Masechet Temurah

Temurah 25 for kids: Which Name Takes Hold?

תמורה כ״ה

🏷️ This daf asks when an unborn animal receives its sacred status. It also asks what happens when someone gives an animal two different names, one after the other.

Daf Yomi day:

📖 Open Temurah 25a in Daf QuestOpen Temurah 25b in Daf Quest

In the app: the Gemara with Rashi and Tosafot, the printed page, games made from this daf, play coins and treasure chests.

Stories from Temurah 25

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Temurah 25 in simple English

Rashi on Temurah 25a, in English Tab translation (30)
  1. No sanctity takes effect upon them — This applies even to the middle clause, which concerns the offspring of consecrated animals: not even their mothers’ sanctity takes effect upon them. The statement says simply that no sanctity takes effect.
  2. As they come into being — When they are born. Until then, no sanctity takes effect upon them.
  3. Their mothers’ sanctity has taken hold of them — From the start of their formation, each bit becomes sanctified as it forms.
  4. Rather, learn from this — The entire mishna follows Rabbi Shimon.
  5. Had it said, and so on — This refers to the verse, “But a firstborn that is born as a firstborn to the Lord among animals, a man shall not consecrate it.”
  6. Had it said, “A firstborn that is born as a firstborn shall not consecrate” — Without “a man,” “it,” or “among animals,” I would have understood that a firstborn man may not consecrate anything.
  7. The verse says, “it” — This shows that the verse also concerns a firstborn animal: a firstborn man may not consecrate it, but he may consecrate other things. One might still think that only a firstborn man is barred, while other people may consecrate a firstborn animal with another sanctity.
  8. The verse says, “among animals” — These otherwise unnecessary words show that the verse is not speaking about a firstborn man.
  9. I was speaking of animals — The verse says that no one may consecrate a firstborn animal with another sanctity. It says nothing here about a firstborn man.
  10. In the womb — One might think that even then, one cannot consecrate it with another sanctity.
  11. From when it becomes a firstborn — The prohibition begins when it becomes sanctified at birth; in the womb it is not yet consecrated.
  12. Might the same apply to the offspring of all consecrated animals? — Might one be allowed to give them another sanctity while they are still in the womb?
  13. The verse says, “But a firstborn” — “But” makes a distinction: you may consecrate a firstborn before it becomes a firstborn, but not the fetus of another consecrated animal. Because its mother is consecrated, each bit of it becomes sanctified as it forms. This tanna holds that the offspring of consecrated animals are sanctified in their mothers’ wombs, unlike the tanna of the mishna.
  14. He said of the firstborn — While it was still in the womb, he declared that the sanctity of a burnt offering should take effect when most of it emerged, at the very moment the sanctity of a firstborn would take effect—not before. The question is which sanctity takes effect first and displaces the other.
  15. Is it a burnt offering? — Its sanctity is more stringent, since it is burned entirely on the altar.
  16. Or is it a firstborn? — The sanctity of a firstborn takes effect at birth for all firstborn animals.
  17. When most of it falls — At that point it would become gleanings for the poor.
  18. Let it become ownerless — So that even the wealthy may take it. The question is which status takes effect. Clearly, if the owner had made all the grain ownerless earlier, it would not be subject to the law of gleanings: that law applies only to produce that is owned and guarded.
  19. And Abaye said: Why is this a question? — Since both would take effect at the same moment, God’s command takes precedence over the owner’s declaration, and God made it gleanings for the poor.
  20. Here too, God’s command — Takes precedence, so the animal is a firstborn.
  21. The mishna: One who says — This refers to the offspring of a pregnant animal.
  22. “Its offspring is a burnt offering, and it is a peace offering”—his words stand — The offspring’s sanctity took effect first.
  23. But if he said, “It is a peace offering” — First, he consecrated the mother and all she carried. The fetus counts as separately consecrated, as though he had consecrated two animals as peace offerings; saying afterward that its offspring is a burnt offering does not change that. The distinction between sanctity at birth and sanctity in the womb does not apply here. It applies when an animal was consecrated before becoming pregnant, so its offspring receives sanctity only through its mother. When one consecrates an already pregnant animal, its fetus can receive sanctity in its own right. Rabbi Meir holds that the first statement governs, even though the speaker did not initially intend to refer to the fetus.
