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Temurah 26 for kids: Which Words Count?

תמורה כ״ו

🗣️ This daf asks what happens when someone gives one animal two sacred designations. It also asks how the words used for a substitute can change what happens.

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Stories from Temurah 26

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Temurah 26 in simple English

Rashi on Temurah 26a, in English Tab translation (9)
  1. Gemara: ‘Substitute for a burnt offering, substitute for a peace offering’ is the correct reading, without ‘and’ before ‘substitute for a peace offering.’
  2. And Rabbi Yosei holds that if I say ‘substitute for a burnt offering and a peace offering,’ etc. — Rabbi Yosei says the man thought that wording would consecrate the animal but leave it unfit to be offered. He mistakenly thought that saying ‘substitute’ separately for each offering would make it fully consecrated and fit to be offered. So, despite his wording, he intended both sanctities to take effect together, as if he had said, ‘One shall not take effect unless the other does.’ In the Jerusalem wording, Rabbi Meir holds that the man who said ‘substitute for a burnt offering, substitute for a peace offering’ was mistaken in thinking, ‘If I do not say…’; Rabbi Meir regards him as having changed his mind. The baraita states affirmatively that this is their disagreement. ‘Rabbi Yosei is the same as the Rabbis’: The Rabbis, too, say both sanctities take effect only when he intended that from the outset. Everyone agrees that if he changed his mind, his later words have no effect.
  3. An animal, half of it a burnt offering and half of it a sin offering, is offered as a burnt offering — Rabbi Meir follows the first statement. Once half the animal acquires the sanctity of a burnt offering, that sanctity spreads to the whole animal. Although Rabbi Meir does not say this when someone consecrates an animal’s leg as a burnt offering, he agrees when half the animal is consecrated, since everyone agrees about a part on which its life depends.
  4. It must die — Both designations take effect, including the sin offering; since he is not obligated to bring a sin offering, the animal must die.
  5. And they agree when one says, ‘Half of it is a sin offering’ — If he says this first and then says ‘half of it is a burnt offering,’ the animal must die.
  6. Who agrees? Rabbi Meir — Even Rabbi Meir, who says in the first case that it is offered, agrees that here it must die. This seems obvious: Rabbi Meir follows the first statement, so when the sin offering is named first, the animal must die because the person is not obligated to bring one.
  7. Mixed — Two sanctities are mixed in the animal. One might think it can be offered even though both take effect, because it also has a designation fit for offering. This teaches otherwise.
  8. Its substitute had to be taught — It has the same status and cannot be offered. After it becomes blemished, it is sold; with half the proceeds he brings a burnt offering, and with the other half a peace offering. One might have thought that although the original animal cannot be offered, its substitute could, and so forth.
  9. And it cannot be offered — When he first consecrated his half, the animal was unfit to be offered because its other half was not consecrated. Since that half did not belong to him, sanctity could not spread to the whole animal at that time: a person cannot consecrate what is not his.
Tosafot on Temurah 26a, in English Tab translation (4)
  1. Rabbi Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Yosei, said in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name: Everyone agrees — On Rabbi Yitzḥak’s account, Rabbi Meir’s reasoning is not simply that the first expression prevails. If someone says, “a substitute for a burnt offering and a peace offering,” even Rabbi Meir agrees that both sanctities take effect. He disagrees only when the person says, “a substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering”: the person could have used the first wording, so Rabbi Meir understands him to mean that one sanctity should take effect after the other. Rabbi Yosei understands him differently. The person avoided the first wording because he thought it would make the animal half one substitute and half the other, so that it could not be offered. By repeating “a substitute,” he thought it could be offered. His intent was therefore for both sanctities to take effect.
