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Temurah 6 for kids: Gifts for the Poor

תמורה ו׳

🌾 Abaye and Rava disagree about whether an act can take effect even when the Torah forbids it. The daf tests their ideas with gifts for the poor and interest, then studies rules about blemished animals.

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Stories from Temurah 6

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Temurah 6 in simple English

Rashi on Temurah 6a, in English Tab translation (18)
  1. You may make it a freewill offering — As explained later, this refers to animals consecrated for Temple maintenance. The verse implies that you may consecrate this blemished animal for Temple maintenance, but not an unblemished one.
  2. A prohibition — As derived later from “The Lord spoke to Moses, saying”: the word “saying” is read as “do not say,” indicating a prohibition.
  3. From where blemished animals were included for the altar — Their consecration takes effect after the fact.
  4. They were also included — The same verse says, “It shall not be accepted for a vow,” referring to animals consecrated for the altar. “Not accepted” means they do not gain favor, but their consecration does take effect. The verse also provides the prohibition against consecrating unblemished animals for Temple maintenance, so the two cases are compared: in both, what was done takes effect.
  5. According to its value at the time of the robbery — He pays for the wool or wood as it was then, but he acquires the garments or vessels by changing the stolen material. Evidently, the act takes effect.
  6. What he robbed, as he robbed it — He must return the stolen item if it remains as it was when he took it.
  7. And Abaye — He does not need this verse to show that the act takes effect; he already knows that. Rather, “what he robbed” concerns someone who swore falsely about a robbery. The verse teaches that if he admits to his own robbery after swearing falsely, he adds a fifth to his payment.
  8. But he does not add a fifth for his father’s robbery — Even if he swore falsely about it.
  9. He returns the mattress at night, and so on — This ruling in Bava Metzia concerns collateral taken against the debtor’s will. Evidently, the seizure takes effect: the creditor may hold a plow at night and nighttime bedding during the day.
  10. It is different there, for the verse says, “You shall surely return it to him” — The repeated wording teaches that the creditor returns the collateral many times: a daytime tool by day and a nighttime item by night. This shows that he acquires a right to hold them at other times. Abaye does not draw that inference from the repetition; for him, the verse is needed to require their return, which the creditor might otherwise think was optional.
  11. An alternative reading: Rava could tell you, “It is different there, for the verse says, ‘You shall return it to him before sunset’” — This teaches that the creditor returns a daytime item to the debtor during the day and takes it back at sunset. Another verse requires him to return a nighttime item at sunset. These verses show that the seizure takes effect. Abaye says they instead teach the duties to return each kind of item. Both are needed: a plow is needed for livelihood, while nighttime bedding relieves discomfort, so neither duty necessarily follows from the other.
  12. Once he smooths the pile — The grain becomes subject to tithes and the priestly contribution.
  13. He tithes it — First, and then gives a portion as pe’a.
  14. A refutation of Abaye — He says the forbidden act takes effect, but here it does not.
  15. You shall leave them — “You shall leave them for the poor and the stranger” is written twice, once in Leviticus 19 and once in Leviticus 23. The extra wording teaches that even if the produce changes while in the owner’s hands, he does not acquire the portion owed to the poor.
  16. He is obligated to leave fallen grapes and small grape clusters, and so on — Although ownerless produce is normally exempt from these obligations, the extra wording “you shall leave” includes produce made ownerless in this way. That extra wording appears with each of these obligations.
  17. But it is exempt from tithes — No extra “you shall leave” is written concerning tithes. The extra wording includes this case of ownerless produce in the other obligations, not produce that has been changed, since in general a prohibited act does not take effect.
  18. Now that we have given all these answers — Some prohibited acts take effect and others do not, and Abaye and Rava agree about each case. What, then, is their disagreement?
Tosafot on Temurah 6a, in English Tab translation (7)
  1. Pays according to its value at the time of the robbery — The change acquires the stolen item for the robber. So the prohibited act has an effect, refuting Rava.
  2. He returns the mattress at night and the plow by day, refuting Rava — If the unlawful seizure had no effect, the creditor would have no claim to the items and would have to return them permanently. One might ask: Perhaps the mishna concerns a court officer who seized the collateral lawfully, not a creditor who seized it unlawfully. But the mishna follows a ruling that a creditor may take collateral only through the court and may not enter the debtor’s home to take it. It then says that if he has two items, he keeps one and leaves one, returning the mattress at night and the plow by day. Thus it is speaking of an unlawful seizure.