  24. Because one cannot give two names at once — A person cannot say two things at the same time.
  25. His words stand — A person’s concluding words count too, since when he first said, “It is a peace offering,” he did not intend to refer to its offspring.
  26. If he wishes, he may gain atonement through her offspring — The rule that the offspring of a sin offering must die applies when the mother was consecrated before she conceived. But if she was consecrated while pregnant, the fetus can receive sanctity in its own right through her consecration. It is like setting aside two sin offerings as alternatives: he may gain atonement through whichever he chooses.
  27. If he excluded it — If he declared, ‘Her offspring is non-sacred, but she is a sin offering,’ the offspring remains non-sacred. Since he can keep it from becoming consecrated, it is not part of its mother. Even when he does not exclude it, it is consecrated in its own right, not through her, and is not treated as the offspring of a sin offering.
  28. It is the offspring of a peace offering — Calling it ‘the offspring of a peace offering’ implies that it receives its sanctity through its mother, not in its own right. By the same reasoning, the offspring of a sin offering would have to die. If the fetus could be excluded and, when not excluded, became consecrated in its own right, the teaching should have said: ‘The offspring itself is a peace offering.’
  29. Set that one aside — That text poses no difficulty, because it is mistaken. The baraita reads: ‘The offspring is a peace offering.’
  30. She secured freedom for it — And the offspring went free.
Tosafot on Temurah 25a, in English Tab translation (7)
  1. Offspring of sacrificial animals are sanctified at birth — Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel therefore holds that the mother’s sanctity does not take effect on a tumtum or an androgynous offspring: by birth, each already has a disqualifying condition. The owner’s declaration does not sanctify them either, since it was not intended to include such animals. If offspring were sanctified in the womb, however, the mother’s sanctity would take effect before that condition arose. Could Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel instead mean only that an owner intends to consecrate an animal definitely known to be male or female? No: that would not prevent the mother’s sanctity from taking effect, yet he says no sanctity takes effect on them at all. Rav Chisda, however, says that a tumtum remains a possible firstborn and is sanctified because of that doubt; after slaughter, it can be examined to determine whether it is male or female. On his view, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement about a tumtum concerns only sanctity conferred by an owner’s declaration, and the Gemara’s inference about sanctity in the womb does not follow Rav Chisda. Why, then, do passages elsewhere need verses to exclude such offspring from the altar or to exempt one who offers other disqualified offspring outside the Temple, if those offspring have no sanctity? Those verses are still needed: while in the womb, an offspring can be brought into the Temple courtyard with its consecrated mother, even if the offspring itself is not sanctified. This also answers the difficulty raised by Rabbi Yitzhak’s explanation that the verse ‘or a goat’ excludes an offspring that resembles a different species, despite its consecrated mother.
  2. If he said of the firstborn, ‘When most of it emerges, it shall be a burnt offering’ — The question arises only when he specifies that moment. If he said ‘when a small part emerges,’ the burnt-offering sanctity would certainly take effect, since firstborn sanctity has not yet taken effect.
  3. The mother is a peace offering and her offspring a burnt offering: both are peace offerings — As soon as he declares the mother a peace offering, his declaration also sanctifies the fetus as a peace offering. This comes from his declaration, not from sanctity passed on by the mother. Even if one holds that an owner can reserve an offspring from its mother’s sanctity, he cannot subsequently change its sanctity here: when he consecrated the mother, he also intended his declaration to cover the fetus. He would have had to name the offspring’s different sanctity first. Rashi explains that the distinction between sanctification in the womb and sanctification at birth applies when the mother was consecrated before becoming pregnant. But when a pregnant animal is consecrated, its fetus can receive sanctity directly. Accordingly, the earlier case in which a female offspring was designated a peace offering must concern an animal consecrated before it became pregnant.
  4. If he wishes, he may obtain atonement through her offspring — The rule that a sin offering’s offspring must be left to die applies when the mother was consecrated before becoming pregnant. If she was consecrated while pregnant, the fetus can receive sanctity independently, rather than through its mother. It is like setting aside two sin offerings as alternatives: he may obtain atonement through whichever he chooses. This is Rashi’s explanation.
