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Temurah 7 for kids: A Blemished Offering

תמורה ז׳

🩹 This daf asks what happens when someone sets aside a blemished animal for an offering. It also asks who may substitute another animal for an offering.

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Stories from Temurah 7

Words to know

Rashi and Tosafot on Temurah 7 in simple English

Rashi on Temurah 7a, in English Tab translation (17)
  1. You might have thought that initially — both goats must be unblemished because we do not yet know which one will be designated for the Lord.
  2. Another version: But doesn’t the lottery determine the designation? — Rav Yosef says this follows Hanan the Egyptian, who does not require a lottery. He teaches that even if the blood of the goat sacrificed inside is already in a cup when the goat sent away dies, one brings another goat from the market, stands it beside the blood to show that it is its counterpart, and then sends it away. Thus no lottery is required, and the earlier objection does not arise. The verse is therefore needed.
  3. One might challenge: You have heard that Hanan does not hold that an offering is disqualified — that is, he does not require two new goats to be brought and a lottery held, with the first goat’s blood discarded. But have you heard that he requires no lottery at all? Perhaps he brings two goats, holds a lottery, sends away the one designated for Azazel, uses the blood already in the cup as prescribed, and lets the goat designated for the Lord graze until it develops a blemish. Rather, the view that needs a verse to prohibit a blemished goat is Rabbi Shimon’s, since he does not require a lottery. That is the conclusion, with no further objection. The reading that begins this challenge with Rabbi Shimon’s name is mistaken; in Yoma 63b, this entire discussion appears without such a challenge.
  4. Rava said: For example, it developed a blemish — as I explained above: it is the leg of the first goat. The proposed answer, ‘For example, he had a sick person in his house,’ should not be read here; it is a mistaken insertion. This discussion is not about an animal too young to be offered. That question appears in the parallel discussion in Yoma 63b. Nor can this verse be applied to an animal too young to be offered when the goat sent away is concerned, since that rule is derived there from ‘to the Lord’ in another verse.
  5. The descendants of Noah were commanded not to offer animals missing limbs — as stated in the first chapter of Avoda Zara, but they were not forbidden other blemishes on their own altars. Without ‘You shall not offer any of these from the hand of a foreigner,’ I might have thought that we could accept their blemished offerings, provided the animals were not missing limbs. The verse teaches otherwise.
  6. On their altar — a private altar that a gentile made for Heaven. The phrase ‘of any of these’ teaches that we do not accept a blemished animal from them for offering on our designated altar, even though they may offer it on their own.
  7. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish objects — returning to the earlier statement that one violates five prohibitions. Perhaps liability for consecrating an animal that has a blemish applies only when it was sound at first and later became blemished: the person might still intend to consecrate and offer it. But an animal blemished from birth is like a palm tree, wholly unfit as an offering. Perhaps the person consecrated it only for its monetary value and is not flogged.
  8. Sarua — one of its limbs is broken.
  9. Kalut — its hooves are fused.
  10. Written in the passage — these blemishes are listed there, and ‘you shall not offer’ applies to them. We interpret that phrase to include ‘you shall not consecrate.’
  11. Perhaps liability for consecration was taught only about substitution — for a substitute takes effect even on an animal with a permanent blemish and gives it full sanctity. It cannot become ordinary property for shearing or work, even through redemption. Thus one is flogged for substituting a blemished animal for an unblemished consecrated animal. But perhaps one who initially consecrates a blemished animal is not flogged, since it is fit only for its monetary value, unless he offers it.
  12. They counted and concluded — this implies that they examined the matter carefully and found no further prohibition. But if they were speaking of substitution:
  13. There would be six — because the prohibition ‘he shall not exchange it’ would also apply.
  14. Then what? An animal blemished from the outset — why would one be flogged for consecrating it? It acquires no sanctity as an altar offering; it is fit only for its monetary value.
  15. Nothing of its kind — is fit for the altar.
  16. A blemished animal has others of its kind — that are fit for the altar. Choosing an unfit animal when a fit one exists is therefore disrespectful.
  17. Even if he consecrated it for the value of libations — where there is less disrespect, since animals are not themselves used as libations and he consecrated this one only for its value, he is nevertheless flogged.
Tosafot on Temurah 7a, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. Neither from the hand of a foreigner shall you offer any of these — Why is the verse “Any man” needed to teach that descendants of Noah may vow and bring voluntary offerings like Israelites? This verse already implies that, although we may not offer blemished animals from them, we may offer unblemished ones. The reverse question cannot be asked: “From the hand of a foreigner” is needed to teach that permission to offer a blemished animal on their altar does not extend to ours. Rabbeinu Shimshon ben Avraham answers that “Any man” is needed for the dispute between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva: the former reads “for a burnt offering” as excluding Nazirite offerings, while Rabbi Akiva limits it to burnt offerings rather than other sacrifices.