  3. It is different there, for Scripture says, ‘You shall surely return’ — Elsewhere this repeated phrase is said to include collateral seized unlawfully. That sounds as though, without it, the creditor would not have to return such collateral at all; here, according to Rava, he would have to return it permanently because the seizure had no effect. For Rava, the other passage means that the phrase lets the creditor take the unlawfully seized item back after returning it for the debtor’s use: his seizure does have an effect. For Abaye, it means that even a creditor who seized collateral unlawfully must return it when needed; without the phrase, his effective seizure would leave him free to keep it. A difficulty remains: Abaye told a man who had seized a food-preparation knife as collateral to return it, though Abaye holds that a prohibited act takes effect. We can say the man had not intended to violate the prohibition. This also explains why the mishna says one who seizes millstones as collateral receives lashes: that case concerns an intentional violation, while Abaye’s instruction to return the knife concerned an unintentional one. Some answer that the millstones had been lost and could no longer be returned, but that is unconvincing: Makkot indicates that when a person can make restitution, destroying the item does not change the law in that way.
  4. He even separates it from the dough — A change in the item’s designation does not acquire it for the owner.
  5. Abaye said: It is different there, for Scripture says, ‘You shall leave’; and Rava could say — Here Abaye needs the extra phrase ‘You shall leave,’ while Rava does not. Yet in Bava Kamma their positions seem reversed: Abaye cites Rabbi Yishmael’s ruling as proof that a change does not acquire an item, and Rava answers that the extra phrase makes this case exceptional. The distinction is that here they are explaining the first tanna. For Abaye, without the extra phrase, an owner who wrongly harvested the corner would no longer have to set aside produce for the poor. The phrase requires him to do so, but, according to the first tanna, if he then changes the grain into dough, he acquires it and need not set anything aside. Rabbi Yishmael, who requires separation even from dough, holds according to Abaye that a change generally does not acquire an item; otherwise the extra phrase could be understood as applying only before the grain changes. For Rava, the first tanna requires separation after harvest even without the extra phrase, because the prohibited harvest has no effect. Once the grain changes into dough, however, the owner acquires it. Rabbi Yishmael can hold that a change generally acquires an item, but not here, because of the extra phrase.
  6. One who declares his vineyard ownerless, then rises early and harvests it, is obligated in fallen grapes, small clusters, forgotten produce, and the corner of the field — Rashi explains that although ownerless produce is ordinarily exempt, this case is obligated because of the additional phrase ‘You shall leave,’ which appears in the laws of these gifts. Rabbi Yitzhak explains that the obligation depends on reacquiring the land itself; one who acquires only its produce is exempt from all these gifts.
  7. Now that all these answers have been given, about what do Abaye and Rava disagree? — One might suggest a person who swore not to divorce his wife but then divorced her: according to Abaye the divorce takes effect, and according to Rava it does not. But Rava’s rule does not apply when the person himself created the prohibition through an oath, rather than violating a direct prohibition such as ‘he may not send her away.’ Rabbeinu Baruch asks why the Gemara does not instead give the example of redeeming a firstborn animal, an animal tithe, or devoted property. All agree that such redemption has no effect; according to Abaye, the person would therefore receive no lashes, while according to Rava he would receive lashes for violating God’s command. This requires further study.
Rashi on Temurah 6b, in English Tab translation (21)
  1. A hint of interest — Interest arising through a sale, such as when a seller says, “If you pay now, the field is yours for one thousand dinars; if you pay at harvest, it is twelve hundred.” Abaye and Rava dispute fixed interest: Abaye, who holds that a prohibited act takes effect, follows Rabbi Yochanan; Rava follows Rabbi Elazar. Here, no verse settles the matter either way.
  2. Do they disagree over reasoning there? — This is a question expressing surprise. Their dispute there is about how to interpret the verses.
  3. Given over to life — That is, the lender is liable to lose his life, but not to return the interest. Even Rava agrees that the payment takes effect, because the verse says so.
  4. Whether a change effects acquisition — Abaye holds that making a change in violation of God’s command effects acquisition unless a verse says otherwise; Rava holds that it does not, unless a verse says otherwise. No practical difference between them has been established for us, only different explanations of the objections above: one attributes the rulings to whether the prohibited act takes effect, and the other to the verses. One could, however, suggest a case: someone steals wood and makes utensils, or wool and makes clothes. According to Abaye, he acquires the finished goods and pays only for the wood or wool; according to Rava, he does not acquire them and must pay for the utensils or clothes. When the Gemara earlier challenges Rava from the teaching about stolen wood made into utensils, his answer need not be that the verse says “which he stole.” Rather, he can follow the opinion that a change does not effect acquisition. This is disputed in Bava Kamma: one opinion derives acquisition through a change from “which he stole,” meaning as it was when he stole it; the other derives from “he shall return the stolen thing” that he must return it regardless. On the latter view, “which he stole” teaches that one does not add a fifth when repaying what his father stole.