  2. One who says, ‘Half this animal is a substitute for a burnt offering and half is a substitute for a peace offering’: The whole animal is offered as a burnt offering, according to Rabbi Meir — Why, if Rabbi Meir’s reasoning is not a general rule that the first expression prevails? Here the person could not have used the alternative wording cited above. The same question arises in the mishna: when someone says, “It is a peace offering and its offspring a burnt offering,” Rabbi Meir rules that the offspring is a peace offering. The answer is that the argument about alternative wording is needed only when someone appears to contradict himself by calling one animal first one substitute and then another. Here, specifying separate halves is not a contradiction; nor is speaking about an animal and its offspring. In each case, the first sanctity takes effect immediately and extends to the whole animal or to its offspring. The discussion of two olive-bulks in tractate Zevaḥim still requires examination. A further difficulty is that Rabbi Meir agrees with Rabbi Yehuda that designating an animal’s leg as a burnt offering does not consecrate the whole animal. And although Rabbi Yehuda makes an exception for a part essential to life, he does not apply that exception to substitution. One answer is that Rabbi Meir agrees with Rabbi Yehuda about an ordinary limb but disagrees about substitution involving a part essential to life: like Rabbi Yosei, he treats it like an initial consecration, which extends to the whole animal. Alternatively, even Rabbi Yehuda may distinguish half an animal from a limb essential to life. A similar distinction is needed for Rabbi Yosei, who rejects substitution of a whole animal for limbs but accepts it for half an animal, as explained below.
  3. Rabbi Yosei says: It must die — Rashi explains that the speaker’s concluding words also count; since he is not obligated to bring a sin offering, the animal must die. But how could sin-offering sanctity take effect at all? Tractate Nedarim says that if someone who owes no sin offering declares an animal a sin offering, his words have no effect. Rabbeinu Yitzḥak therefore explains that here he said, “Half of it is a substitute for a sin offering,” as the Tosefta reads. Rabbi Yosei rules that both sanctities take effect; because the animal has the status of a substitute for a sin offering that must die, it must die.
  4. You might have thought: Although the original animal cannot be offered, its substitute can be — Why might a substitute be more fit for offering than the animal from which it derives? One might think the person intended the entire substitute to replace either the burnt-offering half or the peace-offering half, rather than intending it to be half each; it could then be offered. Although Rabbi Yosei says that one cannot substitute a whole animal for an animal’s limbs, he accepts substitution for half an animal. Thus half an animal must be distinguished from other parts, as explained above. The teaching rules out offering this substitute: it derives from a sanctity already disqualified from being offered.
Rashi on Temurah 26b, in English Tab translation (12)
  1. Value-based sanctity causes deferral — If someone consecrates an animal for its value when it cannot itself be offered, as here when he consecrates only half of it, it becomes permanently barred from the altar. One might have thought deferral applies only to an animal consecrated for the altar that later became unfit.
  2. Living animals can be deferred — Even if they later become fit to be offered, their earlier disqualification bars them permanently.
  3. Deferral from the outset — An animal unfit from the moment it is consecrated, like this one, is considered deferred. This is disputed: one opinion holds that an animal that was once fit and then became unfit cannot become fit again, but an animal unfit from the outset is not considered deferred.
  4. Half a burnt offering and half an animal tithe: everyone agrees it is offered as a burnt offering — Even if he intended both designations from the start, the second has no effect: an animal becomes a tithe only by being counted as the tenth. Likewise, if he said, “Half a burnt offering and half a substitute,” substitution would not take effect, since no consecrated animal stands beside it for him to substitute it for.
  5. But half an animal tithe and half a substitute — Both designations are on equal footing; which takes effect? Substitution applies to every type of offering.
  6. In place of this one, its substitute, or its exchange — These are terms of substitution.
  7. Desacralized — This means transferring its sanctity, but his statement has no effect: an unblemished consecrated animal cannot become non-sacred.
  8. To assess its value — The non-sacred animal onto which he transfers the sanctity must be worth as much as the consecrated one, so that the Temple does not lose value.
  9. Associating sanctity — Through substitution.
  10. Animals consecrated for Temple maintenance — He placed a non-sacred animal beside one of them and said, “This is its substitute” or “its exchange.”
  11. His statement has no effect — These are terms of substitution, and animals consecrated for Temple maintenance cannot produce substitutes, as stated in the first chapter.
  12. This one in place of that one, or desacralized onto this one: his statement takes effect — The consecrated animal becomes non-sacred, and the other takes its place, since animals consecrated for Temple maintenance can be redeemed even if unblemished. Evidently, “in place of” can mean transferring sanctity. The Jerusalem Talmud asks whether redemption takes effect for them—that is, whether they can produce substitutes.
Tosafot on Temurah 26b, in English Tab translation (2)