  5. Rabbi Yochanan holds that a reservation of the offspring is effective — If he says, ‘Her offspring is non-sacred, and she is a sin offering,’ the offspring remains non-sacred. Since he can leave it unconsecrated, it is not considered part of its mother. Even when he makes no reservation, its sanctity comes from itself, not from its mother, so it is not treated as the offspring of a sin offering. This is Rashi’s explanation.
  6. It is the offspring of a peace offering — Calling it an ‘offspring of a peace offering’ shows that its sanctity comes from its mother, not independently. Likewise, an offspring in the corresponding case of a sin offering is treated as the offspring of a sin offering and must be left to die.
  7. For if you suppose that a reservation is effective — Then the offspring counts as a separate animal, and when it is not reserved, it becomes sanctified in its own right. The teaching should therefore have said, ‘The offspring itself is a peace offering.’ This is Rashi’s explanation.
Rashi on Temurah 25b, in English Tab translation (22)
  1. One who frees half his slave — The slave acquires freedom for that half and becomes half free. Although the master has not freed him entirely, he can receive his bill of manumission: his ability to receive it and his freedom take effect together.
  2. But if you say that a reservation is effective — If the master frees the mother but reserves her offspring for his service, the offspring remains enslaved. This shows they are separate beings. Why, then, can the mother receive a bill of manumission for the offspring? It is like a slave receiving a bill for another slave from their shared master: the other slave is not freed, because handing the bill to his own slave is like keeping it in his possession.
  3. As it is taught, “It appears” — A slave can receive a bill of manumission from another slave’s master, provided that master is not his own. In relation to that man, the receiving slave has the legal capacity to act as an agent.
  4. Her offspring is like her — The offspring is free.
  5. His statement stands — The offspring remains a slave.
  6. What does the verse teach in support of the Rabbis? — The verse seems to support Rabbi Yosei HaGelili instead: the offspring’s status follows the mother’s.
  7. The reservation is not effective — The fetus is considered part of its mother, and therefore becomes free like her.
  8. And here this is the reason — Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s reason is that the verse explicitly says so. The rule for a maidservant follows from Scripture, not from treating the fetus as part of its mother.
  9. One who slaughters a sin offering — At this point, the Gemara assumes he consecrated it while it was pregnant.
  10. Is it not over this that they disagree—that the first tanna — He treats the fetus as a sin offering because he holds that reserving it separately would be effective. Since it counts as a separate animal, it can also become consecrated in the womb when it is not reserved.
  11. And the later tanna — He treats the fetus as non-sacred because he holds that reserving it separately is not effective: it is considered part of its mother. It becomes consecrated through its mother, like other offspring of sacrificial animals, and he holds that such offspring become consecrated only at birth.
  12. Rabbi Yoḥanan could say to you that everyone agrees — If the animal was already pregnant when consecrated, everyone agrees that reserving the fetus is effective; without a reservation, the fetus is fully consecrated as a sin offering. The dispute concerns an animal consecrated before it became pregnant: one tanna holds that offspring become consecrated at birth, and the other holds that they become consecrated in the womb.
  13. Here it was consecrated and only then became pregnant — Everyone agrees that offspring become consecrated at birth, not in the womb. The baraita that calls the fetus a sin offering concerns an animal that became pregnant before it was consecrated. Everyone agrees that reserving the fetus is effective, since it can be consecrated separately. Thus these tanna’im do not disagree on this point.
  14. Rava objected — He challenged the objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from the ruling that, if the mother was pregnant, she acquired freedom for her offspring—the objection we had treated as conclusive.
  15. Who says Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason is that a reservation is effective? — Only if that is his reason would the objection refute him.
  16. Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason is — Although the fetus is consecrated through its mother, it need not be put to death, because a person can obtain atonement through the increase of consecrated property. An offspring of a sin offering is put to death when its owner chooses to obtain atonement through the mother rather than through it.