  5. The Sages taught—another version: “In the answers we gave” — This is the correct reading. There is no substantive difference between this version and the one I heard, “whether a change effects acquisition”; one is a Jerusalem formulation and the other a Babylonian one.
  6. If it means, “Do not slaughter,” that has already been stated below — The prohibition against slaughtering a blemished animal for the altar is explained later. So are the prohibitions against burning it and sprinkling its blood.
  7. If so, what does “You shall not offer” teach? — You shall not consecrate it.
  8. Five categories — The prohibitions are derived below.
  9. One who consecrates blemished animals — And burns them whole as burnt offerings.
  10. These are offerings by fire — This refers to burning the sacrificial portions.
  11. To include the scapegoat — One who consecrates a blemished animal as the scapegoat is liable for violating “You shall not consecrate.”
  12. An offering — The passage on slaughtering sacrifices outside the Temple says, “and has not brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting ... to offer an offering to the Lord.”
  13. The correct reading is: “If it says ‘an offering,’ I might think ...” — This refers back to the earlier teaching in the Sifra: One might think that slaughtering an unconsecrated animal inside the Temple incurs liability, but “an offering” teaches that liability applies to an offering, not to an unconsecrated animal. The question now is: If “an offering” is decisive, might slaughtering an animal consecrated for Temple maintenance outside the Temple incur excision? Such property is also called an offering, as in “We brought the Lord’s offering,” followed by a list of gold articles given for the Tabernacle.
  14. Not fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting — For example, animals consecrated for Temple maintenance are not fit to be brought there, since they are blemished: as stated above, consecrating an unblemished animal for Temple maintenance violates a prohibition.
  15. I might exclude these but not the red heifer — One might think that slaughtering the red heifer outside, contrary to its prescribed procedure, incurs excision, and likewise slaughtering the scapegoat outside. Both must be unblemished: the verse says of the heifer, “which has no blemish,” and the scapegoat’s requirement was derived above.
  16. These are excluded — This shows that the verse excludes the scapegoat.
  17. There — “At the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” already includes all unblemished consecrated animals in the liability for slaughtering outside. Why, then, add “to the Lord”? It must be to exclude something.
  18. But here, if “an offering by fire” excludes it — Concerning blemished animals, the verse says, “You shall not place any of them as an offering by fire.” This implies that consecrating a blemished animal violates the prohibition only if it is destined for the altar fire. The scapegoat is already excluded by “an offering by fire”; why would “to the Lord” exclude it again? It must instead include it.
  19. It is permitted — To consecrate it.
  20. Does the lot not assign one ‘to the Lord’ only when it is fit for the Lord? — When the two goats are brought for the lottery, it is not yet known which will receive the lot marked “to the Lord.” Both must therefore be unblemished. What need is there for a verse to teach this?
  21. For example, it became blemished — After the lottery, the scapegoat became blemished and was replaced by another goat that was also blemished. The teaching is that the person who designated that replacement is liable for consecrating a blemished animal. The case specifies a replacement because otherwise there would be no liability under “You shall not consecrate” for the second goat.
Tosafot on Temurah 6b, in English Tab translation (2)
  1. And why not include the red heifer and the scapegoat? — Rashi says in Yoma not to include the red heifer. The Mishnah in Zevachim exempts one who burns a red heifer outside its designated place or offers the scapegoat outside, because the verse applies only to an animal fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. The Gemara challenges the exemption for the scapegoat by citing the baraita here. If that baraita included the red heifer, the Gemara could have raised the same challenge about it, but its answer would not apply to the red heifer. There is a difficulty, however: Zevachim initially answers that before the lottery the scapegoat is fit for the entrance, yet says the verse exempts one who offers it outside; Yoma explicitly says that one who slaughters it outside before the lottery is liable. The final answer in Zevachim resolves this: its distinction is between before and after confession. Both cases could be after the lottery, while slaughtering the scapegoat outside before the lottery could be liable, as Yoma says.
  2. And why do we need a verse? For a case where it became blemished after the lottery and he redeemed it onto another animal — The other animal is also blemished. The verse teaches that the person who redeemed it receives lashes for consecrating a blemished animal. That is why the case specifies redemption onto another animal: without redemption onto a blemished animal, there would be no lashes for violating the prohibition against consecrating the second animal.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Temura 6.