  2. Rather, it was sound and then became blemished — Rashi explains that someone who consecrated it while sound might still have intended to offer it after it became blemished, and so could be flogged; but an animal blemished from birth was never fit to offer, so he may not have thought of offering it. Rabbi Meir asks: How can we say he did not intend to offer it when he was warned not to offer a blemished animal and accepted the warning? He therefore explains that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish is speaking not about the prohibition on consecrating it, but about those on burning its parts and sprinkling its blood. These apply when it was consecrated while sound and then became blemished, because its consecration for the altar took effect while it was fit to be offered. If it was blemished from the outset, before consecration, it was never fit to be offered, and he is not flogged for those acts.
  3. Even if he consecrated it for the value of libations, he is flogged — The same applies if he consecrated it for the value of a burnt offering. Thus, when the later teaching says that a female animal consecrated for a burnt offering is sold and its proceeds go toward a burnt offering, we must say that the person is flogged. So too with the teaching that saying of an impure or blemished animal, “This is a burnt offering,” has no effect, but saying, “This is for a burnt offering,” means it is sold and a burnt offering is bought with the proceeds: in the latter case, he is flogged.
Rashi on Temurah 7b, in English Tab translation (38)
  1. You may offer it as a gift — A blemished animal may be consecrated for the value of Temple maintenance offerings, but not for the altar: Scripture says, “You shall not put any of them on the altar.”
  2. I have derived only — Permission to designate a blemished animal for Temple maintenance.
  3. But only — As a gift, by saying, “This animal is for Temple maintenance.”
  4. From where is a vow derived? — If one says, “I undertake to give an animal for the value of Temple maintenance,” one may set aside a blemished animal. The verse says, “And for a vow,” meaning that the same applies to a vow.
  5. It shall not be accepted—this refers to altar offerings — Acceptance is relevant to them.
  6. I have derived only a vow — Because “vow” stands next to “it shall not be accepted,” implying that someone who vows, “I undertake to bring a burnt offering,” may not bring a blemished animal.
  7. From where is a gift derived? — That one may not say of a blemished animal, “This is for the altar.”
  8. The verse says, “Gift” — Read the verse as saying: A gift that you offer, or a vow, shall not be accepted.
  9. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said, “It shall not be accepted” speaks of acceptance of the animal itself — It may not be sacrificed. This, too, refers to altar offerings, as the first tanna said.
  10. The Gemara asks: Then what does “it” teach? — The rest of the verse has already been used to derive the rules for gifts and vows.
  11. But “it” — Why does the verse say, “You may offer it as a gift”?
  12. It — You may consecrate a blemished animal for Temple maintenance, but not an unblemished one.
  13. Transgresses a positive commandment — The instruction that one may not consecrate unblemished animals is a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment, and thus counts as a positive commandment.
  14. No was stated concerning these matters — That is, the matters in this passage.
  15. Say “no” — God told Moses to say “no” to Israel: anyone who violates the instructions in this passage also transgresses a prohibition.
  16. The limbs — The portions of the animal, as prescribed for a burnt offering.
  17. For a general prohibition — Burning the whole animal and burning part of it both derive from one prohibition: “You shall not offer any of them as a fire offering.” The other acts each have their own prohibition: consecration derives from “Any animal with a blemish you shall not offer”; slaughter from “You shall not offer these to the Lord,” said of blind or broken animals; and sprinkling the blood from “You shall not offer,” said of crushed or mangled animals. When Abaye says one is not flogged, he means not twice; according to the view that lashes are given for a general prohibition, one set of lashes still applies.
  18. For five categories of prohibition — The baraita counts burning the whole animal and burning part of it as two.
  19. It teaches cases involving different people — It is not saying that someone who does both receives two sets of lashes. Rather, one who burns the whole animal violates the prohibition against burning it whole, while someone else who burns part violates the prohibition against burning part. One person who burns the whole animal is liable only for burning it whole.
  20. Remove one of them — Remove either burning the whole animal or burning part of it, and add collecting the blood, whose prohibition derives from “You shall not offer,” in the passage about an animal received from a foreigner.
  21. But the first tanna does not include collecting the blood — So how can he count five prohibitions?
  22. The first clause follows the Rabbis — They do not hold one liable for collecting the blood, yet they still count five prohibitions. This is a difficulty for Abaye.
  23. The priests can effect substitution with their own offerings — If a priest declares a substitute for an offering he set aside for himself, the substitute acquires that status.