  17. Rav Hamnuna said to him — You cannot say that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason is unrelated to an effective reservation. Rabbi Elazar had already challenged him from the ruling: if he says, “She is a peace offering and her offspring is a burnt offering,” the offspring is a peace offering.
  18. He was Rabbi Yoḥanan’s student and was sitting before him — Rabbi Elazar challenged him, yet Rabbi Yoḥanan did not answer, “I hold that the offspring is consecrated through its mother, not independently, and my reason is that a person can obtain atonement through the increase of consecrated property.”
  19. Rather, can he reconsider whenever he wants? — This is a rhetorical question.
  20. Within the time needed to speak — The time it takes a teacher to greet a student, or, according to another view, a student to greet a teacher.
  21. Mishnah: “This is a substitute for a burnt offering” — Rabbi Meir holds that the first expression takes effect.
  22. His statement stands — Half the animal is a substitute for a burnt offering and half for a peace offering. It grazes until it develops a blemish, is sold, and the proceeds of each half are used for the corresponding offering. This concerns a case where both a burnt offering and a peace offering stood before him when he declared the substitution.
Tosafot on Temurah 25b, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. The first tanna holds that if he reserves the fetus, the reservation is effective — Since he could leave the fetus non-sacred, it is a separate entity. So when he consecrates its mother as a sin offering, his declaration also consecrates the fetus as a sin offering, and it may not be eaten by everyone. The second tanna holds that a reservation is ineffective: the fetus is part of its mother. It receives its status through her, like other offspring of sacrificial animals, rather than directly through his declaration. But if he slaughters the mother and finds a live four-month-old fetus, the fetus is not consecrated, because such offspring become consecrated only when born. That is why this tanna says anyone may eat it. My teacher asked: The mishna says that if a man declares, ‘She is a peace offering and her offspring is a burnt offering,’ the offspring is nevertheless a peace offering. Rashi explains that when an animal is consecrated while pregnant, the rule that its offspring become consecrated at birth does not apply. If, as stated here, the fetus remains non-sacred until birth when a reservation is ineffective, why can he not consecrate it as a burnt offering? The answer is that the mother’s consecration assigns her status to the fetus, preventing a different consecration, although the fetus remains non-sacred until birth. If the mother is slaughtered before then, anyone may eat the fetus. The mishna also says that if the offspring is female, it is a peace offering, showing that one can assign an offspring a different status; but that case concerns an animal that became pregnant after it was consecrated. Some texts reverse the views: the first tanna says a reservation is ineffective, so the fetus is consecrated through its mother and may not be eaten by everyone; the second says it is effective, so the fetus remains non-sacred and anyone may eat it. This reading cannot stand. Even if the mother’s status does not apply to the fetus, the person’s declaration should consecrate it, as the mishna’s case of a peace offering whose offspring is declared a burnt offering shows. Moreover, the Talmud earlier cites these two baraitot in discussing whether consecration takes effect upon fetuses and must assign the baraita that restricts eating to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that a reservation is effective. Rashi’s reading is therefore correct.
  2. And you say Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason is that a person can gain atonement through an increase in consecrated property — Here Rabbi Yoḥanan appears to hold that one cannot. Yet in the final chapter of Keritot, when Rabbi Elazar asked him whether one can, Rabbi Yoḥanan replied, ‘How many years has he grown up among us and still does not know whether one can gain atonement through an increase in consecrated property?’ That implies that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds one can. We must distinguish between an increase in a thanksgiving offering and an increase in a sin offering. This case concerns a sin offering.
  3. It was necessary to teach the case where he spoke immediately afterward — This means within the time it takes a student to greet a teacher by saying, ‘Peace be upon you, Rabbi.’ The established rule that speech within a brief interval counts as part of the original statement refers to the shorter interval it takes a teacher to greet a student.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Temura 25.