  1. Infer three laws from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement — Some texts read, “Infer that sanctity of monetary value can cause deferral.” Some explain this to mean that it disqualifies a substitute from being offered, but that cannot be right: in Keritot the same inference is drawn about a wealthy person who set aside birds for an offering and then became poor, and birds cannot become substitutes. Rather, it means that deferral applies even where an offering has only sanctity of monetary value. One might object that birds cannot be redeemed, so they do not have that sanctity either. The point there is broader: deferral applies even without inherent sanctity, including where there is no sanctity of monetary value. What, then, does Rabbi Yoḥanan add beyond the three laws already inferred in Pesaḥim from a female animal set aside for a Paschal offering? He establishes that he follows the view that living animals can be deferred, a matter disputed by the sages. And although deferral from the outset and sanctity of monetary value coincide in his case, they are distinct laws. Deferral from the outset can also affect something with inherent sanctity: for example, an apostate who ate forbidden fat, set aside an offering for it, and then repented, or sacrificial blood that fell into water and was nullified as it entered, even if the mixture eventually looked like blood. Why, then, does Rabbi Yoḥanan elsewhere speak of someone who set aside an offering *before* becoming an apostate, rather than teach the stronger case of deferral from the outset? He pairs it with a case of someone who set aside an offering before losing his sanity and later recovered; a person who is not of sound mind cannot effectively set aside an offering. One might also object that Yoma appears to say that living animals are deferred only if they were fit initially. But another approach there derives the rule that living animals are not deferred from the verse “they shall not be accepted, for their blemish is in them,” rather than from an animal not yet old enough to be offered. On that approach, initial deferral can indeed count as deferral; the distinction about initial fitness was made before that verse was introduced. Finally, why does Keritot challenge Rabbi Oshaya’s ruling about the birds from Rabbi Shimon’s ruling that a male born to a female set aside for a Paschal offering may itself be offered? Why not challenge Rabbi Yoḥanan too, cite the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon in support, or cite Rabbi Eliezer’s similar ruling in the mishna? The questioner understood Rabbi Shimon to hold that inherent sanctity never takes effect on an animal unfit for its designated offering. That understanding makes his ruling a pertinent challenge about the birds: birds cannot be redeemed, so they have no sanctity of monetary value through which inherent sanctity might take effect. By contrast, the Rabbis’ disagreement about a female Paschal or guilt offering may rest on their view that inherent sanctity takes effect together with sanctity of monetary value; that reasoning does not apply to the birds. It does apply to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s case, so Rabbi Shimon’s ruling would not challenge it in the same way. The questioner cited Rabbi Shimon rather than Rabbi Eliezer because Rabbi Shimon’s position could be understood from his ruling elsewhere about a female guilt offering. The Gemara answers instead that the dispute turns on whether living animals can be deferred: Rabbi Oshaya follows the Rabbis, while Rabbi Shimon holds that they cannot.
  2. Abaye said: Everyone agrees that if one says, ‘Half is a burnt offering and half is an animal tithe,’ it is offered as a burnt offering — Rashi explains that this holds even if the person intended both designations from the start: animal tithe takes effect only through counting, and the same reasoning applies to a proposed substitute when no consecrated animal is present. He says the question concerns only ‘half animal tithe and half substitute,’ whose designations are equally weak. But if merely calling an entire animal a tithe accomplishes nothing, how could the Gemara suggest that this animal might be offered as a tithe? Rabbi Yitzḥak explains that the person is passing his flock under the rod and declares that when the tenth animal emerges, half of it will be a burnt offering and half an animal tithe. Everyone agrees that it is offered as a burnt offering, because spoken consecration as a burnt offering is stronger than tithe consecration, which requires counting and passage under the rod. Unlike the case of a burnt offering and a peace offering, the two designations are not equally strong. Why not say that God’s prescribed tithe must prevail over the person’s declaration, as the Gemara said earlier about a firstborn animal? There, the person declared it a burnt offering when most of it had emerged and its firstborn sanctity had already taken effect. Here, he spoke when only a minority had emerged; tithe sanctity had not yet taken effect.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Temura 26.