  24. Not with a sin offering or a guilt offering — If an Israelite gave it to a priest to sacrifice on his behalf, the priest cannot make a substitute for it. He gains a share in its meat only after the portions for the altar have been burned, and a baraita in this chapter says that a person cannot designate a substitute for something that is not his.
  25. Nor with a firstborn animal — If an Israelite gave it to a priest, the reason the priest cannot make a substitute for it is explained in the mishna itself.
  26. Why not? — Why can priests not substitute another animal for a firstborn? It belongs entirely to them: the Israelite gives it to a priest while it is alive and receives no atonement through it.
  27. Just as priests cannot substitute for a sin offering or guilt offering — For it is clear that they acquire a share in these offerings only after the portions for the altar have been burned.
  28. What does it matter that he cannot substitute for a sin offering or guilt offering? — That is, it makes sense that priests cannot substitute for those offerings, and so on.
  29. It and its substitute — The verse compares the substitute to the consecrated animal itself: just as consecration takes effect while the animal is in its owner’s possession, so substitution can take effect only there, not when it is in a priest’s possession. Thus a priest cannot substitute for a firstborn. But if an Israelite does so, the substitute becomes consecrated, since the firstborn became consecrated while in his possession.
  30. They may sell it unblemished and alive — This appears to apply both when the Temple stands and today. When the Temple stands, a priest may sell it alive to another priest, who will offer it. He may not sell it after slaughter, since trading in an animal from which a portion is offered on the altar dishonors sacred offerings. Today, a priest may sell it unblemished and alive to a priest or an Israelite; the buyer waits until it develops a blemish and then eats it. Today, once a firstborn develops a blemish, the only prohibition involved in taking it without permission is theft from the priest. If the priest sells or gives it to someone, that person may eat it. As stated in Bekhorot 32b concerning a blemished firstborn, Beit Hillel permit it, and even a gentile may eat from it. But an unblemished firstborn slaughtered today is not a possible case.
  31. And uses it to betroth a woman — A priest may do so because it is his property.
  32. They taught this only — That a priest may sell it while it is alive.
  33. Only today — Because it is not destined to be offered.
  34. And the priest has a claim to it — Even while it is alive, since firstborn animals belong to priests today as well.
  35. They may not sell it unblemished and alive — For the priest acquires a share in it only after the portions for the altar have been burned.
  36. Can there be an unblemished one that has been slaughtered? — Slaughtering it would be slaughtering a sacred animal outside the Temple.
  37. Does it say, ‘But not if slaughtered’? — Only such a statement would suggest that the baraita is not discussing the present day, when there can be no unblemished firstborn that has been lawfully slaughtered.
  38. The baraita teaches this very point — It needs to tell us that a priest may sell an unblemished firstborn while it is alive; we might have thought he acquires no claim to it until it develops a blemish. Its purpose is not to imply that he may not sell it after slaughter, for the baraita concerns the present day, when an unblemished firstborn cannot be lawfully slaughtered.
Tosafot on Temurah 7b, in English Tab translation (3)
  1. Abaye said: One is not flogged for a general prohibition — Rashi explains that Abaye means one is not flogged twice, but is flogged once, following the view at the end of the chapter “At All Times” in Pesachim that a general prohibition carries one set of lashes. The discussion here supports this.
  2. They do not acquire them during the owners’ lifetimes — If they did acquire them, how could an owner make a substitute offering, according to the view in the Gemara that we follow the person who gains atonement? The answer is that this view includes the person who gains atonement; it does not exclude the owner.
  3. This was taught only for the present era — But Bava Kamma discusses an ordinary ox and an ox from disqualified consecrated animals that gored. Abaye rules that half the damages are paid, even though the oxen are habitual gorers, because the consecrated ox is exempt: it is not considered the property of “his fellow.” Yet Bava Kamma also says that an ordinary ox that gores such a consecrated ox is liable, suggesting that the latter is considered the property of “his fellow.” The first case must concern a firstborn animal, which cannot be redeemed, and the baraita must concern other offerings, which can be redeemed when blemished. But the Bava Kamma discussion concerns the present era—the sages discussing it lived after the Temple’s destruction—and still says the animal is not its owner’s property. That conflicts with the ruling here that it is his property in the present era. We must therefore say that the ruling here follows Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, while the ruling there follows the Rabbis. Although the first chapter of Bava Kamma assigns one case to Rabbi Yosei and the other to the Rabbis, on this explanation the discussion in its chapter “The Cow That Gored” cannot stand as stated.

Sources

Kid summary and story cards written by Tab from the William Davidson Edition English (Sefaria, CC BY-NC 4.0).

Tab translation (machine-assisted) of Rashi and Tosafot, from the Vilna Edition Hebrew (public domain) on Sefaria. May contain mistakes.

In the app, the Gemara text comes from Sefaria (William Davidson Edition, CC BY-NC 4.0; Hebrew/Aramaic Vilna Edition). Rashi and Tosafot Hebrew: Vilna Edition (public domain) via Sefaria.

Also spelled: Temura 7.